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Socialist Medicine and Maoist Humanitarianism:  




As China was recovering from disease, starvation, and death that resulted from the authoritarian 
policies of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese officials looked outwards to “heal” Africa. From 
1963, a steady trickle of Chinese doctors and nurses arrived in Algeria, providing health care for 
rural and suburban communities, before expanding their care throughout the continent of Africa. 
This dissertation explores the experiences of the medical mission workers in Algeria during the 
first two decades of China’s medical aid program. It documents the rise of a globalizing China in 
the post-colonial world through the highly significant, yet heretofore overlooked, medical and 
humanitarian networks between Chinese provincial health institutions and Algerian medical 
facilities. It shows that the exchange of medical technology, drugs, and practices between China 
and Algeria crossed not only physical borders, but also boundaries between different systems of 
medicine and visions of development.  
Amidst the geopolitics of the Cold War, Chinese medical aid formed an alternative model 
of postcolonial international health care intervention in Third World countries. Central to this 
model was what I call “Chinese socialist medicine,” a body of hybrid medical knowledge and 
socialized health care delivery. Chinese socialist medicine not only challenged medical elitism 
by devising new, egalitarian approaches and ethical models, but also heavily relied on 
improvised medical technology and “scientized” acupuncture, which crossed epistemological 
 
 
boundaries between Western and Chinese medicines. Using a combination of Chinese, Arabic, 
and French textual and video sources, oral interviews, and clinical observations, this study 
analyzes the mobilization of human resources to Algeria, the application of mixed technologies 
of biomedicine and Chinese medicine, efforts to build medical supply infrastructure to manage 
local health problems, and China’s ambitions to transplant Chinese socialist healthcare ethics and 
ideals to Algerian communities. During this process, China’s socialist medicine emerged as a 
hybrid and flexible product of Maoist ideals for social welfare and internationalism. It constantly 
redrew its boundaries in Algeria by competing with medical missions from other socialist 
countries and recruiting local health actors to its enterprise.  
The dissertation argues that China’s medical aid in the form of socialist medicine was a 
channel for the projection of China’s soft power in global health governance. It demonstrates that 
medicine and internationalism were integral to China’s political history in the Mao period. Mao’s 
China was hardly “xenophobic” or inwardly focused, but rather tangibly connected with the rest 
of the world by flows of people, ideas, materials, and technologies. Socialist China during this 
era was in fact committed to building its global presence through networks of soft power, 
including humanitarian aid and medicine. Resting at the intersection of Cold War politics, the 
history of medicine, and global humanitarianism, the dissertation shows that China’s medical 
missions served as an ideological and methodological alternative in postcolonial health 
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Feng Bin and his team accepted me as a member of their acupuncture clinic. Ordinary Algerians 
who frequented their clinics—and of whom I do not know their names—were more than friendly 
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Xu Xianze gÉ awoke with a start. The relentless click-clack of the train wheels had almost 
softened into melody, but still he could not sleep. It had been seven days since he boarded the 
Trans-Siberian in Beijing. In the restless nights amidst the rattle and shake of the train, the 29-
year-old thought of his wife, seven months pregnant with their first child, and the mission to 
which he was assigned out of the blue. Xu was a laboratory technician at the hospital affiliated 
with the Hubei College of Traditional Chinese Medicine.1 A month earlier, after a night shift, he 
had been called to the personnel office. There, he was told to pack for a business trip to Algeria 
for at least six months. He was startled and totally unprepared. The personnel cadre explained 
that Xu had been selected to join a medical team and he should feel honored because three 
candidates were proposed for the position, and he had been the only one to pass. At the end of 
their conversation, Xu was warned to keep his mission secret. Three days later, unbeknownst to 
his laboratory director, Xu and several other doctors left Wuhan for Beijing, where they were 
joined by cohorts from the capital as well as Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Shenyang, Changchun, 
and Hunan. Xu felt anxious. The doctors’ meeting with officials from the Ministry of Health 
provided little useful information about their work environment in Algeria. They were simply 
asked to be prepared to “go wherever there is hardship.” Tossing and turning on his train berth, 
Xu mentally fortified himself for the challenges ahead: “Dr. Bethune did it; so shall we.” 
 
1 Hubeisheng zhongyi xueyuan fushu yiyuan (1¢2RâàY2â, 1961-1964), which was renamed to 





The “green-skinned” steam train pulled into the Yaroslavsky Station in central Moscow. 
Xu had already changed into his new Mao suit. During his short stay in Beijing, he received a 
generous clothing allowance of over 500 yuan (203 US dollars) from the Ministry of Health, an 
amount roughly equal to a doctor’s annual income. He bought a Western-style suit, a Mao suit, a 
coat, a pair of pajamas, two pairs of leather shoes, a satchel, and some suitcases. His new dress 
and appearance took on an important layer of meaning: an image of the new China. Warmly 
greeted by staff from the Chinese embassy, Xu and his colleagues were brought to a dinner 
where they were told to “eat as much as [they] can, [as there is] no food rationing here.” The 
specter of the three-year Great Famine (1959-1961) still hovered overhead, and hardly could a 
Chinese commoner eat his full. Xu’s own legs were swollen, a common symptom for those 
suffering from chronic hunger. After the layover in Moscow, the ten-member group flew via 
Belgrade and Rabat to Algiers, and finally rode overland to Saïda, a town in northwestern 
Algeria on the northern edge of the Sahara Desert. It was 16 April 1963.2  
As China was recovering from the disease, starvation, and death that resulted from the 
authoritarian policies of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese officials looked outwards to “heal” 
Africa.3 Xu’s team arrived in Algeria at a time when the newly independent country was in dire 
 
2 The above narrative is constructed based on an interview with Xu Xianze, the memoir of a ministry of health 
official named Qian Junqi, and other Chinese news reports. See Yang Zhenglian ¹ and Guo Linghe ×
%í, “Shouzhi yuanwai yiliaodui de beifei suiyue” ìrqJ2 Þ¡1çZ{ [The years of the first 
foreign medical aid team in North Africa], Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan EvÝB' [China Newsweek], 
April 16, 2012, 84-86; Qian Junqi Û@, “Zhongguo shouci yuanwai yiliao shimo” EìqJ2 O
} [The Whole Story of China’s First Foreign Medical Aid], Jiankang bao do [Health Newspaper], 
March 22, 2013, 6; “Wo yiliaodui shiming duiyuan fu aerjiliya” k2 Þ3?jAÊßW:( [Ten 
medical team members go to Algeria], People’s Daily, April 7, 1963. 
3 Chinese policymakers saw Algeria as being part of “Africa” despite the country’s highly complex cultural 
makeup—classical, Arab-Islamic, Berber, Ottoman, and French colonial, all of which overlap to an extent with 
histories of “Africa,” but none of which is synonymous with it. China had naturalized the physical worldview 




need of medical professionals after the exodus of French and other European medical staff. 
When they set foot on Algerian soil, they did not know that they were ushering in a new era of a 
globalizing China that attempted ambitiously to promote its vision of a new world through 
medical intervention. Thereafter, a steady trickle of Chinese doctors and nurses followed suit, 
providing health care for rural and suburban communities in Algeria and soon expanding their 
care throughout the continent of Africa. Throughout the following half century, more than 
23,000 medical personnel traveled back and forth between China and Africa, with over 3,000 of 
them deployed to Algeria.4   
This dissertation explores the experiences of these medical mission workers in Algeria 
during the first two decades of China’s medical aid program. It documents the rise of a 
globalizing China in the post-colonial world through the highly significant, yet heretofore 
overlooked, medical and humanitarian networks between Chinese provincial health institutions 
and Algerian medical facilities. It shows that the travel of medical technology, drugs, and 
practices between China and Algeria crossed not only physical borders, but also boundaries 
between different systems of medicine and different visions of development. Amidst the 
geopolitical struggles of the Cold War, this medical aid was a channel for the production and 
global transmission of China’s soft power in the form of socialist medicine, wherein the ethical 
 
Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997). 
4 For the total figure of deployment from 1963 to 2013, see “Xi Jinping huijian yuanwai yiliao gongzuo 
xianjin jiti he xianjin geren daibiao” 
Ñ_ÀqJ2 [ÒæDÒ¿ [Xi Jinping met 
with the model units and individuals of the Chinese medical teams], The Central People’s Government of 
PRC, accessed August 5, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-08/16/content_2468079.htm. Hubei Province 
sent 3,445 deployment by 2018, including some to Lesotho since 1997. See “Jinian yuanwai yiliaodui paiqian 
55 zhounian” ®iqJ2 ÞÕ55B` [In commemoration of the 55th anniversary of sending medical 





dimension and humanitarian sensibilities must be taken seriously. My dissertation thus revises 
current understanding of China’s interventions in Africa as primarily a post-1990s “neo-
colonial” phenomenon pursued for political and economic ends. Resting at the intersection of 
Cold War politics, the history of medicine, and global humanitarianism, it argues that China’s 
medical missions served as an ideological and methodological challenge to the postcolonial 
international health regime.  
 
Mao’s China Connected  
The time frame of this study overlaps with that of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and 
its aftermath. For this late Maoist period, historians have given the most attention to how China 
was consumed by internal disorder. Earlier scholarship focused on the Cultural Revolution’s 
causes, violence, and consequences, while a new generation of scholars in the 1990s sought to 
present a more nuanced view of this decade by using new sources that became available in the 
post-Mao period and taking advantage of the increased opportunities for interviews. Recent 
scholarship has agreed that this period was not an aberration but rather a continuation or result of 
earlier political, social, and cultural phenomena and formed a legacy that continues to impact 
China today, whether in the formation of new classes or in the production of arts and culture.5 
Still, in this burgeoning scholarship on the Maoist era, the primary preoccupation remains high 
politics and elite ideology, representation and performance, and the social resonance of political 
campaigns, all of which falls conceptually within the confines of China’s borders and thereby 
reinforces the false image of China’s self-imposed isolation during this period.  
 
5 For example, see Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of 
China’s New Class (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Barbara Mittler, A Continuous Revolution: 




This dissertation contends that Maoist China rarely if ever concerned itself exclusively 
with internal events and that China’s domestic development interpenetrated with the rest of the 
world. Political historians and social scientists of international relations pioneered in making 
efforts to understand Maoist China’s involvement in international affairs.6 Recently, cultural 
historians and literary scholars have adopted this global perspective to investigate Maoism’s 
cultural influence. Alexander Cook’s edited volume on the Little Red Book is a fresh attempt to 
grasp the meanings of this most-printed cultural symbol in the process of its global circulation 
and local appropriation.7 Julia Lovell’s latest work on the global history of Maoism offers a 
comprehensive account of the preeminent influence of Maoist ideology on radicalism around the 
world from the Black Panthers to the PLO.8 I follow this new line of inquiry, but expand beyond 
the realm of ideology and discourse. As this dissertation demonstrates, Mao’s China was more 
internationalistic than xenophobic, tangibly connected with the world by flows of people, ideas, 
materials, and technologies.9 In particular, it shows that medicine and internationalism were 
integral to China’s political history in the Mao period.   
 
Maoist Health Diplomacy in the Cold War 
 
6 A typical work is Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001). Newer generation of Chinese historians who study the early PRC and the world follow Chen’s 
approach and focus their attention at the crossroad of political history and international relations. This group is 
based in East China Normal University in Shanghai, led by the historian Shen Zhihua. 
7 Alexander Cook, ed., Mao’s Little Red book: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
8 Julia Lovell, Maoism: A Global History (London: The Bodley Head, 2019). 
9 Priya Lal’s study of ujamaa socialism in Tanzania is a good example. See “Maoism in Tanzania,” in Mao’s 





China’s medical aid missions were a health program embedded in wider political, 
ideological, and cultural contexts that defined postwar international relations. As a government-
sponsored program, they were inevitably used as a tool of foreign and economic policy. This 
made them similar to Western international health campaigns, whose links with politics have 
been thoroughly explored by political scientists and historians of public health.10 While similar 
in their underlying political nature, Chinese and Western health interventions nevertheless 
differed significantly in goals. Western international health campaigns advocated reform of a 
client country’s political and economic systems, whereas the Chinese sought to counter the 
perceived hegemonies of both the United States and the Soviet Union and reinforce relationships 
with allies in developing countries. Sending the missions as part of a commitment to African 
peoples’ welfare and gesture of devotion to internationalist solidarity, the Chinese government 
laid non-health-related goals for its health interventions in Africa from the inception of the 
medical aid program. Maoist China engaged in “health diplomacy” in a manner consistent with 
the term’s contemporary usage, which refers to “political activity that meets the dual goals of 
improving health while maintaining and strengthening international relations.”11  
I argue that the duality of health issues and state interests highlighted in this definition is 
appropriate for understanding the Chinese case. Scholarship on health diplomacy takes up 
 
10 For some recent works on this, see Sunil S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast 
Asia, 1930-65 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Erez Manela, “A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing 
Disease Control into Cold War History,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 299–323; John Farley, To 
Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913-1951) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Randall M. Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions into 
the Lives of Other People (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). 
11 Jeremy Youde, “China's Health Diplomacy in Africa,” China: An International Journal 8, no. 1 (2010): 
152. “Health diplomacy” has different definitions. For the first 100 years of this term’s usage from 1851 to 
1951, it referred to International collaboration to protect from global health risks including infectious diseases, 
environmental pollution, etc. See David Fidler, “The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of 




different positions regarding the intersection of health and foreign policy. For example, the 
political scientist Yanzhong Huang views Maoist China’s participation in global health as 
lacking concern about potential health risks or awareness about benefits of improved health to 
the international system.12 While I agree with him that protecting health itself was not the sole 
motivation behind the Chinese contribution to global health, I find this view does not do full 
justice to the mission’s tangible results and fails to acknowledge the personal sacrifices and 
devotion of the Chinese mission doctors. Meanwhile, a narrow, romanticized focus on the 
provision of health aid for its own sake would fail to appreciate the critical role of foreign policy 
interests in shaping health priorities and determining funding. In recent years, global health 
communities have sometimes idealistically claimed that health issues drive health aid, 
triumphing over traditional foreign policy interests.13 I am less optimistic about this prospect of 
“global altruism,”14 because history has shown an enduring relevance of national interests to 
health governance and nation states remain stubbornly at its core against the growing scale and 
depth of globalization. After all, whether and what kind of diseases and health issues receive 
foreign policy priority is fundamentally a sociopolitical and economic problem.15 The case of 
the Chinese medical mission program, even disregarding for a moment its own internal 
ideological orientation, only confirms again that efforts to improve health lie within the larger 
 
12 Yanzhong Huang, “Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China,” Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 17, no.1 (2010): 107. 
13 Richard Horton, “Health as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” Lancet 369 (March 2007): 806–807. 
14 Horton, “Health as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” 807. 
15 Harley Feldbaum and Joshua Michaud make this point in their article, “Health Diplomacy and the Enduring 




context of protecting state interests. This dissertation, therefore, is not only a history of Chinese 
global health but of Chinese state interests in the Cold War.  
Indeed, focusing on China’s international health aid sheds new light on the Cold War as a 
tripolar rather than bipolar conflict. Mao’s China was never fully dependent upon a hegemonic 
power nor fully subsumed within the equilibrium of Cold War rivalry between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Rather, by the late 1950s, China was already equally estranged from the 
two superpowers, not only playing off one against the other but also attempting to realign the 
balance of power by mobilizing existent discontent and rivalry within and outside each bloc. To 
understand China’s engagement with any of its allies and rivalries in any form, it is essential to 
lay out the relationships between Mao’s China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. When 
China sent its first medical team to Algeria in 1963, China was fetishized with counter-
hegemonic ideas that would persist throughout the Maoist era. These ideas were formed and 
developed as conflicts of national interests, Mao’s strategic visions of Cold War geopolitics, and 
China’s domestic power struggles unfolded with their many twists and turns. In turn, they 
produced far-reaching consequences in China’s domestic and international policy making.             
China’s relationship with the Soviet Union arguably shaped most fundamentally China’s 
international policies and domestic political climate. The relationships within the global Socialist 
camp were ridden with tension from its formation, as shared ideology and goals could not always 
mitigate conflicts over national interest. Ideologically, China had attempted to break away from 
the Soviet Union’s trajectory after the demise of Joseph Stalin (1953), to follow its own path of 
socialist development as early as 1956.16 A series of conflicts of interest over territory (in 
 
16 Qian Xiangli Úb, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (di wu juan): lishi de bianju ºDF<
(©7): <¡ÂX(1962-1965) [The history of the People’s Republic of China (Vol.5): the change of 




Northeast China and Xinjiang), railways, and trade escalated CCP leaders’ ill feeling toward the 
Soviet Union led by Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64) and later Leonid Brezhnev (1964-82).17 Just 
as negativity in ideological debates between the communist parties of China and the Soviet 
Union was approaching its peak, the latter’s position in the Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962 
further antagonized China. The Soviet Union’s “neutrality” and later open support for India, a 
“bourgeois” country fighting against China, a fellow socialist state, was not only embarrassing to 
China but also a manifestation of the irreconcilable clash of interests between the two communist 
powers. The open split between the two in the fall of 1962 fundamentally shaped Mao’s re-
positioning of China in the Socialist camp. During the ideologically and politically polarized 
Cultural Revolution (1966–76), China’s hostility with the Soviet Union reached its apogee. 
American diplomats, for their part, came to grasp that China saw the Soviet Union as a “far 
greater military threat” than the United States.18 By and large, all of China’s foreign policies and 
initiatives during the 1960s and 1970s revolved around their rivalry with the Soviet Union, 
which displaced the United States as China’s primary target throughout the rest of the Cold 
War.19  
Still, these more pronounced anti-Soviet hostilities arose in the context of the longer-
standing opposition to American imperialism from 1949. While the American threat had loomed 
large in the minds of Chinese communists since the Korean War, the escalation of the Vietnam 
 
17 On Xinjiang and the abrogation of Sino-Soviet consular relationship, see Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet 
Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 213-218. 
18 The view was expressed in a report by American Consulate General in Hong Kong in January 1971. See 
Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 145. 
19 On the history of Sino-Soviet relations in the twentieth century, see Shen Zhihua h4 and Yang 
Kuisong N, eds., Zhongsu guanxi shigang ¶¬<¯ [History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-




War in August 1964 further intensified China’s sense of insecurity and radicalized China’s 
political and social life. Mao considered U.S aggression against North Vietnam as also a new war 
of aggression against China. His re-orientation of China from its post-Great Leap Forward focus 
on economic development toward preparation for a war with imperialists brought significant 
changes in the planning of the national economy. To build an industry less vulnerable to foreign 
attack, Mao decided to establish the Third Front (sanxian, the industrial bases located in the 
interior of the country) by relocating a large number of factories to the interior of middle and 
west China. Along with this grand project of industrial restructuring and migration, the slogan of 
“Resist America and Assist Vietnam” swept across China’s cities and countryside and became a 
national theme that penetrated the lives of the ordinary Chinese people.20 These developments 
are immediately relevant to this study because quite a few urban medical staff who joined 
overseas missions were first sent on mobile medical teams to the regions of the Third Front.   
More importantly for ordinary Chinese, political tensions were rising in the early to mid-
1960s due to Mao’s excessive reactions to the double threat he perceived from the Soviet Union 
and the United States. Mao reversed Liu Shaoqi’s post-Great Leap Forward policy adjustments 
and self-critique of past mistakes in favor of a renewed and stronger emphasis on class struggle. 
He compared China’s situation with what he considered “revisionist” phenomena in the Soviet 
Union and decided to mobilize class struggles to combat alleged “revisionism” (i.e., the 
restoration of the bourgeoisie) in Chinese society and within the communist party. The 
government launched the “Four Cleanups” (siqing) in rural areas and the “Five-antis” (wufan) in 
 





the cities and sought to arouse a greater sense of class struggle among the commoners.21 With 
policies leaning increasingly to the left, the divergence in opinion between Mao and Liu Shaoqi 
became even greater. These tensions in high politics quickly penetrated the grassroots level. 
Ordinary Chinese were constantly instructed to stay alert to anything “revisionist” or “counter-
revolutionary.” As a result of intense propaganda campaigns and political purges, strains in the 
domestic political climate intensified to the extent that, in the words of the historian Qian 
Xiangli, the Chinese generally shared “the false feeling that China would undergo some sort of 
major [apocalyptic] event like foul wind and bloody rain.”22 Exhausted by this rising anxiety 
and fear about potentially ubiquitous enemies, people were prone to be suspicious of even trivial 
things and to engage in disruptive activities of armed “class struggle.”  
Anti-Soviet revisionism, anti-American imperialism, and class struggle were the three 
related ideological and political priorities of Mao’s China, which formed the backdrop to its 
health intervention in Africa. Sending medical missions to Algeria in 1963 happened to occur at 
this critical moment of the leftist turn in China’s foreign policy, which overvalued China’s 
influence on the one hand, and on the other hand held up “proletarian internationalism” as its 
“highest guiding principle” above national interests.23 In this context, the Chinese revolutionary 
state emerged as an alternative and potent player disrupting the earlier geopolitical order of the 
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Cold War. Heavily influenced by yet independent of the Soviet model, this mighty party-state 
demonstrated an enormous efficiency in mobilizing its human and material resources to pursue 
the goal of continuous revolution. The medical aid program was small in proportion to the vast 
amount of China’s military, infrastructural, and agricultural aid input. Nevertheless, it was seen 
in its time as an important step toward fulfilling Mao’s new vision of world order after breaking 
away from the Soviet Union, and in hindsight it has quietly proven to be one of the most durable 
forms of modern Chinese internationalism, even outliving Maoism itself. 
From the perspective of the ideologies described above, Algeria’s request for medical aid 
in 1962 was perfectly timed. It was an unsolicited yet good opportunity for China to strengthen 
its alliance with Algeria and build a new type of relationship that revised the Bandung spirit. 
Algeria had become one of China’s most important anti-imperial African allies since 1958 in 
advance of its independence. To the Chinese government, Algeria’s war of independence 
provided a model of militant anti-imperialism for other African countries to follow. Having taken 
over China through armed struggle, the Chinese communist party closely identified with the 
Algerian FLN’s (National Liberation Front) path to victory through guerrilla warfare. Chinese 
historian Li Qianyu argues that China’s support for Algeria derived less from the specificities of 
Algerian case and more from its endorsement of the militancy Algeria adopted to achieve 
independence.24 In addition, Algeria was an ideal ally in Africa and the Arabic-speaking world 
for two other reasons. Firstly, it was among the first African countries gaining independence and 
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aspiring to the Third Worldist movement;25 secondly, the foreign relations of more central 
Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were increasingly dominated by the 
United States and Soviet Union. The Sino-Algerian relationship in some ways signaled the end 
of the Bandung spirit for China. China had been effectively pushed out of the central Middle 
Eastern countries. Algeria was one of the first instances where China had to be more 
opportunistic and selective about its partners and had to work on a country-by-country basis, and 
in more tangible ways, rather than relying on broad and often vague Afro-Asianism.  
Beijing overtly supported the FLN and recognized it immediately after its establishment 
of a provisional government (GPRA) in Cairo, Egypt, in September 1958 (by contrast, whereas 
Moscow and Prague did so only until after the signing of the Evian Accords between Algeria and 
France in March 1962).26 In 1962, 80% of China’s foreign aid went to socialist countries, mainly 
the fellow anti-revisionist Albania and Vietnam, which were both at the forefront of the fight 
against American imperialism. The other 20% went to more than a dozen Afro-Asian and Latin 
American countries, among which Algeria took precedence.27 By sending free military supplies 
to Algeria and via Algeria to other African countries (e.g., Congo-Kinshasa), Beijing hoped to 
use Algeria as an entrepôt to channel its support for armed African revolutions which would 
divert American military powers from Vietnam.28 In July 1962, the newly founded Algerian 
government called on the international community for medical assistance following the end of 
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Algeria’s war against French colonialism and the flight of most of the country’s trained medical 
personnel. China responded to the request and sent its first medical team the next year.  
Although it was the Algerian government that proposed bringing in Chinese doctors, 
China was not merely a passive, sympathetic responder to the proposal. No immediate document 
is available to reveal the decision-making process behind sending the first medical team, but 
what is certain is that the foundation of Beijing’s strategic vision for Africa had already been laid 
over the years of its declining relationship with Moscow. In the early 1960s, China’s highest-
level foreign intelligence service—the Investigation Department of Central Committee of CCP 
(Zhonggong zhongyang diaocha bu)—collected information on Africa. Even though the 
knowledge it provided about the continent was dismal and Mao admitted in April 1961 to a 
group of African and Asian delegates that he “did not have a clear understanding of Africa,”29 
Chinese leaders still reached a provisional conclusion: that many African countries had not yet 
shown an obvious ideological slant and therefore it was still possible for China to encourage 
them to lean toward Chinese socialism and ally with Beijing. The Department also surveyed the 
amount of U.S. and Soviet aid to Africa. Its reports served as a reference point for Chinese policy 
makers to decide on further aid input. Whenever Moscow increased the amount of input in 
Africa, Beijing attempted to follow suit regardless of the worsening conditions of its domestic 
economy.30 In this context, sending a civilian medical team fell squarely into an “aid offensive”, 
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to use Jeremy Friedman’s word, which China unleashed from 1963 onwards in Africa (mainly in 
Algeria and Tanzania) to compete with the Soviets for influence.31 Chinese leaders realized that 
the outcome of this competition was crucial to the ultimate balance of power both in the world 
and in the Communist camp.  
Moreover, China took advantage of medical aid’s singularity to promote an image of a 
benevolent and responsible government, which actively partook in international welfare 
development. Conceived as more “value-neutral” than military aid, medical aid allowed Beijing 
to exploit world opinion and win international sympathy and support at a time when it was not 
recognized by a large majority of countries around the world. On the psychological level, 
winning hearts and minds of people in developing countries was another principal Cold War 
battle among different powers.32 Although China did not use terms such as “cultural diplomacy” 
or “people’s diplomacy,” its rhetoric and practice of building “solidarity” and exemplifying 
“proletarian internationalism” functioned in a similar vain.33 For both capitalist and socialist 
 
included the Liaison Department (µÖ), the Foreign Ministry, the PLA, the Chinese Peace and Solidarity 
Committees. See Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War, 18-19. Friedman also mentions a Chinese Foreign 
Ministry report on the Soviet aid to Afro-Asian countries between 1954-64 and the ministry’s concern about 
not being able to compete with the USSR over the long term. See Shadow Cold War, 123. 
Similarly, in emergency aid, Beijing decided on the value of donations according to the amount donated by 
the Soviet Union. After 1959, Beijing not only considered the Soviet amounts but also gave more attention to 
the American donation numbers. See Yin Qingfei zë, “1949-1965 nian zhongguo duiwai rendao zhuyi 
yuanzhu fenxi” 1949 ~ 1965 `EVJÔ	q.& [The Analysis of Foreign Humanitarian 
Assistance from 1949 to 1965], Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu fE<£§ [Contemporary China History 
Studies] 18, no.4 (2011): 95-96. 
 
31 Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 104, 119-121. 
32 For example, the US was engaged in extensive psychological warfare under the Eisenhower administration. 
See Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). Similar efforts were made from the part of the Eastern Bloc as 
well. See Quinn Slobodian ed., Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World (New York; 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015). 
33 For example, China sent sport teams to Africa to cultivate diplomatic relations and shore up support for a 




camps, exporting medical care, expertise and personnel to help those most in need was central to 
health diplomacy in the global battle for the perceived affinities of newly independent and 
developing countries.  
This dissertation demonstrates the intimate association between the ideas and practices of 
China’s medical aid missions and a larger vision of Third World development according to the 
Chinese model that evolved during the Mao years. I suggest that many of the technical, 
organizational and financial problems that plagued the missions flowed from this association.  
 
Medicine in the Cold War 
There is arguably no other period than the Cold War in modern history that has so 
conspicuously politicized medicine, yet remains so little understood as a distinct regime of 
medical thought and practice. By contrast, the relationship between medicine and European 
colonialism has been explored much more thoroughly.34 It was not until the late 1990s when 
historians of medicine started to direct attention to this connection between medicine and the 
Cold War, in which they find analogies with the relationship between tropical medicine and 
imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century.35 This growing scholarship shows how Cold 
War ideologies and politics shaped medical practice and public health initiatives, as well as how 
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issues in medicine and public health became central to Cold War geopolitics.36 With the growing 
importance of American hegemony in medical and scientific programs overseas after WWII, 
development and anti-communism emerged as the two dominant themes linking politics and 
international health. Western directed efforts at the eradication of malaria (1940s-50s) and 
smallpox (1960s) in Asia, Africa, and Latin America became metaphors for the containment of 
communism and were used to demonstrate a vision of Third World development to curry favor 
and influence in developing countries.37 Within this thematic rubric, recent studies have moved 
beyond state actors (e.g., ICA, later USAID) to explore the role played by international 
organizations (e.g., WHO, UNICEF) and nongovernmental organizations and networks (e.g., the 
Rockefeller Foundation) in defining the global history of public health campaigns and standards 
by which their outcomes were judged.38  There were times when some of the public health 
problems created by diseases such as polio and smallpox, which do not respect national borders, 
brought about superpower collaboration in the medical field—a subject that was overshadowed 
by superpower conflict and is yet to be fully explored.39 More often, political values and 
business interests remained prominent in the motives of international medical cooperation and 
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constituted the source of misunderstanding and dissatisfaction between the two superpowers—
the United States and the Soviet Union.40 
China’s role in the arena of Cold War international health remains neglected given the 
well-rehearsed narrative that relays between the two superpowers who were undoubtedly the 
major players in high-profile public health campaigns. Recent scholarship on international 
relations of the Cold War has revised this two-superpower narrative to accord a pivotal role to 
China as “the third (albeit shorter) leg of a Cold War tripod.”41 This revisionist view of political 
history warrants attention to the potential significance of China’s other types of engagement with 
the world to Cold-War history. Again, this study reveals how the history of China’s medical aid 
missions sheds new light on Cold War medical intervention in foreign lands as well as the 
dynamics of competition between the world’s three major powers more broadly. 
Cold-War Western efforts in developing countries were always vertical programs 
concentrating on specific diseases such as hookworm, yellow fever, malaria, smallpox, polio, 
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and more recently, cancer. These initiatives were armed with new 
medical and scientific technologies, and mobilized administrative schemes developed under 
multilateral frameworks. China adopted a different method in its involvement in global health 
networks. Between 1963 and 1978, China insisted on bilateral, unidirectional relationships with 
individual countries when providing healthcare initiatives. Partly due to limited economic 
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capacity and an inferior level of medical technology, Chinese medical missions targeted basic 
health care instead of specific diseases and epidemics, aiming for full coverage in general 
medicine fields in rural areas and the incorporation of more people into primary health service 
networks. The medical services China provided complemented the more conspicuous vertical, 
disease-oriented programs led by Western countries, and functioned at a more routine level to 
intersect with the everyday life of the local communities. Instead of providing treatment based on 
high-tech medical science which required large funds for furnishing supplies, training local staff, 
and educating locals, the Chinese program aimed at providing “socialist” care along personalized 
doctor-patient relationship, which was purportedly outdated at the time by the triumph of 
biomedicine in Western countries. Although China’s medical aid program was also informed by 
ideology and political values, it joined the international health with a different orientation—
directing us to new, untold histories of Cold War healthcare initiatives. 
China’s challenge to the Western-dominated health care regime was favored by a political 
context characterized by the anti-imperialist and leftist movements spreading in newly 
decolonized African countries as well as in some industrialized countries. Scholarship has 
recognized China’s experience of massively expanding rural medical services through the 
“barefoot doctor” program from the early 1960s as an important aspiration for the world’s 
primary health care initiatives. By the mid-1970s, Euro-American scholars had begun to question 
the relevance of medical advances to the most serious health needs in developing countries.42 
Attention increasingly shifted from disease-oriented campaigns to primary health care in many 
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countries of the Third World. In 1975, the WHO and UNICEF issued a joint report, Alternative 
Approaches to Meeting Basic Health Needs in Developing Countries, to declare primary health 
care as a matter of urgent priority, which eventually led to the goal of “Health for All by the Year 
2000” proclaimed in the international conference at Alma-Ata in September 1978. However, this 
lofty goal was criticized for being too broad and utopian: the historian Marcos Cueto, for 
example, has explained in detail the financial, political, and intellectual conundrums that 
impeded its fulfillment. What was indeed carried out by most international agencies was 
selective primary health care, an “interim” strategy that concentrated on GOBI for children 
(growth monitoring, oral rehydration techniques, breastfeeding, and immunization). The WHO’s 
priorities for primary health care lasted from 1972 to 1988, ending pitifully with the divorce 
between goals and measures.43  
Therefore, the Chinese medical mission experiment in Algeria and other African 
countries from 1963 onwards stands out as peculiar because they actually attempted to transplant 
China’s primary health care model holistically to foreign lands. These attempts not only preceded 
but also survived the international initiatives of implementing primary health care in developing 
countries led by the WHO and UNICEF. Financed and materially supported by the Chinese 
government—exclusively before 1974 and partially in collaboration with recipient governments 
afterwards, the Chinese missions reified some key ideas declared in the Alma-Ata conference to 
attain an acceptable level of health for all. In Marco Cueto’s analysis of the Alma-Ata 
Declaration, he identifies three central ideas underlining its spirit and content: “‘appropriate 
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technology,’ opposition to medical elitism, and the concept of health as a tool for socioeconomic 
development.”44 My goal is to elucidate how the Chinese missions interpreted these ideas 
through their medical contact with local people. Partly following Cueto, I emphasize the notion 
of “appropriate” medical technology drawn from China’s domestic medical experiments and 
innovations, the dilemmas between opposition to medical elitism and the defense of medical 
authority, and the political agendas underneath Maoist health care ideals. I use an umbrella term, 
“Chinese socialist medicine,” to encapsulate these aspects and their relationships, which I will 
elaborate in the next section. I do not intend to argue, however, for a triumph of the Chinese 
trials in Algeria. In fact, the unfolding of the mission’s history—with many setbacks and 
obstacles for both China and Algeria (chapter 5), as well as the more recent call from Chinese 
doctors for mission reform—reveals imbalances and gaps between idealism, technical expertise, 
finance, and political commitment that ultimately hampered those attempts even as most sides 
continued to support the project. 
 
The (Global) Making of Chinese Socialist Medicine 
In his talks at the Chengdu Conference on 10 March 1958, Mao Zedong blasted the 
alleged tendency to merely imitate the Soviet Union in major sectors of Chinese society, 
specifically mentioning health care:    
Learning should be combined with creativity. To import Soviet codes and conventions 
inflexibly is to lack the creative spirit. … The same applied to our public health work, with 
the result that I couldn’t have eggs or chicken soup for three years because an article 
appeared in the Soviet Union which said that one shouldn’t eat them. Later they said one 
 




could eat them. It didn’t matter whether the article was correct or not, the Chinese listened 
all the same and respectfully obeyed. In short, the Soviet Union was tops.45  
Mao’s sarcasm bespeaks the wholesale importation of a health care delivery system from the 
Soviet Union into China. After 1949, the communist government created a health system based 
on the prototype of socialist medicine pioneered by the Soviet Union. Mao’s criticism of 
installing Soviet medicine in China was not only derived from the ongoing ideological debates 
with the Soviet Union but also from his concerns about health care conditions in China, 
especially the drastic imbalance between urban and rural areas and the overall paucity of medical 
resources, which were not easily handled by copying the Soviet model. His talks foreshadowed a 
departure of China’s health care system from a replicate of the Soviet version to develop into a 
life of its own. This dissertation demonstrates one way in which China’s socialist medicine came 
to have its own characteristics, and how this expands our understanding of what socialist 
medicine is.  
According to Mark Field and William Cockerham, two notable historians of postwar 
Soviet health care, “‘socialist medicine’ applies to a health care delivery system designed to 
provide preventive, diagnostic, clinical, rehabilitative, educational, and custodial services to a 
designated population free of charge at the time of the service.” As such, under socialist 
medicine, “it was society (i.e., the polity) that would shoulder the responsibility of the provision 
of health services to the entire population.” And one important merit of socialist medicine is “the 
promise of gratuitous and universal (though not necessarily equal) medical care to the entire 
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nation.”46 China’s urban health care largely followed this Soviet model.47 In 1951, China 
established a comprehensive labor insurance system to cover health care expenses and old-age 
pension for industrial workers in state-owned enterprises. From 1952 onwards, civil servants and 
personnel were entitled to publicly funded free medical care. By 1957, among the 99,490,000 
urban population, 7.4 million enjoyed free medical care and 60 million were covered by the labor 
insurance system.48 Like the Soviet Union, the Chinese government owned and operated all 
health care facilities, ran medical schools to train health personnel, employed the health care 
workforce, and (ideally) guaranteed public access. 
Whereas China emulated the Soviet urban system of health care management, the 
development of its rural health delivery was more of a local initiative specific to its contextual 
and historic period. Rather than an implementation of a top-down health policy, a rural 
Cooperative Medical System (CMS) first emerged spontaneously in some villages in the mid-
1950s during the cooperative movement in agriculture to deal with the severe shortage of 
physicians and drugs. Proven effective locally, this program of self-insurance quickly spread and 
was officially acknowledged in a national rural health work conference in November 1959. The 
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social cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution boosted and institutionalized this system, which now 
acquired the more familiar title “the barefoot doctor scheme.”49 It has been recognized by 
foreign researchers of health policies and the World Health Organization as a distinctive 
accomplishment which improved the delivery of health care in China, predominantly a rural 
nation with 80% of its population in the countryside. By 1971, there were said to be over one 
million barefoot doctors throughout the country—community-based, peasant health workers who 
received training for three to six months and provided very basic health services at the village 
level.50 
It was in building this rural health care system—and the vision and practice of primary 
health care (PHC) writ large—that socialist medicine in China started to diverge from the Soviet 
model. That divergence, I argue, was exemplified and amplified in the Chinese overseas medical 
mission, which brought the Chinese brand of socialist medicine into confrontation with other 
variations of socialized medicine. In Algeria, the Chinese teams had many competitors. Middle 
Eastern doctors were dispatched as a sign of Arab-Muslim solidarity, and at one point a group of 
American volunteer doctors came from Rhode Island, but both of these stayed only briefly. 
Doctors also arrived from France, which was a special case not only as the former colonial 
power, but as a Western country that took pride in its socialized health care system (in which 
private care was allowed alongside a state-run system). Apart from these exceptions, most of the 
foreign medical teams were from socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and 
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Czechoslovakia. In other words, Algeria provided an experimental field in which its own system 
of socialized medicine mixed with a legacy of French biomedicine and local healing traditions, 
and where medical teams from many different countries, primarily socialist, brought their own 
methods and visions. When Chinese socialist medicine traveled to Algeria, it was a form of 
Maoist state soft power defined in contrast to French biomedicine on one hand (somewhat 
ironically designated as “capitalist”), and to other competing socialist medicines in Algeria on 
the other hand. 
Building on Field and Cockerham, I take China’s socialist medicine as an all-
encompassing term that consisted of many sub-issues of health care. It included but was not 
limited to medical education, medical research, the structure of health care delivery, health care 
financing, the production of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, mass health campaigns, 
environmental protection, and so forth.51 This dissertation, however, is primarily concerned with 
the aspects in which China developed distinct policies and practices that characterized its own 
brand of socialist medicine. I identify three characteristics of Chinese socialist medicine which 
emerged prominently during the missions: medical technology (which Field and Cockerham do 
not include in their definition), health care ethics and the method of delivery, and the underlying 
view of intersectoriality between health and social development. 
As medical technology, China’s socialist medicine adopted a pragmatic method that 
moved freely between Western biomedicine and “traditional” Chinese medicine with the aim of 
finding cost-effective cures under restricted conditions, especially in new locales. It made do 
with less sophisticated and cheaper medical equipment. It relied heavily on improvisation, as 
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Chinese doctors often were forced to invent new healing methods and conjure up basic medical 
supplies from what was available. It was therefore a field of medical knowledge whose 
boundaries were fluid and constantly being redefined by its practitioners (chapter 4). This 
Chinese attention to appropriate medical technology suitable for local low-resource conditions 
contrasted sharply with the Soviet ideal, which, like Western-led disease campaigns, insisted 
upon the correlation between technical advances and improvement of health.52 Unable to operate 
on par with Western or Soviet technological prowess, Chinese socialist medicine emphasized the 
common needs of poor people and financial feasibility more than scientific soundness, though 
Chinese doctors seized opportunities to demonstrate the latter as well (chapter 3).  
The formation of such medical technology was driven by a socialist ethical goal of 
providing universal access to basic health care generally; and both were more specifically 
restrained and shaped by the extreme paucity of medical resources in Mao’s China. I use the term 
“Maoist humanitarianism” to grasp this set of medical ethics, which entailed revolutionizing the 
relationship between the doctor and the patient to achieve equality of care and resources. On the 
ideological level, these health care ethics challenged the medical elitism of both the Soviets and 
Westerners. This view not only required medical professionals to deny their own intellectual 
superiority, but also attempted to transfer expert authority, at least partially, to lay health 
personnel to encourage community participation. In practice, these ethics disapproved of 
overspecialization and instead urged one to become a highly versatile generalist or multi-
specialist. This Chinese orientation went against the Soviet emphasis on educating medical 
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cadres in “scientific medicine” as a prerequisite for the best health outcomes.53 Whereas the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Romania were trying to replace feldshers (rural health 
providers viewed as second-class doctors) with physicians,54 China was expanding its barefoot 
doctor scheme (along with sending trained urban physicians to the countryside) to maximize 
health coverage at the probably expense of quality. In addition, medical personnel were exhorted 
to help eliminate the barrier to health care by proactively delivering services and shifting the 
concentration of care away from major hospitals. Chinese teams volunteered to station in 
landlocked areas removed from the more prosperous coastal cities. Itinerant medical teams were 
organized to complement the construction of health posts in rural areas and shantytowns (chapter 
2). Despite frequent hardship and heavy workload, Chinese doctors received little payment or 
prestige comparable to other foreign doctors. The success of the Chinese mission—at least in 
terms of its continued presence in Algeria and wider Africa—was guaranteed by the authoritarian 
power of the Chinese regime, which co-opted doctors for hard tasks and provided them with 
medical and material supplies mobilized domestically.55 At the same time, the rhetoric of 
 
53 Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Nikolai Krementsov, “‘Socialising’ primary care?,” 7, 12. 
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The prevailing Soviet policy view was to replace feldshers with physicians. See Mark Field, “Health Personnel 
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“revolutionary humanitarianism” generalized and romanticized individual success stories into the 
ethics of Chinese socialist medicine. 
China’s socialist medicine was not merely for medicine’s sake; it had political 
implications. From patriotic health campaigns in the early 1950s to Mao’s Directive of 25 June 
1965 to “put the stress on rural areas in health and medical work,” the simple fact that health was 
often brought to the forefront at the time of political campaigns speaks to the socialist view of a 
positive correlation between medicine and social revolution/development. Class struggle 
appeared in medicine, because health and disease were viewed not only as biological phenomena 
but also political, social, and economic phenomena rooted in social relations.56 As a Chinese 
medical team’s report from Afghanistan in 1970 stated, “that locals often fall sick was a result of 
the social system; it was a social problem.”57 When socialist medicine travelled beyond China, it 
was intended, where possible, to act as an adjunct to social revolution. Its promotion of 
pragmatic “nonscientific” medical solutions, demand for doctors’ self-sacrifices, and advocacy 
for equity in profession and care all challenged local health care regimes. Most of these 
challenges did not come to fruition because China’s medicine was inseparable from the way the 
highly centralized socialist country organized its national life, and the places to which it was 
exported often lacked the necessary conditions for it to take root.58 Nevertheless, the practical 
effects Chinese medical teams brought to local communities indeed reified the socialist rhetoric 
of international proletarian solidarity with peoples of the post-colonial Third World. By filling 
 
56 On Marxist analysis of socialist medicine versus capitalist medicine, see Vicente Navarro, “What is 
Socialist Medicine?,” Monthly Review 38, no.3 (1986): 61-73. 
57 Hubei Provincial Archives (HPA), SZ67-4-125-4, March 1970, p.10. 
58 For example, see Robert J. Blendon, “Can China’s Health Care Be Transplanted without China’s Economic 




gaps in areas of the countryside that even Algerian physicians shunned, the Chinese missions 
embodied the character of socialist medicine, a presumably more equitably distributed medicine 
allocated according to need regardless of class, race, gender, and region. 
To sum up the three characteristics, my contention is that the ideals of Chinese socialist 
medicine were best embodied by the basic, “non-elitist” medical technology (including 
techniques of acupuncture and improvised medicine), doctors going to the people, and solidarity 
with former colonies in the period of decolonization. These ideals first formed during China’s 
domestic healthcare campaigns, yet they acquired new meanings within the context of the 
overseas missions through interactions between doctors and local communities. These ideals 
made the Chinese medical missions appealing in Algeria, enabling them to find a niche in that 
country’s post-colonial medical landscape.  
China’s socialist medicine was, however, also characterized by a number of contradictory 
features that only became visible in the overseas missions. On the one hand, it insisted that 
medical workers sympathize with locals in Algeria and consider them equals or of the “same 
kind” (tongzhong), especially in light of their common experiences of colonialism and 
imperialism.59 Chinese doctors and health workers thus normally refrained from open 
generalizations about race, religion, or culture. Yet, on the other hand, there was a tendency 
among Chinese medical workers to ignore Algeria’s indigenous medical knowledge and practice 
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in favor of pursuing their own Chinese medical “civilizing mission.” In this regard, socialist 
medicine showed expansionist aspirations typically attributed to Western medicine.60     
As bearers of a mission, Chinese doctors did not have a definitive term to describe their 
health care ideals, ethics, and technical knowledge; they simply attempted to reproduce in 
Algeria what they were used to doing domestically. Nevertheless, it was through their continued 
work and efforts to differentiate themselves from other foreign missions that a boundary was 
gradually established to define the set of practices that I call Chinese socialist medicine. This 
socialist medicine developed in contexts that were resource-poor yet held high aspirations for 
equality in welfare and social development. In these situations, doctors drew on a hybrid mix of 
medical cultures to form a body of fluid and often improvised medical knowledge. Through a 
process of experimentation, China’s socialist medicine became more hybrid, complex, and 
distinct from other types of socialist medicine. 
This case study of an overseas health program expands the geographical scope of the 
transnational history of modern medicine in China. Historians of medicine in modern China have 
tended to examine developments from within a nationalist framework, whether examining the 
integration of Western medicine and Chinese medicine in the context of state building or 
questioning the practical legitimacy of Chinese medicine across rural China in the socialist 
period.61 The major interlocutors are almost always Europe, the United States, Japan, and/or 
Russia. When scholars have taken a more global approach, furthermore, they have focused 
 
60 Mark Harrison once remarks that other medical traditions lacked the expansionist and hegemonic 
aspirations of Western medicine. See “A Global Perspective: Reframing the History of Health, Medicine, and 
Disease,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 89, no.4 (2015): 663. 
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primarily on the early twentieth century when China’s troubled encounters with the West and 
Japan delegitimized its native medicines.62 Scholarship has, however, overlooked the medical 
encounters initiated by China with the world after 1949, particularly the large and complex 
regions of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.63 Studying the history of the medical aid program 
in Algeria brings medical development in socialist China into the broader framework of postwar 
international health, an analytical perspective that is indispensable to understanding medicine’s 
development in modern China yet remains little explored.  
 
Maoist Humanitarianism 
The Maoist era still raises many complex emotions among the Chinese public today. One 
ambiguous concept within this realm of contested memory is the Maoist term geming rendao 
zhuyi (èCÔ	), which could be translated as either “revolutionary humanism” or 
“revolutionary humanitarianism.” Regardless of how it is translated, this was one of the most 
important concepts that helped reify socialist medical ethics. Since Mao used the term in his 
ceremonial inscription—“Rescue from death and heal the wounded; carry out revolutionary 
rendao zhuyi” (Jiusi fushang, shixing geming de rendaozhuyi tn,S¾èC¡Ô
	)—for the Fourteenth Class of the Medical School of the Red Army (renamed China Medical 
University in 1940) in Yan’an in 1941,64 it has become a catchphrase for the Chinese medical 
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profession that is still invoked and celebrated today.65 Chinese mission doctors proudly upheld 
“revolutionary rendao zhuyi” to characterize their work. Yet the meaning of this term has 
remained ambiguous for different people at different moments, and little scholarly effort has 
been done to locate its meaning across time. This was in large part due to the political risk of 
venturing into the field of rendao zhuyi, which, when used alone as a loan phrase into Chinese, 
referred often to “humanism” rather than the more narrowly defined “humanitarianism.” 
Humanism had been cast as a negative term in the mainstream CCP ideology since Mao’s 
seminal talks on literature and art in Yan’an in 1942. Criticized for its bourgeois ideals of 
individualism and human rights, humanism was not rehabilitated until after 1978 when new 
intellectual discourses emerged in post-Mao China.66 Sharing the same Chinese translation of 
the fraught concept of humanism, the idea of humanitarianism was regarded with suspicion by 
government officials during the Maoist era and into the early 1980s, yet persisted nonetheless as 
a result of Mao’s endorsement of it in the medical setting. 
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In such a political climate that denigrated “humanist quest,”67 why were doctors attracted 
to use the term rendao zhuyi despite the fact that the state was allergic to it as a phrase? What 
meaning did the Chinese denominator rendao zhuyi carry in the specific context of medical 
activities? What kind of medical ethics was informed by a humanism discussed in a socialist 
context that endorsed collectivism? What kind of life was valued or prioritized in the political 
work of overseas humanitarian intervention of Maoist China? These are the questions that 
interest me. In my dissertation, I seek to understand how Chinese doctors constructed a 
“revolutionary rendao zhuyi” to serve as an ideological defense on their expertise. I also attempt 
to reconstruct the doctors’ encounters with Algerian patients whose health became a site of 
performing “revolutionary rendao zhuyi” in which the doctors carved out a strategy to negotiate 
the revolutionary politics of the era.  
The Maoist medical aid program offers an ideal case study to explore the doctor’s usage 
of “revolutionary rendao zhuyi” for a variety of reasons. First, because this program formed a 
focused spotlight of China’s medical activities on the world stage wherein the term was 
frequently invoked and reified. Only in this combined setting of medical activities and 
diplomatic occasions did rendao zhuyi survive the Maoist attack on humanism.68 Second, this 
program enabled encounters between Chinese medical staff and foreign patients, a situation that 
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‘State-of-the-Art’,” 730. They define the “humanist quest” in three interrelated aspects, which revolve around 
the rediscovery, the reexploration, and the rebuilding of human beings as individuals. 
68 The foremost ideological critic of the early 1980s Wang Ruoshuo · (1926-2002) observed in an 
article that rendaozhuyi was a taboo word except in the medical realm and some diplomatic occasions. See 
Wang Ruoshui, “Ren de nanchan—rendaozhuyi zai zhongguo de mingyun he qingwu yundong ¡å——
Ô	GE¡CÐD“”Ð- [Dystocia of Man: The fate of humanism in China and the Anti-





was made parallel to Norman Bethune’s encounter with Chinese patients and allowed Chinese 
doctors to define the term as a concept that modeled itself after the Canadian volunteer surgeon 
in wartime China. 
Given these contexts, I see “humanitarianism” as a better rendering than “humanism” for 
the term rendao zhuyi as used by mission doctors. For one thing, the doctors never intended to 
label themselves as “humanists” amidst heated political campaigns against humanism.69 Instead, 
they associated their care for other human beings with the language of “proletarian 
internationalism,” a Marxist notion for which Mao praised Norman Bethune for living up to its 
promises. To further assert the particularities of Maoist rendao zhuyi and distinguish it from 
bourgeois humanism, the word “revolutionary” was always collocated with the term as a 
necessary modifier to describe Chinese humanitarian actions. In addition, despite ideological 
tensions, the Chinese medical workers provided care for African patients and relieved their 
suffering in a way comparable to the modern Western convention of international medicine 
defined as “humanitarian.” Therefore, this study seeks to embed the interpretation of doctors’ 
“revolutionary humanitarianism” within the interplay of Chinese state ideology, Cold War 
international discourse on humanitarianism, and the actual practices of the medical missions. 
Although not officially labeled as a humanitarian mission, China’s medical aid program 
should be considered as a humanitarian regime that was influenced by, yet fundamentally 
diverged from, liberal notions of Cold War humanitarianism. This Maoist humanitarianism of 
socialist China is a key analytical category I use to frame this dissertation. China sent medical 
aid to Algeria as a form of continued support for its African ally, with whom it had built a 
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mutually beneficial relationship during Algeria’s war of independence (1954-1962) when China 
sent many tons of military and medical supplies to support the FLN’s struggle against the French 
colonial regime.70 However, this aid program also grew out of China’s vision to partake in 
global humanitarian competition that helped shape new institutions of world governance in the 
postwar era of decolonization. 
Parallels can be drawn between socialist China’s humanitarianism and its contemporary 
Western counterparts. Both were gestures of compassion enacted by states and were thus 
inherently imbricated within state politics of offering care beyond national borders. Recent 
historiography on Western humanitarianism in the Cold War era has revealed it as in the form of 
activities carried out by states and their international organizations across national boundaries to 
meet basic human needs. The meaning of what Michael Barnett terms “neo-humanitarianism” 
(ca. 1945-1991) of this phase differed from the term’s current popular usage as pre-state, 
individual human rights as Samuel Moyn has discussed.71 As governments became major 
funders of humanitarian missions during World War II (and NGOs remained largely dependent 
on national governments), humanitarian aid was often supplied in the interest of the donor, not 
just to meet the needs of the recipient.72 This was undoubtedly the case when the need to 
counterbalance the spread of communism in the Cold War arose.73 Similarly, Maoist 
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humanitarianism, often associated with proletarian internationalism, was from the beginning 
blunt about its intention to use medical relief as a policy instrument to counter Western and 
Soviet humanitarian projects. By its design, the meaning of the medical mission was sustained 
first and foremost on the basis of realpolitik concerns, claiming moral solidarity with recently 
decolonized nation-states, rather than deriving legitimacy from the value of individual lives and 
rights. It was a humanitarianism defined by and mobilized for the interests of China’s socialist 
aspirations and global agenda. 
Although their political goals were often in opposition, the ideals of different aid-
donating countries were not necessarily so. Maoist humanitarianism was not alone in the Cold 
War era for its aspiration to an abstract, collective good, and its debt to the ideals of socialism 
and anti-colonialism. As Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann has noted, before the 1990s, “human rights,” 
which were tied to the nation state and thus more or less synonymous with “citizenship rights,”74 
as well as with other moral and political concepts such as “solidarity,” a key term employed by 
socialist internationalism.75 This study of the Chinese case confirms Hoffmann’s observation by 
demonstrating how Chinese officials (and to a certain extent mission doctors) understood China’s 
medical humanitarianism on the international stage in terms of proletarian, internationalist 
solidarity. It also shows how the Chinese government rhetorically adhered to Cold War 
international norms, limiting the scope of “humanitarianism” to emergency relief and excluding 
its routinized medical aid program from the category of humanitarianism. It was not until after 
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the Cold War, and specifically after China’s failed attempts to give Marxism a more human face 
(1978-1984),76 that China diverged from the new human rights idealism in the West by 
continuing its insistence on collective rights claims.   
Humanitarianism was a truly global Cold-War practice in which socialist China 
participated and was in turn influenced by international discourse. At the same time, the Chinese 
case challenges the view that humanitarian aid helped to define the relation of the global North to 
the global South. Scholars have demonstrated that the global North has dominated the regime of 
postwar humanitarianism and did so by relying heavily on former imperial knowledge and 
structures.77 Others have critically shown how liberal humanitarianism has been grounded in 
notions of racial and civilizational difference.78 Socialist China’s medical aid program to Algeria 
(and Africa), however, ran along the South-South axis and differed in many respects, including in 
its design, the actors and institutions in which it was embedded, the leftist discourse through 
which it was structured, and the mode of global governance it aimed to shape.  
China’s medical aid program represented a unique form of humanitarian idealism and 
practice. Whereas China was still an underdeveloped country struggling between superpowers 
that could not provide the same level of material and technical aid as the United States or the 
Soviet Union, it was already looking outwards to partake in a global race to bring health care and 
welfare to the Third World—and to win the hearts and minds of the local peoples. To be sure, 
while Chinese doctors did not use the term “civilizing mission,” a latent notion of it was 
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embodied in their determination to export Maoist ideology and socialist values. They also 
probably carried hidden biases towards local Algerian communities in two respects: in their 
belief that Algeria was at a lesser stage of Marxist social development, and that Algerians had 
inferior medical knowledge to China. Yet while the medical aid relationship was unequal and 
notions of race did appear in on-the-ground medical treatment (chapter 3), Chinese doctors and 
officials did not invoke ideas of racial or civilizational hierarchy. Chinese official discourse went 
to length to nip that kind of language in the bud to avoid comparisons to European colonialism or 
Soviet chauvinism. Instead, they used tropes such as yijiaren (“one family”) and qinxiongdi 
(“close as brothers”) to claim affinity and equality with recipients of aid.79 This idealism and the 
medical practices informed by it crystallized into what I call Maoist humanitarianism. This 
dissertation is dedicated to tracing the meanings of this idea, and suggests how the PRC—
without officially using the term to label its medical aid missions—carved out an alternative and 
competing model that differed from the Western-dominated global humanitarian regime.  
 
Were Chinese Doctors Medical Missionaries?   
China’s medical aid program represents a significant type of international medical 
cooperation for its long-time commitment to strengthening human resources across Africa. 
Intellectual labor was central to its mode of operation, in which medical teams were deployed to 
receiving countries for a two-year term. The socialist regime mobilized its manpower and 
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supplied it as a resource “in kind” to compensate for its technological and financial limitations 
compared with other foreign donors in Africa.  
While working with ideological guidelines stipulated by the state, individual men and 
women health personnel were nonetheless not merely acted upon. This dissertation explores the 
lived experiences of Chinese health personnel, who, as medical specialists, state agents, and 
travelers across national and cultural boundaries, worked with sick people in remote parts of the 
world away from home and stretched the traditional boundaries of a doctor’s role in China as 
caregiver to encompass the uncharted domain of missionary in the post-colonial setting.  
The Chinese missions recruited a sizable group of doctors, nurses, medical technicians, 
and assistant staff including translators and chefs. Between 1963 and 1992, a total of 2,034 
health personnel and assistant staff were deployed to Algeria on medical teams. Of them, 157 
went twice and 6 for a third time during this period. According to the Hubei provincial health 
bureau, these personnel were dispatched in 15 missions in 49 batches, members of each batch 
ranging from 8 to 90 with the median at 47.80 Gender distribution did not constitute a special 
concern, as official name lists do not bother to indicate sexes yet each batch contains some 
apparently female names.81 The second team (in Saïda, Dec.1965- Sept.1968), for example, 
included 10 women members out of the total 33. Some of them filled the positions of midwives 
and nurses—deeply feminized professions in China—but there were also women doctors. A 
woman internist was recruited to the team “to more easily approach women patients.”82 While 
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convenience in interactions with women patients was a concern especially in obstetrics and 
gynecology, the gender distribution of Chinese teams was more of a reflection of China’s 
domestic status of medical profession. Teams were young in terms of the average age of health 
professionals. The majority of the second team averaged around 35 years old in a range from 25 
to 42. The team leader was older but presumably a party cadre rather than a medical specialist.83 
Mission members were carefully selected to ensure their loyalty to the party line. Out of the 33 
members of the second team, 21 were members of either the CCP or the Communist Youth 
League, one was from a member party of the United Front, and the other 11 were categorized as 
being of the “masses.”84  
China’s medical missions have been predominantly organized on the level of subnational 
governments (i.e., provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions), thus the doctors sent to 
Algeria were mostly from the Hubei Province which was paired with Algeria.85 Out of the 2,203  
deployments in the first three decades, only 20 were from the Ministry of Health and 83 from 
other provinces (mainly Shanghai). Initially, mission members were recruited from the three 
medical schools and their affiliated hospitals in the provincial capital, Wuhan: Hubei Provincial 
Medical College, Wuhan Medical College, and Hubei College of Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM). From the second team onwards, the candidate pool was expanded to district and city-
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level hospitals as a result of the scarcity of both professionally and politically qualified health 
personnel. Over the years, Wuhan (298 deployments), Jingzhou District (141), and Xiaogan 
District (127) ranked as the top senders in the category of administrative units. Meanwhile, the 
major hospitals in Wuhan continued to play a crucial role in supplying human resources—Union 
Hospital (133), Tongji Hospital (124), Hubei Provincial Medical College’s First Affiliated 
Hospital (117), Second Affiliated Hospital (114), and Hubei TCM College Affiliated Hospital 
(111).86 Although the Chinese missions provided rudimentary medical care in remote areas in 
Algeria, implementing the health care mode of “barefoot doctor,” the practitioners were mostly 
properly trained professionals—not “barefoot doctors”—from Hubei’s best reservoirs of medical 
personnel. In the spirit of addressing a wide range of medical concerns, each team was composed 
of specialists in diversified branches of medicine or with different focuses. Among the nine 
internists in the second team, there were a cardiologist, an epidemiologist, and specialists in 
blood diseases, digestive and respiratory diseases, and diabetes. Three midwives from district 
hospitals were specifically included on the team to “deal with obstructed labors in complicated 
and tough situations” in medical visits to pastoral regions.87 The second and third teams (August 
1968-April 1971) both had specialists in internal medicine, surgery, OB-GYN, pediatrics, ENT, 
eye, radiology, anesthesiology, and acupuncture, as well as pharmacy, laboratory, and nursing.88 
The inclusion of this broad range of specialties continued, and expanded when demand arose, 
such as in the sixth team (1974-77) to which TB physicians and dermatologists were added.89   
 
86 “Appendix I,” in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei. 
87 HPA, SZ115-1-543-1, March 26, 1966. 
88 For the second team, see HPA, SZ115-1-543-1, March 26, 1966. For the third team, see HPA, SZ115-1-
565-3, September 1, 1967. 




I have avoided using the loaded term “missionary” to label the Chinese mission doctors, 
but there was indeed an undeniably intense association between their medical activities and 
ideological impetus, which was analogous to missionary medicine that saw healing and social 
amelioration infusing each other. Neither would Chinese discourses the Chinese equivalent of 
“missionary,” chuanjiaoshi (literally, a person who preaches a religion), to describe the mission 
participants, because missionaries are not only commonly associated with Christianity but have 
also been accused by the communist regime as “a tool of imperialist aggression against China.”90 
Official narratives remain silent about the paradox between the predominant view of missionary 
imperialism in the Chinese communist historiography and the action of sending China’s own 
medical teams (yiliao dui, addressed by Algerians as “la mission médicale chinoise”)91 to 
African countries left by European colonists with the goal of promoting China’s socialist 
ideology. But for us to understand medical missions sent by a former semi-colony to post-
colonial Africa with which it claimed a shared past, we cannot easily dispense with either 
China’s own experience with Protestant medical missionaries during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries or the coeval African encounters with European missionaries. As a full 
comparative review of China versus Africa in the colonial encounters and Chinese missions 
versus Protestant ones would stretch beyond the bounds of manageability, I will focus here on 
the side of proselytizers, and on several major aspects in which the Chinese broke away from the 
 
90 Major Chinese dictionaries (for example, Xinhua zidian v4Q  and Hanyu dacidian ÇLÎ ) 
explain “chuanjiaoshi” in relation to the preaching of Christianity. For a brief overview of the Chinese 
historiography of missionaries in China since the nineteenth century, see Jifeng Liu and Chris White, 
“Consuming Missionary Legacies in Contemporary China: Eric Liddell and Evolving Interpretations of 
Chinese Christian History,” China Information 33, no.1 (2018): 48-51. 
91 In Arabic, the medical mission is called “ ةیبطلا ةثعبلا ” (albiethat altibiya, medical delegation), which has 
nothing to do with ریشبت / رشبم  (tabshir, preaching/ mubashir, preacher). It seems like the ambiguity is only in 





norms of Euro-American medical missionaries, and thus did not fall squarely into the 
conventional category of “missionary.” 
The Chinese missions to Algeria share a number of similarities with Protestant 
missionary activities in China: the appeal to people living on the margins of the society (i.e., 
rural population in the Chinese case); the importance of curative effects as engines of broadening 
the appeal (chapters 2 and 3); the popularization of the medicine they used as a more lasting 
legacy of their missions—be it acupuncture or certain aspects of biomedicine; the disinterest in 
acquiring a knowledge of local medical cultures; the use of the experience of mission medicine 
in the production and reaffirmation of a new globalized system of medical knowledge; the 
compassion for suffering people and the moral imperative they felt to provide good medical care; 
the awareness of the need to develop sustainable working ties with people in the host society; the 
portrayal of their results and the gratitude shown by their patients for domestic audiences in a 
favorable and dramatized light; yet, the inability to control the meanings their work took on for 
its indigenous audience; and their role in the political expansion of the state authority to which 
they answered.  
At the same time, the differences are more striking: Chinese mission members generally 
lacked privately driven motivation for proselytizing socialist ideology at a level comparable to 
Christian missionaries’ religious fervor for conversion. To be sure, both Chinese and Western 
missionaries were a disparate collection of individuals with the whole range of human strengths 
and weaknesses, and neither formed a united front of socialist or Christian faith. The Chinese 
missions, however, were short of individual voluntarism and were rather solely driven by a 
domineering state. Often forcefully recruited onto medical teams, the doctors were instructed to 




benevolence. Many of them indeed internalized the official rhetoric and interpreted new 
information about the world through Maoist ideology. Yet the ultimate lack of immediate 
benefits to the participants—whether economic, professional, or otherwise—in such a collective 
socialist agenda became clearer abroad, where mind control and monitoring were relatively 
loosened. This individual disinvestment eventually undermined the goals of the mission. The 
Chinese doctors did not share Christian missionaries’ belief in a moral duty to explore the world. 
This lack of internal motivation manifested itself, for example, in the doctors’ satisfaction with 
learning a mere smattering of local language and culture. Over the years, they relied on Algerian 
nurses to translate for patients who spoke colloquial Arabic. Meanwhile, the doctors also spoke 
little French, barely enough to perform their work. In stark contrast, Christian missionaries were 
well known for their efforts at communication because presenting their messages in vernacular 
languages was at the heart of the missionary enterprise. Therefore, although the Chinese missions 
worked in day-to-day contact with the local lower and middle classes, they regrettably did not 
leave many high-quality accounts from which to speculate about the “subaltern” perspective of 
the patients they treated. 
Chinese mission doctors thus exhibited a strangely ambiguous persona. On the one hand, 
they presented themselves to be internationalists, genuinely serving the poor of the brotherly 
African allies of China and bringing about changes which would improve local quality of life. 
On the other hand, they maintained a distance from local societies in realms beyond medical 
activities, which accounted for the absence of large-scale resistance from the African part. When 
some of the doctors did attempt to propagate Maoist thought at a time when the disorders of the 




summer of 1967),92 their actions were limited to distributing pamphlets, badges, and copies of 
the Little Red Book among their patients and hospital colleagues. Compared to European 
missionaries, Chinese mission doctors were less possessed of a moral self-righteousness. Or, they 
were less overt in passing judgment on local norms and values. Because they always refrained 
from open criticism about the host society (in contrast to their attitudes toward the competitors 
from the Soviet Bloc), we can only catch a glimpse of their sense of developmental superiority 
through their boasting about their work ethics and the morality of Maoist humanitarianism in 
their reports to superiors in China.  
This tangled position of Chinese mission doctors should not be viewed in isolation from 
their professional status in China. In many ways, their activities were constrained by it and 
served in its interest. Similar to their counterparts in the Soviet Union, Chinese doctors did not 
constitute a “free” professional group and enjoyed no autonomy professionally, economically, or 
politically. The elimination of the private sector forced doctors into state organs, becoming 
salaried state employees who lacked control over the health care system’s orientation or the 
collective power to negotiate with the state. Rather than a member of a medical society, a doctor 
in socialist China was identified more crucially as a member of a certain medical work unit 
(danwei). Nor did doctors independently formulate professional codes of practice; instead, the 
regime stipulated professional ethics for them—“to serve for proletarian politics.”93 Doctors 
 
92 For an overview of how Chinese foreign policy was affected by the Cultural Revolution from 1965-67, see 
Thomas Robinson, “China confronts the Soviet Union: warfare and diplomacy on China's Inner Asian 
frontiers,” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol.15, eds. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 231-248; and the former Chinese foreign minister, Huang 
Hua ï4’s memoir, “Wenge shiqi de huangdan waijiao” uèx|¡¸ÆJ [Absurd Diplomacy during 
the Cultural Revolution], Wanbao wencui you»[Evening Paper Digest] 5 (2015):18. 
93 On (medical) professionalism in socialist China, see Deborah Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban 
China: Training, Hiring, and Promoting Urban Professionals and Managers after 1949,” Modern China 26, 
no.3 (2000): 251-275; Robert J. Blendon, “Can China’s Health Care Be Transplanted without China’s 




acted as the product and proxy of a Chinese socialist politics and intellectual milieu on the one 
hand, and on the other, used their missions far removed from the center to carefully negotiate 
professional norms, standards, and the authority of their knowledge. 
The ebbs and flows of the medical aid program—its beginning, design, finance flows, 
structural changes, and ideological orientations and reorientations—were primarily shaped by 
China’s politics and its changing relationships with the two superpowers and host countries. At 
the same time, a nuanced approach to the lives and experiences of the mission doctors reveals 
that this Cold War story of medical aid was not a simple tale of global powers and local players 
but reflected an interplay of medical humanitarianism, encounters with ordinary people 
possessing their own voices, misunderstandings, missed and seized opportunities, and the 
interests and perceptions of local and international audiences.  
 
Structure 
This dissertation focuses on the two decades from 1963 to 1984, during which China was 
still a socialist country struggling with the configuration of the global international system. At 
this time, China’s health care institutions were situated in a planned economy with tight control 
of intellectual and material resources. The year 1985 marked the official collapse of socialist 
medicine in China and the beginning of an overhaul of its health system to for-profit status, one 
of the Deng era’s several dramatic free-market reforms. But like in any periodization, the time 
frame is more for convenience than definitive. As such, readers will find some of the sources I 
 
î, “Jindai yilai zhongguo yisheng zhiye yu guojia guanxi de yanbian” ÑE2´ET¬
¡;—¦´¤R¡ÁØ [The changing relationship between Chinese urban medical profession and 
the state since the republican period: from the perspective of the sociology of professions], Shehuixue yanjiu 




use date to a few more years into the late 1980s, and some turning points in the program’s 
ideological, financial, and structural reorientations actually occurred before 1984. The chapters 
of this dissertation overall follow a chronological order, starting from the program’s inception 
and evolving as it unfolded. As the period covered is short and largely coherent from the vantage 
point of China’s socialist medical intervention in Algeria, the middle chapters are structured 
thematically.  
The chapters interweave the writings of mission doctors and journalists, circulars and 
documents of health departments, and my interviews with former mission members and 
observations in acupuncture clinics. Chapter 1 sets the stage by discussing the politics of Chinese 
medical missions in the Mao era through the recruitment and training of mission doctors. China’s 
first medical mission to newly decolonized Algeria in 1963 heralded Mao’s ambition to make 
China’s socialist medicine capable of serving as a “world medicine,” and to forge a geopolitical 
confederation of Third World countries with China at its head. While a form of health diplomacy 
in the Cold War, it should also be considered within the framework of the emerging global 
concept of humanitarianism. I examine how doctors, who were often forcefully sent to missions, 
appropriated Mao’s concept of “revolutionary humanitarianism” to negotiate the revolutionary 
politics of the era that generated an overwhelming focus on “redness.” This chapter introduces 
the impact of ideology and political power on knowledge production.  
Chapter 2 examines the early encounters of Chinese doctors and Algerian patients in a 
pastoral region in Algeria and highlights the ethical component of Chinese socialist medicine. 
The Chinese teams distinguished themselves from other foreign medical missions by providing 
health care in the way characteristic of China’s socialist medicine. Their practices included 




improvising treatments by moving across boundaries of medical systems, all of which was 
derived from the primacy of the Maoist ideals of primary health care as a new principle of 
socialist medicine. 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore an important technological component of socialist medicine, the 
“new acupuncture,” including its reconfiguration in Algeria. Chapter 3 discusses both the 
practice of acupuncture and the formation of a Chinese medical discourse about a receptive 
Algerian body, which speculated about an association between acupuncture and race. It also 
examines the rise of a political discourse of acupuncture’s legitimacy through the making and 
circulation of stories of miraculous cures in Algeria. Chapter 4 shifts the site of medical 
encounters to that between Chinese doctors and Algerian nurses. By analyzing a training course 
of acupuncture-moxibustion (acu-moxa) offered in the Hospital of Médéa, this chapter shows the 
refashioning of acu-moxa during its transmission from Chinese teachers to Algerian students in 
circumstances of scarcity and a redrawing of boundaries around proper practices of socialist 
medicine.  
Chapter 5 takes a step away from the practices of medical missions to examine medical 
industrial technology that constituted a material component of China’s self-reliant socialist 
medical system. By examining a project of building a surgery supplies factory in Algeria from 
1974 to 1980, this chapter uncovers a failed Chinese attempt to produce medical supplies locally 
and build a medical industry in Algeria along the Chinese model. The various problems that 
emerged during the process of negotiation between the two parties revealed issues inherent in the 
Chinese project of exporting its health care model, and signaled a change ushering in a new 




CHAPTER ONE:  
 
Mission Assembled: The Politics of Revolutionary Humanitarianism 
 
 
“The proletariat can finally emancipate itself only with the 
emancipation of all mankind.” 
—A Chinese rendition of a quote from the 
Manifesto of the Communist Party that was the 
best-known idea of Karl Marx during the Cultural 
Revolution1 
 
In April 1963, Wei Jinyuan ŦŌ/ received a last-minute notice from the Party leadership of 
his work unit, the First Affiliated Hospital of Wuhan Medical College, informing him of his 
assignment to the first medical mission to Algeria, which was to leave in three days’ time. Thus 
began his three adventures to Algeria between 1963 and 1982. Twenty years later at the Second 
National Medical Aid Conference in Beijing, the radiologist recalled how, over two decades, he 
had departed home three times and spent seven years in Algeria:  
In April 1963, the Party informed me to join the Chinese medical aid team to Algeria. At 
that time, although I was only at the age of 39, I had elders and children [to take care of], and the 
six of my family across three generations crammed in a small apartment. I could not put the weight 
off my mind. But I required myself to behave as a Party member and did not ask for any benefit for 
exchange from the Party. On the third day after receiving the notice, [I] happily set forth.  
In September 1970, the Party sent me to Algeria to work for a second time according to the 
work demand overseas. This was a task given to me without any prior mental preparation. My 
thoughts were very contradictory. On the one hand, I had tasted the various feelings of being abroad 
during my first two-year tenure in Algeria. On the inside [to tell the truth], being alone abroad has 
many aspects of inconvenience. On the other hand, my wife was not well and relatively old in age. 
All of the housework would fall on her shoulder, so [I] could not help but worry about [her and 
home]. However, I thought of the Canadian Communist, Comrade Bethune, who came from 
thousands of miles far to China to help with work and devoted his precious life to the liberation 
cause of the Chinese people. I am a Chinese Communist Party member. To aid the Algerian people 
is my bounded duty to proletarian internationalism. I unloaded a burden off my mind, and happily 
set forth to Algeria for a second time.  
When I was asked to go for a third time, I was nearly sixty with greying temples. This time, 
the obstacle was different from that of the previous two. Considering that I was getting old, I was 
 
1 This is a summary. The original text is “…the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain 
its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, 
and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinction, and class 




worried that I could not fulfill this glorious yet onerous task that my superiors entrusted to me in 
Algeria. With care and support of the hospital Party and administration superiors and my family, 
and holding the good wishes to contribute to the “Four Modernizations” and aiding world 
revolutions, in November 1980, along with other mission members, I travelled across oceans for 
the third time to serve the Algerian people again.2  
     
Wei’s experience of being brought onto the mission with only three-days’ notice was similar to 
Xu Xianze’s experience (see Introduction). They were not army doctors but ordinary 
professionals working at civilian hospitals. Yet they had no other choice but to accept the orders 
that unexpectedly befell upon them. Xu was forced to leave behind his wife who was 7 months 
pregnant without knowing the baby’s gender. Wei was compelled to leave his whole family to 
his wife to take care of. On the inside, Wei could hardly have been “happy” each time he set off. 
Yet he skillfully chose to paint his distress and complaints as obstacles to be overcome in his 
capacity as a qualified Party member. He learned to mobilize the ideological rhetoric of 
“proletarian internationalism,” “supporting world revolutions,” and “serving the people” to claim 
credit for his sacrifices for the government program. He concluded his report by reaffirming that 
it was his “biggest happiness to contribute to the Sino-Algerian friendship” and further expressed 
his determination to “happily” take a fourth term “if the Party and Motherland need [him] to go 
abroad again.” To an extent, Wei’s assertion of his passion and motivation was formulaic, a 
product of the mindset and rhetorical choices that had been shaped by political indoctrination. 
His distress, however, appeared genuine and was indeed shared among his fellows and followers. 
The sentiment of deprivation that he attempted to underplay revealed the painful truth: the 
inhumanity underlying humanitarian missions that is often overlooked.  
I take Wei’s account as a point of departure to question the humanitarian nature of the 
Chinese medical aid mission to Africa in its first two decades (1963-1983). Sending medical 
 




specialists and providing free medical supplies to resource-poor countries in Africa was 
doubtless a humanitarian action, as it forwarded care to people of color living beyond China’s 
borders. It entailed, however, sacrifices that were forcefully imposed on the mission members 
and their families. In analyzing debates within the executive committee of Doctors Without 
Borders (MSF) about whether to withdraw a team in Baghdad right before the American 
invasion in 2003, Didier Fassin argues that humanitarian intervention inevitably involves making 
choices between lives to be saved and lives to be risked, between causes to be defended and 
causes to be left aside. Recognizing the inherent inequality of lives, he proposes the concept 
“politics of life”—a politics that “give[s] specific value and meaning to human life”—to push us 
to ponder how and why certain choices are made at the expense of others.3 To be sure, the 
situation under review here was not as intense as the dilemma of life or death in Fassin’s case 
study, but his concept provides a good entry point for us to consider the political work of China’s 
medical humanitarianism in Africa. The medical aid program not only served China’s 
geopolitical interests but also informed the Chinese state’s “politics of life,” which treated 
individual doctors as expendable and defended its cause by producing representations of African 
patients in need. 
An interrogation of the humanitarian ethics of China’s medical aid on the level of 
individual lives is one goal of this chapter. Another goal is to look at the medical aid program as 
a whole to examine how the Chinese government and mission doctors interpreted the 
relationship of the medical mission to ideas of humanitarianism. Current literature on the 
intellectual history of Chinese humanitarianism is mainly divided into two trends. First, in the 
 
3 Didier Fassin, “Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life,” Public Culture 19, no.3 (2007): 499-520. The quote 




early 1980s, debates on humanitarianism came from a Marxist perspective. Wang Ruoshui óĞ
Ý (1926-2002), the foremost ideologue of Marxist humanism (and the corollary concept of 
humanitarianism), sought to return to Marx’s texts to bring a humanist interpretation into 
Chinese socialist doctrines. While he rejected Mao’s view that human nature was defined only 
by class, he still proposed a “socialist humanitarianism” freed from the hold of the bourgeoisie.4 
A second trend burgeoning in the twenty-first century is devoted to tracing convergences 
between Confucianism and modern Western humanitarian ideals. In serving the renewed 
political interest in Confucianism, Chinese scholars argue that elements of Western humanitarian 
values, for example, the idea of “benevolence,” are deeply rooted in native cultural traditions.5    
There are three notable gaps in this literature that this chapter seeks to address. First, the 
socialist period prior to the 1980s remains largely unexplored due to a pervasive official distrust 
of the Western bourgeois ideas of humanitarianism and fear of its challenge to the regime. 
Nevertheless, continuous renegotiations of Chinese humanitarian sentiments and political 
traditions with European definitions since the late nineteenth century did not simply come to a 
halt during the Mao era. The Chinese Red Cross Society continued to function, though it was 
tightly regulated; the Chinese medical society upheld “revolutionary humanitarianism” as its 
motto. This chapter examines the period of the 1960s-70s to offer a historical perspective of how 
 
4 See Wang Ruoshui’s anthology, Wei rendaozhuyi bianhu !ńĸ¬ [In Defense of Humanism], 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1986), especially the four essays from pp. 200-274. 
5 For example, see Chen Ming ŘÀ and Yang Xinli Î.ā, Zhongguo chuantong wenhua zhong de 
rendaozhuyi g(Ē·Kû!ń [Humanism in traditional Chinese culture] (Beijing: Huaxia 
chubanshe, 1996). Western sinologists also contribute to this trend by exploring Confucian and Daoist 
dimensions of humaneness in Chinese philosophy and history. See for example, Carmen Meinert ed., Traces of 
Humanism in China: Tradition and Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Also, for a good 
comparative review of humanitarianism in East Asia, see Pichamon Yeophantong, “Understanding 
Humanitarian Action in East and Southeast Asia,” Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: 




contemporary norms and standards in Chinese humanitarianism evolved from Maoist 
understandings. A second gap is that both trends of the existing scholarship share an underlying 
assumption of Chinese exceptionalism, whether by emphasizing the Chinese characteristics of 
Marxism or by identifying a Chinese origin of similar values and logics. My case study, 
however, shows that the communist government largely kept in line with international norms in 
its practices despite its discursive rejection of Western humanitarian ideologies. Thirdly, whereas 
the current scholarship is marked by philosophical discussions among humanities scholars, my 
approach is more concerned with how humanitarianism in China was shaped by its actors and in 
turn guided their actions in specific contexts.         
This chapter argues that the Chinese government and mission doctors diverged in their 
treatment of humanitarianism. Chinese officials were unwilling to embrace the term 
“humanitarianism” given the term’s close relationship with “humanism,” which smacked of 
bourgeois liberalism. Rather, they substituted “proletarian internationalism” for 
“humanitarianism” to characterize the mission and mobilize morale. Chinese doctors, however, 
appropriated and upheld Mao’s term “revolutionary humanitarianism” as their motto, which, in 
my view, constituted the socialist medical ethics. I argue that the doctors defined “revolutionary 
humanitarianism” as a concept modeled after Norman Bethune and based on a principle of 
serving the “people.” In doing so, they sought to lift out an ideological defense for their expertise 
in a period where “redness” was a criterion privileged over technical expertise. While I hold the 
argument true for Chinese doctors in general, I also perceive it particularly relevant for the 
mission doctors, who were able to use this concept of “revolutionary humanitarianism” to carve 
out a strategy to negotiate an overbearing state that did not give them much choice in terms of 




This chapter develops its arguments by tracing the process of recruiting and training 
mission members. The first section explores the recruitment procedure for mission doctors, 
which was a rather rigid bureaucratic process of classifying and credentialing medical personnel, 
without special reference to any humanitarian ideals. The doctors had little control of their 
assignments, yet found opportunities to capitalize on to gain fringe benefits. The second section, 
by examining the content of pre-mission trainings, analyzes the geopolitical context of the 
mission to Algeria and argues that the Chinese government understood humanitarianism in terms 
of socialist internationalism and solidarity. China sent the medical aid mission with the ultimate 
goal of carving out a space outside the US and Soviet dominions and mobilizing ordinary 
Chinese health workers for continuous revolution. The third section shifts perspective to medical 
personnel and explores how they defined revolutionary humanitarianism by interpreting Dr. 
Bethune’s experience in wartime China. My discussion revolves around two questions that the 
doctors had: “whom to serve” and “how to serve.” I argue that the doctors mobilized the Maoist 
concept of “revolutionary humanitarianism” to construct a medical ethics tailored to the political 
aesthetics of Maoist revolutions. They also expanded the common understanding of expertise to 
include improvisation and localization. In the end, this chapter demonstrates that the Maoist 
strand of humanitarianism—conceptually developed by the Chinese doctors who also put it into 
practice—was a historically contingent array of moral, medical, and logistical practices that were 
intertwined with politics, power, and ethics.    
 
Recruitment: A Humanitarian Mission without Volunteers   
While Wei and his fellow mission members were caught completely off guard when they 




what they did not know is that the last-minute decision came as a result of a year-long search for 
proper mission carriers.6 After receiving the request for a medical aid team from the Algerian 
government in 1962, the Ministry of Health assigned to the Hubei provincial health department a 
personnel quota, with specific instructions about the desired medical specialties, the expertise 
level, and the numbers of doctors needed for each specialty. The department committed five 
hospitals affiliated with Wuhan Medical College, Hubei Provincial Medical College and the 
Hubei TCM College to search for candidates.7 Next, these candidates were investigated by party 
personnel cadres in their work units and departments of public security, without their knowledge. 
This investigation process took up the majority of the time of the selection process, during which 
investigators would do field trips to other provinces to verify information. After local reviews, 
the investigation materials were sent to the Ministry of Health for final approval. The year-long 
search led to a 13-member list in March 1963 and an additional 11-member list a couple of 
months later to form the first mission to Algeria.8 It was not until the decision was informed in 
private when the recruited came to know their assignment. Their colleagues were still kept in the 
dark. In retrospect, the ones who were chosen had expressed publicly that they were eager to 
 
6 HPA, SZ115-1-433-3, June 16, 1964. This document indicates the duration it took to compile the first team. 
This fact however contradicts the health official Ms. Qian Junqi’s account. She recalls that the Chinese 
Ministry of Health received the request for medical aid from the Algerian Minister of Health Dr. Mohamed 
Seghir Nekkache (1918-2010) in mid-December, 1962. See Yang Zhenglian ÎÕĢ and Guo Linghe ň<
ŧ, “Shouzhi yuanwai yiliaodui de beifei suiyue” ţ°¯kN÷ŔûLŝÄ [The years of the first foreign 
medical aid team in North Africa], zhongguo xinwen zhoukan g¹œaA [China Newsweek], China 
Newsweek, April 16, 2012, 84. The former account is more reliable in reference with other sources. 
7 For the later missions, area hospitals (zhuanqu yiyuan MNŚ) were also mobilized to send mission 
doctors. “Area” was an administrative unit that covered several counties. The unit was canceled gradually 
during the 1980s and 90s. 
8 The first team was comprised of ten members from Hubei, four from Beijing, one from Tianjin, four from 
Shanghai, two from Nanjing, one from Shenyang, one from Changchun, and one from Hunan. See Hubei 
sheng zhi: Weisheng îLý·Qö [Gazetteer of Hubei Province: Health], vol. 2 (Wuhan: Hubei renmin 




help advance the health conditions of Algerians. However, it is patently clear that they were not 
volunteers for this government-organized international medical mission.  
Chinese doctors had little choice on their part. In China’s socialist structure of society, 
the life and career of urban employees was bound to their “work unit,” or danwei—in this case, a 
hospital or medical college.9 Unless the chosen doctors had a compelling reason to refuse, they 
had to accept the decision and serve in Africa. Moreover, they were not allowed to bring their 
families with them. It is not uncommon that couples who were both doctors served on medical 
missions, yet they were always sent on separate ones.10 Fringe benefits might be offered to aid 
doctors or their family in return, but these did not come by default. The journalist Alan 
Hutchison calls the Chinese aid in Africa during the 1960s-70s “a commitment to sacrifice” in 
the sense that it was economically non-productive.11 The Chinese government’s anxiety to 
compete with the Soviet Union—and to a lesser extent with Taiwan—for African affection not 
only committed large amounts of capital investment, but also human capital. The doctors, among 
other aid experts in agriculture and industry, were considered expendable in the wider context of 
building the China-Africa alliance. Little consideration was given to the doctors’ own 
preferences; and they were indoctrinated to believe in their internationalist duty and perform 
activities of self-sacrifice.  
 
9 For a good overview and analysis of the life and work in the Hubei Provincial Medical College and its 
teaching hospital as a “work unit” between November 1979 and March 1980, see Gail Henderson and Myron 
Cohen, The Chinese Hospital: A Socialist Work Unit (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
10 I met two couples from Wuhan, the four of whom all went on medical missions but separately. I’ve never 
encountered any doctor couple working at the same time on a team either in files or interviews. Personal 
interviews with Dr. Feng Hongzhi and his wife Dr. Luo Changxian; Dr. Guo Yude and his wife Dr. Cao 
Xiujuan. August 2017. 




This section explores doctors’ involuntary enrollment in the medical mission. It first 
analyzes how the mission, first impromptu in nature, was quickly institutionalized by health 
cadres’ employment of China’s existent bureaucratic procedures of credentialing personnel. The 
predominant emphasis on political credentials, especially between 1966 and 1972, caused 
adverse events in medical treatment in Algeria. This section then shifts to the perspective of 
doctors to discuss how they used the enforced chance to work abroad to negotiate for greater 
personal benefits. I argue that neither the recruiters, nor the recruited, thought it in terms of 
humanitarianism when they first came into the program. 
 
Assembling an Impromptu Team 
The assemblage of the first team was an ad hoc response to an Algerian request, the 
process of which entailed many impromptu initiatives. The Chinese government did not have a 
prior vision to instrumentalize medical missions despite its growing interests in the continent 
after the Sino-Soviet split. There were some precedents of sending civil medical teams to 
neighboring countries such as one in a China-aided hospital in Mongolia from 1957.12 But no 
clear political agenda was in place nor had an institutional establishment been set up to systemize 
the management of aid missions. The organization of the first team was thus an impromptu 
move, as questions such as which provinces should be involved, from where mission workers 
should be drawn, and how the mission should be advertised were all yet unanswered. In 1963, 
health officials treated the mission to Algeria as a one-time task, the duration of which was not 
decided at its commencement. Until June 1964, when medical teams were ready to set out to 
Zanzibar (from Jiangsu) and Somalia (from Shanghai), officials in the Ministry of Health were 
 




still uncertain whether a second team to Algeria should be sent or which province in China 
should take up the mission if it was to occur. Nonetheless, health officials at the ministerial and 
provincial level had developed an awareness that foreign activities of China’s health sector, 
especially medical aid missions, would see large increases. Their anticipation mounted during 
China’s active expansion of connections with the decolonizing world, especially after Premier 
Zhou Enlai’s historic tour of ten African countries from December 13, 1963 to February 4, 1964 
which promised more Chinese aid to Africa.13   
Although no archival documents are available to tell us how the first team was 
assembled, accounts of the mission from decades later offer some hints that allow us to speculate 
the extent of prudence exercised in the selection process as well as the experimental nature of 
organizing such a civil medical aid mission to a country geographically insensible to most 
Chinese. It is unclear why Hubei Province was designated as the main source pool for the first 
team. In September 1962, six months after Algeria’s independence from France, China signed an 
aid agreement about sending a medical team.14 A Chinese health delegation of five members 
took a three-week tour of Algeria starting on 5 March 1963 to obtain a concrete sense of the 
country’s health conditions and demands, and to discuss the details of a medical mission with the 
Algerian minster of health Dr. Mohamed Seghir Nekkache (1918-2010).15 At the time, Hubei 
might have not been the first choice for the Chinese Ministry of Health, because the delegation 
 
13 HPA, SZ115-1-433-3, June 16, 1964. 
14 See Jiang Huajie ĥPÏ, “Zhongguo yuanfei yiliaodui lishi de zaikaocha” g¯ŝN÷ŔSZû7ė
z [A re-investigation into the history of China’s medical aid teams in Africa], Waijiao pinglun kįĬ 
[Foreign Affairs Review] 4 (2015): 62, n.4. 
15 “ رئازجلاب عیباسأ ةثالث میقت ةینیص ةیبط ةثعب ” [A Chinese medical delegation stays in Algeria for three weeks], 




was led by a vice president of Xi’an Medical College (Shaanxi Province). It was only after the 
delegation’s return to China that its deputy head Tan Taijie Ĳäŕ, a vice director of the 
Wuhan Municipal Health Bureau (Hubei Province), was appointed the head of the first medical 
team.16  
Whereas the health officials in 1963 were not yet certain how a civil medical mission to 
Algeria should be devised, they knew for certain that the candidates they were looking for should 
ideally combine professional and political credentials. The result of the search was a group of 
highly qualified specialists—perhaps the team that best balanced the two merits until the end of 
the Mao era. Out of the total 24, ten members were from the major hospitals in Wuhan, Hubei.17 
Among the provinces, Hubei possessed a relatively better reservoir of medical personnel, which 
likely accounts for its inclusion in the first mission. Mission members from Hubei were mostly 
selected from the three medical schools and their attached hospitals in the provincial capital 
Wuhan: Hubei Provincial Medical College, Wuhan Medical College, and Hubei TCM College. 
Among them, Wuhan Medical College was developed out of the Tongji Medical School 
relocated from Shanghai in 1952. At the time of the relocation, the school was one of the top two 
medical education institutions in China, the other being Peking Union Medical College. During 
the 1960s-70s, doctors moving from Shanghai dominated the school. Among them were the 
leading medical experts in China at the time.18 In the selection process, candidates were limited 
to attending physicians and chief doctors with college degrees. To make sure that the mission 
 
16 Shaanxi Province has since never become involved in the missions to Algeria. Instead, it started to send 
medical teams to Sudan in April 1971 and continues until today. 
17 HPA, SZ115-1–543-1, March 26, 1966. 
18 Personal interview with Dr. Wei Fengpo and his daughter Dr. Wei Bo at their apartment in Guangzhou, 




doctors were more than competent for their work, they were recruited to fill positions that 
required lower qualifications. According to Ms. Chen Jinrong ŘŌġ, the personnel cadre in 
charge of the selection from the Personnel Office of the Hubei Provincial Department of Health, 
“an attending physician was assigned to the position of a resident, and a young surgeon was to 
act the role of nurse.”19    
Equally importantly, the aid doctors were to be politically reliable. For a government-
sponsored mission that offered the rare opportunity to work abroad and live among foreigners, 
the organizers were careful to recruit loyalists who did not stray from the party line. The 
uncertainties about the mission propelled them to impose an “extremely strict” political 
investigation, or zhengshen (³w). Political investigation was a common method of state 
surveillance and control from the 1950s through the 1980s, when the Communist Party dug into 
the family backgrounds and connections of every Chinese citizen to determine their political 
suitability. The specific criteria used for investigating candidates included “no connections with 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; no historical problems of any immediate family members; no 
complicated social relations; good performance in the daily life, positive work attitude, and no 
malpractice.” Chen recalls that “at least three generations [of the candidate] (which means up to 
the generation of the person’s grandparents) were investigated. Any little [negative] finding 
would disqualify [the person] and every claim requires additional evidence to corroborate.”20 
 
19 Yang and Guo, “Shouzhi yiliaodui de beifei suiyue,” 85. 




Such extensive investigation inevitably involved collaboration with public security departments 
which sent officers to the candidate’s birth places to verify information.21 
The recruiters quickly realized the difficulty in finding qualified mission doctors. 
Political investigation was not new to the Party’s personnel officers who in fact developed 
investigative skills during a series of political campaigns. However, stringent guidelines of 
political investigations resulted in a trying situation in which few professionally excelled 
candidates passed the investigation while those who passed were not technically competent 
enough.22 In order to equip the first team with enough qualified members, the search extended 
beyond Wuhan to three other major urban centers—Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin—to form a 
team of only 24 members. The difficulty in assembling a mission of such a small size over such 
an extended period of time speaks volumes to the scarcity of medical intellectual resources that 
the Chinese state deemed reliable. It also reveals the precariousness of the mission organizers 
who were reluctant to venture sending “inappropriate” medical personnel abroad, which might 
affect their own careers. They had to tread a fine line between finding the attributes of redness 
and expertise in a candidate who would be suitable for any mission whose outlook was yet 
unclear.  
The method of assembling the first team set an example for the following missions. Yet 
intellectual resources became scarcer over the ensuing decade. After health officials exhausted 
resources across major urban centers and probably recruited the best candidates available for the 
first team to Algeria, they had to be more practical when the mission developed into a regular 
 
21 Qian Junqi, an official in the Ministry of Health, mentioned the involvement of public security in the secret 
investigations of the candidates in an interview. See Jiang, “Zhongguo yuanfei yiliaodui lishi de zaikaocha,” 
69, n.1. 




program and the Algerian demand for medical personnel increased over time. With the 
expansion of China’s medical aid program into more African and Latin American countries, an 
increasing number of provinces were involved and less inter-provincial support was available. 
For example, Hubei Province was assigned to partner with Algeria thereafter, with sporadic 
support from Shanghai only until 1974.23 In order to find enough mission doctors, radical 
criteria had to be compromised. In the end, many of those who did not pass the review for the 
first team were recruited on following missions.24 Doctors started to have some leverage in 
negotiating for their interests, though they remained mostly powerless as to whether, when, or 
where they were sent.    
 
Credentialing Mission Doctors  
The individual mission doctors had little power to influence the formation of a team, or 
design the goals and work plans of their mission. In contrast, health and party personnel cadres 
who were the mission organizers controlled the initial shape of the project by setting the 
eligibility standards and making decisions about who were qualified mission carriers. Their 
concerns and priorities directly shaped the politics of life for the mission members who had little 
decision-making power. Meanwhile, their decisions to send less skilled medical workers 
eventually boosted the likelihood that some unlucky patients would end up dealing with the 
consequences of serious, life-threatening mistakes. Here I will analyze a few examples of 
mission doctors’ recruitment to show how political criteria often overshadowed professional 
 
23 The support from Shanghai occurred mainly between 1972 and 1974 when medical teams from Shanghai 
ran two new posts in East Algeria. 




expertise in response to the vicissitudes of domestic political life. As a result, shifts in 
ideological priorities in China bore on actual medical practices in Algeria, and patients’ lives 
were often put at risk unnecessarily.    
After another team was sent to Zanzibar in August 1964, it became ever more likely that 
the medical aid program would continue to expand into other African countries. The Ministry of 
Health set some brief standards for recruitment as a step toward institutionalizing the 
management of the medical mission. To become eligible for an overseas mission, a doctor or 
medical technician had to meet the following criteria:  
* First, one should meet the political requirement for being eligible to travel abroad 
(depending on one’s personal history, family ties, and social relationship).25  
* Second, one should have adequate theoretical training and clinical experience [or 
have the potential for improvement]. 
* Third, one should have an adequate level of foreign language ability [or have the 
potential to reach this level with further study]. 
* Fourth, one should be physically healthy, morally upright, and suitable for engaging 
in activities of foreign affairs.26 
* Lastly, though not specified in any official document, one must have regular facial 
features and normal body growth; and a male candidate cannot be too short in height.27    
 
 
25 In 1965, the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCP issued 10-point standards for 
the political investigation of people who apply to travel abroad. The selection of medical mission candidates 
followed this regulation. See HPA, SZ115-1-565-3, attachment 2. 
26 The four criteria—political, technical, linguistic, and health-wise— remain in effect throughout the whole 
medical mission program and by extension, all of China’s foreign aid programs. But the specifics changed over 
time depending on how the criteria were interpreted. The version quoted here was used by the Ministry of 
Health in November 1964 in a circular to instruct several provincial health departments to select candidates to 
form a reserve team for the medical mission. I put the part of the content within brackets which were meant to 
apply to reserve personnel. See HPA, SZ115-2-706-5, November 25, 1964. 
27 The Shandong Provincial Health Department reported to the Ministry of Health that it excluded candidates 
who had deficiency in appearance during investigation. See the Ministry of Health Archives, 148-17-1983-D-
97-24, January 1983. The Liaison Bureau of the Ministry of Construction (ĈăŇ{kĈ«Çęđ~) 




These political, technical, linguistic, and bodily standards were only loosely sketched on paper, 
and remained—as a result of their elasticity—the guiding framework for selecting medical 
mission members until at least the mid-1980s. In a highly politicized era, sensitivity to one’s 
political positions was a strong component in the selection process. Premier Zhou Enlai assured a 
Sierra Leonian delegation in 1971 that “Chinese medical mission members must be both red and 
expert.”28 Balancing this political prerequisite with the rest of the criteria was a key dilemma of 
recruiters. Responding to changing political climate, the officials in charge translated the vague 
terms into specific standards that they could use to fill the assigned personnel quota. As it turned 
out, the overwhelming attention given to the political criterion markedly reduced the efficiency 
of the searches and bore much of the responsibility for the fluctuation of the quality of missions 
over the years. After all, the selection process was built on a bureaucratic system of classifying 
and credentialing individuals, with little concern for the mission’s particularities, but rather 
fraught with individual interests, factional conflicts, and officials’ perfunctoriness.   
The socialist ideal intellectual who was both “Red and expert” could hardly find its 
personification in real life. Indeed, the two attributes were in conflict in most cases and Chinese 
intellectuals were always positioned as the “other” of the party/state, since the Anti-Rightist 
movement from mid-1957. The convergence of Red and expert did not occur until toward the 
end of the 1970s when a new technocratic class, or “Red engineers,” emerged and took charge of 
enterprise and government offices.29 Medical doctors, as highly specialized professionals who 
received a better education—which was highly correlated with family wealth and thus “low” 
 
28 See Jiang, “Zhongguo yuanfei yiliaodui lishi de zaikaocha,” 69, n.4. 
29 See Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of the China’s New 




class origins in the CCP’s taxonomy of classes—had been a typical group of experts vulnerable 
within this “Red-over-expert” power structure.30 In 1964, the Ministry of Health decided to form 
a reserve team of 120 doctors in preparation for future medical missions, but the quota assigned 
to major cities were infrequently filled. Over a year later, Shanghai had only identified 10 
qualified doctors when the quota was 40. The ministry’s Party Leadership Group concluded that 
the difficulty in finding qualified doctors to be sent abroad originated from the “very bad 
political quality (zhengzhi zhiliang) of health technical cadres.” It stated that medical school 
graduates working in local civil hospitals “generally had low political quality,” because in the 
first place, “those who were able to pass entrance exams were in general low in political 
credentials,” and secondly, “the better ones among them were recruited first to the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and other ministries at the time of graduation.”31  
As a result of the Anti-Rightist movement, after 1958, the social significance of the class 
label (jieji chushenŕĊ>ķ, or family origins, jiating chengfeny¥@) took root in the 
minds of the general public.32 But the ebb and flow of class struggle left a grey area where many 
doctors from “bad” classes could survive class determinism and negotiate the image of their 
political reliability. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, personnel cadres were still careful to 
walk the line between the two poles of professional expertise and ideological commitment. An 
investigation file on a Dr. Luo, which survived the scrutiny of archivists, provides a glance into 
 
30 For a discussion of “Red and expert” in the medical field, see Christos Lynteris, The Spirit of Selflessness in 
Maoist China: Socialist Medicine and the New Man (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Chapter 3. 
31 HPA, SZ115-2-706-3, May 24, 1965. 
32 Gao Hua ťP, Shen fen he cha yi: 1949-1965 nian Zhongguo shehui de zhengzhi feng ceng ķ%c
1949-1965gĂ&û³â@ [Identity and difference: the political stratification of the Chinese 




how certain requirements were compromised while others were prioritized in less than ideal 
situations, which most academically trained doctors at the time would have faced.33 Dr. Luo was 
an attending orthopedic surgeon in the Second Attached Hospital of Wuhan Medical College. He 
was investigated in April-May 1966 for his eligibility to join a delegation of doctors to North 
Vietnam and the battlefield in the south. The delegation was organized by the Ministry of Health 
to observe first aid in battlefield and the military training of ABC protection (measures to 
prevent atomic, biological, and chemical threats and hazards).34 A personnel cadre at the 
hospital wrote following the conclusion of the investigation:  
Comrade Luo has a clear political history. In various political movements, he can stand 
firm, listen to the Party, implement the Party’s principles and policies, and understand 
correctly in the struggle against revisionism.  
His father joined the Nationalist Party in 1940 and served as a member of its district 
party committee until 1942. According to the field investigation, he was deemed an 
ordinary counterrevolutionary who had not incited any public anger nor had been punished 
[by the Public Security department]. Luo has a certain recognition of his father’s problems. 
His uncle is also a historical counterrevolutionary, but Luo has no connection with his 
uncle. 
According to the above findings, we conclude that, since he joined the Party in 1953, 
Comrade Luo has consistently performed well. He has taken a firm position and expressed 
correct views in various types of work. After discussion, we agree to send Luo abroad for 
the observation trip.35 
 
 
33 How the individual cases were handled in practice varied per the handler and the timing; moreover, the 
selection procedure was kept confidential and the personal files remain inaccessible if they still survive in the 
archives. Personal files are usually not transferred to a local archives center. They are kept in the archives 
office of the person’s work unit, and are discarded later in many cases. Personal files are not accessible in any 
Chinese archives unless they accidentally escaped the scrutiny of archivists. Historians of PRC have recently 
taken up “garbology” and use documents sold in flea markets to study the early PRC period. The pioneers in 
this area include Michael Schoenhals, Jeremy Brown, and my cohort at Columbia, Chris Chang. 
34 HPA, SZ115-1-528-1, July 24, 1966. 




The personnel cadre was well-acquainted with the genre of investigation material 
writing.36 He (who signed off with a male name) identified what was considered to be the most 
pertinent to Luo’s political reliability and how it could be negotiated in the face of delegitimizing 
charges. The summary starts with the fundamental statement of Luo’s ideological commitment, 
which echoed the primary eligibility term for any one applying to go abroad. In 1965, the 
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCP issued a 10-point notice to 
regulate how a candidate’s political qualifications were judged before they traveled abroad. On 
top of the specifics, the opening paragraph of the notice states that a candidate must “have a clear 
history, be politically reliable, and have a firm stand.”37 The cadre thus set a positive tone before 
indicating the minor problems that might have affected Luo’s reliability. The major drawback in 
Luo’s resume was the historical problems of his father and his maternal uncle. Luo had 
confessed to all of these details when reporting his personal history in the same file. Both his 
father and uncle were GMD party members and both served on a district party committee. His 
father was categorized relatively safely as an “ordinary counter-revolutionary,” but his uncle was 
less lucky. Once a baozhang (captain of the bao, one hundred families) during the GMD rule and 
having fled to Guangdong, he was put under surveillance. Article 8 of the Notice stipulated that 
in such cases one could be approved to go abroad if this person was able to “draw a line of 
demarcation” between themselves and “bad” family members. The cadre’s summary also 
addressed this requirement by pointing out that Luo had cut off his relationship with his uncle.  
 
36 On the genre of political investigation and China’s dossier system, see Chris Chang, “Communist 
Miscellany: The Paperwork of Revolution.” PhD diss., Columbia University, 2018. 




The 110-character conclusion was a product of a series of investigations, one of which 
was a field investigation. Though for a different purpose, the investigation into Luo’s 
background followed a standardized bureaucratic workflow that was also utilized in the selection 
of medical mission doctors. The Personnel Office of the Hubei Provincial Department of Health 
recorded the three major steps in investigating candidates for the second team to Algeria 
(Dec.1965-Sept.1968): initial review, comprehensive internal and field investigation, and final 
review. In the initial review, the Personnel Office followed the criteria set by the 10-point Notice 
and developed a candidate pool which met professional qualifications. Then the officers went 
through the personal files which candidates normally filled out in detail about their class status, 
family and social relationships, personal history, and individual performances in each political 
campaign.38 If a candidate had a simple history and the conclusion was easy to draw, they would 
be recommended immediately to the public security department and the provincial party 
committee for approval.39 Luo apparently did not pass the first round of reviews because a 
further field investigation was conducted to verify the information he had written about his 
family. In the second step, personnel cadres would ask the candidates themselves and their 
acquaintances for verification, in addition to traveling to other provinces to obtain corroborative 
materials. For the selection of the second medical team, 15 cadres were sent to 10 other 
provinces and 7 counties within Hubei for field investigations. The materials obtained would 
 
38 People in the early PRC grew accustomed to state their own histories in detail as a result of the self-
criticism craze. See Chinese historian Ge Jianxiong’s memoir about his experience as an investigation cadre in 
a Shanghai middle school between 1968 and 1978. See “Wo jingli guo de ‘xuesheng zhengshen’” ¦ĐSĺ
û“rö³w” [The student political censorship that I experienced], in Tian ren zhi ji m!Ŗ [The 
intersection of nature and man] (Beijing: Jiu zhou chubanshe, 2018), 28-36. 





then be used in the final review to help make the decision of whether to recommend a candidate 
for approval. It is unclear whether Luo was eventually approved to join the trip to Vietnam. The 
final say usually lay at the hand of the party leadership of a provincial health department. The 
pass rate could be low. The provincial health office once failed 10 out of the 15 candidates 
proposed by a regional office after comprehensive reviews.40 Finally, a copy of review materials 
of successful candidates was sent to the Ministry of Health, which usually rubber-stamped the 
list.41 The complex procedure of political investigations thus took up most of the selection 
process. For example, it took a year from July 1964 to mid-June 1965 for Hubei to complete 
reviews and compile a list of 33 members.42       
During the investigation procedure, the initial review was a site for self-critique and 
confession where one struggled to strike a balance between presenting oneself as a reliable 
member of the “people” and a conscientious examiner of one’s own history. Luo summarized his 
attitudes and performance in political campaigns by claiming to have had a consistently firm 
stance along party lines. To follow the format of this writing genre, he also admitted some 
deficiencies—such as “not being courageous enough to criticize bad phenomena before going to 
the countryside to join the Four Cleanups Movement” and “propagandizing party thoughts by fits 
and starts (“W;ñù”)”—faults that were only vaguely described and probably could apply to 
any one. 
 
40 The Archives of the Ministry of Health, 148-17-1983-D-97-14, February 1983. 
41 The Ministry of Health found it difficult to investigate every single candidate case reported by all the 
involved provinces and thus handed the power of decision to the party organs of provincial health departments. 
HPA, SZ115-2-784-1, Attachment 1, June 9, 1965. 




Whereas individuals might have some leeway in prioritizing their merits and 
underplaying disadvantages when reporting their own histories, they were under scrutiny and 
susceptible to critiques from their superiors, colleagues, acquaintances, neighbors, and even 
family members, especially for professionals like urban doctors whose personal life and 
professional work were closely bound to the hospital or medical college. The comprehensive 
internal and field investigation offered a legitimate opportunity to raise complaints or report on a 
person under investigation. During the field investigation, informants were required to sign (and 
usually print their fingerprints) on recorded statements to undertake liability.43 But gossip and 
rumors from the community could also arise to push personnel cadres to re-examine a case and 
justify their decision. An anesthesiologist, Dr. Zhu from Shanghai, was chosen to join a team 
going to Guelma and Oued Zenati in Algeria in 1972. After the decision was announced at the 
hospital, some colleagues informed party leaders about his “improper life style” during his work 
on a medical team in a mountainous area in Wannan, south of Anhui Province.44 A member of 
the party branch of the hospital was sent to where Zhu worked in Wannan to conduct a field 
investigation. Some interestingly scandalous details about Zhu’s “bourgeois” behaviors thus 
found their way into official documentation, including his “over-zealous” care of two female 
colleagues on the team, his pomposity in dealing with local medical staff, and his pursuit of 
better food.45  
 
43 I’m grateful to Dr. Jiang Huajie from East China Normal University for informing me of this information. 
44 Between 1968 and 1973, Shanghai sent 632 medical personnel in 4 batches to the rural areas of Ningguo s
g, Jingde », and Shexian ÔT counties of the Anhui Province to run mobile medical services for the 
locals and provide medical care for Shanghai workers in the construction of the Small Third Front (xiao san 
xian |č) industries. See Zhang Mingdao À, et al. eds. Shanghai weisheng zhi êQö 
[Shanghai Gazetteer: Weisheng] (Shanghai: Shanghai she hui ke xue yuan chubanshe, 1998), 102. 




Tip-offs were not rare. Informants might have truly believed that a candidate was not 
suitable, yet evidence shows that factional interests also motivated attempts to sabotage 
candidates’ opportunities. In 1977, a team from Shandong arrived in Beijing for a short stay 
before they departed to Tanzania. A letter arrived to inform on a member’s inappropriateness for 
working abroad, offering some evidence to discredit him. The accused was then forced to cancel 
the scheduled trip only to find out later that the charges were false and driven by ideological 
factionalism that lingered into the post-Cultural Revolution period.46 Such instances lead us to 
two conclusions. First, individuals were subject to intense scrutiny—and not just by the 
superiors, but by each other. Second, working abroad on a medical team was quite sought-after, 
to the extent that some were motivated to employ class lines or factional struggles to deliberately 
spoil another’s chance even when it did not directly benefit themselves. Faced with the charges, 
the accused could do nothing but accept his superior’s decision. He was sent back home, and 
after clarification of the charges, was re-assigned to the next team.  
 
Swinging between Red and Expert 
In an increasingly tense political climate that culminated in the Cultural Revolution in 
1966, the fine balance between expertise and ideology was disrupted. In July 1966, the 
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCP revised its standards of political 
investigation into experts who were about to be sent abroad, in order to “further purify foreign 
aid teams,” and requested a second review of already approved personnel by adding individuals’ 
performance in the Cultural Revolution as a key determinant in the final decision.47 Professional 
 
46 The Archives of the Ministry of Health, 148-17-1983-D-97-24, January 1983. 




expertise was rendered secondary until the tumultuous decade of pervasive factional struggles, 
the meltdown of the higher education system, and intense insecurity in people’s lives and careers 
came to an end. Class labels became the sole indicator of a doctor’s political reliability and thus 
the main determinant of whether he/she would be eligible for career advancement.48 As a direct 
consequence, in 1972, the Chinese ambassador to Algeria reported to the Ministry of Health that 
there was a lower service quality and increasing malpractice in the South Oran region (Saïda, 
Mascara, and Relizane).49 A vice director of the Hubei provincial health department soon 
admitted in a provincial foreign aid convention that “political concerns were prioritized over 
expertise” in the recruitment of mission members.50 This decrease in the quality of medical 
service was experienced across many provinces. Health officials in Shandong recognized that 
they had paid more attention to candidates’ class origin and social relationship than anything else 
up until 1978.51 Personnel cadres in Shanghai had only looked for “perfect” candidates who 
were “from good class, with no overseas relations, [had] simple social relationships, and strong 
ideological commitment.”52 At the height of the Cultural Revolution (ca. 1967-1969), the 
majority of the Hubei mission members were “rebels”—nominally at least, no matter how 
diverse their motives and aims were in their “rebellious” attacks and counterattacks.53 Some 
officials in the Ministry of Health even proposed in 1975 to send “barefoot doctors” to Algeria as 
 
48 The idea of the unique important of family origin (wei cheng fen lun e¥@Ĭ) was dominant from 1958 
to the early Cultural Revolution. 
49 HPA, SZ67-4-183-3, April 26, 1972. 
50 HPA, SZ139-6-409-7, May 10, 1972. 
51 The Archives of the Ministry of Health, 148-17-1983-D-97-24, January 1983. 
52 Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA), B242-3-517, February 2, 1973. 




medical aides, a plan which was finally deserted upon its discussion at the Chinese embassy in 
Algeria.54  
The overwhelming attention given to political credentials came not only from an anti-
intellectual climate that endorsed redness more than expertise, but also derived from the wariness 
of the party cadres whose priority was to reduce their own workload and protect their own 
careers. There were many possible ramifications to their decisions that they feared: if the doctors 
they referred were not approved by their superiors and had to go through more rounds of review; 
if doctors they sent abroad made serious political mistakes (for example, conflicts with locals or 
defection); or if bad incidents occurred, responsibilities would be traced to them and affect their 
careers. Cumbersome bureaucracy and these potential political risks pushed the personnel cadres 
to handle candidate selection so gingerly that they shrank the candidate pool to a very tiny group 
of “perfect” doctors.55  
Team performance and efficiency were risked as a result of the shrinking pool for 
qualified “Red” doctors. “Perfect” political credentials in ideological terms did not always 
correlate with someone’s actual performance. The crude criteria of class, family, and social 
relationships were not much in relation to one’s work attitude, team spirit, and collegiality, all of 
the behavioral characteristics that were important for a team to work and live a collective life in a 
small space for a long period of time. Less effort was made on the selection cadres’ part to 
carefully consider these more practical factors. They took their work as “simply choosing people 
according to the criteria” and were “not aware of how [the mission doctors] actually performed 
 
54 See the memoir of the then Chinese ambassador to Algeria. Zhou Boping a*Ĥ, Feichang shiqi de 
waijiao shengya ŝ¾Æûköì [My diplomatic career during the unusual times] (Beijing: Shijie 
zhishi chubanshe, 2004), 218-219. 




abroad and what problems existed.”56 Infighting within medical teams was not uncommon.57 
Though it is unfair to attribute blame solely to the personnel cadres given the availability of 
candidates, they did lack motivation to maximize the efficiency of a mission by looking into 
practical elements of successful team-building.  
Prioritizing political standards was a safe approach for the officials, but the abuse of these 
standards in the late 1960s seriously undermined the technical level of missions. The unfortunate 
consequence of the ideological craze at the expense of expertise put patients in vulnerable 
situations. A sudden drop in technical competence and quality occurred with the third team 
(August 1968- April 1971) when the Cultural Revolution was on the rise and the “rebels” 
comprised the majority of the team.58 The call for better expertise came around 1970 when 
Algerian health officials complained about the malpractice of Chinese doctors and “repeatedly 
asked for” better doctors. The Hubei provincial health office had to acknowledge the shortage of 
experts in the team and the “bad influence” of malpractice that resulted in deaths and extended 
hospitalization.59 The situation, however, did not immediately improve for the better. The 
Chinese ambassador to Algeria reported in 1972 that the fourth batch of teams in the South of 
Oran were, on average, even more inferior than the third. Unfortunate incidents continued to 
occur: one physician who had never practiced independently had problems giving prescriptions, 
to the point that Algerian nurses questioned whether he was a real doctor; a surgeon from a 
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county hospital did not know how to perform appendectomy; out of the ten acupuncturists, three 
were amateurs who had only studied “the New Acupuncture therapies” for three months before 
going abroad; still others had been off duty for so long that they had gotten rusty in their 
practice.60 Ironically, before sending the fourth batch abroad in 1970, Hubei health officials 
boasted that they taught the mission workers “who thought themselves incompetent in skills” to 
“complete tasks relying on the invincible Mao Zedong thought, and must not rely on ‘a knife’ 
(which means expertise).”61 The ambassador’s report was forwarded by the Ministry of Health 
to the Hubei party leadership, and an additional notice was drafted by the ministry to alert the 
fourteen participating provinces to these problems.62 Whereas political loyalty continued to be 
stressed on paper, officials acquired an awareness that a team had to at least have a few experts 
who were able to cover the work and fix the mistakes of the less experienced colleagues.  
From 1972 onwards, selection cadres started to take a more accommodating attitude 
toward the political credentials of mission doctors in order to restore some measure of 
professional expertise to the missions and keep the medical teams functioning normally. The 
strategy they adopted was to shift the emphasis on one’s family origin and social connections to 
one’s everyday performance. To justify the change, they resorted to the party’s earlier policy of 
class lines— “Class origin is important but not unique; performance should be emphasized.” (Å
¥@Ĭ+	e¥@ĬŊiħô)—to offset the radical classification of Chinese citizens 
into political categories solely according to their parentage.63 This policy had been made known 
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to the public at least in the early 1950s,64 yet was overshadowed by the craze of the Cultural 
Revolution. The urgency to “maintain the international glorious reputation” of the medical teams 
brought the redemptive method back to the forefront.65 In this new context, an orthopedist from 
Shanghai was approved to go abroad in1972 despite the many disqualifying stains he once had 
on his resume, each of which could have easily ruined his career previously: he was from a 
landowning family; his elder brother was a baozhang during the Japanese occupation; his uncle 
was “suppressed” (which could mean executed or jailed); his wife had complicated social 
relations.66 The change towards a more expertise-oriented approach, however, varied by the 
specific handler of the case and was in general slow and gradual given that “political thought 
work” remained the dominant principle of social behavior.67 In 1977, complaints from Algeria 
about the decline of doctors’ technical level “in recent years” were still forwarded to the Hubei 
provincial health department and foreign aid office.68         
In reviewing the bureaucratic procedure in selecting mission workers, especially its major 
component, political investigation, a picture of the strict control of doctors and their 
credentialing emerges that contrasts sharply with the conventional image of medical mission 
doctors as volunteers motivated by personal passion to care for patients in poor conditions. This 
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review has demonstrated that the party cadres responsible for recruitment were bureaucrats who 
processed a task in the same fashion that they classified and credentialed human resources for 
other purposes. Given the scarcity of qualified intellectual resources, they prioritized ideological 
purity at the risk of lowering the level of expertise. It is hardly fair to discredit the expertise of 
every Chinese mission worker, because “red” doctors did not necessarily lack expertise like 
Sigrid Schmalzer argues in the case of agricultural scientists.69 But adverse results emerging 
from time to time, though not intended, did harm to the reputation of the missions.   
 
Leveraging Assignments  
It is worthwhile to point out that not all of the hospitals or medical colleges were willing 
to send away their doctors. Although health administrators and party officials always pledged 
their determination to “send the best doctors abroad,” “offer whomever is needed in whichever 
specialty,” and “prioritize the external needs over the internal ones,”70 the medical work units 
were not often strongly motivated to do so. A major reason was the shortage of experienced 
doctors, a general phenomenon across China even in major urban centers in the 1960s and 1970s. 
No matter how severely doctors were denigrated based on their class label, their medical 
expertise was still sought after in times of need. Hospital directors had to preserve at least a 
minimal group of capable doctors—especially those with both technical and political 
credentials—to keep their hospitals operating. This dilemma created a degree of flexibility for 
individuals to negotiate for their interests.      
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Two major factors contributed to the overall lack of well-trained medical professionals in 
major urban hospitals: the forced relocation of medical experts to rural areas and the lack of new 
medical graduates. Anxieties about achieving social justice and fair division were the 
mainstream of Chinese life, to which the sector of health care was no exception. In addition to 
the overall underdevelopment of the health care system, Mao himself was very concerned with 
inequality in the distribution of health care resources between urban and rural areas. Since 1949, 
the development of modern health care had been city-oriented, following the trajectory set in the 
Republican period (1911-1949). Health policy of the 1950s and early 1960s revolved around 
redistributing urban resources to the countryside, by means of sending temporary mobile medical 
teams to rural areas.71 Various kinds of itinerant teams under different titles went to the 
countryside on a regular basis, assisting in disease control in agricultural production, disaster 
relief, and the prevention of epidemics or endemic diseases. Dr. L, for example, served in a 
“Four Cleanups Work Team” sometime between 1963 and 1966. In 1960 alone, more than 
10,000 medical staff from Wuhan were organized into mobile teams to travel out to the rural 
corners of Hubei, treating patients and training local health aides.72 From 1964, urban workers 
were mobilized to migrate to rural inlands to construct the industrial “Third Front.” More doctors 
were sent along with the workers, and Dr. Z from Shanghai was one of them.  
More radical measures were adopted from 1965 when Mao found that the temporary, 
seasonal re-allocation of urban medical resources did not do much to solve the fundamental 
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inequality of health care distribution. In 1964, more funds were spent for the 8300,000 cadres 
who lived in cities and enjoyed free medical care than for the total 1/2 billion rural population.73 
Mao angrily criticized the condition in the famous “June 26 Directive” of 1965, thus putting 
forward a radical emphasis on health care work on rural areas. Plans were immediately made in 
Hubei to organize 10-20% of the medical staff from urban hospitals (above the county-level) into 
two batches every year, each working in the province’s countryside for four months.74 
Moreover, Hubei also regularly dispatched medical teams to frontier regions between 1973 and 
1982. During this time, 5 teams and a total of 154 personnel were sent to Tibet on two-year 
tenure.75 If urban hospitals could still cope with rural tours from time to time, the “permanent” 
relocation—no one knew at the time if there was the chance to return—of the politically 
unreliable doctors to rural villages was another heavy blow to the normal operation of the 
hospitals.76 The general hospital of Yichang (Hubei) District reported in 1972 that half of its 
medical personnel were in the countryside. At the time of a collective food poisoning case in 
1971, nurses had to take the role of doctors. It also happened that for a period, only one 
OB/GYN doctor remained in his post in this hospital which had over 400 beds.77  
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The forced relocation of medical professionals to rural areas left a vacuum in urban 
hospitals that was hard to fill, because formal medical education had been disrupted by the 
Cultural Revolution. In early 1966, the Hubei Provincial Health Department promised to assign 
more medical college graduates to the hospitals from which mission members were drawn.78 It 
was, however, an empty promise. From the same year, medical schools were suspended from 
admitting undergraduates for 5 years, graduate students for 12 years; no students were sent 
abroad to study in 6 years, nor were foreign students accepted in 7 years. In addition, medical 
professors and registered students were forced to leave the cities to practice as “barefoot 
doctors.”79 In 1973, Hubei provincial health department petitioned the provincial party 
committee to assign 100 medical college graduates of the 1974 class to the several major 
hospitals in Wuhan as reserve members for overseas medical missions. The health department 
pointed out that these hospitals, from which the majority of mission doctors were drawn, suffered 
severe brain strain because “there were no college graduates in the recent past years” and “since 
1964 most graduates were directly sent to primary hospitals.”80  
Given the serious shortage of skilled medical laborers, complaints from hospitals arose 
around the practicality of sending doctors abroad. A common objection derived from the fact that 
“we have so much work without enough hands.” It further developed into a sense of “[our 
medical system] being deprived of all its potential” which could only “leave [us] with the short 
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end of the stick.”81 Some county hospitals outside Wuhan “had kept emphasizing that no one 
was qualified” to save their already limited strength.82 Others sent inexperienced medical staff to 
fill their quota, while keeping the better ones home.83 Health officials in Shanghai also 
recognized the “general perception across hospitals about the shortage of doctors” and reported 
“the unwillingness of work units to send personnel abroad.”84  
In this context, individuals could gain leverage to join a mission and negotiate benefits. 
Individuals prized opportunities to work abroad, as it demonstrated official acknowledgement of 
one’s political credentials—a key factor to secure one’s life and career—and also provided 
considerable financial benefits, in addition to the chance to “tour around the world,” “open 
[one’s] eyes,” and “gild oneself with gold.”85 In financial terms, the mission members did not 
have to pay for their housing or food abroad, yet still received a monthly stipend from the 
Chinese government along with their domestic salaries. In 1964, the salaries of a reserve team 
from Wuhan ranged from 43.5 yuan to 65.5 yuan (from the level of medical laboratory 
technician at Grade 17 to visiting staff at Grade 13).86 Once in Algeria, each mission member 
would receive an additional 40 yuan every month.87 But if they stayed in Wuhan, they would 
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likely be assigned to rural mobile teams for several months in a year, away from home and 
without any financial subsidies. Other types of motivation also existed, varying from person to 
person. In one case, a doctor suffered from discord in his marriage and wanted to use the work-
abroad chance to get divorced.88   
In addition to tangible benefits, the simple fact of going abroad itself was enviable. 
Visiting a foreign country was a rare opportunity reserved for a selected few. Except for those 
who went on a mission for a second or third time, hardly anyone else of the general population 
had ever had experienced a trip outside China. A surgeon expressed that he had never, “in [his] 
wildest dreams,” thought that he would be selected as an expert to work abroad.89 A cardiologist 
in his mid-eighties recalls how fifty years back on the day of his departure, all of his colleagues 
at the hospital skipped the morning round and lined up to see him off. “It was a very glorious 
moment. Of the a few hundred staff in the hospital, no one has gone abroad before. They all 
envied me.”90 Given the potential reward, it is thus not surprising to find that some doctors 
petitioned to stay on their mission after they were discovered to have chronic diseases right 
before departure.91  
People sought to join the overseas medical mission through their personal connections. 
With the development of the medical mission into a regular program, the opportunity to work 
abroad was no longer a secret; from 1971, the selection process was officially made public. 
Claiming to adopt the policy of “mass line,” selection cadres introduced a referral method to 
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complement the existent appointment procedure.92 While the previous top-down method was not 
devoid of partiality, the referral system offered an open channel to negotiate the possibility of 
getting on board. For example, a cadre working abroad repeatedly requested that his relative, a 
gynecologist in a county hospital, be assigned to a mission to Tanzania. The request was 
declined because the relative was found to have heart disease.93 The case was documented only 
because the health officials in Shandong used it to boast of their impartiality. Other successful 
cases of this kind certainly existed as officials themselves admitted the fact that some people 
“used every connection to get in the back door.” Abuses of the bureaucratic system have never 
been eliminated since 1949. From the early 1970s onwards, corruption had become a prevalent 
phenomenon in this resource-poor society where all material products and opportunities were 
controlled and distributed by party cadres.94 Even investigation results reported by a work unit 
could be way off the mark. A conclusion in a candidate’s file submitted for approval indicated 
that the person under review “had good expertise and knew all specialties,” only to be found out 
later that this person “was poor at any specialty, did not like to learn and progress, and was not 
disciplined.”95 
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As for those who were already enlisted, they might negotiate for some special rewards 
that were otherwise hard to obtain. Tied closely to their work units, urban doctors often “relied 
on the organization” (yikao zuzhi)—a phrase often invoked at the time—to solve family and life 
problems, including food rations, health care, children’s education, and so forth. Records of care 
delivery to the mission members’ families such as dealing with childbirth, sending off children to 
college, and funeral arrangements were abundant.96 One’s immediate family was always invited 
to attend holiday gatherings and sometimes received valuable gifts like a bicycle.97 Some 
fortunate doctors even successfully argued for an official transfer of their spouses from another 
city or the suspense of their spouses’ transfer from the city to rural grassroots work units, on the 
basis that the family left behind had to be taken care of.98 Without special accommodation, work 
transfers could otherwise be very difficult and time-consuming,99 especially one’s removal from 
the countryside to urban areas—even more difficult to the major cities like Shanghai—under the 
strict control of the household registration system.100 Extra benefits could be negotiated for, but 
were not guaranteed. Therefore, complaints about unfulfilled demand and resistance to work 
deployment arose from time to time. Interestingly, these actions were always taken by wives and 
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mothers of the selected doctors, whose objections to party decisions were understood in safer 
familial terms.101      
Colleagues of mission members might also benefit unexpectedly from the mission 
program, because previously occupied positions suddenly became open. After sending six 
doctors away, the district hospital of Yichang was left without mainstays in its divisions of 
thoracic surgery, rehabilitation medicine, and pharmacy. In the meantime, half of the hospital’s 
medical personnel were sent to rural areas. As a solution, the hospital had to promote 16 doctors 
to the levels of either attending physician or division chief to fill these vacancies, allowing them 
to “improve [and meet standards] through practice.”102  
It is difficult to estimate how many mission doctors actually received extra benefits 
through negotiations or the scope of these benefits, nor is it easy to learn how many doctors were 
qualified and how many others made their way into the mission through a back door. What is 
certain is that this system of recruiting mission laborers was authoritarian and generally rigid, 
taking most of the decision-making power out of the hands of the individual. Although the 
wishes of individual mission doctors were not entirely ignored, they were only accommodated in 
a limited way. Given the overall low level of fixed salaries and small differences between each 
salary grade, compensation demand was not difficult to meet and doctors were easy to satisfy.103 
Those who insisted on “unreasonable demands” took the risk of losing the opportunity for 
negotiation at all.104 In parallel, the doctors had more practical concerns about personal interests 
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and issues rather than an idealistic pursuit of humanitarian care for peoples they did not know. 
Most adjusted to their new situation very quickly. Doctors like Wei, who struggled every time 
they were called onto a mission, turned the impersonal decision into an opportunity for career 
development and defense on expertise. They started to participate in constructing a 
“humanitarian” and “revolutionary” mission, by wielding the discourses that they had 
internalized in their routine political education and learned in special training sessions before 
heading for Algeria.   
 
Ideological Cramming: The Official Narrative of Internationalist Solidarity  
As mission doctors were asked to make sacrifices for the country, the question arose of 
how to prove to doctors that China would benefit from sending medical aid missions to Algeria. 
Some members explicitly expressed doubts about the practicality and value of their mission: “Is 
it worthwhile to aid countries ruled by national bourgeoisie (Ü¼Ĵ ŕĊ) who is anti-
imperialism and anti-Communism at once? Given that our economy is underdeveloped, are we 
feigning more than our abilities to simply seek to impress them with our aid?”105 To address 
questions of this kind, party officials from the provincial health department organized training 
camps to bring all the mission members together in an enclosed environment to participate in an 
ideological drill to prepare them for an alien setting. Though the duration of the training ranged 
from 15 days to 3 months and the specifics of content varied, an emphasis on ideological training 
remained constant throughout the Maoist era.106 Officials were committed to clarifying the 
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state’s political stance towards other parts of the world, especially the Soviet Union, and 
educating mission members to make sense of their task in the broader Cold War political 
dynamics of hegemony and resistance. Using lectures, group discussions, self-reflective essay 
writing, and exhibition tours, the organizers attempted to instill in the mission doctors a sense of 
internationalism and national pride in socialist China’s achievements, in the hope of justifying 
free aid from China—which was still struggling to recover from a great famine (1959-61) and 
economic devastation as a result of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61)—to a more affluent 
“capitalist” Algeria.  
Much more recently in the twenty-first century, Western observers are curious about the 
fact that the incentives for the Chinese state into Africa are obscure and are not even legible to 
voluntary Chinese migrants.107 It was completely the opposite during the Maoist era. The 
political incentives of the Chinese government were made open and clear to every mission 
member, through their recurrent ideological and political indoctrination in the training camp 
prior to departure. The first medical mission to Algeria received a very brief training session in 
Beijing due to the urgency of their departure, about which little information is available. But the 
state had since produced an official narrative about the political meanings of medical missions’ 
forays into Africa, which was generally applied to all of China’s foreign aid projects until the 
1980s. By early 1983, Hubei had sent 26 batches of medical teams to Algeria108 and organized 
29 pre-mission training classes. Although each class was supposedly split between political 
education and French instruction, overwhelming attention—as responsible officials later 
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admitted—was given to the former, at least until the end of 1978 when the historic conference of 
the 11th Central Committee of the CCP ushered in the “Reform and Opening Up” era.109 A 
survey of the official summaries of these training classes from the Hubei Provincial Archives 
reveals heightened zeal of party cadres to teach members to fulfill internationalist duties and 
exporting revolutions—at least on the rhetorical level—between 1965 and 1972, which was 
followed by an inward turn until 1977, as the available documents show, to domestic struggles of 
class lines and power conflicts within the top rank of Chinese leaders.110 While internationalism 
continued to be a recurring slogan into the 1980s, the importance of ideological education during 
the training declined until it was finally overtaken by foreign language instruction around 1983.  
In what follows, I will focus on the first stage of the mission (1965-1972) as it presents a 
period when Maoist China’s political goals in Africa were made most explicit, due to an upsurge 
in belief in China’s proletarian revolution. By examining the themes of the training courses, I 
argue that China’s medical mission was exploited politically and ideologically as health 
diplomacy, which also mobilized Chinese citizens, in this case health workers, to maintain the 
momentum of “continuous revolution” after the failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61).111 
Anxious to carve out a new space to maneuver in a world that was seen as hostile to socialist 
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China, the government ventured into medical aid to reify Mao’s conception of Third World 
solidarity with China at its center. As such, China entered the arena of international health care to 
challenge the two superpowers, in Africa, a continent which had never been seriously on China’s 
radar throughout its history.112 In Algeria, and soon in many parts of Africa, socialist China 
presented its model of humanitarian moral economy/justice for decolonizing peoples.  
On the practical level, mission doctors were not trained differently from other technical 
aid personnel despite the particularities of their profession and mission. Their training followed a 
fixed method of mass mobilization drawn from the party’s rich experience and probably shared 
the same study material with other contemporary ideological trainings. In other words, the 
mission doctors were regulated by the same biopolitics widely applied to the ordinary urban 
Chinese insofar as the vocabulary they used to describe their lives and work, what social and 
political stances they were told to take publicly, and what kind of witness to bear to overseas 
conditions. Whereas the political intentions of their missions were conveyed clearly to the 
doctors, the government did not offer them a detailed manual with instructions about how to 
carry out a medical mission. China’s medical humanitarianism—exemplified by the slogan “the 
revolutionary humanitarianism of rescuing people from death and healing the wounded”—
obtained its meanings in the actual performance of the mission doctors who may have had 
different understandings of the politics of life in Maoist humanitarian intervention.   
Doctors were taught to understand their missions to Algeria within the tri-polar 
geopolitical conditions of the post-Sino-Soviet split era. The second team (Dec. 1965-Sept. 
1968) outlined in its training summary three political concerns: anti-imperialism, anti-
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revisionism, and armed class struggle. The summary was also marked by other big terms and 
lofty slogans such as “supporting the world revolutions of the proletariat” and “emancipating all 
mankind.”113 These phrases were not simply ornaments to accommodate the genre of an official 
report; they were interpreted in a way that explained how China could benefit specifically from 
its investment in these grandiose goals and why the doctors were “duty-bound” to fulfill their 
missions.  
In the context of envisioned imperialist encroachment of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, the necessity of sending medical missions to Algeria was justified by the imperative to 
defend national security. The training courses attempted to establish linkages between grand 
international visions and China’s domestic needs. A summary written by mission doctors in 
October 1970 stated: 
Through discussion, a few linkages are made clear to us: the relationship between 
eliminating the system of exploitation of human beings on the earth and thoroughly 
excavating the root cause of our bitterness; the relationship between supporting revolutions 
of the people of the world and consolidating the proletariat dictatorship in our country; the 
relationship between supporting the independence of the oppressed nations and 
safeguarding our country’s security as well as resisting invasion by the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union.114  
Although this claim appears in a section titled “For the Purpose of World Revolutions,” each of 
the three linkages between the international and the domestic clearly speaks to the benefits 
communist China would obtain by looking outwards and achieving the lofty goal of 
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“emancipating all mankind.” The three matches address Mao’s perception of the threats 
confronting China. To “eliminate the system of exploitation” and remove the cause of 
“bitterness” meant to eliminate the bourgeois class which was the target of Mao’s anti-revisionist 
campaigns. The elimination of the bourgeois class will subsequently consolidate the rule of the 
proletariat class and its leader, the communist party. With domestic counter-revolutionary 
powers being exterminated, Chinese would be of one heart under Mao’s guidance and the whole 
country would mobilize to resist imperialist invasions. In the meantime, the other oppressed 
nations’ anti-imperialist struggles would help to mitigate the pressure felt by China by diverting 
the attention of the imperialists and dispersing their military powers.  
However, in the beginning of the medical aid program in 1963, confusions abounded 
about China’s turn against the “revisionist” Soviet Union, the longtime ally and role model who 
had made a large material and intellectual investment in China by 1960.115 Some doctors 
questioned China’s complete rejection of revisionism and suggested the possibility of turning 
revisionists into an ally “with whom to form a united fronted and resist imperialism.”116 But the 
party stance was clear-cut and firmly against compromises as such. Much of the study time in the 
training camp was devoted to reading and discussing the key texts on anti-revisionism, including 
the CCP’s “A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement” 
(June 14, 1963) and the following series of debates against the CPSU, “the Nine Commentaries” 
(September 1963-July 1964).117 Emphasis was given to the last commentary which summarized 
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Mao’s theories and policies of “combating and preventing revisionism” into 15 articles as well as 
the “Five requirements for successors of the proletarian revolution.” In retrospect, China 
historians comment that the “Ninth Commentary” leveled false accusations against the Soviet 
Union that a new bourgeois class had emerged among the Soviet party leaders and intellectuals 
and was represented by Nikita Khrushchev and his followers.118 But an ordinary Chinese at the 
time had neither the baseline knowledge nor the courage to come to similar conclusions. The 
doctors were required to take reading notes and prepare talk outlines for class discussions which 
were held 2-3 times a week. At the end of the training, they claimed to “no longer entertain any 
illusion [of revisionism]” because they realized it was “a product of imperialist policies and 
betrayed proletarian interests to serve imperialist policies.”119 It was doubtful that the doctors 
fully understood the connotations of revisionism, because Mao’s various definitions of this 
concept were ambiguous, and, as Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji—the famous Chinese historians 
of party history and biographers of Mao—have pointed out, Mao extended this concept to 
include some Marxist and socialist principles which were far from relevant.120 When it came to 
translating the concept into practice, the doctors chose to simply set themselves against doctors 
from the Soviet Union as a safe way to perform anti-revisionism.   
Another paradox existed between the goal of eliminating the exploitative bourgeois 
system and the goal of forming the widest united front with the oppressed nations.121 Seeking to 
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form new alliances outside the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, Beijing had to direct its 
attention to decolonizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and establish affinities 
between them by stressing the shared impulses of anti-imperialism. Chinese experts and workers 
on different types of aid missions discovered that the majority of the “oppressed nations,” to 
which they were asked to contribute wholeheartedly, were under the leadership of national 
bourgeoisie, which generated confusion. “Among the countries we aid, the majority are 
nationalist countries. These countries are completely bourgeois from politics to economy, from 
culture to life.”122 Algeria was deemed one of them.123 Judged from the information collected 
by the first team, Algeria—which was self-categorized as a socialist country—appeared to the 
Chinese doctors of the second team as “clearly belonging to the category of bourgeois country.” 
But they had to justify the government’s decision to aid “capitalist” Algeria, and gave a plausible 
statement which prioritized the imperative to “liberate” the oppressed peoples from 
imperialists.124 Nonetheless, questions about the worthiness of aid quoted in the beginning of 
this section continued to hover around the mission until the end of China’s socialist era. 
Concerns with the “irrelevancy [to our cause]” (yuji wuguan luan) and “foreign aid producing 
losses” (yuanwai chikui lun) which were oftentimes highlighted in government papers can trace 
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their roots to the uneasy reconciliation between aiding better off capitalist countries and 
benefiting China in tangible terms.125   
The gap between ideology and practice was derived from the Chinese government’s 
strategic vision for Algeria, which was nonetheless little conveyed to mission doctors. Even the 
basic facts about the country were largely missing from the official training course. The doctors 
might learn about this country from their predecessors, but the format of learning was fairly 
informal, if it existed at all. In all available reports between 1963 and 1977, only the second team 
mentioned that they had learned something about “Algeria’s society, history, politics, economy, 
health conditions, people’s lives, and customs…as well as the local health care level and 
common diseases.”126 None of the other reports had any comments about Algeria. The lack of 
such crucial information was confirmed by some of the doctors that I interviewed. Dr. Feng (3rd 
team, 1968-71 in Saïda) remarked: “I did not know Algeria at all in the past. I only knew 
socialist countries like Albania, the Soviet Union. No one talked about Algeria, no publicity for 
it. I did not know it was in Africa. …Where Algeria is does not matter. It is alright I did not 
know. Nobody knew.” He added that the study sessions he took in Beijing, which lasted three 
months, offered briefings on international situations and emphasized the importance of building 
good relationships with African countries, but did not once refer to Algeria in particular.127  
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Officials’ negligence to provide basic factual information in the training sessions hints at 
several possibilities. First, the government’s intelligence network was incompatible with the 
rapidly growing demand for knowledge about previously less noticed countries. Second, party 
officials deliberately intended to keep mission members (and by extension their communities) 
ignorant of facts contradictory to government propaganda. Dr. Feng mentioned that their teachers 
in the political training sessions in Beijing knew nothing about Algeria, nor did anyone from the 
Chinese embassy in Algeria come to talk.128 It was likely that there were few social scientists in 
Beijing’s research institutes who could offer a class on Algeria. It was more plausible that 
officials of health and foreign affairs did not see such information as important to the mission. 
Among the doctors, first-hand knowledge about Algeria was circulated in a semi-private manner, 
exclusively within the local medical society and their families. Dr. Feng was the first and only 
doctor sent by his hospital in his batch and was honored by being seen off by the whole hospital; 
but he was not asked to give a public talk about his experience abroad after his return in 1971. 
He reasoned that the hospital leadership was afraid that he would say inappropriate things. 
“What would happen if you made comments like [Algeria] is better than us?” Feng commented 
that in Algeria he came to understand Mao’s fallacies in China’s aid policy and China’s poorer 
economic situation in relation to Algeria. Yet cautiously enough, he chose not to talk to his 
children about his experience. “My son was twleve years old when I returned home. My 
daughter was younger. Children should grow up and receive education single-mindedly. I don’t 
want to affect them.”129 This discretion was not unique to Hubei missions. Ms. Hu from 
Shanghai recalls that her colleagues in the earlier missions before 1979 only talked about their 
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experience in small private gatherings. “There was not much publicity. Little appeared in 
newspapers. Perhaps [the government] was still exploring.”130 Party officials were probably 
aware of how much mission doctors learnt about the world like Feng. Records show that post-
mission training sessions were sometimes organized on a team’s return to re-adapt its members 
to new lines of policies and regulate their thoughts. A team, which finished its tenure from 1974 
to 1976 and returned to Wuhan in late December 1976, was called to re-assemble in Wuhan a 
month after its return to take a two-week concentrated training. The schedule shows the 
training’s exclusive focus on studying new policy documents, summarizing and self-criticizing 
their work in Algeria, without any indication that they would share information of any kind 
outside the small group.131  
Instead of satisfying curiosities about the host country or addressing questions about 
medical needs in Algeria, the training organizers were more concerned about instilling in the 
mission members a sense of patriotism and superiority about Chinese socialism. Privately 
circulated information about better living conditions and social welfare in Algeria were not 
directly discussed in any official report, but the silent consensus among doctors themselves was 
disclosed when they declared that they would “remain immaculate in ‘the dazzling and bustling 
world’ (huahua shijie).”132 Officials’ worst fear was defection. According to a confidential 
report by the Foreign Ministry, 13 cases of defection occurred from 1978 to 1980, one of which 
involved a cook for a medical team in the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).133 To prevent such 
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incidents, strict rules were laid out to guide mission members’ daily activities and regulate 
behavior in interactions with locals.134 Moreover, part of the training stressed the socialist 
achievements that every Chinese should be proud of and the value of working abroad for which 
mission members were expected to repay with their loyalty. Two types of activities featured this 
part of training: “recalling bitterness and reflecting on sweetness” (yiku sitian) and visiting 
exhibitions. Both were common forms of political repertoire that had been skillfully utilized by 
party-state cadres to mobilize the masses.  
Sessions of yiku sitian in the pre-mission training placed more emphasis on the 
“sweetness” of the present than the bitterness of the past. As historians have noted, the 
transformation from bitterness to sweetness was a standard political narrative of Chinese history 
which the party-state imposed onto the commoners.135 Whereas the primary goal of yiku sitian 
was to reinforce class awareness and enact class struggle,136 it was used in training sessions to 
underscore the legitimacy of the regime and the benefits it had brought and thus should be repaid 
with gratitude. In one session, a former military surgeon, Zhang Yongtai (b.1924) from the 
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Yichang District,137 recalled his miserable family history before 1949, expressing his excitement 
and indebtedness to the state: “Once a child beggar in the old society, [I] now go abroad as an 
expert. [The thing that I] never thought about in my wildest dream came true. All of this was 
given to me by Chairman Mao. After going abroad, [I] must follow the instructions of Chairman 
Mao to repay his kindness.” Another surgeon Li Baochang applied the same narrative which 
juxtaposed the old and the new, but he also incorporated the motherland as an object of his 
loyalty. “In the old society, I was a poor kid out on the streets searching through garbage cans. It 
was Chairman Mao who liberated me. The motherland sent me abroad to implement Chairman 
Mao’s internationalist mission. I must use all my strength to win glory for the great leader 
Chairman Mao and for the great socialist motherland.”138 The two doctors were unified in their 
appreciation for the incredible fortune they enjoyed in the “new China,” both invokeing a 
commonly accepted logic of “requiting kindness with kindness” to enlighten their fellow 
members. By providing testimonies of the benevolence of Mao and showing belief in the bright 
future of China under Mao, they demonstrated political awareness of how to act as a good citizen 
of new China. 
These expressions of personal positions were not only derived from individual 
experiences but were also informed by the official narratives of socialist models. A vivid way to 
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present official narratives was through exhibitions. Visiting displays was a ritual during the Mao 
years, which as Denise Ho argues “taught people how to take part in revolution.”139  Whereas 
exhibitions were carefully choreographed, the choice of which to visit could be somewhat 
random. Drs. Zhang and Li’s group visited an exhibition on the deeds of Li Quanzhou Ê2è 
(1946-68), an exemplary solider who died in a task to destruct explosives. The exhibition was 
popular because Li was a local of Hubei and the display opened in July 1970, three months 
before their training.140 Its theme was straightforward with the title “A good party member 
boundlessly loyal to Chairman Mao,” the honorary posthumous title Li received from the Central 
Military Commission.141 Along with other more famous soldier role models (e.g., Lei Feng and 
Wang Jie) in the 1960s, Li served to promote Mao’s personality cult, a new direction in the 
campaigns of model emulation.142 This tendency to project Mao’s influence over the party was 
reflected in the above-mentioned doctors’ praise to Mao’s benevolence.   
In comparison, a visit for a Shanghai medical team heading to Morocco was planned to 
foster admiration for socialist achievement among its members. The team took the training in 
August 1975. They visited Fanggua Lane, a preserved fragment of the shantytown which was 
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juxtaposed against concrete apartment buildings to present Shanghai’s past and present.143 The 
team members appreciated the message of this living exhibition. They were the first batch to be 
sent to Morocco and did not seem to be equipped with up-to-date knowledge about Morocco’s 
political and social situations. After visiting Fangua Lane—an illustration of the contrast 
between pre-“Liberation” “old society” and post-“Liberation” “new China,” they stated that 
“[they] developed more love for the socialist motherland.” Moreover, they applied this narrative 
of how the old was replaced by the new to understand Morocco in relation to China. One 
commented that “the place we will go to is perhaps similar to old Shanghai [before the 
Liberation].” He followed by explaining how old Shanghai—and Morocco in parallel—was a 
miserable place, which “could not be transformed to [better conditions] today without Chairman 
Mao and the CCP.”  
As for all that about old Shanghai, we saw a lot. Imperialism tyrannized [the city], swollen 
with arrogance. The capitalists cruelly exploited the laboring people whereas the latter were 
suffering from poverty and pain, dying on the streets.144    
The arbitrary analogy drawn between Morocco and old Shanghai betrays a victorious undertone 
of China’s superiority over Morocco (and similar countries on the list of China’s aid recipients). 
Marx’s theory of history as a linear progression of higher stages of human society, culminating 
in the utopia of communism, was the ideological cornerstone of the socialist state of China. 
Paralleling 1975’s Morocco with pre-1949’s Shanghai was a statement that Morocco was 
standing at the lower stage of this linear path, mirroring China’s pre-socialist, colonial past, 
constructed visually in Fangua Lane. When the team concluded that “only Socialism could save 
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China, and only with Socialism could we go abroad to aid [other countries],” they not only 
conveyed a sense of triumph and superiority of China’s socialist achievements but also came to 
see themselves as the ones who would heal Morocco and bestow progress upon it.  
To sum up, pre-mission political training provided party officials with the opportunity to 
reinforce the dual duties of internationalism and patriotism that Chinese citizens were expected 
to fulfill. They mobilized mission doctors by explaining how fulfilling internationalist duties 
would help to protect China’s national security and how helping peoples of “oppressed nations” 
would maintain the momentum of China’s anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist revolution. They 
also wielded patriotism to certify mission members’ loyalty to the party and the country. 
Interestingly, however, whereas the broader political intentions of China’s commitment to 
medical (and other types of) aid to decolonizing countries was made as clear as the benefits 
China might gain, there was obvious neglect in the official training to convey the importance of 
information specific to the host country and the medical mission. The lack of any specific, target-
oriented plan reveals a then-common Chinese mentality that a mission would be successful as 
long as the political direction was correct and the morale was high. This blind optimism could 
trace its roots to Mao’s famous instruction: “The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological 
and political line decides everything.”145 Mao committed many mistakes—the Great Leap 
Forward as the most immediate example—which proved this instruction false. Yet it would 
continue to inform people’s mindsets and public behavior into the post-Mao years.   
The lack of official attention to the details of medical missions posed both a challenge 
and opportunity for the doctors who were the actual agents of the state mission. Deeply 
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indoctrinated with what Michael Dutton calls “the simple binary choice of friend and enemy” as 
the way of understanding any politics,146 they were confused, even fearful of dealing with what 
they imagined “the more complicated situations and sharper class struggle” in “capitalist” 
Algeria.147 But as medical professionals, they found a solution by converting these ideological 
demands to a more tangible goal that they were more familiar with: performing their medical 
practice well. To do so, they took up Mao’s term “revolutionary humanitarianism” to instill their 
professional work with socialist ideals and revolutionary medical ethics.  
 
Defining “Revolutionary Humanitarianism”  
The Chinese concept of “revolutionary humanitarianism” popular among health workers 
in the socialist era (until 1978) signifies a strange—to many Western humanitarian 
practitioners—amalgam of Chinese communist revolution and Western humanitarianism. It 
contrasts with the utopian vision of many contemporary Western relief agencies who consider 
their actions as apolitical. Scholars have for some time now debunked the romanticism of many 
within the humanitarian sector who insist on the purity of their cause, and have revealed the deep 
entanglement between humanitarianism and politics.148 In doing so, they draw a division 
between perceptive pundits (themselves) critically analyzing issues of politics, power, and ethics 
and self-complacent practitioners who refuse to acknowledge these “moral pollutants.”149 The 
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case of socialist China offers a counterexample to the idealistic Western practitioners. The 
Chinese mission doctors have positively construed their work as a political project of the Chinese 
state, perceiving themselves as implementing the vision of a state that saw itself as a legitimate 
moral agent and provider of welfare. The Chinese strand of humanitarianism exhibits how this 
concept is a contingent intellectual and political practice, which can be made compatible with 
communism.   
While both Chinese party officials and mission doctors were cognizant that the medical 
missions served a political agenda bounded to China’s ideological values and national interests, 
each group articulated different views of the missions’ relationship to humanitarianism (rendao 
zhuyi, which Chinese also uses to render “humanism”). The divergence between the official 
labeling and the practitioners’ self-made image produced an incoherent narrative about Chinese 
humanitarianism. The officials tended to avoid using the term because they faced a paradox 
between the divergent goals of resisting bourgeois humanism while still infusing moral content 
into China’s international politics. In contrast, the mission doctors took the term as the 
profession-defining character and claimed credit for revolutionizing humanitarianism. This 
section discusses the two perspectives.   
 
The Government: Refusing the Category of Humanitarian  
Given all the strategic concerns and national interests involved, partaking in international 
humanitarian medical aid raised an ideological dilemma for communist China. How could China 
justify a humanistic mission while the “humanism of the bourgeoisie” was under vehement 
attack in anti-revisionism campaigns?150 Here I sketch a brief outline of the history of Chinese 
 




official attitudes toward humanitarianism. I show that on the one hand, the official narrative 
restricted the term to a narrowly limited field of usage and has never defined the overseas 
medical mission as a “humanitarian” cause. On the other hand, many of the Chinese actions 
taken throughout the Mao years and into the twenty-first century did not significantly deviate in 
practice from contemporary international norms of humanitarianism.   
Humanism (and the corollary concept, humanitarianism) had been regarded unfavorably 
since Mao’s Yan’an talks. The early years of the PRC saw sporadic critiques of the concept. Liu 
Naiyuan B/, a graduate of St. John’s University in Shanghai (regarded as the Harvard of 
China) and a former reporter for the International News Service (INS, now merged to UPI) 
before 1949, documents in his memoir a debate on humanism he engaged in during his re-
education in North China People’s Revolutionary University (Huabei renmin geming daxuePL
!ÜŞblr). Disagreeing with Mao’s view of human nature as defined by class,151 Liu asked 
in a discussion session: “Which class does the human rights movement in America belong to? 
Which class are philanthropic activities and humanitarian causes associated with?” The answers 
his classmates reached were: “First, America is a class society; …the human rights movement is 
a movement of black people who belong to the proletariat class. Second, philanthropic programs 
are a performative gesture by the bourgeoisie to mitigate the anger of the poor and oppressed. 
Philanthropy is simply another form of class struggle, which is more treacherous than open 
oppression.”152 Liu’s note reveals that although party ideology—and common sense—found it 
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hard to totally dismiss humanitarian concerns, the ideology refused to attribute any benevolent 
motives to its stated class enemies. Liu’s suffering induced by simply raising these kinds of 
questions, as documented in his memoir, demonstrates the terror one could have faced and many 
would have liked to avoid.      
The concentrated attack on humanism began in 1957 against the backdrop of the 
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. It first started in the realm of literature and arts with the 
critiques of the humanistic spirit of the nineteenth-century Russian classics and modern Soviet 
literature. Previously admired Russian writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Baklanov were 
criticized for being humanists who advocated universal love of mankind. The CCP radically 
disagreed with such notions. Chinese leaders viewed man as embedded in his social class and 
insisted on the principle of class struggle. They rejected the existence of a human nature that 
transcended class and could potentially cushion class tensions.153 Individual existence and rights 
were expendable and negligible compared to national goals and the collective interests of the 
“masses.” Aside from ideological considerations, political ones were no less important for the 
revival of criticism in the early 1960s. D.W. Fokkema has rightly suggested that the Chinese 
leaders’ opposition to humanism derived not only from their self-conceived orthodox Marxist-
Leninist ideology. Rather, China’s repudiation of humanism in general was also a challenge to 
the Soviet interpretation of “peaceful coexistence”—a policy of Khrushchev since the late 1950s 
to achieve “peace with the West at the expense of the South.”154 Relevant to this Soviet political 
agenda was “socialist humanism,” a new interest in humanism shared among Eastern and 
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Western communists. But the few Chinese literary critics who had once taken up the concept, 
like Shao Quanlin ņĠŨ(1906-71) quickly disavowed it for the fear of being labelled as a 
revisionist.155  
As a result of this general negative sentiment, by the 1980s, humanitarianism had seldom 
been a celebratory catchphrase in China’s official media. A brief survey of People’s Daily for the 
two decades of 1950s and 1960s reveals that, except in the first several years after 1949, 
“humanitarianism” carried positive meanings only in the following circumstances: when it was 
associated with China’s emergency aid in kind and cash to disaster-stricken areas abroad,156 the 
PLA’s treatment of American and Indian POWs, or relatively more often, in medical services 
(both military and civilian, domestic and abroad). Even for the medical community, the sector 
generally most immune from politicizations of the term “humanitarianism,” the usage was 
carefully geared toward a particular setting. As if to distinguish from “bourgeois 
humanitarianism,” the word “revolutionary” was always collocated with “humanitarianism” as a 
necessary modifier to describe Chinese humanitarian actions. Even more commonly seen was the 
complete slogan—“the revolutionary humanitarianism of rescuing from death and healing the 
wounded.”   
In foreign aid, the Chinese government restricted the use of “humanitarianism” to 
emergency relief and did not categorize its overseas medical aid missions as a humanitarian 
cause. It was in part due to the officials’ reticence about the term, and to the government’s 
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conformity to the Cold War-era international norms. An analysis of China’s “humanitarian aid” 
(rendao zhuyi yuanzhu) between 1949 and 1965 based on 89 documents found in the archives of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that the ministry counted only cases of emergency relief, 
and 55 out of the total 76 cases were donated in the name of the Red Cross Society of China or 
other Chinese people’s organizations. The reach of these donations extended beyond neighboring 
nationalist and other socialist countries to cover not only typical capitalist states including the 
UK and Netherlands but also those in the Third World like Chile that had not yet established 
diplomatic relationship with the PRC.157 This impartiality of offering assistance based on need 
and not on ideological opinion as well as the ostensible independence of the aid agencies from 
the government suggested the desire of socialist China to improve its relationship with others by 
conforming to the postwar Western norm of humanitarian actions. As Michael Barnett and 
Thomas Weiss have pointed out, by the late 1980s, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC)—the guardian of the industry—identified humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence as the core principles of humanitarianism, and confined humanitarianism to “relief 
and nothing but relief.” It was only after the Cold War that other forms of international aid and 
advocacy—for example, development and human rights, pluralized the meanings of 
humanitarianism.158 Although none of the Chinese aid agencies were independent from the state 
and China as a state actor conflicted with the ICRC’s utopian vision of the apolitical nature of 
humanitarianism, the Chinese government exhibited its willingness to act like a responsible 
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government when it was seeking to become a recognized member of the international 
community.159 The fact that China’s medical mission to Algeria found counterparts mainly in 
socialist countries and did not have an analog in western practices may have partly accounted for 
its not being defined as a “humanitarian” project. During this period, the medical mission was 
categorized under the umbrella category of technical cooperation, similarly to how Soviets and 
Cubans framed their medical missions.160   
After the end of China’s socialist era, humanitarianism was gradually rid of its conceived 
bourgeois hypocrisy and started to take up more positive meanings. The official labels the 
Chinese government has adopted to characterize its medical missions remain indeterminate, yet 
showing a shift away from the discourse of political solidarity towards the discourse of 
development.  In the first white paper on China’s foreign aid published in 2011, the medical 
mission was considered as one of the eight forms of aid China offered, along with technical 
cooperation and emergency humanitarian aid. Whereas the simple grouping in 2011 was shaped 
along the line of China’s twentieth-century aid practices that were characteristic of a fairly 
distinct Chinese framework of aid, the second white paper published in 2014 uses a very 
different categorization that adopted the Western developmental vocabulary. In the latter paper, 
the medical mission came to be listed—along with “humanitarian aid”—under the category 
“helping to improve people’s livelihood” and was specifically identified as a means “to support 
other developing countries to reduce poverty and improve the livelihood of their peoples.”161 In 
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a 2018 white paper on China’s human rights produced as a response to Western criticism, the 
medical mission and technical cooperation projects (including agriculture, industry, transport, 
energy and power, information technology and communication) were all grouped into 
“development assistance,” separate from the category of “humanitarian relief” (rendao jiuyuan) 
which consists of within the limited fields of disaster relief and treatment of epidemic outbreaks 
(e.g., Ebola) defined by the ICRC.162  
Despite the constantly shifting discursive boundaries around the medical missions, one 
feature is clear. It has remained throughout an entity separate from what the Chinese government 
perceives as humanitarian actions. Sharing the ICRC’s view of humanitarianism singularly as 
relief and thus quintessentially a “pure” cause, the Chinese government excludes the much 
politicized medical mission from its discourse on humanitarianism. The removal of the medical 
mission from the “humanitarian” category in the official narrative underscores the undisguised 
consensus among Chinese officials that the mission has been intertwined with Chinese politics 
and ethics.  
 
The Practitioners: Embracing the Humanitarianism of the Medical Mission 
Acknowledging the co-existence of revolution and humanitarianism, Chinese 
practitioners took initiatives to define how their humanitarianism could operate within the 
dominant system of power, rather than defying it. In the absence of any fixed, clear, or 
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authoritative definition of “revolutionary humanitarianism,” doctors collectively developed 
meanings for this term contingently and contextually through the actual practice of health care, 
and formed a narrative for the public through their own writings and those of health news 
reporters. They identified several critical issues that allowed them to display loyalty to the party-
state as well as defend the expertise required by their profession. Specifically, many tended to 
honor the principle of humanity—serving all people yet implicitly excluding those who were not 
classified as members of the people; to conceive the ideal humanitarian act as motivated by an 
altruistic desire to provide care for the people; and to innovate and revolutionize medical 
technologies to better heal the people. The target of their acts being limited to the people 
ostensibly violated the western humanitarian ideals of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. But 
I argue that the Chinese particularity bespeaks the plurality of humanitarianism, which should 
always be considered a historically contingent array of moral, medical, logistical, and political 
practices.   
The three issues were deeply rooted in Chinese medical professionals’ interpretations of 
Mao Zedong’s famous essay, “In Memory of Norman Bethune” (1939), a memorial to the 
communist and internationalist Canadian doctor who died of blood poisoning contracted during a 
battlefield surgery in China.163 Christos Lynteris argues that this memorial “played a crucial role 
in defining the contours of the New Man” in socialist China. He also demonstrates how, rather 
than “simply typical or doctrinaire,” this essay achieved “exegetic efficacy” in mobilizing the 
Chinese people to cultivate themselves to become “a new type of human who could carry 
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through the revolution.”164 Lynteris is right about the power of textual exegesis in Chinese 
communist propaganda; and it can never be overemphasized how readings and counter-readings 
of Mao’s eulogy for Bethune served as a Foucauldian “technology of the self” to permit Chinese 
medical workers, in particular, to exert a measure of their own agency and transform themselves 
in emulation for an idealized status of “absolute selflessness”—a key term in Mao’s memorial. 
As the best known foreign doctor and model of revolutionary virtues in China for his 
internationalism and voluntary service from 1938 to his death in 1939, Dr. Bethune (known in 
China as Bai Qiu’en úÞ) served as the paragon to whom Chinese mission doctors found 
many references to safely explicate “revolutionary humanitarianism.” Like Wei Jinyuan’s 
confession in the beginning of this chapter, a range of sources from the socialist era—from 
newspaper accounts, films, to archival documents—suggests a generally coherent discourse of 
the medical society, which ascribed itself to Bethune’s inspirations.   
In the blurred area between ethics, politics, and power, Chinese doctors sought to answer 
two defining questions of their professional identity: “Whom do we serve and how do we 
serve?”165 The answer to the first question remains rhetorically constant in an idealized form: it 
is the people (renmin) that they serve. The moral duty thus originated not from a respect for 
humanity in general but from a very politicized view of who deserved the service. Bethune was 
portrayed as “a loyal servant to the laboring people,” who “carefully treated revolutionary 
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warriors and common people in the border region.”166 A graduate of China Medical University 
in 1944 (still in Yan’an), who has Mao’s inscription “the revolutionary humanitarianism of 
rescuing from death and healing the wounded” on his diploma, affirmed recently in his late 
eighties that as doctors, they were inspired to serve “the proletariat and the laboring people” and 
“not to serve the money-holders and the privileged.”167 This revolutionary rhetoric popular in 
the socialist era is, however, not much useful to pinpoint the targets of medical services, because 
the “people” is an invented, unstable concept in Chinese communist discourses and it included 
and excluded social groups as political needs changed.168 What is certain is that “people” does 
not include all Chinese citizens and, in socialist morality, “people” is rhetorically most closely 
tied with the previously subaltern classes—peasants and workers—before the communist 
revolution. Direct discussions by doctors about the medical treatment of the excluded were rare, 
but distinctions among human beings within China (through the idea of class) and subsequently 
different treatment they deserved was clearly inherent. In this respect, Chinese humanitarianism 
manifested a gesture of solidarity only toward fellow comrades, to whom a higher value of life 
was accorded. When China’s health care service was extended to Algeria, the moral duty toward 
patients had to become more inclusive as the “people” expanded to cover all Algerians without 
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class differentiation. To establish solidarity between China and Algeria, Bethune was taken up as 
an epitome of the internationalist spirit to inspire the mission doctors to define internationalist 
duty as intrinsically for the good, and thus perform their duties.169  
While the first question was to contour the targets of medical services, the second 
question about how to serve these targets was both an ethical and technological issue. 
Inspirations from Bethune were even more pertinent here because of his professional identity as 
a doctor. On November 12, 1949, People’s Daily celebrated the tenth anniversary of Bethune’s 
death by re-printing Mao’s memorial along with an overview of Bethune’s 18-month work in the 
Jin-Cha-Ji Military District and two commentaries.170 One of the commentaries indicates a clear 
position with its title, “Dr. Bai Qiu’en Is the Direction of the Medical Workers of New China.” 
After listing examples of Bethune’s “revolutionary qualities and his scientific spirit,” the author 
Ma Ding Ť teaches a lesson using the method of contrast:  
[Those] are clearly opposite to [the qualities of] doctors who are capitalist individualists 
and self-serving hypocritical humanitarians. They are irresponsible to the people and do 
not care about the people; [they] indulge in empty talks about theory, mechanically copy 
foreign [methods], and take patients as guinea pigs; [they] sell technology to the people 
and make money from the people’s health; [they] do everything for personal interests, full 
of foreign chic and self-righteous complacency. All of these are the evil legacy of the 
exploitive classes.171 
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This contrast helps to clarify what “revolutionary humanitarianism” connoted by outlining what 
constituted its opposite. In the author’s view, the “self-serving hypocritical humanitarian” 
doctors were not only uninterested in their patients but also domineered over and profited from 
them; what is worse, these doctors worshiped foreign methods and had no intention to localize 
the methods to accommodate Chinese conditions. The author found it was high time to warn 
about these “evil” qualities because the newly founded government was incorporating into its 
health system a large number of professionals from the pre-existing Nationalist apparatus of 
medicine who were “affected by the habits of the ‘old society’.”172 These new recruits, “the vast 
majority of whom were from non-laboring class families,”173 were useful with their expertise to 
the socialist construction of new China, but only after they had undergone a thorough 
reeducation of how to exercise their expertise in a revolutionized manner. The demand for a new 
ethics and new technical expertise emerged from the author’s criticism of the earlier practices.   
Virtue ethics was dominant in the discussion regarding how a doctor’s humanitarian act 
was evaluated. With Mao’s endorsement, Bethune’s “utter devotion to others without any 
thought of self” became one of the most desirable virtues not only of medical workers but also of 
the socialist new man.174 In endorsing altruism, Maoist humanitarianism found its utmost 
resonance with Western voluntarism, sharing the ideal of altruistic individuals making sacrifices 
and giving to others without expecting anything in return. In the medical mission program, this 
altruism was translated to “free aid” on the policy level, and to “no special treatment” for 
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mission doctors, who continued to receive the same domestic salary with small monthly living 
stipends, which was in no way comparable to those of their Algerian co-workers, not to mention 
other foreign doctors who received privileges as experts (see Chapter 2). The doctors were not 
unpaid, but economic compensation was not a primary motivation for their undertakings. 
Instead, the motivation was expected to come from the inner traits of the individual. It was 
powerfully narrated in lucid, vernacular Chinese—and preached to the Chinese public—by Mao 
as he concluded his eulogy for Bethune: “A man’s ability may be great or small, but if he has this 
spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, 
a man who is of value to the people.”175 Following this calling, doctors and the medical society 
attempted to mold an image that the medical vocation reflects something about their inner 
quality, such as sacrifice, compassion, empathy, and courage. These qualities did not have to be 
innate but could be acquired and cultivated through thought education and in daily performance. 
In celebrating the first successful hand graft surgery in the Sixth People’s Hospital of Shanghai 
in 1963, reporters emphasized that it was the compassion for the suffering worker patient, who 
had his right hand severed while operating a punch press, that motivated the medical personnel to 
carry forward “revolutionary humanitarianism.”   
Under the long-term education of the party and during their professional practices, they 
learn the significant role of workers’ hands and laborers’ hands in socialist construction. 
They have developed deep feelings for workers. They regard the misfortune of this worker 
as their own misfortune, which has produced the enthusiasm and strong desire to 
 




“reconnect this broken hand.” This desire drives them to bravely break the conventions in 
medical history.176 
The motif of deep affection for the laboring people and the willpower derived from the 
unconditional devotion to patients recurred in news coverage, official reports, and doctors’ 
memoirs. Few people were truly altruistic and exceptional, but all were aware of the ethical 
expectation and attempted to demonstrate their virtues.     
Intentions mattered, but so did medical technique, an aspect of “revolutionary 
humanitarianism” that has been frequently overlooked. Mao’s eulogy for Bethune has so often 
been read by the general public as one of “the three old essays”177 to elaborate desirable 
revolutionary virtues that little attention outside the medical society was paid to Mao’s brief 
praise for Bethune’s expertise. Mao commended Bethune for “constantly perfecting his skill” 
and criticized “those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no 
future.”178 Medical professionals were acutely aware of the opportunity therein to substantiate 
their expert authority, while feeling increasing anxiety about the hegemony of politics over 
expertise. By expounding Bethune’s anecdotes in China, they interpreted “revolutionary” 
medical practices as new and innovative in two ways: first, medical achievement in conventional 
sense; second, local innovations to accommodate special needs.  
“Revolutionary” medicine meant progress based on specialized knowledge and training. 
Bethune was upheld as a professional example who accumulated medical knowledge and 
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perfected his skill. Ma Ding’s commentary identified him as “a famous Canadian surgeon” with 
“surprisingly superb expertise.”179 The other commentary by Ye Qingshan ([Ŝ, co-founder 
with Bethune of the Model Hospital of Jin-Cha-Ji and the vice health minister of North China 
Military Region) on the same page went a step further to establish a link between expertise and 
revolutionary goals. It portrayed Bethune as supposedly realizing that “in order to build a 
communist society, one must strive for excellence, constantly improve his expertise, advance his 
business, and regard technical work as his lifelong career.” Ye recorded Bethune’s blunt 
criticism of the medical staff in the Eighth Route Army: “You are good in political 
consciousness, but very bad in medical skills.”180 This emphasis placed on the accumulation of 
knowledge and skill as a prerequisite for technical innovations and the selfless offering of one’s 
services was also echoed in the portrayal of the case of the hand graft. A series of reports 
surrounding the surgery acknowledged both the basic technical skills and experiences obtained 
from longtime work and the bold innovations based on the existing expertise.181 Admittedly, 
these highlights of expertise were vulnerable to the increasingly more dominant narrative of “red 
over expert,” and Ye’s openness in 1949 about Bethune’s criticism of incompetent and ignorant 
Chinese communist medical co-workers no longer existed in Zhou Erfu’s famous 1953 novel 
Norman Bethune.182 But the suppressed narrative about expertise emerged from time to time as 
 
179 Ma Ding, “Bai Qiu’en daifu.” 
180 Ye Qingshan [Ŝ, “Yinian weida de guoji zhuyi zhe—Bai Qiu’en daifu” 'lûgŖĘ—
—úÞln [In memory of the great internationalist: Dr. Bethune], People’s Daily, November 12, 1949, 
p.4. 
181 “Cong yizhi shou kan yige shehui.” 
182 On a comparison between Zhou’s 1944 reportage of Norman Bethune and his 1953 novel, see Lin Gang 
Ò, “Jiti jiyi zhong de yiwang yu xiangxiang—60 nian lai Bai Qiu’en ticai de zuopin fenxi” ś,īû
Ņ




medical professionals struggled to defend their expert authority. For example, a Hubei hospital 
offering technical training to the reserve team for a medical mission in 1972 mobilized the 
dialectics of politics and expertise to justify the importance of the latter. While acknowledging 
that “expertise should serve the politics” in overseas medical missions, they inserted into the 
political narrative the claim that “political struggles are embodied in expertise.”183   
“Revolutionary” medicine was more than scientific breakthroughs. It was also about 
“reconciling scientific methods with backward rural realities,” to use Ye Qingshan’s comment on 
Bethune’s work method.184 Bethune’s arrival in May 1938 at the Jin-Cha-Ji region, the northern 
frontlines in China’s war with Japan, coincided with a bitter moment amidst the upscale of 
Japanese aggression after July 1937. After a fixed hospital he insisted on building was quickly 
destroyed by the Japanese and being inspired during a meeting with Mao, he saw the merit of 
Mao’s guerrilla warfare and was converted to the Chinese view that mobility was the foremost 
characteristic of medical care at the front.185 Equipped with the latest practical knowledge of 
battlefield medicine from his experience in Spain, Bethune developed methods suitable for an 
army without its equivalent of “Army Medical Corps as known in the English, American, and 
Canadian Armies” and “terribly under-supplied with materials of all kinds.”186 Ye and Ma both 
mentioned in their commentaries Bethune’s invention of “Lugouqiao” mule lither which he 
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named after the Marco Polo Bridge. “In the place of sedans of the Red Cross,”187 a mule could 
carry surgical instruments and medicines for 100 persons and wound dressings for 500 persons; 
two lithers with a door plank were easily converted to an operating table.188 Bethune 
incorporated this invention into an improvised military medicine textbook, Organization and 
Technique for Division Field Hospitals in Guerrilla Warfare. As a manual developed in response 
to the extreme war situations he observed, Bethune intended to find alternative medical solutions 
and standardize these solutions improvised during battles.189 A portable manual widely studied 
by the army’s medical personnel, this book is considered “very pragmatic” to “solve the key 
existing problems” even though, from the present point of view, it had “no sophisticated theories 
or breakthroughs in military medicine.”190 It was in contrast to Bethune’s adaptation of Western 
medicine to Chinese guerrilla war conditions that Ma criticized other bourgeois doctors’ empty 
talk and mechanical copying of foreign methods. He enthused about Bethune’s localization: 
“Although what he learned was all American, it did not take him much time to sinicize it to 
become entirely suitable for the actual situation in China.”191     
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Localized improvisation at the expense of modern biomedical standards was a crucial 
element of the “revolutionary” practice of medicine in China’s socialist era. The wartime 
medical experience continued to inform the communist regime’s health care policies after 1949, 
when it found a crisis in the existing crippled health care system. That system was primitive, 
inadequately staffed, and terribly under-supplied on the wider national scale. The chasm between 
the paucity of resources and the tremendous demand for health care propelled the party leaders to 
adopt a non-elitist scheme of medical development. The medical personnel recruited into the new 
health care system of the PRC—be they the former professional biomedical elite or self-made 
practitioners of Chinese medicine—were co-opted to pursue socialist medicine, even though its 
revolutionary nature sometimes conflicted epistemologically with what they learned in school or 
from medical texts.   
Medical revolutionary humanitarianism—idealized as serving the people 
undifferentiatedly, demonstrating compassion and devotion to patients without expecting 
anything in return, and innovating techniques in adverse conditions—was held up as a guideline 
for medical personnel of socialist China. From skilled medical professionals to poorly-trained 
“barefoot” peasant-cum-paramedics, from urban hospital centers to rural mobile services, all 
were supposed to work in its spirit and bolster that spirit. The mission doctors were no exception. 
Their reports to their superiors and the public back home were all constructed around 
revolutionary humanitarianism. It is not that their heroic anecdotes are to be discredited. Their 
successful medical cases may be confirmed by Algerian sources when they become available, 
and many of them might be exceptional human beings kindled with revolutionary fervor. It is 
just that they generally presented themselves as ethically virtuous, technically superior and 




claim that their efforts were apolitical; instead, they saw both their merits and ends as being 
inspired by Maoist politics.  
 
Conclusion 
China’s medical aid missions to Africa were a thinly-veiled instrument for the pursuit of 
strategic interests in the Cold War. Though not officially categorized by the Chinese government 
as humanitarian aid, these were indeed humanitarian missions mobilized in the framework of 
socialist solidarity and internationalism. Their design, actors and institutions, and the discourse 
through which they were structured all exhibited the particularities of socialist China as a regime 
seeking balance between international humanitarian norms and values and its distinctive take of 
a Maoist humanitarianism.  
While the Chinese doctors displayed loyalty to the party-state and could be considered 
co-opted by the state’s political agenda in Africa, to conclude that they were merely political 
agents underestimates their moral commitment to patients and the medical profession. Even 
though they were not volunteers in the first place, many did exemplary work that should be 
valued and remembered.   
In the meantime, their humanitarian work was also fraught with contradictions. This 
chapter has touched upon some of them when discussing the recruitment process, which shows 
that the Chinese doctors were not purely altruistic for they privately and often unconsciously 
expected fringe benefits, power, esteem, and social status in return. This is not a moral judgment 




calls “selfish altruists” with disarming honesty.192 After all, the spirit of “absolute selflessness” 
was a lofty sentiment flowing from the heights of political authority, whereas the mission doctors 
were flesh and blood, with a mixture of motives and feelings. Such inconsistencies between 
discourse and practice will recur in the following chapters. At home, the mission doctors wished 
for extrinsic rewards in exchange for their submission to the work assignment and the sacrifices 
they made in the process. Abroad, they expected esteem for their specialized knowledge and 
obtained power by assuming a position of expert authority. After returning home, they seized 
another type of expert authority by providing eyewitness accounts of the situation on the ground 
and constructing an image of their needy African patients.193 With all that they did, they 
expected to cement or raise their social status in Chinese society.  
There existed irony as well in the mission program. No matter how the Chinese 
government tried to articulate an equal relationship with Algeria and other parts of the Third 
World, its action of giving was predicated on and furthered an unequal relationship. The 
revolutionary humanitarianism based on the theoretical equality of “the people” (the oppressed 
classes) around the world ironically reproduced attitudes of inequality and tutelage characteristic 
of both earlier and later forms of international intervention. The following chapters will continue 
to explore the structures of politics, power, and ethics within socialist solidarity.   
 
 
192 Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War (Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 
2001). 
193 For recent critiques of humanitarian organizations’ act of essentializing the victims, see Didier Fassin, 




CHAPTER TWO:  
 
The Ethics of Socialist Medicine: Early Experiments in the South of Oran, 1963-1973 
 
Off medical workers, off to Tanzania! 
Traveling from far and wide to deliver medical care. 
With Chairman Mao’s teachings born in our hearts and minds, 
We trudge over hill and dale to aid the wounded and dying. 
… 
 
Off medical workers, off to Tanzania! 
With our love of brotherhood as deep as the deep blue sea.  
With Bethune’s example held dearly in our hearts,  
We work tirelessly day and night without a single thought for 
ourselves. 
       –Excerpt from the theme song of the 1972 
documentary “Chinese Medical Team in Tanzania”1 
 
The widely circulated theme song, “Medical Workers in Tanzania” (yiliao duiyuan dao tansang), 
of a 1972 documentary swept across China’s acoustic landscape with a beautiful and exotic 
melody. The song, still replicated today in nostalgic soundtrack records,2 painted a picture of 
selfless Chinese doctors devoted wholeheartedly to the health care of a faraway African country. 
This depiction of altruistic behavior encapsulates the Chinese state’s expectation of the mission’s 
doctors and also reveals the doctors’ own strategies of self-promotion. As the public listened to 
the lyrics, the compassionate and self-sacrificing doctors came to represent the medical missions 
as a whole. While the humanitarian compassion of the doctors existed, the emphasis lent to this 
compassion overshadowed the physical reality of how Chinese medical professionals carried out 
 
1 Dr. Norman Bethune (1890-1939), or Bai Qiu’en m in Chinese transliteration, was a Canadian 
physician and communist. He has been one of the best-known foreigners in China because Mao Zedong wrote 
a eulogy to him, which was memorized by generations of Chinese people. He has continued to be invoked as 
the epitome of the selfless medical worker in China. See Chapter 1 and the later part of this chapter for how 
Dr. Bethune’s example not only inspired the medical mission workers, but was also used by them as a 
rhetorical means to promote their public image.  
2 For example, this song was reproduced in a 2004 album of classic cinematic songs by Cui Yongyuan, one of 




their missions. Trudging “over hill and dale” was indeed hard physical labor, but the real 
difficulties lay in integrating into local communities and fulfilling their humanitarian duties with 
Chinese socialist medical practices, which challenged boundaries between different medical 
cultures and social values.  
Algeria received its first medical mission from China in April 1963, nine months after it 
achieved independence from France.3 As one of the National Liberation Front (FLN)’s most 
consistent allies since 1958, the Chinese government responded to Algeria’s appeal for help and 
sent a civilian medical team to the hospitals in the wilaya (province) of Saïda, where the demand 
for health care was the most urgent. China’s first non-emergency medical aid team was of a 
rather limited size, with 24 members who worked in Algeria for two and a half years. With 
assistance from Algerian nurses, this team alone provided healthcare services for Saïda’s entire 
population of 180,000.4 When Chinese medical personnel first encountered local Algerians, it 
was likely an eye-opening moment for them. None of them had ever had the chance to travel 
outside Maoist China, which had been under the U.S.-led political and economic embargo since 
1949 and had just parted ways with the Soviet Union.5 In much the same way, the local 
Algerians—the majority of whom did not speak French but the local dialect—were puzzled at 
the arrival of these strangers, who spoke only a few words of French. When the Chinese doctors 
 
3 The first Chinese medical mission to Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania, was in August 1964. 
The mission members came from the Jiangsu Province. 
4 Wen Shuxian Ð, “Zhongguo yisheng zai aerjiliya”E/GáX6+[Chinese Doctors in 
Algeria], People’s Daily, October 8, 1964. 
5 The Soviet Union was the major donor for China’s development projects before they split publicly in 1960. 
For the Soviet’s aid to China, see for example, M. Gardner Clark, Development of China’s Steel Industry and 
Soviet Technical Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1973); and for a more extensive coverage from the aspect of 
Soviet experts, Shen Zhihua, Sulian zhuanjia zai zhongguo, 1948-1960 ¸¶VGE: 1948-1960 [Soviet 




rode on horseback or camels to their settlements to distribute medicine and care, locals 
frequently asked: “Why do you come here?”6 Medical humanitarianism’s pledge to help 
strangers in distant lands was not yet a universal concept in the early 1960s. Nor was receiving 
medical help the norm in local communities. Some of the local herdsmen had never met a doctor 
before. Others had limited experience with European medicine, which had become the dominant 
medical system in Algeria during French colonial rule. For those with exposure to French 
medicine, doubts abounded about whether the Chinese doctors had adequate technical skills to 
provide a fair level of biomedical service. They were certainly not convinced of the curing 
powers of inserting stainless steel needles into the body.  
Given that Algerians’ first contact with medical workers from socialist China was likely 
unsatisfactory, how did the medical team build a relationship of trust with the local people? How 
did Chinese doctors on special medical, cultural, and political missions negotiate with the local 
society, and did the doctors seek to exert influence over it? This chapter explores how the first 
several Chinese teams in Saïda—a pastoral wilaya (province) in the South of Oran (le Sud-
Oranais), 270 miles southwest of Algiers—experimented with Chinese healthcare modes and 
treatment methods. Given their rather limited knowledge about local social and cultural realities, 
it was an unprecedented challenge for Chinese doctors to debut “revolutionary humanitarianism” 
(geming rendao zhuyi) on the world stage. Yet, they attempted this by introducing a Chinese 
“socialist medicine” in Algeria that was informed heavily by Maoist ideology and political 
values. Although only a few Algerian ideologues embraced Maoism wholeheartedly, China 
enjoyed considerable popularity within Algeria as both its ideological model of anti-imperialist 
 
6 See the interview with Chen Haifeng in a documentary produced by the Hong Kong based Phoenix TV, 
“Zhongguo tianshi: Yuanfei yiliaodui wushi zhounian jishi” EN——ræ/ß0?_Æ 




revolution and its model of how to implement the ideals.7 The ideological tie between the two 
countries facilitated the work of Chinese doctors, though tensions still arose with local 
administrators who sought to contain Chinese influence when doctors attempted to extend the 
network of mobile healthcare services into rural areas.8      
This chapter explores the strategies and sentiments of the Chinese medical mission in its 
initial encounter with Algerians, with an emphasis on the ethics of “socialist medicine” as 
displayed in the doctors’ routine activities. The first section provides a brief overview of the 
healthcare situation in the newly independent Algeria, and particularly in Saïda, prior to the 
arrival of Chinese doctors. It contextualizes the cultural and material difficulties Chinese doctors 
faced during their mission. The French colonial regime had built modern healthcare institutions, 
including hospitals, clinics, asylums, and medical schools, and planted French-accented 
biomedical ideas of treatment in the minds of ordinary Algerians.9 However, the colonial 
authorities’ unequal and inconsistent efforts to provide medical care resulted in the concentration 
of healthcare resources in the three major coastal urban centers of Algiers, Oran, and 
Constantine. By the time of independence, Algeria’s healthcare system was underdeveloped and 
unbalanced. For several decades to follow, the system was compelled to rely on foreign doctors 
from different countries who were on various kinds of missions or under contract.     
 
7 Kyle Haddad-Fonda, “An Illusory Alliance: Revolutionary Legitimacy and Sino-Algerian Relations, 1958–
1962,” The Journal of North African Studies 19, no.3 (2014): 338-357. 
8 Hubei Provincial Archives (HPA), SZ139-1-84-27, October 29, 1968. 
9 See, for example, Mostéfa Khiati, Histoire de la médecine en Algérie (Algiers: Éditions ANEP, 2000); 
Richard Keller, Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007); Ellen Amster, Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-
1956 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013); and Jennifer Johnson, The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, 




In the second section, which discusses initial contact between the Chinese medical team 
and Algerians, I show how the Chinese doctors attempted to build relationships of trust with the 
local community by displaying technical skills and emphasizing the value of equality. In the 
process, Chinese doctors applied the methods and ideals that they were familiar with from their 
training in China. They hoped to exemplify the Maoist ideals of social equality in their work and 
daily life. They did this by disrupting the division of labor between doctors and nurses to 
showcase the spirit of selflessness highly acclaimed in China. In addition, they initiated mobile 
medical services in pastoral areas in order to provide equal access to health care. The relationship 
of trust was not only built from one side. The popular Algerian perception of China as a friendly, 
anti-imperialist ally created an affinity for Chinese doctors that allowed Chinese medical 
practices to find a niche and gain a foothold in local communities. In Algeria’s far-flung 
hinterland, in the relatively isolated communities where they were the dominant medical 
authority, the Chinese doctors were not so much concerned with seeking professional 
acknowledgment from the broader medical community in Algeria as they were with the local 
clientele. Some of the doctors also used the opportunity to propagandize Maoist thoughts, as they 
saw that as a goal of the mission. 
The third section shifts focus to actual medical practices to showcase how the ethics of 
Chinese socialist medicine prioritized efficacy of treatment over staying within one system of 
medical knowledge. It examines how the Chinese doctors found themselves often forced to 
improvise. Some forms of endemic diseases were unfamiliar to them; chemical drugs and 
medical devices were often in short supply. Local conditions of scarcity and Algerian reactions 
to the treatments often forced them to adjust their practices, thus offering opportunities for the 




advocated by the Chinese government since 1954.10 Though their medical practices in Saïda 
were guided by the PRC’s domestic medical policies, on-the-ground improvisations were 
critical.  
In the first decade after 1963, the Chinese medical aid teams attempted to transplant 
China’s socialist mode of health care to the South of Oran, a pastoral region in Algeria. The 
Chinese mission did not have previous colonial knowledge and imperial structures to build on.11 
Nor was the mission equipped with advanced medical technology, plentiful material resources, 
or a sufficient number of capable doctors. Nonetheless, it established itself in the local 
communities. Its medical practices were largely shaped by the work habits that doctors had 
cultivated in hospitals in major Chinese cities, as well as experience obtained from domestic 
healthcare experiments in rural areas and borderlands.12 Despite their lack of prior knowledge 
about the local society, Chinese doctors and policymakers believed in the possibility of broadly 
applying domestic Chinese medical experiences to development projects far beyond China’s 
borders. The doctors introduced ideas of social equality in terms of the division of labor and 
access to care; they extended health care to rural populations who were the least cared for by 
 
10 Mao stated in 1954 that “China ought to have one [integrated school of] medicine, and not two [schools of] 
medicine [co-existing] over a long period of time.” See Kim Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist 
China, 1945-63 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 68. 
11 Tehila Sasson has demonstrated how imperial expertise and knowledge became central to the British as well 
as international humanitarian response to famine relief. See “From Empire to Humanity: The Russian Famine 
and the Imperial Origins of International Humanitarianism,” Journal of British Studies 55, no. 3 (July 2016): 
519-537. 
12 From the early 1960s, Chinese doctors from big hospitals in urban areas were encouraged to go to the 
countryside for short term visits to treat the rural population. But the temporary solution could not fully meet 
the needs of the large rural areas. After Mao’s instruction on June 26, 1965, middle school graduates were 
trained in 3-6 month courses to become “barefoot doctors” who would live in the rural areas to provide basic 
health service. To clarify, the Chinese doctors on the missions to Algeria were well-trained medical 




introducing mobile services; and they deftly crossed the boundary between different medical 
traditions for the sake of finding effective cures.  
Their idealism was often met with resistance. Algerians had come to recognize the field 
of medicine and health care as a justification for colonial conquest as early as the 1870s-80s.13 
The famous anti-colonial ideologue Frantz Fanon articulated the violence of colonialism through 
the lens of medicine; and the ruling party FLN stressed the malign contribution of the colonial 
power to the health of the Algerian nation. The romantic idealism of the Chinese doctors easily 
reminded Algerians of colonial physicians and surgeons, who had been among the most efficient 
agents of the French civilizing mission in Algeria, and who had also entertained universalist 
ideals while holding onto racist beliefs. Some of the Algerian officials in the newly independent 
government were thus reserved about, if not openly hostile to, the Chinese mission.  
After all, the individual Chinese medical professionals were not given the capacity to 
build new public health infrastructure in Algeria, but had to work within the framework and 
confines of the local health system that was under reconstruction. And yet, they took initiatives 
in their everyday practices to relay the message of what they thought proper socialist health care 
was and sought to showcase what they believed exemplary humanitarian workers should do. 
Their activities and interactions with the local communities helped shape a socialist medicine 
that was both an efficacious knowledge system and an ethical imperative, which provided an 
alternative regime of health care deeply entangled with Cold War tensions.  
 
An Army of White Coats Building the Babel  
 
13 William Gallois, “Local responses to French medical imperialism in late nineteenth-century Algeria,” 




On April 16, 1963, a Chinese medical team arrived in Saïda, the capital town bearing the 
same name as the wilaya (province) and a former French military outpost. This was after a one-
week train ride from Beijing to Moscow, exhausting travel on red-eye flights via Belgrade and 
Casablanca to Algiers, and finally an eight-hour drive to the town. When Xu Xianze gÌ, a 
laboratory technician on the team, at last set foot on the northern fringe of the High Plateau, he 
thought that he had come to the “illimitable” Sahara Desert, “Algeria’s backyard,” which he had 
hastily read about from an American journalist’s 1955 account of the country.14 Xu’s knowledge 
of Algeria was negligible: in a three-day interval between receiving the recruitment notice and 
his departure, he found a copy of Chinese translation of John Gunther’s book on Africa in a local 
library in Wuhan and jotted down notes from it.15 Gunther’s chapter on Algeria ended with the 
“Algerian revolt” in November 1954, which no one at the time had foreseen would initiate an 
eight-year war of independence (1954-1962). After the signing of the Evian Accords in March 
1962, which planned the French withdrawal from Algeria, in six months nearly one million 
Europeans had rushed out of Algeria for France. Most professionals and skilled laborers, 
including doctors and paramedics, joined this “exodus” to France, leaving the newly independent 
country in desperate need of skilled personnel across all sectors of society.16  
 
14 John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York: Harper, 1955), 121. Xu Xianze read its Chinese translation 
Feizhou neimu æ#^ (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1957). 
15 See Xu’s interview from the video clip “Quanguo yuanwai yiliaodui paiqian 40 zhounian jinian biaozhang 
dahui” !ErL/ßÓ40?_­k¿eM [The national commemoration of the 40th anniversary of 
dispatching foreign medical aid teams], National Health and Family Planning Commission, last accessed 
September 10, 2018, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/gjhzs/spzq/201308/1ee7b4e58ec2437487d6ed782b504a51.shtml. 




Xu’s team was sent by the Chinese government in response to the Algerian government’s 
appeal for international help. However, neither Gunther’s “Brief Word about Algeria” nor the 
briefings Xu attended in Beijing offered any useful information about Saïda. After all, the town 
was far from the three urban coastal centers—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—where the 
European population lived, and was a rather small settlement with a population of only 40,000-
50,000,17 out of a total 180,000 in the whole wilaya.18 Xu could not have known that Saïda, 
before housing a regiment of the French Foreign Legion, was once a stronghold of Emir 
Abdelkader (1808-1883), one of the most celebrated national heroes who led the locals in their 
struggles against French domination. He could only observe it with his eyes. A reporter from 
China’s party mouthpiece Xinhua News Agency labelled Saïda the “Gate of Algeria’s Sahara,” 
and described it in a depressing tone that became pervasive in Chinese accounts. “A boundless 
steppe spanning the region made most of the province a natural pastoral area. As a result of the 
brutal French colonial rule for over 130 years, the people here suffered from poverty, frailty, and 
endemic diseases. In some areas, within 80 kilometers lay no village, yielding nothing but 
desolation.”19 Decades after their return from the mission, the doctors still lamented the high 
morbidity and mortality rates among the local population who lacked access to health care.20  
 
17 The number of the population of the Saïda city comes from a Chinese doctor’s recollection, see the video 
clip “The national commemoration of the 40th anniversary.” Hubert Papin mentioned in his doctoral thesis that 
the population in 1980 was 68,000. See Papin, “Seize Mois de Cooperation Medicale A Saïda (Algerie)” (MD 
thesis, Universite de Nantes, 1981), 34. 
18 Wen, “Zhongguo yisheng zai aerjiliya.” 
19 Wen, “Zhongguo yisheng zai aerjiliya.” 
20 Qian Junqi Ù=, “Zhongguo shouci yuanwai yiliao shimo” EêrL/Q{ [The Whole Story 
of China’s First Foreign Medical Aid], in Shengming weishi da’ai fengbei @2JM¤: ­kEr
L/ßÓ50?_ [An anthology in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of China’s foreign medical 




In Chinese official discourse, everything poor and backward was evidence of colonial 
atrocities. But the real problem was that colonial governments’ medical services were not 
distributed equally or consistently. French colonial medicine had prevented many epidemics, 
including smallpox, and had established modern medical facilities in Algeria, as the 
administration had been fully aware of medicine’s role in governing the indigenous population. 
However, the primary objectives of colonial healthcare services was to protect the European 
settler population, therefore hospitals and clinics were concentrated in major cities along the 
northern coast. As Jennifer Johnson has pointed out, the physical distance between these urban  
facilities and the rural areas where the majority of the Algerian population lived prevented the 
latter from receiving medical assistance. In the first half of the twentieth century, the colonial 
regime made efforts to expand medical facilities and coverage of healthcare service, following a 
reformist agenda. However, World War II interrupted these plans and delayed most projects of 
this nature. Even though the decade after the war witnessed an increase in the number of hospital 
beds and a shift in focus to controlling tuberculosis and distributing vaccinations, the expansion 
of medical care paled in comparison with the speed of population growth. As Johnson has 
forcefully concluded, much of Algeria and its population remained “beyond the reach of the 
colonial state.”21 
That said, the colonial regime had made some innovative attempts to reach out to poorer 
inhabitants outside urban centers. During the first half of the twentieth century, the authorities 
trained young locals aged between 19 and 24 for two years to become medical auxiliaries to ease 
the load of French physicians.22 In the early 1950s, as tensions escalated between the colonial 
 
21 Johnson, The Battle for Algeria, 42-46. 
22 See Hannah-Louise Clark, “Doctoring the Bled: Medical Auxiliaries and the Administration of Rural Life 




government and Algerian nationalists, and a potential war loomed ahead, the administration used 
medical pacification as a vehicle to reconnect with Algerians and collect information for civil 
authorities. The Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) of the French army were founded to 
target poor and malnourished Algerians in rural centers and to better sanitation and health care.23 
Mécheria, a small town in the wilaya of Saïda, had also received free medical care from SAS 
officers in the late 1950s, before Chinese doctors took over a decade later.24  
Overall, the French colonial rule that officially ended in July 1962 left a poorly 
developed and very unbalanced healthcare system in Algeria. Healthcare networks were largely 
missing in rural areas, reinforcing huge urban-rural disparities. The collapsed colonial regime left 
behind a people who, after the war, were chronically undernourished, suffered from rickets, 
tuberculosis (with a morbidity rate of 12.8% in 1954), malaria, syphilis, and uncontrolled 
trachoma in the south.25 To make matters worse, the colonial state’s neglect of education had 
marginalized Algerians in the medical sphere, and had left a considerable vacuum in the area of 
medical expertise. Jennifer Johnson provides the following statistics in her book: “In December 
1954, fewer than 1,900 doctors in Algeria (of whom only 75 were Algerian) served a population 
of roughly nine million Algerians and one million French settlers. …Of the total number of 
 
auxiliaries were different from the Chinese barefoot doctors in the nature of the work, as the latter worked 
independently as licensed doctors. 
23 The SAS were founded in May 1955 as part of the reform package ordered by Jacques Soustelle, then the 
Governor-General of Algeria. For more information on this French pacification units in Algeria, see Martin S. 
Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger eds, France and the Algerian War, 1954-1962: Strategy, Operations and 
Diplomacy (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 4-6. 
24 Johnson, The Battle for Algeria, 49-57. 




doctors, 75 percent (approximately 1,400) lived in the three major cities of Algiers, Oran, and 
Constantine.”26 In December 1964, there were only 288 Algerian doctors remaining in Algeria.27  
The medical service of the newly independent Algeria operated with one thousand 
foreign doctors (by December 1964),28 including the 24 Chinese who arrived in 1963. These 
derisory numbers of medical practitioners had to meet the needs of nine million inhabitants and 
manage around 42,000 hospital beds, 200 dispensaries, and about 1,000 treatment rooms across 
the country. Given that regional differences were not reflected in these numbers, the situations in 
some regions like the Aurès Mountains or the South of Oran (le Sud-Oranais) were much worse, 
where one doctor had to serve 300,000 inhabitants.29 The Faculty of Medicine of Algiers 
reopened in November 1963,30 but was yet to cultivate a new generation of Algerian doctors 
capable of handling the country’s healthcare service by themselves. Foreign doctors continued to 
be the crucial intellectual resource for a long time to come, their total number increasing to 1,500 
in 1965 and 1,782 at the end of the 1970s.31    
 
26 Johnson, The Battle for Algeria, 66. 
27 Papin, “Seize Mois de Cooperation Medicale,” 57. 
28 Papin, “Seize Mois de Cooperation Medicale,” 57. 
29 Catherine Simon, Algérie, les années pieds-rouges : des rêves de l’indépendance au désenchantement, 
1962-1969 (Paris : Découverte, 2009), 54. 
30 Simon, Algérie, les années pieds-rouges, 59. The University of Algiers was closed in spring 1962 and 
resumed functioning in 1963. See Martena Sasnett and Inez Sepmeyer, Educational Systems of Africa 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 11. 
31 Jiangsu sheng jianzhu shejiyuan ¸¡b«ÈÄã [Jiangsu Provincial Architectural Design Institute] 
ed., Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya rLpPç ÈÄI£Ív±á
X6+[Compilation of the basic information for the designs of complete projects in foreign aid: Algeria], 




Among the first foreign doctors who arrived in Algeria after its independence in March 
1962 were those from France, the United States, the Arab countries (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and 
Kuwait), the USSR and its East European allies. The French remained ironically a significant 
power in the construction of Algeria’s post-colonial health system. Some “red-footed” (les pieds-
rouges) health professionals who had been sympathetic to the Algerian nationalist movements 
joined the Ministry of Health to become administrators;32 some pieds-noirs (settlers of European 
descent) aligned themselves to Algerians and chose to stay,33 many of whom remained in their 
posts in the Faculty of Medicine to train new doctors.34 Many more came to restore the health 
system in light of the Evian Accords that stipulated the responsibility of the French government 
to offer free medical assistance to Algeria. Their service in Algeria, however, pertained largely to 
the economic interests of France. In October 1962, one hundred and twenty French military 
doctors were sent to the wilayas of Saoura and Oasis in the south—the former French 
departments of the Sahara, where the French government continued to have control of the natural 
resources.35 At the end of the 1970s, fresh medical college graduates were still being sent by the 
French government to the Sahara as an alternative way to fulfill their military services. They 
 
32 See the experience of Dr. Annette Roger as recorded in Catherine Simon’s Algérie, les années pieds-rouges, 
54-57. Les pieds-rouges refer to French leftist activists who went to Algeria after independence to work for the 
reconstruction of the country outside the framework of cooperation. 
33 Personal interview with Dr. Jean-Paul Grangaud, Algiers, July 14, 2018. 
34 Simon, Algérie, les années pieds-rouges, 59. 
35 Simon, Algérie, les années pieds-rouges, 56. The continued control of the Sahara and the existence of 
French military bases there were terms negotiated in Evian in exchange for French economic and financial aid 
to independent Algeria. See Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca: Cornell University 




usually worked for 1.5 to 2 years and received half their salary from the Algerian government 
and the other half from the French government.36  
Doctors from the United States and Arab countries mainly stayed in hospitals in city 
centers for a limited period of time. On September 29, 1962, a team of ten doctors from the 
Rhode Island Hospital in Providence arrived to start a one-month service in the Hospital of Beni-
Messous in Algiers. The team came with the support of the U.S. government and under the 
patronage of “Médico,” a U.S. volunteer relief organization providing medical assistance to 
foreign countries. It was the fourth of its kind that year to work in the Hospital of Beni-Messous , 
a sanitarium that specialized in the treatment of chest diseases, including tuberculosis. Like its 
predecessors, the tenure of its service lasted only one month.37 Six Egyptian and Syrian doctors 
on a humanitarian mission sent by the United Arab Republic (1958-1971) joined the team at the 
Hospital of Mustapha—the largest hospital in Algeria—in August 1962.38 Nineteen more 
Egyptian medical specialists arrived in December to be posted to hospitals in large cities. They 
stayed slightly longer, for about three months, and were not made to go to the countryside except 
at times of epidemic outbreaks.39 There were other, more sporadic, medical missions from the 
Middle East, such as a team of three Saudi Arabian doctors visiting on a short stay of a few 
weeks,40 which revealed more of a humanitarian and friendly gesture than a long-term 
commitment to local health care.     
 
36 Jiangsu Provincial Architectural Design Institute ed., Compilation, Vol. 3 (1981), 327. 
37 “L’Aide médicale étrangère à l’Algérie,” Al-Chaab (French), October 5, 1962, p.3. 
38 “Médecins Egyptiens et Syriens en mission dans notre pays,” Al-Chaab (French), October 11, 1962, p.1. 
39 “50 Enseignants Egyptiens ainsi que des Médecins sont arrivés hier a Maison-Blanche,” Al-Chaab (French), 
December 6, 1962, pp.1 and 3. 




Only after the arrival of medical missions from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, 
and Cuba, did a cosmopolitan and cacophonous army of foreign doctors—the vast majority of 
whom did not speak French—start to spread beyond Algiers and other large cities. The teams 
from these socialist countries operated under a considerably different framework of health 
cooperation. These countries signed cooperation protocols with the Algerian government.41 
Their medical professionals were assigned by the Algerian government to areas outside urban 
centers it deemed in urgent need of health care; and their terms of service tended to be longer, at 
a one-year minimum. As a French doctor who joined the Algerian Ministry of Health in 
September 1962 recalled, the Cubans were assigned to the region of Biskra in the east, and in the 
west, especially in Sidi-Bel-Abbès where many of the locals spoke Spanish. The Chinese were 
sent to the South Oran region (le Sud-Oranais), the Russians to Constantine, and the Bulgarians 
everywhere.42  
The doctor’s memory served her right. Between 1963 and 1970, the Chinese medical 
missions were stationed in South Oran, mainly in the wilayas of Saïda, Mascara, and Relizane 
(or Ighil Izane). Saïda was their first stop. Like other cities on plateaus and in South Oran, Saïda 
was particularly lacking in basic infrastructure. The wilaya was so sparsely populated in the 
1960s that population density was as low as three inhabitants per square kilometer. Moreover, 
this number fluctuated due to the population’s dual lifestyle: partly sedentary and partly 
nomadic. The fluidity of nomadic habitats obstructed any attempt to grid the region into 
 
41 China and Cuba did not have a protocol with Algeria when they sent their first medical mission to Algeria 
in spring 1963. In both cases, the service term was undecided at the time of dispatch. The Cuban mission 
doctors recalled being penniless in their first few months of work because the division of expenses was not 
settled between the two governments. For the Cuban case, see Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, 
Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 35-38. 




divisions and install a sanitary infrastructure in each of them. Hubert Papin, a French doctor who 
worked as a pediatrician and instructor for nurses in Saïda from 1979 to1981, remarked that in 
the 1960s there was no functional, basic socio-economic or cultural infrastructure outside the 
daira (district) capitals (five dairas in the wilaya); nor was there a sufficient medical or 
paramedical network.43 By the time of the Chinese doctors’ arrival, the demand for medical care 
in Saïda was the highest in all of Algeria.44 
When the Chinese doctors arrived at the city of Saïda in April 1963, they found a poorly 
equipped general hospital that was short of medical staff and medicines, and only had 280 beds. 
The one and only ambulance of the hospital had also broken down. There had been six doctors in 
the hospital, serving the whole wilaya (with a population of 180, 000). After the French 
withdrawal, a doctor and two nurses from Bulgaria managed to maintain the operation of the 
hospital until the Chinese arrived.45 No Algerian doctors were practicing there. In addition to 
their sheer number, the Algerian doctors were notorious for being “home-loving,” arrogant, and 
selfish. As ridiculed by a French colleague, the Algerian doctors felt themselves to be exiled if a 
post was proposed to them that was merely fifty kilometers away from the coast.46 It is also very 
likely there were local Algerian healers who practiced folk or religious medicines. French 
psychiatrists in the colonial era noticed contesting medical epistemologies that produced 
 
43 Papin, “Seize Mois de Cooperation Medicale,” 61-62. 
44 “Une équipe médicale chinoise est arrivée hier à Alger,” Le Peuple, April 17, 1963. 
45 Yang Zhenglian }¼ and Guo Linghe Õ'î, “Shouzhi yuanwai yiliaodui de beifei suiyue” êsr
L/ß.æZz [The years of the first foreign medical aid team in North Africa], zhongguo xinwen 
zhoukan EwÞ?( [China Newsweek], April 16, 2012, 85. 




misunderstandings between themselves and their patients.47 A Chinese doctor on the first 
medical team to Algeria vaguely alluded to “indigenous” Algerian medicine by mentioning that 
Algeria must have had its own “precious medical heritage” (as a peer of Chinese medicine) in a 
very speculative manner.48 Chinese acupuncturists in the contemporary era have noticed the 
scars left on their patients’ bodies by hijama, a popular Arabic healing method of wet cupping. 
They admitted knowing of the Arabic method only when I asked them. But no mention of local 
healers appears in Chinese written records, which may reflect that Chinese doctors did not find 
them worthy of mention or that they did not pay attention to local healing techniques. This 
lacuna may also be indicative of how Chinese doctors saw themselves as more on par with 
foreign medical staff.  
The first team was soon to find out that they were not the only foreign medical staff 
working in post-colonial Algeria. In fact, compared with missions from other countries who had 
also responded to the Algerian government’s call for assistance, the initial size of China’s 
medical mission was fairly small. A conference report from the Chinese ministry of health noted 
in June 1964 that the number of health professionals from other countries was over 1,600. China 
ranked at the bottom, whereas Cuba sent 55 medical workers, Vietnam over 100, Bulgaria 
around 300, and more came from other countries.49 But the Chinese doctors in Saïda did not 
need to compete with their foreign counterparts. The Algerian Ministry of Health intentionally 
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avoided allocating teams from different countries in one place.50 The Chinese team would 
continue to dominate the healthcare service in the wilaya of Saïda for about 15 years before other 
doctors, mostly Algerians, joined them.  
The Chinese doctors quickly took charge of the hospital. With the arrival of two more 
groups of medical staff from China two months later, the team grew from the initial size of 
thirteen members to twenty-four (including a cook sent after a request was made by the early 
arrivers). The Bulgarians left Saïda soon after the Chinese arrived, and the Chinese team was 
entrusted to look after the entire hospital at least until 1977.51 They thus enjoyed freedom in 
setting up outpatient services and wards for different departments based on their specialties and 
the available resources. The doctors claimed that their focus was on treating and caring for 
patients, suggesting little interest in the management of the hospital.52 Given that they were paid 
by the Chinese government, received no extra stipend from Algeria before 1974,53 and they did 
not charge for their services, they were not pressured to actively participate in the resource 
planning of the hospital in financial terms. Unlike the early Western medical missionaries who 
struggled to make ends meet for their medical facilities in nineteenth-century China, the Chinese 
 
50 No official record specifies the rationale of the distribution of foreign doctors in Algeria. According to the 
director of E.P.H. de Médéa (Hospital of Mohamed Boudiaf), the decisions were made by the Algerian 
Ministry of Health based on the statistics of personnel shortage in different provinces. Personal interview with 
Madaoui Ahmad, in E.P.H. de Médéa, Algeria, July 24, 2016. 
51 Papin, “Seize Mois de Cooperation Medicale,” 57. 
52 Qian, “Zhongguo shouci yuanwai yiliao shimo,” 221. 
53 Gao Tan í and Xu Guangyue Ç [, “Zhongguo yuan aerjiliya yiliaodui dashi nianbiao (1963-
1992)” EráX6+/ßM_¿ (1963-1992) [The chronology of Chinese medical teams in 
Algeria (1963-1992)], in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei ;/èG.æ [La mission médicale Chinoise en 




doctors were exempt from concerns about operating expenses.54 They left administrative work 
to a locally appointed Algerian hospital director and his few assistants.55  
The doctors’ nominal non-intervention in the hospital’s finances did not prevent them 
from wielding authoritative power. For one thing, they were not only the sole experts overseeing 
the re-installation of various departments and wards, but also the suppliers of free medical 
equipment and medicines. In September 1962, China donated chemical medicines and basic 
medical equipment worth 492,381 yuan ($200,168) in response to Algeria’s ruling FLN party’s 
request to help with post-independence reconstruction.56 This was a huge expenditure, especially 
at a time when China’s economy plunged to a record low: the relative value of this amount in 
2011 was roughly 210 million yuan ($32.5 million), using the nominal GDP as an indicator of 
comparison.57 After investigating the hospital’s repository, the team sent a list of desirable 
equipment and medicines to the Ministry of Health in China. Supplies began to arrive in June 
1963 and a couple more shipments were delivered by sea afterwards.58 The supplies included a 
range of items, such as microscopes, stethoscope accessories, tapered suture needles, and 
acupuncture appliances, as well as antibiotics and Chinese proprietary medicines.59 A packing 
 
54 Yang Nianqun }k³, Zaizao “bingren”: Zhong xi yi chong tu xia de kong jian zheng zhi, 1832-1985 $
Ò: À/%©¨Ýt1832-1985 [Remaking “patients”: Politics of space in the conflicts 
between traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine, 1832-1985] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue 
chubanshe, 2006), 8-9. 
55 Personal interview with Dr. Feng Hongzhi (August 1968-April 1971 in Saïda), August 2017, Wuhan. 
56 The Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA), B123-5-764-15. 
57 The online tool MeasuringWorth can calculate the relative value of a Chinese Yuan amount between 1952 
and 2011. The GDP is the market value of all goods and services produced in a year. Comparing an 
expenditure using this measure tells us how much money in the comparable year would be the same percent of 
all output. https://www.measuringworth.com/chinacompare/index.php. 
58 Yang and Guo, “Shouzhi yiliaodui de beifei suiyue,” 85 




list for the cargo from Shanghai to Saïda dated December 30, 1964 indicated that on board there 
were 115 types of biochemical tablets, capsules, ointment, powders, injections, 42 types of 
surgical instruments and laboratory supplies, 45 types of Chinese proprietary medicine pills, and 
some acu-moxa tools.60 Despite this support from the Chinese government, the shortage of 
supply continued to plague the hospital. In dealing with urgent needs, doctors were often 
compelled to repair or make their own appliances, or create reagents by themselves. The 
pharmacist Lü Xuexiu <T, for example, compounded a reagent himself for examining 
echinococcosis, a parasitic disease prevalent in pastoral areas that was expensive and 
complicated to treat.61 The continuous medical and technical supplies that the team could 
potentially provide granted them de facto influence in Saïda’s healthcare system. Their control of 
material supplies also gave them leverage to adopt their own methods of treatment.  
The service coverage of the Chinese medical mission gradually expanded over the years. 
A year later, around April 1964, two doctors were transferred to a hospital in the commune of 
Mécheria (a pastoral district of the wilaya of Saïda), 100 miles south of the Saïda city, to run the 
outpatient clinic with 58 hospital beds.62 During the 1960s, the Chinese teams stayed in the 
South Oran region (Saïda, Mascara, and Relizane). From 1970, they expanded towards the north 
and the east to serve in provincial hospitals (Médéa and Guelma), district hospitals (Oued Zenati 
and Arris), and one teaching hospital affiliated with the Faculty of Medicine of the University of 
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Algiers (Douéra). Except for the Hospital of Douéra, all of the other hospitals were almost 
entirely under Chinese technical supervision during the 1960s and 1970s. By the late 1970s, the 
total number of Chinese medical professionals had grown to around 170.63  
As the Chinese doctors had more encounters with Algerian patients, a network of 
relationships was built and strengthened, the doctors’ expertise was recognized, and their 
medical authority was acknowledged by the local community. The initial, unsigned agreement 
between the two governments stipulated that the tenure of the first team would be six months. 
But because they were so popular and indispensable to the local people, the contract was 
renewed three times. When the news of the team’s departure spread in October 1965, residents of 
Saïda appealed to the local authorities to retain the Chinese doctors on the workforce of the 
hospital.64 
 
Cultivating Trust: Skill, Devotion, and Ideological Sensitivity  
The Chinese team that arrived in Saïda in 1963 enjoyed such an extraordinary wealth of 
numbers and resources that they came to possess a certain amount of collective authority at the 
institutional level. But this advantage did not automatically translate into the acknowledgment of 
their expertise by either patients or Algerian hospital staff. The second team (Dec.1965- 
Sept.1968 in Saïda) questioned “how medical teams in foreign aid work to gain a foothold and 
open up a new prospect” in their work report. Clearly embracing the ethos of the Cultural 
Revolution, the drafters of the report gave an answer that prioritized political sentiment over 
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technical skills, emphasizing the necessity of highlighting “proletarian politics” and Mao Zedong 
Thought in their mission.65 An instinctual response of the reader today might be to disagree with 
this argument, and to make efficacy and professional skills as the primary reason behind their 
acceptance in Algeria. There is no doubt that medical efficacy was a key factor, but the 
experience of the early Chinese missions shows that their devotion and ideological affinity with 
the local community were also crucial to integrating doctors into a foreign society.  
Local residents of the city were at first skeptical about the Chinese doctors’ proficiency in 
medicine. Having been receptive to French medicine for more than a century, and given that 
almost all of the previous practitioners were Europeans, the locals were hesitant to trust the 
Chinese who claimed to practice modern medicine as well as, if not better than, European 
doctors. One patient, for example, was diagnosed with a stomach ulcer by a Chinese radiologist, 
but did not believe the doctor’s diagnosis and traveled to Oran, 100 miles to the north, only to be 
given the same diagnosis by a European doctor.66  
Cases like this helped the Chinese team earn a reputation for having medical expertise 
among the locals. What may have most successfully galvanized a change in attitudes was a 
successful cataract surgery performed by the ophthalmologist Liu Gang )Ø. For the people in 
Saïda, cataracts were seen as an incurable illness.67 Recovering a patient’s sight proved to be a 
powerful way to legitimate the authority of the Chinese ophthalmologist, and by extension, his 
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whole team. Xu Xianze commented in retrospect that they would have not established a foothold 
in local society without “strong technical expertise.”68 European medical missionaries in late 
nineteenth-century China often wrote about how patients, once cured of their cataracts, were 
amazed by Western medicine and converted to Christianity.69 In Saïda, the Chinese medical 
workers reproduced this success. Yet, in this case, patients did not turn to the mysterious power 
of God, but began to place their trust in the Chinese medical mission.  
Shortly after the first team’s return to China in October 1965, the team’s deputy leader 
boasted of having zero medical errors in their two-and-a-half-year tenure in a long article he 
published in People’s Daily—the most widely circulated mouthpiece of the government in 
China.70 While these statistics are impossible to corroborate, Algerian newspapers in the early 
1970s point to the Chinese doctors’ expertise and express trust in their work. Reports of 
successful surgeries performed by Chinese doctors appeared in major national newspapers from 
time to time. They included a biliary-duodenal anastomosis on a 65-year old patient in Saïda in 
1972, the removal of a 44kg cyst assisted with acupuncture anesthesia in Relizane in 1972, and a 
hand replantation in 1974 which appeared on the front page of both El Moudjahid and La 
République, to list a few.71  
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In a column of readers’ letters in the major state daily El Moudjahid in June 1970, a Mr. 
B.A. from Biskra wrote to praise the Chinese mission in Mascara, which had been there since 
December 1965: 
I would like to congratulate this Chinese mission (Hospital Hospice) and thank it for its 
dedication and efforts that it made to save hundreds of Algerians (in less than 15 days, my son 
has recovered [from polio]). Bravo! … I am now speaking to the journalists of El Moudjahid 
who informed me of the work of this hospital and asked them to talk about it often, because many 
Algerians will be able to benefit from it. And the multiplication of such missions across the 
national territory will not be without interests.72   
The father, who claimed to be a member of the city council (l’APC) of Biskra, 390 miles to the 
east of Mascara, took his son to Mascara for treatment after learning about the Chinese mission 
in the local hospital. It is unclear how the doctors “cured” the child’s polio. He only mentioned 
that they prescribed baths at the thermal water spa of Bou Hanifia. Nonetheless, he appeared 
very satisfied with the result and advocated for more Chinese doctors to serve across the country, 
and in particular, to go to Biskra where a health spa was under construction. With such a vague 
description of his experience with the Chinese doctors, it is hard to verify the role the doctors had 
actually played in curing his son, or if there had even been a cure. More confusingly, the letter 
was titled “The City of Mascara Does Not Sleep;” and the writer framed the letter in a way that 
endorsed the efforts of Mascara officials to develop tourism and have Chinese doctors installed 
in the local hospital. The letter also promoted the hospital staff’s hospitality towards “our 
Chinese doctor friends,” an explicit attempt to make Chinese doctors stay in the area. The intent 
of the letter, however, is unclear. It could have been an endorsement for the writer’s friends or 
 




political allies in the city council, or even an advertisement for local tourism. Published in a 
major state newspaper, the letter could have represented an official view to promote the Chinese 
missions as part of the state’s agenda to secure the aid from China. Regardless of its potential 
political or economic motivations, the very mention of the Chinese mission and the unreserved 
praise for it does however reveal their general credibility among the locals.  
Trust develops not only out of competency or skill; it evolves out of the persona of the 
caregiver. The Chinese doctors might not be recognized individually by their surnames, but they 
seemed to have built a collective reputation by creating a sense of equality with local 
communities, and bringing attentive care to their patients. On May 14, 1971, El Moudjahid 
published an editorial, “Learn from the Chinese Doctors,” along with a full-page reportage titled 
“Province of Saïda waiting for special programs.” Labeling the province as “a huge desert 
region” in the subheading of the feature report, the journalist Halim Mokdad described the 
struggles of the Chinese mission in this area and spoke highly of its work ethics: 
The Hospital of Saïda dates from the last century. Its equipment is outdated and clearly insufficient. 
It takes the ingenuity of Chinese doctors to succeed in routine surgical operations. Serious cases 
are directed to Algiers. …… The action of the Chinese mission, by its selflessness, its seriousness, 
is in this respect an example. We saw them at work in Saïda. Chinese doctors are simply admirable. 
They raise with people the general admiration. We have heard this disillusioned comment several 
times: “Our doctors must take a lesson in public spirit, modesty, and abnegation from the Chinese. 
We must think of flushing them out of Algiers.” It is a matter of means, men and …education too.73 
The author’s focus here was not on medical expertise, but on the team’s responsibility in 
conducting its daily work and its willingness to make sacrifices for the local communities. The 
 




author also positioned the Chinese doctors in sharp contrast with Algerian doctors, who were 
reluctant to leave the capital city on the coast to serve their own people in the huge desert region. 
Alongside this comment, the journalist describes how Saïda’s needed development in many 
areas, including health care. Through his depictions of the bleak health conditions and the lack of 
intellectual and material resources available in Saïda, it is clear that the very existence of the 
Chinese mission was likely a relief for local patients. Their appreciation for the Chinese mission 
grew in moments of relief when they found a place to seek medical help.74 
The Chinese doctors, however, liked to compare themselves with other foreign doctors. 
When recounting their experiences to audiences in China, they almost unanimously neglected the 
contributions of doctors from other countries to Algeria’s health care. Foreign doctors are 
missing in their accounts largely because they lacked the opportunities to work with them on the 
ground. But whenever foreign doctors appeared in Chinese narratives, they always stood in stark 
contrast to the Chinese, serving as a counterexample to the image of a dedicated, selfless, highly-
skilled Chinese aid worker. This formulation can be understood as a result of Mao’s ideological 
wars that discredited anything related to the Soviet revisionists and their East European and Latin 
American allies. But it can also make the case that the Chinese doctors abroad were drawing a 
line between themselves and their competitors, and that they were not concerned with seeking 
professional acknowledgment from the broader medical community in Algeria as they were with 
local Algerian clientele and their domestic audience. 
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Chinese doctors consciously distinguished themselves from the “bourgeois” doctors from 
“capitalist countries” who were working in other Algerian medical facilities.75 They proudly 
reported that they were better qualified humanitarian workers. They did not receive payment 
from the Algerian government nor requested any special treatment, whereas foreign doctors 
demanded quality housing, high salaries at 1,500-2,000 Dinar in the form of US dollars, paid 
leave and reimbursement for family trips.76 The modest disposition of the Chinese medical 
mission followed a precedent that had been set in previous Chinese missions to Africa. An 
agreement between China and Guinea in 1960 stipulated that Chinese technical advisers would 
live in Guinea at a standard “not exceeding that of personnel of the same rank in the Republic of 
Guinea.” The Chinese aid scholar Deborah Brautigam considers these stipulations as “a swipe 
aimed at both the Soviets and the Americans, whose personnel would not have dreamed of living 
like a local official in Africa.”77 Moreover, Chinese doctors worked for extended hours late into 
the night and ensured that there was always someone on duty during weekends and holidays, 
whereas foreign doctors worked short hours and limited the number of visitors at their outpatient 
services.78 Although no Algerian accounts are available on this subject, these differences were 
likely not just differences in rhetoric. Ali Sultan Issa, Zanzibari Minister of Health (1968-72), 
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accounted for his antipathy to the “very mean and arrogant” Soviets by comparing them with the 
Chinese who “wanted to develop their country first, but still they helped.”79  
In fact, the Chinese doctors worked on their own in Saïda, and they rarely had direct 
contact with their foreign counterparts. But they were more than happy to “quote” the remarks of 
local Algerians on the comparison and conveyed these quotations to Chinese readers through the 
widely circulated People’s Daily. While the sporadic accounts of the mission workers mentioned 
the nationalities of foreign doctors, indicating the presence of the Soviets, Czechs, Bulgarians, 
and French, it was not as important as making a clear distinction between who were “capitalists” 
and who were “socialists.” What is important was the binary between a “capitalist” them and a 
“socialist” us in solidarity with “socialist” Algeria. On the first day of the team’s arrival in 
Algeria, the head Dr. Tan Taijie Ëà expressed the hope that Algerians would “progress 
towards socialism” to a group of Algerian journalists.80  
To exhibit China’s socialism, Chinese doctors adopted a work method that embodied the 
socialist ethos in China in the 1960s: aspirations to diminish hierarchies, oppose privilege, and 
defend the ideal of equality.81  The Chinese doctors treated the Saïda residents as equals—
something which they had never been afforded under colonial rule. Working in the way in which 
they had been taught to do in China, the doctors purposefully attempted to erase the hierarchies 
between the care provider and the patient, the healthy and the ill, the expert and the illiterate, the 
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professional and the paramedic. Considering themselves to be “ordinary laborers,” Chinese 
doctors insisted that they would not receive any privileges granted from their professional 
identity.82 On the first day of their arrival at the hospital of Saïda, they were surprised to find 
that two Bulgarian nurses had made beds for them. They learned later that it was a “colonial 
legacy” that doctors were persons of “high status,” and making beds or cleaning floors was the 
job of nurses or servants. They immediately informed the hospital director that they would no 
longer need the service.83 
Their commitment to “serving the Algerian people wholeheartedly” soon developed into 
a frenzy of super-human selflessness that was highly endorsed in the Maoist ideological upsurge 
of the Cultural Revolution. Upon their return to China, the second team (Dec. 1965-Sept. 1968) 
reported to their superiors that they had completed their mission with “no fear of suffering, no 
fear of exhaustion, no fear of filth, no fear of death.” They listed in detail the services they had 
provided, including sucking the smelly amniotic fluid from a newborn with meconium aspiration 
syndrome (MAS) to clear the infant’s airways; suctioning mucus mouth to mouth from the throat 
of a child who had difficulty breathing; and rolling bedridden patients, cleaning bodies, feeding 
drugs to patients, lifting stretchers, and washing medical instruments—the very things that were 
conventionally categorized as nursing care in China prior to the Cultural Revolution, and in the 
West.84 Algerian health administrators might have had doubts about the efficacy and social 
appropriateness of disrupting labor divisions between doctors and nurses. Algerian patients who 
had subscribed to the hierarchy between the doctor and the nurse might also have found the 
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Chinese behaviors unfathomable. In retrospect, some mission doctors I interviewed admitted that 
what they did actually undermined their authority as medical specialists.85 But at the time, they 
were simply applying the domestic norms to Algeria and were eager to show to their superiors 
that they met their Algerian patients’ yearnings for attentive care.  
To Algerian health administrators and other foreign doctors, the Chinese missions’ work 
model was surprising and confusing at once. Dr. Omar Boudjellab (1930-2006), the Algerian 
minister of health, used the phrase “militant spirit” to characterize the Chinese doctors’ 
“dignified manner” in carrying out their mission.86 Several years later, a French physician 
echoed this impression in a more vivid description of the distinct manner of the Chinese. Dr. 
Hubert Papin, who worked in the Hospital of Saïda between 1979 and 1981, testified that his 
Chinese colleagues “devoted their entire time to the work that the hospital needs.” He wrote that 
he was “much impressed by their seriousness, their punctuality, their devotion, their regimented 
life like sheet music, their similar clothes with a Mao collar and strict pants, their extreme 
delicacy.” He further commented on the potential cultural shock that the Chinese might have 
brought to the local population from their practices. “All of these strike the eye in a Muslim 
world where fatality and anarchy were omnipresent.”87 The contrast he draws between the 
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Chinese and the locals is rhetorically powerful, regardless of his persistent European bias that 
Muslims were passive or fatalistic because of their religion and culture.88  
Algerian newspapers reported only successful surgeries that had no precedent and 
recorded barely anything about the daily practices of the Chinese team. Their lack of attention to 
daily practices, however, may suggest that the doctors at least met the expectations of the local 
patients. In contrast, Bulgarian doctors were the target of taunts in various accounts. They were 
said to be fanatics of craniotomy—a method during a difficult delivery that consists of 
sacrificing the fetus by crushing his skull in order to save the woman in labor.89 The sadistic and 
venal repute of doctors treating helpless female patients was reified in a cruel and hilarious 
testimony of a young British medical student in 1970.90 The rumors of ill repute seemed to be 
spread widely and were quite well-known. The wife of a famous French pied noir pediatrician in 
Algiers told me that people did not like Bulgarian doctors, though she could not give specific 
reasons.91   
For the Chinese-Algerian medical encounters, a vast majority of documents were 
produced by the Chinese. Anecdotes of care and healing are not only apparent in doctors’ official 
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reports to domestic audiences, but are also abundant in their memoirs. These reported cases 
resonated with tropes of selfless work that often appeared in textual documents of medical 
missions within and outside China during the 1960s and 1970s. The “No fears” was such a 
popular theme that Premier Zhou Enlai felt it necessary to caution that practices like suctioning 
mucus mouth to mouth were only “temporary and primitive approaches that functioned as a last 
resort” and “would not continue to work for long despite the good will” of medical workers.92 
The second team was apparently aware of the popular conception of what a model practitioner of 
socialist medicine was expected to do. Instead of emphasizing their technical skills, they chose to 
highlight their commitment to healing the Algerian people regardless of sanitary conditions or 
social circumstances, which they believed to be the major criteria to determine one’s 
performance in the mission of carrying out socialist medicine. 
Chinese doctors also gave a multitude of anecdotes about how the cured patients and their 
families showed great gratitude and affection toward them. Chinese reports from a non-medical 
perspective always corroborated the doctors’ statement. A Chinese writer and editor visiting 
Algeria in March 1965 to participate in the Second Asian-African Conference reported on 
affection Algerians developed toward their Chinese doctors.93 He recorded that, while local 
women in Saïda and Mécheria observed the practice of veiling strictly and kept their veils on 
when receiving male guests at home, when he visited these homes accompanied by Chinese 
doctors, the hostesses removed their veils, which to him was a gesture of “treating the Chinese 
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doctors like their families.”94 However, little detailed textual evidence can be found in non-
Chinese sources to attest to the factuality of his account and other stories told by Chinese 
doctors, as the majority of the patients treated by Chinese doctors were illiterate peasants and 
herders, and the medical teams were rather isolated in rural areas where foreign observers 
seldom set foot.  
Chinese doctors saw their mission to Algeria as not only medical and humanitarian, but 
also political. First and foremost, it was a mission to exhibit the Maoist worldview of Third 
World solidarity. The more avid political activists among them went a step further to 
propagandize Maoist ideology to their patients, especially in the late 1960s when the Cultural 
Revolution was in full swing. They handed out portraits and badges of Mao Zedong, copies of 
the Little Red Book, and pamphlets on China and its socialist achievements.95 The distribution of 
these materials must have been a popular practice, as a physician who went to Saïda in 1979 
recalls that they were tasked with retrieving the copies of the Little Red Book that had been 
distributed earlier.96 It is, however, hard to verify how intensive the doctors’ propaganda effort 
was or to determine how coercive their means were. The big drawback in the efficacy of their 
propaganda was the language barrier. Almost all of the doctors did not speak French well, and 
they often had to rely on local nurses to communicate with their patients. Even after they had 
gradually grown competent in communicating with the patients about illnesses in their 
specialized fields, it was still difficult for them to express more complicated ideas about political 
debates. A cardiologist working in Saïda between 1968 and 1971 denied any propagandizing: 
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“We didn’t talk about politics. Even if we wanted, they were not interested. How would I be able 
to explain to them the Long March or the Opium War? They did not understand.”97 But even if 
the doctors were not able to express their ideology in words, they could still exhibit allegiance to 
Maoism with visual performances. A gynecologist also denied that their team (1974-1977) had 
propagandized Maoist Thoughts in Saïda, yet she added what she heard from the locals: “The 
Chinese doctors on the previous team were always dressed in the same uniform like in a band, 
and holding a Little Red Book in hand. Chinese are like cheerleaders.”98 While the Chinese 
medical mission in the latter half of the twentieth century was not as obviously extractive as 
French colonialism had been, it was nonetheless still a form of soft power that had political 
ambitions in its design.  
The same cardiologist mentioned above may have underestimated Algerians’ knowledge 
of socialist China. Algerians who were better educated, or at least literate, may have read about 
the Long March of Chinese Communist Party from El Moudjahid,99 or may have known more 
about China. A brief survey of the April, November, and December issues in 1963 of the major 
Arabic daily, Echaab, immediately reveals the wide and continuous coverage on China. Aside 
from textual reports, photos of China’s industry, agriculture, architecture, markets, artistic 
objects, and even singers appeared in the newspaper almost every other day. Two girls from the 
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Ourida-Meddad High School in El-Harrach, Algiers, told their new French teacher that they 
dreamed of visiting China. One thought that China and America were “the only two countries 
where there are many interesting things”; the other would like to visit China “because it dazzled 
[her].”100 
The Chinese medical missions thus enjoyed a “privileged” status as they were positioned 
on the first day of their arrival as “nos amis” (our friends) from a socialist country that served as 
a model in Algeria’s anti-imperialist revolution. The official from the Ministry of Public Health 
remarked that the arrival of the Chinese medical mission “reinforced the friendship that exists 
between our two peoples.”101 Algerians’ appreciation of Maoist political ideology could have 
played an important role in establishing a feeling of connectivity between the two countries. 
Some avid political activists eagerly opined their preference of Mao’s socialism to the revisionist 
version of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Ian Young, a British medical student completing his 
midwifery internship with Bulgarian doctors in Kabylia, observed such a case in 1970. The local 
postmaster had a large portrait of Mao Zedong over the desk in his office and a pile of China 
Pictorials in his cupboard. He criticized the Bulgarians and Russians of having “lost the socialist 
ideal,” saying that it was only to be expected that “their doctors [were] commercially minded.”102   
… 
One of the most significant initiatives that Chinese doctors undertook to exhibit their 
devotion to care for Algerians was organizing mobile medical teams to tour the countryside. In 
expanding their service outside of Saïda, the first team sought to bring health care to the tents of 
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herdsmen who were scattered across the massive prairie and had difficulties receiving health care 
in a timely manner. Shortly after they had settled down and normalized the operations of the 
Saïda Provincial Hospital, the Chinese doctors decided to go to rural areas to seek patients 
instead of waiting for patients to visit. The mobile medical service was popular at the time in 
China. The doctors mostly replicated this model, except that they usually returned to Saïda at 
night rather than staying out in rural areas. They started with medical posts that the French had 
built, going to these posts two or three times a week.103 Then they founded four posts at Bedru, 
Charrier (Sidi Boubekeur), Franchetti (Sidi Amar) and Balloul. Another four were later added to 
their patrol route as they gradually expanded the coverage of their service. After two of them 
were transferred to the Mécheria commune in 1964, they set up four more at El Biodh, Naâma, 
Ben Amar, and Abdlmola. These posts were fairly dispersed: the nearest to Saïda was 7.5 miles 
away, while the farthest was about 60 miles. Every day, two to four doctors went on patrol to 
these posts, either on horseback or by car, turning the mobile service in pastoral areas to a major 
portion of their work. According to their own account, they did not suspend medical patrol for 
even one day during their two-and-a-half-year tenure.104  
Such an exhausting mobile service was not as efficient as the outpatient departments 
where patients were crammed in, yet it expanded the influence of the Chinese medical team, and 
more importantly, delivered the message that the Chinese doctors cared about their Algerian 
patients. This was a message that some Algerian officials had ambivalent feelings about. A 
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hospital director in the South of Oran once attempted to reduce the medical posts that the 
Chinese doctors set up and hand them over to the charge of other foreign doctors. His comment, 
as recorded in a Chinese report, is revealing: “The French brought canons and you Chinese 
brought influence!”105 
The idea of the “barefoot doctors” or “barefoot medicine” had a large following in 
Algeria in the 1960s. Frantz Fanon realized that it was impossible for the newly independent 
country to train sufficient numbers of physicians. He thus espoused the training of a corps of 
paraprofessionals who would give medical care after appropriate preparation by professionals.106 
Inspired by the Chinese experience, some French leftist “pieds rouges” and technical cooperators 
tried to put the theory into practice in the early 1960s, with fleeting success.107 The idea was 
popular and attractive—even the postmaster in Kabylia agreed that educating doctors for six 
years was a waste of time, and “what the country needs is barefoot medicine.”108 
The Chinese doctors implemented practices drawn from “barefoot medicine” in Algeria. 
They ran rural medical posts until the mid-1980s, the number and location of posts changing 
over the two decades.109 In 1979, the Chinese government decided to stop expanding the mobile 
medical service and let the existing services gradually wane. It believed that the mobile service 
was “ineffective” in terms of the provision of quality medical treatment and was concerned about 
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its financial cost.110 Despite being deemed unrealistic or inefficient by 1979, the doctors’ efforts 
to expand access to basic care for underserved populations exemplified a Chinese Socialist or 
Maoist healthcare idealism. Such idealism was often built on an imaginary of what an African 
country was like. Before the doctors set out for such an unknown distant land, they imagined 
Algeria as one of the newly independent African countries that, like the new China, was in dire 
need of technical, material, and ideological support. They thus felt a genuine moral imperative to 
reduce the suffering of ordinary African people who, as they were taught in political education 
sessions in Beijing,111 must have suffered at the hands of imperialists. Though at first they were 
shocked that Algerians had a higher standard of living and better social welfare than they had in 
China,112 their ingrained Maoist mindset that they had “the responsibility to help peoples in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America” and the poor conditions of local medical facilities drove them 
to execute nascent Chinese modes of rural health care in the Algerian countryside. In memoirs 
and reports, they always referred to Mao’s praise of Dr. Norman Bethune’s spirit of selflessness, 
and the models of Zhang Side clh and Lei Feng åÚ, both of whom epitomized the spirit 
of “serving the people.” The doctors themselves were often praised as such by the Chinese 
press.113 Soon after the first team’s experiment (1963-1965), heightened political tensions of the 
Cultural Revolution left the doctors with no choice but to show that they were conforming to 
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these preconceived images of super-human selflessness in order to continue their work in both 
China and Algeria.  
 
Improvising Cures 
Working in areas that were either rural or far from coastal city centers, Chinese doctors 
were forced to employ pragmatic methods, improvise where necessary, and adapt knowledge and 
standards of care they learned in China to the biological, technical, material, and social 
conditions of medical care in Algeria. Whether a cure was a standard biomedical solution or a 
technique borrowed from Chinese medicine—or even a blurring of the two—did not seem to 
matter. Instead, Chinese doctors moved freely between Western biomedicine and Chinese 
medicine, selecting any medical technique or theory that was helpful. 
Although each medical worker had been trained in a particular field or specialization in 
China, professional fields and areas of specialization lost some of their cogency in Algeria. In 
general, each medical team consisted of doctors (and sometimes nurses) with different specialties 
so that the team as a whole could deal with a broad range of medical cases. The second team in 
Saïda (12/1965- 9/1968), for example, had four surgeons, nine internists, three obstetricians, a 
pediatrician, an ophthalmologist, an ENT doctor, an anesthesiologist, a radiologist, a Chinese 
medicine physician, as well as a pharmacist, a laboratory technician, three midwives, and two 
nurses.114 Medical cases that required a certain level of specialization and expertise would be 
assigned to the relevant specialist. For instance, patients with cataracts were sent to oculists; and 
surgeries could not be performed without an anesthesiologist. More often, however, there was no 
such clear division of labor in the treatment of Algerian patients. It often happened that 
 




“internists helped women with deliveries, and surgeons took care of general patients.”115 Team 
reports documented cases where a tuberculosis physician conducted an X-ray instead of a 
radiologist, out of necessity.116  
The shortage of medical workers and the significantly low doctor-to-patient ratio 
accounted for some of this functional dislocation, which became even more common in the 
mobile medical service. When doctors took turns to go on patrol to far-flung medical aid posts, 
they often encountered patients with a range of needs and were thus not inclined to draw only 
from their specialization, but treated the patients in a flexible manner. When one team discovered 
that pastoral women suffered a higher frequency of dystocia and infertility, the internist Zhang 
Yingfu c¹§ learned OB/GYN skills to handle those cases. The acupuncturist Zhang 
Jiasheng cVK also went around vaccinating the children of pastoral families before each 
season to prevent infectious diseases, which would not be something acupuncturists in China 
would have normally done.117 China’s Ministry of Health was fully aware of this situation. In 
June 1965, it issued a notice to twelve provinces that were involved in dispatching medical teams 
to request the training of reserve personnel who could fulfill the need for “one-person-multiple-
function.” The notice asked that ophthalmologists learn to deal with common ENT diseases, and 
obstetricians cooperate with surgeons.118 Such a pattern of “one-person-multiple-function” 
continued throughout the 1970s. 
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The fact that doctors worked beyond their own specific expertise was not always 
manifest to their patients. To the herdsmen in Saïda, the Chinese acupuncturist was a doctor who 
used needles dexterously, whether it was for vaccination or pain relief or otherwise. If patients 
ever had complaints, it was most often due to the effects of vaccinations themselves, rather than 
doctors’ qualifications. If Dr. Zhang were to vaccinate patients at home in China, things would 
have been more complicated. He was from a family of hereditary physicians of Chinese 
medicine in Wuhan.119 It is unclear whether he had received any education in biomedicine or 
had any experience in vaccination before he arrived in Saïda. The work of vaccination was in 
general new to Chinese medicine physicians. It was not until 1950 in the Campaign against 
Summer Epidemics in Shanghai that Chinese medicine doctors were for the first time officially 
permitted to join their Western medicine counterparts in a government-sponsored preventive 
health care event. Despite the government’s endorsement, suspicion remained about the 
qualification of Chinese medicine doctors in inoculating patients with vaccines.120 However, 
when Zhang was in Saïda, the problem of his lack of expertise and the issue of whether he had 
enough medical authority ceased to exist—both in his own mind and in the mind of others. 
Doctors also drew avidly from two medical systems, Western medicine and Chinese 
medicine. Their combined use of biomedical and Chinese therapeutics in their treatments 
revealed a versatile approach to healing regardless of differences in medical epistemologies. A 
case of treating scorpion stings in Saïda’s pastoral areas was a typical example of blending 
medicines from different traditions. Scorpion stings are a public health issue in the Maghreb 
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region. In Algeria, dangerous scorpion species are found in many areas, including the northern 
Sahara where Saïda is located.121 Scorpion stings are painful, and can be fatal if no measures are 
taken within twenty-four hours. The local treatment of scorpion bites was to make incisions with 
a knife and apply a bleeding-cup, or to bind the skin of a freshly killed dog onto the patient, or to 
rub the fat of two certain types of lizards into the wound, while the patient drank an infusion of 
mint.122 This method might have worked in some cases, yet Chinese doctors reported as many as 
ten persons bitten on one summer night seeking their help.123 At first, Chinese doctors did not 
know how to deal with scorpion stings, but they finally found a remedy that mixed the use of 
“Jidesheng Snake Drugs,” a Chinese proprietary medicine, and scorpion antivenom, a biological 
product. While the availability and timely use of antivenom in peripheral health structures was 
low, emergency care with the Chinese snake drug turned out to significantly reduce mortality. 
The remedy proved so effective that herders in the Mécheria commune demanded that the snake 
drug be kept in each tent as an essential medicine.124  
The drug itself was a fairly new product of the campaign of “collecting and editing 
yanfang (proved prescription) and mifang (secret prescription) of folk medicine” in China. The 
recipe came from a snake medicine peddler, Ji Desheng, who had lived off of catching snakes 
and selling snake drugs. In 1956, Ji donated his secret recipe that had been passed down orally 
within his family for six generations. A group of researchers helped to develop the recipe from a 
list of variable ingredients to one that had a fixed proportion for each ingredient. The drug was 
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quickly put into mass production, and brought to Algeria.125 Its usage, however, may upset 
many who understand the mechanism of antivenom in immunological terms. The creators of the 
drug claimed it was effective for the treatment of envenomation of vastly different kinds of 
snakes, whereas even polyvalent snake antivenom could only neutralize several similar species. 
Why it appeared to have effects on scorpion stings is unknown. Yet, the uncertainties did not 
seem to bother the Chinese doctors. Chen Haifeng â\, the deputy head of the first team and 
a pioneer in China’s social medicine and health management studies, showed little hesitation in 
making the following comment in an article he wrote for People’s Daily when he returned to 
China, “[In Algeria,] Chinese medicine doctors used both Chinese drugs and Western drugs; 
Western medicine doctors [from China] used both Western drugs and acupuncture.”126 
This rhetorical move granted Chinese medicine a commensurability with Western 
medicine domestically, through deploying testimonies from abroad. The doctors were very 
conscious of the development of medicine in China. Their acceptance of blending Chinese herbal 
medicines and Western chemical medicines was partly a result of the movement to “train doctors 
of Western medicine in Chinese medicine.” It was formally conceptualized by the Ministry of 
Health in 1960 as “Chinese medicine and Western medicine integrated.” Echoing Mao’s remark 
in November 1953 that “in the future there will be only one medicine,” the vice director of the 
State Science and Technology Commission Yu Guangyuan  Ï proposed in 1965 that 
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integrating the two medicines would create a better and more innovative medical system. He 
considered contemporary practices which were “neither Chinese nor Western, both Chinese and 
Western” were in line with the law of development.127 Mass campaigns during the Cultural 
Revolution further pushed forward integration, which was exemplified by the “barefoot doctors” 
who emerged and flourished in the period.128 The medical missions in Algeria were not exempt 
from these political currents. A work report from Saïda in 1971 proclaimed that all departments 
were promoting combined therapies of acupuncture and Western medicine.129  
Professional acupuncturists also attempted to explore new therapies in addition to 
needling. They incorporated into their practice the use of both chemical and Chinese proprietary 
medicines, cupping, acupoint injection, and other techniques. Medical papers published in 
journals of traditional Chinese medicine in the 1970s indicated that doctors used a variety of 
techniques to treat Algerian patients. In a report of 257 cases of sciatica treatment, doctors also 
gave vitamins B1 and B12 to patients, injected compound angelica (fufang danggui) into certain 
acupoints, and practiced cupping or moxibustion when necessary.130 In treating deaf-mutism, 
Liu Wei Di Huang Wan (Six Flavor Rehmanni)—a traditional formula used to treat yin 
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deficiency—was prescribed.131 Some commonly used proprietary pills for improving kidney-
yang deficiency such as Shengui Lurong Wan and Jinkui Shenqi Wan were given to patients to 
treat male infertility before acupuncture and moxibustion were applied.132 These medical papers, 
alongside other articles in the same journals, reflect the practice of integration and blending that 
characterized China’s medical sphere.  
Improvisations on the ground in Algeria were not just epistemological in nature. They 
were oftentimes concrete and material as medicine and medical equipment were not always 
readily available. The first team in Saïda had to manufacture equipment and pharmaceutical 
reagents themselves with whatever ingredients and materials were locally available, or make use 
of alternative products. Reports of the improvisation of surgical supplies for urgent use were 
scattered in accounts from the period. In 1970, pharmacists in Médéa manufactured 8660 grams 
of ointment within two and a half months.133 In a surgery to remove a 44kg ovarian cyst in 1972 
in Relizane, doctors had to build a device to measure central venous pressure.134  
 
Conclusion 
A new post-colonial Algeria in dire need of medical professionals tolerated different, or even 
competing, medical traditions and treatment methods. In such a context, Chinese doctors found 
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space to experiment. Seeking to better Algeria’s health care, they attempted to reproduce the 
Chinese socialist way of caring in Algeria. They worked arduously, as equals with nurses and 
other laborers. There is no evidence that the kind of civilizational discourse that appeared in the 
writings of nineteenth-century European missionaries was used. Some of the doctors may have 
had racial or cultural preconceptions about Algerians, but the overwhelming political pressure in 
China during the 1960s and 1970s pushed them to reframe all of these conceptions in Maoist 
terms of class and solidarity. By distributing care to underserved populations through the mobile 
medical service, these doctors also delivered the socialist message of equal opportunity for 
access to health care.  
The history of China’s medical missions to Algeria is thus a story of medical aid framed 
by the geopolitics of the postwar era. Not only did the geopolitics of the era shape the medical 
practice and innovation on the ground, but the analytical framework of the Cold War also 
informed the mode of thinking of mission participants. Anna Geltzer shows how Cold War 
ideologies distorted the American and Soviet medical scientists’ views about the structure and 
function of their respective research enterprises in a medical exchange program.135 In a similar 
vein, the participants of the Chinese mission made sense of the world, local groups, and the goals 
of their missions by drawing on their existent ideological framework. They used the interpretive 
framework of Mao’s revolutionary worldview, which understood international politics in terms 
of the emerging discourse of Third Worldism, and so saw their missions as a way to exhibit 
solidarity and the superior role of China in leading the world revolution.  
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On the ground, Chinese doctors employed flexible method and were willing to utilize any 
effective medical therapies or drugs regardless of the epistemology of their respective medical 
tradition. When drugs and diagnostic technologies associated with biomedical methods of care 
were unavailable or unreliable, doctors introduced Chinese drugs and medical techniques as 
complements or alternatives. When the boundaries between different medical traditions were 
blurred, medical expertise and authority did not rely on recognition from the broader 
international medical community in Algeria that endorsed a shared standard, but resulted from 
the relationship of trust between doctors and patients. In doing so, the medical mission doctors 
helped shape a Chinese socialist medicine that required its practitioners to conform to the ethics 
of “revolutionary humanitarianism,” as well as appropriate a set of medical knowledge drawn 
from both biomedicine and Chinese medicine.  
This moment in Algeria was crucial in lending legitimacy to Chinese acupuncture and 
medical knowledge. Experiments with herbal medicine and acupuncture in Algeria proved that 
the latter was a more adaptable and sustainable Chinese medical therapy that appealed to locals. 
Treating patients with acupuncture and training Algerian paramedics in the art of acupuncture, 
helped to strengthen acupuncture’s therapeutic and political legitimacy. This is the subject of the 






Clinical Miracles, Receptive Bodies, and (De-)Racializing Acupuncture  
 
 
For millennia, acupuncture has played a large role in the protection of health in China. After actively 
practicing acupuncture therapy, Chinese doctors have developed a new application—anesthesia by 
acupuncture—on the basis of a wide use of needles to suppress pain. During the last twenty years, 
clinical practice in many cases has proved that this method of acupuncture anesthesia is very effective. 
 
“The Miracles of Acupuncture,” Algérie-Actualité, No.599, April 1977 
 
On 24 March 1977, a Chinese medicine physician named Gao Guoxun 0 during his second 
tenure as head of the Saïda team (July 1975-December 1977), gave an invited talk on 
acupuncture anesthesia at the University Hospital Mustapha Pasha of Algiers (CHUMA), the 
largest hospital and medical research center in Algeria. Held by the Algerian Society of Surgery 
(SAC), this talk attracted nearly 150 Algerian medical professionals and health administrators.1 
Gao reported on 439 surgery cases conducted by his team in Saïda in a period of approximately 
nine months, all assisted with acupuncture as the anesthetic method. He also introduced three 
theories accounting for the analgesic effect produced by acupuncture—the meridians (Jingluo) 
theory, the nervous theory, and the neuro-humoral theory. The lecture was followed by a 
documentary film screening, which illustrated some surgical procedures performed in this form 
of anesthesia.2 Two weeks later, a widely circulated weekly newspaper, Algérie-Actualité 
 
1 The date, location, and participant number are documented in Gao Tan Ƹē and Xu Guangyue ſ3, 
“Zhongguo yuan aerjiliya yiliaodui dashi nianbiao (1963-1992)” jËƥSGLĬƤy¡ŵ (1963-
1992) [The chronology of Chinese medical teams in Algeria (1963-1992)], in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 332. A 
reportage article in the same volume describes the event, see pp.154-155. People’s Daily records the number of 
attendees. See “A’erjiliya juxing zhenma xueshu zuotanhui” ƥSGųƟƺå¨ƅ" [An 
academic seminar on acupuncture anesthesia was held in Algeria], People’s Daily, July 11, 1977. 
2 “Les miracles de l’acupuncture,” Algérie-Actualité, no. 599 (April 8-14, 1977), p.5. Mingyi fengliu zai beifei 
indicates that the short films projected were shot in Saïda and a scene from them showed how a female 
Algerian nurse was performing independently acupuncture anesthesia on a patient. See p.155. I cannot verify 
the fact. But it is also likely that the documentary shown at the talk was the one China exported to French-
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(Algeria News), devoted a whole page to this lecture in its “public health” section and put the 
headline “The Miracles of Acupuncture” above the fold. Considered a “legendary” weekly that 
has been “part of the collective memory” of Algerians from the 1970s to 1990s, this newspaper’s 
endorsement of acupuncture anesthesia must have been noted by many local readers who keenly 
purchased its latest issues every Thursday in kiosks.3       
Although the reporter of Algérie-Actualité claimed the article to be simply a reproduction 
of the lecture’s main points, its wholesale acceptance of advantages of acupuncture spiced up a 
discourse of miraculous effects of acupuncture. This discourse had been in molding since 
acupuncture’s institutional entry into Algeria with the Chinese medical team in 1963, and 
advocated by its Chinese practitioners and health officials in both Algeria and China. In this 
narrative, the alien and presumably dubious healing method of inserting thin needles into the 
body, twisting them and leaving them in the skin for twenty minutes did not baffle Algerians so 
much as the expertise level of the Chinese biomedical doctors. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
Chinese sources recorded that the first team in Saïda had to overcome the bias that a Chinese 
doctor who practiced biomedicine was not as good as a European one. In a sharp contrast, these 
sources presented a unanimous account of smooth first encounters of Chinese acupuncture with 
Algerian patients. Acupuncture emerged forthwith as a desirable type of treatment among 
Algerian patients with little hint of suspicion or resistance. News of its triumph in Algeria was 
 
speaking countries as a propaganda material which I found in the archives of Centre Cinematographique 
Marocain. 
3 Youcef L’Asnami, “ « ALGÉRIE-ACTUALITÉ », Un journal, Une ÉPOQUE et UN GÂCHIS!,” Le 
Quotidien d’Algérie, May 17, 2017, http://lequotidienalgerie.org/2017/05/17/algerie-actualite-un-journal-une-
epoque-et-un-gachis. A comment posted by a reader to this article mentions his weekly acquisition of the 
newspaper back in the time. The popularity and significance of Algérie-Actualité can also be confirmed by the 
fact that a dissertation was devoted to the analysis of this newspaper. See Salima Ferrag, “Algérie-actualité : le 




quickly circulated back to China by the major state mouthpiece People’s Daily, whose reports 
were copied and disseminated further by local newspapers.4 A small amount of available 
Algerian news reports only worked to corroborate the success narrative of acupuncture. At the 
same time, a complex discourse arose among the Chinese doctors about the relationship between 
acupuncture and race.  
How did acupuncture come to acquire a rhetorical, if not always real, popularity in 
Algeria, in which many Chinese were made to believe? How did doctors interpret illness of 
Algerian bodies, and how did patients experience encounters with an alternative medicine? Why 
were mission doctors imbricated in discussions over the question of race and acupuncture, and 
how did they use medical arguments to supplement a range of professional and political positions 
on that question? Situated at the juncture of health and governance, and postcolonial histories of 
medicine, this chapter traces the emergence of a discourse about acupuncture’s miraculous cures 
in Algeria and a new remedial intervention that went hand in hand with socialist China’s 
ambition of global governance. 
 Two main themes structure this chapter: miracle narratives in medicine, and race in 
Chinese medicine. Wishes and evidence for miracles in medicine persist in modern life. In the 
history of science, the interest in miracles, or wonders, has declined as a category of scientific 
investigation since the Enlightenment as a result of increased desire to provide naturalistic, 
scientific explanations for wondrous occurrences.5 In medicine, by contrast, although physicians 
 
4 People’s Daily was the dominant newspaper in until the early 1980s. For a brief history of the print media in 
the PRC, see Feng Yuan ;, “80 niandai yilai zhongguo dalu baoye de bianqian” 80¡éjyƧÅ
ĶWƎ [Changes of the print press in mainland China since the 1980s], Modern China Studies no.3 (1994), 
https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/42-mcs-1994-issue-2/310-80.html. 




often have an uncomfortable relationship with miracles, facts and claims about medical miracles 
continue to constitute clinical experience. A historian writing on miracles of healing in the 
process of canonization in the Roman Catholic tradition offers an explanation which is still 
pertinent today: miracle stories “represent human response to illness everywhere.”6 Medicine 
practiced in China is historically no exception to this intrinsic imperative. In the twentieth 
century, this miracle narrative has become less epistemologically stable due to the rise of a 
hegemonic scientism and an almost unquestioned positive value of modernizing indigenous 
medical practices. Constantly being compared with biomedicine, Chinese medicine has been 
forced to reaffirm its legitimacy not only through scientization but also by claiming its unique 
clinical value. In her study of contemporary TCM practiced in Shanghai and San Francisco, the 
anthropologist Mei Zhan discovers the prevalence of a miracle narrative promoted by individual 
Chinese medicine physicians and argues that the need for miracles reveals Chinese medicine’s 
marginality in comparison with biomedicine.7 Though Zhan’s argument is drawn from her 
observation of contemporary profit-oriented practitioners, it stands for the case of Chinese 
medicine in Algeria from the 1960s. As an alien healing method that attempted to find a niche in 
heavily biomedicalized Algerian healing cultures, miracle stories served to push boundaries and 
fight out relative positions with biomedicine. Moreover, these overseas stories, I argue, helped to 
counter the de facto marginality of Chinese medicine by showing it to be “universal” and justify 
the academic and cultural privilege granted to it by the government in China. The mechanism of 
 
6 Jacalyn Duffin, Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 189. 
7 Mei Zhan, Other-Worldly: Making Chinese Medicine through Transnational Frames (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009), Chapter 3. 
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making these miracle stories is also worth inquiry, as it pushes us to think about what counts as 
good medicine, and who is authorized to define and craft legitimate medicine.  
While calling stunning effects of acupuncture as “miracles,” I do not intend to verify their 
authenticity nor consider that as important. Bruno Latour has broken down the binary between 
facts and fetishes by arguing that both are fabricated.8 In a similar vein, the distinction between 
medical facts and medical miracles is not always clear. Prognostic uncertainties (the complexity 
of the reality) always end up in different results for different patients, in which one may recover 
in a way that physicians find difficult to explain (miracle), or one may recover as the statistics of 
treatment efficacy predicts (science).9 When Chinese reporters mystified healing stories and 
used the word “shen” ($, magic, miraculous, divine) to describe acupuncturists on the mission 
as shen yi and their needles as shen zhen, they were straddling the border between “miraculous” 
results that we do not yet understand their biomedical explanations and “miracles” inherently 
beyond biomedical explanation. In a context where acupuncture was held as a socialist scientific 
renovation (in China) and was popular with patients (in Algeria), there was nothing to be gained 
from suggesting that acupuncture is unscientific, a placebo, or a sham. As long as the Chinese 
government’s support for acupuncture is to continue and patients to seek the treatment, the 
efficacy of acupuncture should be conceptualized with social, cultural, and political parameters 
outside of the reductionist biomedical framework.10                
 
8 Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), Chapter 1. 
9 Elizabeth Dzeng and Josh Booth, “Facts and Fetishes: When the Miracles of Medicine Fail Us,” The 
American Journal of Bioethics 18, no. 5 (2018): 63–64. 
10 See Priscilla Song, Biomedical Odysseys: Fetal Cell Experiments from Cyberspace to China (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2017), Part III, especially Chapter 7. She discusses what counts as evidence for 
efficacy in current biomedical research regimes. 
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 A second theme of this chapter is the racialization of Chinese medicine, which revises 
the scholarship on the appropriation of race in modern China and expands the limits of 
discussion about race from its association with biomedicine to Chinese medicine. In claiming the 
miraculous effect of acupuncture, Chinese doctors uncritically mobilized the language of racial 
difference, which is seldom resorted to in the PRC’s political rhetoric of its alliance with the 
Third World. Race, as an imported concept gaining influence in China at the turn of the twentieth 
century, mainly appears in scholarly discussions of eugenics, Social Darwinism, national 
identity, and ethnic minorities.11 Discourses and practices of race in modern China before 1949 
have been always examined in connection to Western and Japanese imperialism, either aspiring 
to racial improvement and a stronger national body or resisting racial discrimination.12 After the 
end of territorial imperialism in China and the communist takeover, racial theories were attacked 
as a tool of imperialism on the one hand, and on the other, adapted mainly to mediate the 
politicized relationship between the Han majority and other ethnic minorities within China.13 All 
of these discussions are established on the premise that modern China was a recipient of North 
Atlantic debates on the concept of race, and then recast the concept for local anticolonial struggle 
 
11 For example, see Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1992); Frank Dikötter, ed., The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); Frank Dikötter, Imperfect 
Conceptions: Medical Knowledge, Birth Defects, and Eugenics in China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998); Emma J. Teng, “Eurasian Hybridity in Chinese Utopian Visions: From ‘One World’ to ‘A 
Society Based on Beauty’ and Beyond,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, 14 (2006): 131–163; Thomas 
Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
12 For the way in which race was used as counterimperial discourse, see Yuehtsen Juliette Chung, “Better 
Science and Better Race?: Social Darwinism and Chinese Eugenics,” Isis 105, no. 4 (2014): 793-802. 
13 See Frank Dikötter, “The Discourse of Race in Twentieth-Century China,” in Race and Racism in Modern 




and internal colonialism. Yet little attention has been given to China’s role as an active 
participant in shaping racial destiny to further its global ambition.  
What is also distinctive in this case of interplay of race and medicine choreographed by 
Chinese actors is the prominence of acupuncture, a branch of Chinese medicine. Scholarship on 
race and medicine is in fact a scholarship on race and Western (bio)medicine. The exclusive 
attention being paid to Western medicine is justified by the fact that the mutual construction of 
the concept of race and colonial medicine was enacted by colonial doctors and scientists in their 
encounters with locals since the eighteenth century.14 Indigenous medical knowledge only 
served as a source of information that they cherry-picked to corroborate their particular positions 
on racialized pathologies.15 Marginalized as unscientific and obsolete during the first half of the 
twentieth century, Chinese medicine was effectively excluded from racial sciences. However, my 
analysis of Chinese medical reports shows that, since the mid-1970s, Chinese medicine doctors 
introduced into acupuncture the factor of race, which was built on and gradually merged with the 
classical concept of “constitution” (tizhi Ɖ). By simultaneously racializing and de-racializing 
acupuncture, these mission doctors redefined Chinese medicine broadly to be a modern category 
of knowledge and practice while also affirming its status as legitimate “Chinese” knowledge.  
I demonstrate in this chapter that Chinese medicine physicians took advantage of 
unprecedented opportunities to experiment on the Algerian body, and claimed acupuncture to be 
 
14 For a most recent work on how colonial medical men used medicine to construct race, see Suman Seth, 
Difference and Disease: Medicine, Race and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). Seth particularly examines the 18th century, a period which is little explored in 
previous scholarship (p.7), for example, in Mark Harrison’s Medicine in An Age of Commerce and Empire: 
Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1660-1830 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
15 For example, a Qing compilation of medical texts and illustrations about smallpox in 1739 was interpreted 
by Europeans as indicative of the ill health and medical backwardness of the Chinese. See Ari Larissa 
Heinrich, The Afterlife of Images: Translating the Pathological Body between China and the West (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008), Chapter 1. 
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a “world medicine” (shijie yi) that could generate stunning therapeutic effects on bodies of other 
races. Their “discovery” of an Algerian body more receptive to acupuncture than the Chinese 
body served practical issues of China’s global governance, its potential reach and influence. To a 
certain extent, the Chinese approach resembled the practice of administrators of the British 
empire, who recognized categories of difference yet “tempered or even subordinated racial 
thinking” for the purpose of imperial management.16 For the Chinese project, the importance of 
substantiating the universality of acupuncture, and by extension, the Chinese medical mission’s 
role in international health provision governed when and how “race” would matter or not. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. It begins with the making and circulation of 
miracle stories of acupuncture in Algeria, which constituted a node in the web of transmission of 
medical knowledge that Chinese medical teams weaved among Third World countries. It then 
analyzes case histories recorded by Chinese medicine physicians to explore their perception of 
the Algerian body as well as patient voices heard particularly when cross-cultural issues were in 
the forefront. Given the limitation of sources in amount and genre, I emphasize a collective 
patient response in the context of sometimes colliding and other times compatible worldviews 
regarding healing and the body. The last section examines the little-studied relationship between 
race and Chinese medicine by analyzing case reports on acupuncture healings and anesthetic 
effects in Algeria and other African countries.  
 The practice and promotion of acupuncture in Algeria began at the moment when 
colonial medicine became international health. A latecomer to join the reframed postcolonial 
global health care initiatives, China sought to provide affordable and effective medical 
specialties that also differentiated it from other suppliers. Focusing on the Chinese mission’s 
 
16 Helen Tilley, “Racial Science, Geopolitics, and Empires: Paradoxes of Power,” Isis 105, no. 4 (2014), 780. 
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acupuncture services, this chapter reveals new understandings of socialist China’s global 
governance as it operated on the ground in Algeria, and more generally, demonstrates how 
science, race, and power were insinuated into the post-1949 reincarnation of Chinese medicine 
that was truly transnational and that served a socialist global agenda.  
 
Narrating Miraculous Cures  
Effects, or claimed ones, are always the primary touchstone for any kind of healing 
method to become popular. A narrative pattern can be discerned in Chinese accounts that 
acupuncture started to attract attention in Algeria, first of all, because of some simply stunning 
treatment effects. Some of these results were presented nearly on the border of miracles. This 
section examines some of them, focusing particularly on an acupuncture-assisted cyst removal 
surgery which stimulated enthusiastic responses from Algerians, and an anecdote of sciatica 
treatment which evolved into three different versions over time in Chinese print media. In these 
anecdotes of miraculous healing, acupuncture became a powerful symbol through which media 
audiences in Algeria and China could imagine an alternative medicine pushing the boundaries of 
biomedicine and a Chinese medical mission supplying alternate sources of cures. Targeting the 
Chinese public, the anecdotes turned normative healing cases into a narrative of extraordinary 
efficacy, whereby the legitimacy of Chinese medicine was reaffirmed from locations beyond 
China. As the production and circulation of the miracle stories occurred in the public space, I use 
newspaper reports and magazine articles, which were written by non-medical writers (by 
practitioners only in few exceptions) and intended for common readers.17 I find that, although 
 
17 The role of the media in spreading and popularizing messages of health and medicine through their articles, 
editorials, and advertisements in both the West and the East has been extensively discussed in the scholarship 
of the history of health. 
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mission doctors were willing to participate in self-promotion, their testimony was manipulated 
by journalists who instead played an essential role in the making of miraculous cures. 
During December 1972, Algeria’s major media spread the news of the removal of a 44kg 
ovarian cyst from a 60-year-old woman with acupuncture anesthesia in the Chérif Chérif 
Hospital of Relizane (in Mostaganem), celebrating it as “an important success of Chinese 
medicine.” Sharing this title, three major nationwide dailies—La République (French), Echaab 
(Arabic), and El Moudjahid (French)—published successive reports on the surgery on December 
8, 9, and 10, respectively. Algerian Radio and Television (RTA), the sole broadcasting company, 
transmitted the news on December 11-12 in French and Arabic, and on the 23rd, a follow-up 
coverage of the patient’s recovery through radio and television.18 The news spread fast and wide. 
According to a Chinese journalist, more than 300 local Algerian women on hearing the news 
visited the patient at the hospital on December 8 alone.19 An Algerian doctor wrote to La 
République, proposing that the Ministry of Public Health should consider assigning Algerian 
doctors to work with Chinese doctors, sending medical student interns to the hospitals run by the 
Chinese, or if possible, sending college students to China.20 The mayor of Relizane reportedly 
congratulated the Chinese team for “creating a medical miracle.”21 
 
18 HPA, SZ115-5-12-13, attachment, 1973. 
19 “Tuanjie hezuo de chengguo” hŒ[*ĶÀï [The fruit of cooperation], People’s Daily, February 17, 
1973, p.5. 
20 According to a Chinese archival document, La République published this reader’s letter from a Dr. Moya 
Zaimuli (pinyin transliteration) on December 15. The letter was titled with a well-known quote allegedly from 
the Prophet Muhammad, “Seek knowledge even as far as China.” Unfortunately, the issue of that date is 
missing from the Algerian National Archives’s La République collection. What I cite here is from the Chinese 
translation of the letter included in the Hubei Provincial Archives’ holdings. HPA, SZ115-5-12-13, attachment, 
1973. I deem the translation faithful to the original, because the translation of another article included 
alongside is faithful. 
21 HPA, SZ115-5-12-13, December 26, 1972, p.4. 
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Chinese medical teams had practiced acupuncture in Algeria since 1963, but it was this 
sensational moment created by media when the effect of acupuncture was magnified and 
mystified. Indeed, this was the moment that amplified the discourse of acupuncture’s miraculous 
effects on a national level, for previous word-of-mouth passing of information was often local 
and multivalent. The patient, Fatima, a poor peasant woman from the douar (commune) of 
Bekhaitrai (in Mohammadia, Oran), had suffered from a growing ovarian tumor for more than 
six years. Her stomach and lower abdomen were swollen that her waistline exceeded 150cm (59 
inches). Consumed by the illness to the point that she could hardly eat or drink, she was 
extremely feeble and could not stand regular anesthesia. Prior to her treatment by Chinese 
doctors in the Hospital of Relizane, she had spent several months in various hospitals in western 
Algeria (including Oran, Mostaganem, and Sig) without receiving surgery. After two weeks of 
preoperative care, on 2 December 1972, a Chinese surgical team led by Zhang Qinglan ­£ 
operated on Fatima with acupuncture anesthesia, and removed a cyst of 44kg plus 30 liters of 
fluid that had drowned her body.22 Although the Algerian newspapers’ mention of acupuncture 
as the anesthetic method alternative to regular anesthesia was brief, their use of “Chinese 
medicine” in the titles as a distinctive category was striking to the eyes of readers. It is not clear-
cut whether Algerian reporters used “Chinese medicine” to specifically refer to acupuncture, or 
more broadly, medicine practiced by the Chinese. The 44kg tumor itself was sufficiently 
sensational to an ordinary reader, but some readers also noticed the Chinese needles. The doctor 
writing to La République interpreted “la médecine chinoise” as opposed to Western medicine, as 
he pointed out that “it is the time now when the West, especially Europe, rediscovers and pays 
 
22 This description is mainly drawn from “Ablation d’un kyste de 44kg: Un succès de la médecine chinoise,” 




attention to Chinese medicine, which has undoubtedly influenced Arab medicine.”23 Different 
foci of attention notwithstanding, the media recognition of the medical fact endorsed 
acupuncture as a legitimate and miraculous method to employ in a modern surgery.       
Just as important in the making of the miraculous feat in Algeria was the circulation of 
the anecdote by Chinese media. In often more vivid details, each newspaper conveyed different 
editorial emphases yet collectively produced an aura of China’s medical achievement. 
Surprisingly, the Chinese print media did not center acupuncture in their narratives. The surgery 
was first reported briefly by Reference News (Cankao xiaoxi) on December 22, without making 
indication to acupuncture anesthesia.24 This daily, under Zhou Enlai’s supervision, collected and 
translated articles from world’s major news agencies into Chinese, and has been an internal 
publication restricted to select intelligentsia and party cadres at the county level and above since 
1970.25 The omission of acupuncture might suggest a cautious attitude of high-level party 
intellectuals towards acupuncture’s claimed effect. The surgery attracted wider domestic 
attention after a feature report in People’s Daily in February 1973. While acupuncture anesthesia 
was mentioned, the narrative was recast to emphasize how Algerian medical and hospital staff 
contributed to the surgery by doing auxiliary work, as its title “The Fruit of Cooperation” clearly 
 
23 HPA, SZ115-5-12-13, attachment, 1973. 
24 Zhang Jinglin ­Üî and Zhang Yalin ­î, eds., Zhang Qinglan wengao xuanbian ­£ÒŉƒŔ 
[Selected works of Zhang Qinglan] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Literary Arts Publication Company, 2013), 156. 
25 On the history of Reference News’s readership, see an article by a chief editor of the newspaper, Zhang 
Xinmin ­ƍý, “ ‘Da duzhe’ he xinhuashe de guoji cankao baodao” “yƃś”bÔMĿĶjƦRŚÅƕ 
[“Big readers” and the Xinhua News Agency’s international news], Dangshi bolan 5ZNŻ [General 
review of the Communist Party of China], 4(2008): 4-10. 
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suggested.26 Other regional newspapers of Hubei, such as Hubei Daily and Changjiang Daily (of 
Wuhan), reproduced the story in a few days.27 It made a hit in Hubei at least. The surgeon Zhang 
Qinglan became a local celebrity and on his return was offered a position transfer from the 
Huanggang County to the provincial capital Wuhan.28     
As a major source of information, the Chinese doctors at Relizane actively participated in 
the construction of the success narrative and self-promotion to domestic superiors. Their 
statements, however, did not always fully satisfy the current strictures of government 
propaganda. Compared with the news in the public domain, the doctors’ report to Hubei 
Province underscored their expertise and work ethics by making contrast between life and death, 
between Chinese and non-Chinese doctors, between poor conditions and smart impromptu 
measures. They reported that they admitted Fatima after she was rejected by French, Czech, 
Bulgarian, and Cuban doctors, a fact that both Algerian and Chinese news shied away from. 
They claimed that all the other foreign doctors and many Algerian medical staff believed that the 
illness was incurable and the patient “would die on the operating table.” They temporarily 
converted a conference room into an operating room, because an official one was under 
construction. They decided to use acupuncture for anesthesia to better handle the feeble status of 
 
26 “Tuanjie hezuo de chengguo,” People’s Daily, February 17, 1973, p.5. The feature drew from an interview 
with the medical team at Relizane and likely from the team’s own report to Hubei Provincial Health 
Department. 
27 Zhang and Zhang, eds. Zhang Qinglan wengao xuanbian, 156. According to this collection, Guangming 
Daily also published an article on February 18, 1973. But I cannot find it in the Daily’s database. 
28 Zhou Kexiang `4Ł and Hu Qiuzi ŠƗ, “Juxiang you yao dao wan qiu” ŰƳĝŸHÞŅ [The 
fragrance of chrysanthemum appears in late Autumn], Huanggang ribao ƻ9ØÅ [Huanggang Daily], 




the patient.29 Contrasts of these kinds were a narrative strategy popularly employed in mission 
doctors’ reports of the 1960s-70s. Particularly striking was the disproportionate attention that the 
team chose to direct to acupuncture anesthesia. It was the sole medical issue discussed 
throughout their report, yet no acupuncturist was named therein. Other medical issues covered by 
People’s Daily, including surgery plans, preoperative care, and instrument improvisation were 
not raised at all by the doctors themselves. The doctors must have been aware of the advocacy of 
acupuncture anesthesia as a state project, which was now reaching its high point. But the low 
profile that the Chinese print media assigned to acupuncture in this case and the fact that no 
acupuncturist claimed the credit for this surgery leave one wondering to what extent acupuncture 
actually played its anesthetic role.    
In either the Algerian endorsement of “an important success of Chinese medicine” or the 
Chinese celebration of “the fruit of Sino-Algerian cooperation,” the Chinese mission doctors did 
not appear to have the decisive power to document or define a miracle. Their self-censored 
expert testimony was only selectively heard by news reporters, except in few occasions when 
they pursued reporting. In shaping the discourse about acupuncture, lay writers often had the 
liberty to revise medical anecdotes to boast of effects. This was especially the case for Chinese 
media. No professional standard of journalism existed to prevent reporters from making 
imprecise comments or request them to double check facts. No scrutiny of miraculous results by 
medical authorities was required before the journalistic reports went public. Unlike coeval news 
reports of biomedical cases which were often filled with technical terms, reports about 
 
29 HPA, SZ115-5-12-13, December 26, 1972, 2-5. 
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acupuncture tended to lack specificities about medical practice itself.30 Such reports produced an 
effect of reaffirming Chinese medicine as a system of belief more than a scientific enterprise.31  
The devolution of precision and the resultant mystification of treatment effects were 
exemplified in three versions of the anecdote of the first documented use of acupuncture on an 
Algerian patient in Saïda. According to the first version, the team’s acupuncturist Zhang 
Jiasheng ­ (1925-?) earned his reputation in 1963 by the quick result he achieved on a 
patient who had hurt his low back in a bad fall and had been bed-ridden for more than half a 
month before the treatment. As the anecdote goes, on Zhang’s patrol to a village clinic 42 
kilometers away from the capital seat of Saïda, the patient was carried to the clinic for treatment. 
He was not able to sit up or move. Zhang treated him with acupuncture and, soon, he was able to 
straighten up and walk out of the clinic. When the little anecdote first appeared in a feature in 
People’s Daily in 1964, its reporter from the Xinhua News Agency maintained a certain 
objective tone in the narrative. He recorded that the Chinese doctor did a check on the patient 
and diagnosed that the immobility of the patient was “due to low back pain involving acute 
sciatica, for which acupuncture could produce immediate effect.”32 This explained to the reader 
that acupuncture functioned well in this case because it was the right antidote. In the second 
 
30 For example, reportage essays in the anthology Mingyi fengliu zai beifei \LƱĉnKƮ treated 
biomedical cases in much better technical terms. See, for example, the essay “Aosiman de shou jie huo le” |
ÓßĶÁÉĈ [Othmane’s hand was grafted and became live] about a hand graft surgery for a printer 
Kaid-Ameur Othmane in Relizane Hospital in 1974, pp.53-63. 
31 Here I do not intend to single out Chinese medicine as a system of belief. As Jacalyn Duffin argues, 
Western medical scientists also act on the basis of faith, “the absolute belief in the nontranscendence of earthly 
events. Like those who believe in God, they believe in the existence of a natural explanation, as yet unknown 
but open for discovery.” See Duffin, Medical Miracles, 189. 
32 Wen Shuxian ďƑ, “Zhongguo yisheng zai aerjiliya” jLĨnƥSG[Chinese Doctors in 
Algeria], People’s Daily, October 8, 1964, p.3. The village’s name is rendered in Chinese as “ƈ¶O” or “±
´”. I cannot identify its original name in French or Arabic. 
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version told by the team’s deputy head, Dr. Chen Haifeng ƨ (1912-2013), again in 
People’s Daily in 1965, the medical explanation was taken out. Instead, Chen emphasized that 
“many patients and nurses present were very surprised,” and the “miraculous efficacy” of 
Chinese acupuncture was “quickly spread in the vast agricultural and pastoral areas.” The 
anecdote’s title was also changed from “Acupuncture is Very Popular” in the first report to 
Chen’s exclamation of “Miracle-working Dr. Ibra (needle, ةربإ ).”33 When the anecdote was 
retold decades later in a commemorative anthology commissioned by the Hubei Provincial 
Department of Health, literary devices were employed to add more dramatic effects to an 
originally normative treatment case. In this third version, the author added free-style comments 
such as how the patient “had been worried that he was incurable,” how Dr. Zhang “immediately 
treated him on seeing his situation,” and “no sooner” had Zhang given the treatment than the 
patient straightened up “instantly.”34 It is clear that non-medical details gradually came to 
dominate the narrative of a cure, while medical skills were sidelined and results magnified and 
dramatized.       
Such gradually developed dramas of acupuncture treatment were intended for a domestic 
audience. More stories of stunning, and often immediate, effects were repeatedly told to Chinese 
readers by non-medical reporters in major newspapers and random journals. Some read like an 
account of magic, in which a scientific-minded reader could hardly believe. For example, Chen 
Hongtao, one of the three doctors training Algerian acupuncturists in Médéa (see Chapter 4), was 
reported to have revived a patient who had been in a coma for fourteen days. “Using his 
 
33 Chen Haifeng ƨċ, “Zhongguo yisheng zuike xinren de ren” jLĨ—àY/ Ķ[Chinese 
Doctors—the Most Trustworthy], People’s Daily, December 18, 1965, p.6. 
34 Huang Sihai ƻgċ, “Feiwang beifei de diyizhi zhongguo yiliaodui” Ʋ²KƮĶŌÏjLĬƤ 
[The first Chinese medical team in North Africa], in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 29. 
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hereditary secret needling skills,” the journal article goes, Chen needled a set of acupoints. Three 
days later, the patient woke up from coma.35 While the three-day gap seemed dubious, a later 
version of the anecdote by the same author offered a surreal narrative to further credit Chen 
instead of coincidence or luck. After the needles were inserted, the author claimed, the pulse of 
the comatose patient “magically beat” and “the tendons of relevant body parts started to shiver 
rhythmically.”36 It is unlikely that this medical case was a total fabrication. Although the 
Algerian side was less invested in the “acupuncture miracle” narrative and its records of Chinese 
medical feats are much fewer in quantity (as far as I can find) and less dramatic in narration, they 
always corroborate basic facts of the Chinese accounts when they are available. Yet, miracle 
cases like this indeed invite careful examination of its sponsorship, readership and tendentious 
messages.  
What these anecdotes shared was a narrative pattern devoted to the motif of “miracle-
working doctors with magical needles” (you shen zhen de shen yi).37 They briefly laid out the 
condition as hopeless (a failure of biomedical doctors from other countries) and they underscored 
surprise at the outcome (for which biomedicine could not take credit). For the process of 
treatment, they used metaphors but lacked technical details of how a doctor reached diagnosis, 
how he or she performed acupuncture, which acupoints to use, which needling skill to apply, or 
 
35 Li Shunlai èƯé, “Bozhong xingfu de renmen—ji zhongguo yiliaodui zai A’erjiliya” Îņ¢ŃĶ
——žjLĬƤnƥSG” [People who sow the seeds of happiness: a documentation of Chinese 
medical teams in Algeria], Guoji jingji hezuo jƦőĊ[*[Journal of International Economic Cooperation], 
no. 3 (1986): 15. 
36 Li Shunlai èƯé, “Shen zhen” ŀƟ[Miraculous needles], in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 152. 
37 A Chinese medicine physician and acupuncturist (in Algeria 1975-77, 1979-81) wrote an essay on this motif 
and was proud that he “shared this reputation” as a member of the Chinese medicine physician collective. See 
Fan Dalin Ŭyî, “Zhongguo zhenjiu xiangyu A’erjiliya” jƟĕżƥSG [Chinese acu-moxa 
won reputation in Algeria], Hubei wenshi ĐKÒZ [Hubei Literature and History], no.2 (2012): 96-101. 
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about any other medication combined with the treatment. They did not supply readers with 
medical terms nor definite dates, doctors’ names, or other basics to help the readers rationalize 
the cases and gain a sense of credibility. Rather, they simply enforced the idea that acupuncture 
was effective by citing exclamations from anonymous Algerian observers on site and publicity 
from unnamed Algerian media. These anecdotes told about transcendent miracles, which were 
not bound by time or conditions.  
Why were Chinese readers supposed to buy such narrative? One answer is that norms of 
truthfulness and credibility in print are culturally relative. This kind of healing narrative was 
rooted in Chinese reportage literature (baogao wenxue), which deliberately blurred the boundary 
between reality and fiction. Popular in China from the 1930s through the end of 1980s and in 
close relationship with cultural leftism, reportage literature was a “deliberately literary” 
nonfiction writing which combined imaginative literary expression with authenticity. It 
employed the technique of narrative verisimilitude that is usually associated with realistic fiction 
in Western narrative poetics. Readers thus often understood the texts as ones that described “real 
people and real events” (zhenren zhenshi), a claim this genre held dear.38 Readers, however, may 
go further and take the emotional and rhetorical colorings in these texts at face value, confusing 
the artistic construction with actual events. Many readers at the time were likely to be bounded 
and governed by the given narrative published and circulated in state mouthpieces. 
While I do not doubt the basic facts in these stories, whether they actually took place or 
not is of less importance than why different medical experiences were made to fit this mold of 
the miraculous healing narrative. This is of particular interest given that the mystifying narrative 
 
38 Charles Laughlin, Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002), 2 and 28. Laughlin offers a careful analysis of this literary genre from the early 1930s up to the 
eve of the Cultural Revolution. 
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ran counter to the scientization movement of Chinese medicine flourishing in China. Whereas 
Chinese medical scientists had since the 1950s tried to explain acupuncture’s mechanism with 
biological theories,39 and to use empirical data and scientific methodology to prove efficacy, 
these anecdotes targeting ordinary readers reversed the efforts of elite scientists and created more 
black boxes. The driving motivations must have lain somewhere else. The emphasis on 
acupuncture as an effective alternative to biomedicine echoes what Mei Zhan observes today 
among acupuncturists in Shanghai and San Francisco, who are eager to prove the legitimacy of 
their practice. Yet, whereas contemporary private doctors seek to speak to patients as a self-
promotion, the overseas medical miracles were intended for the general public at home. The 
purpose of telling these anecdotes was not to attract patients to a certain physician, but to show to 
the domestic audience that acupuncture was recognized by foreigners and that Chinese medicine 
was worthwhile preserving and promoting. Therefore, these anecdotes did not seek to present 
mission acupuncturists as individual masters but rather attempted to portray the doctors as a 
collective who shared a reputation of “miracle makers” with Chinese needles.40 This was a 
project of the “worlding” of Chinese medicine, to use Zhan’s term,41 which conjured legitimacy 
and reaffirmation from disparate locations.  
For this reason, voices of Algerian patients who recovered miraculously were seldom 
heard—and when they were heard, they always tended to be celebratory—in the Chinese 
anecdotes circulated among common readers. We read about how they pleaded for alternative 
 
39 Zhu Lian æč was a leading physician in this research by proposing “new acupuncture.” See Kim Taylor, 
Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China,14-29. 
40 Fan stated that he was proud to be seen as a member of the needle-holding Chinese doctors who produced 
miracles. See Fan Dalin, “Zhongguo zhenjiu xiangyu A’erjiliya,” 96. 
41 See Mei Zhan, Other-Worldly, Ch.1. 
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Chinese healing interventions and how they expressed gratitude upon recovery. But we learn 
nothing about how they might be perplexed, doubtful, anxious, or uncooperative, or how 
miracles did not transpire in many other cases.    
Telling stories of overseas acupuncture miracles to a domestic audience was a form of 
self-assuring propaganda produced by non-medical writers. Since its encounter with Western 
medicine, Chinese medicine had been driven to the margin, ontologically and epistemologically 
destabilized in spite of its long history. Even the coeval socialist rural health care system of the 
barefoot doctors, which was commonly perceived as the major promoter of Chinese acupuncture 
and herbs, has been recently demonstrated by a historian to have been in favor of biomedicine.42 
The pressure to preserve a space in the medical market and the state interest in encouraging 
people to pursue Chinese medicine generated an impulse to produce extraordinary events out of 
mundane practice of Chinese medicine. This task was taken up mostly by non-medical writers. 
Their insufficient knowledge of medicine was nonetheless compensated by the authority of 
major government publications. Their exaggeration in narration was mitigated by the long 
distance of the stories from Chinese everyday life: miracles were easier for people to imagine 
from afar. The miracles told by non-professionals were an ambiguous yet powerful source of 
medical authority, which lured readers who sought to fight illness and delay death. More 
importantly, these miracle stories represented a narrative pattern and public discourse 
characteristic of China’s mission medicine as a whole. This discourse of healing continues to 
shape the way in which Chinese reporters and self-promoting mission doctors write about 
medical events abroad for the general public at home.  
 
42 Xiaoping Fang, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in China (Rochester, N.Y.: University of 
Rochester Press. 2012). 
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The Receptive Body and Patient Voices  
Whereas non-medical reporters produced the miracle discourse for the public to consume, 
mission doctors mainly engaged in writing and reporting case histories on Chinese medicine 
journals for their professional counterparts. The circulation of printed specialized journals of 
Chinese medicine at regular intervals provided a convenient and efficient forum for any 
interested physicians to claim expertise, regardless of their professional accomplishment or 
richness of experience. Since its emergence in the mid-Ming, the publication of individually 
authored case history collections had only been possible for more established physicians, who 
had accumulated sufficient cases and received generous financial sponsorship from their lineage, 
clients, and patrons.43 The late Qing innovation of publishing journals of Chinese medicine, 
following the suit of biomedical journals, opened up space for junior physicians to participate in 
the production of knowledge shared by the medical community.44 If the late Ming already saw 
an “extremely decentralized” medical culture as a result of case history writing and publication, 
as medical historians have argued,45 the diffusion of medical authority became even wider in the 
modern age.          
 
43 Charlotte Furth, A Flourishing Yin: Gender in China’s Medical History, 960-1665 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 225-226. 
44 A recent 212-volume compilation of modern journals of Chinese medicine collects 49 influential journals 
published between 1897 and 1949 in Wenzhou, Shanghai, Shaoxing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Tianjin, Taiyuan, Nanjing, Chongqing, and Hong Kong. See Duan Yishan úƔ, ed., Zhongguo jin dai 
zhong yi yao qikan huibian jƐLŭãAÿŔ [A compilation of modern journals of Chinese 
medicine in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2012). For a brief analysis of Chinese-language 
scholarship on Republican journals of Chinese medicine, see Li Boqun èNŘ and Chen Ting ƨ, 
“Minguo shiqi Zhong yi yao qikan jiqi wenxian tese tanxi” ýjÙãLŭãAS7ÒĞěŧÈì [An 
analysis of TCM journals and their features in the Republican period], Zhongguo zhongyiyao tushu qingbao 
zazhi jLŭk»Åç· [Chinese Journal of Library and Information Science for TCM] 40, no. 3 
(2016): 49-52. 
45 See Charlotte Furth, A Flourishing Yin, 226; also, Angela Leung, “Medical Instruction and Popularization 
in Ming-Qing China,” Late Imperial China 24, no. 1(2003): 131-136 and 139-44. 
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This section examines case histories written by mission doctors and published in journals 
of Chinese medicine mainly from the 1970s to 1980s. The case history allows me to follow the 
clinical encounter from the doctors’ viewpoints and explore how they reached diagnosis, made 
choices about therapeutic interventions, and perceived the Algerian body using the combined 
language of Chinese medical theory and biomedical terms. Through the doctors’ narratives about 
illness and their interaction with patients, I can peer into illness experience of Algerians who 
sought advice from Chinese doctors, the patients’ and their families’ understandings of their own 
bodies, and tensions between doctors and clients in terms of medical beliefs and social 
relations.46 All but one of the articles were on acupuncture treatment, which suggests the 
dominance of acupuncture in the application of Chinese medicine in Algeria.47 The majority of 
the articles were summaries of cases of one certain disease, employing statistical methods and 
providing a few typical cases as sample analyses; the rest were old-style single case reports. 
Most articles appeared in a bimonthly academic journal, the Hubei Journal of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine, which indicated a special community interest among physicians from 
Hubei—the province designated to partner with Algeria for medical aid. The Hubei physicians 
crafted stories of healing, shared information and circulated ideas about Algerian patients: their 




46 My analysis of case histories is inspired by Charlotte Furth (1999), 224-265. 
47 The only exception was an article about Chinese medical method in treating bone fracture. See Wang 
Guosheng ĠjĨ, “Zai guowai yunyong zhongyi gushing liaofa zhiliao sizhi guzhe 42 li” njxƏĩL
Ʒ%ĬĄĂĬgŞƷÄ42+ [The use of Chinese orthopedics in treating 42 cases of limb fracture], Hubei 
Zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç· [Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine] no.2 (1988): 43-44. 
192 
 
Illnesses treated with acupuncture in Algeria were categorized into a fairly small range of 
chronic diseases. Whereas the classic style of an individual physician’s case collection selected a 
variety of diverse individual cases that best manifested the author’s medical philosophy and 
pharmaceutical strategies, the journal articles of the 1970s-80s focused on showcasing the 
applicability of a certain therapeutic intervention to a large number of similar cases. In Algeria, 
the commonly seen illnesses—and ones that would be brought to an acupuncture clinic—
appeared to be limited to mainly chronic complaints: enuresis, sciatica, asthma, arthritis, deaf-
mutism, and pain. Most journal articles synthesized different cases into these disease categories, 
whereby individual variations were suppressed in the process of naming illness into disease. 
Pulse examination was reported only twice (one in a case of asthma and the other in neck 
strain);48 and pattern analysis did not appear crucial in explaining etiology. Often not taking 
Chinese medicine as their first choice, patients had already been inspected by biomedical 
physicians and likely learned of their diseases in biomedical terms before they were referred to 
an acupuncturist. By the time they arrived, illness had been lingering for a while. The Chinese 
acupuncturist seldom expressed any criticisms of the diagnoses of biomedical physicians whom 
the patients had consulted previously. Supposedly a diagnostician before giving treatment, the 
acupuncturist was nonetheless willing to subscribe to biomedical doctors’ opinions and often 
used biomedical vocabularies to describe diseases. For example, they used “sensorineural 
 
48 Zhang Zhiguo ­Ăj et al. “Meihua zhen kou ci jia bahuoguan zhiliao xiaochuan zai A’erjiliya de 
yingyong tihui” õŪƟXIJÆĔŕĂĬefnƥSGĶ¦ĩ(" [Experience about using Meihua 
needle and cupping to treat asthma in Algeria], Zhongguo zhenjiu jƟĕ[Chinese Acupuncture & 
Moxibustion], no.2 (2000): 109; and Li Jiakang èª, “Zhenci Houxi Fengchi xue zhiliao laozhen 55 li” Ɵ
I]Ē<ĀŊĂĬűí55+ [55 cases of puncturing Houxi and Fengchi to treat Laozhen], Hubei zhongyi 
zazhi ĐKLç· [Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], no.4 (1985): 13. 
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hearing loss” instead of a certain long (Ŝ) among the five classical categories of deafness;49 
“rheumatoid arthritis” was adopted instead of one of the bi zheng ( ) categories.50         
In thinking about why one falls ill, racialization of Algerians was not a factor for the 
Chinese medicine doctors. Their narratives did not differ much from their late imperial 
predecessors. They continued to grapple with the causes of sickness by appealing to the patient’s 
“innate constitution, or to influences of external environment or vagaries of personal 
circumstances.”51 But now they also juxtaposed the classical line of analysis with biomedical 
explanations. To begin with, everyone has a natural constitution (tizhi Ɖ). People with 
congenital deaf-mutism or suffering deafness due to streptomycin (a type of antibiotics that can 
treat TB and other serious infections) were often “depleted in innate endowment,” and especially 
“deficient in kidney-qi.”52 A corpulent person tended to have phlegm-Damp constitution, with qi 
closed in, and was susceptible to bi zheng (lit., blocks, resulting in rheumatism).53 A child or 
youth with “poor appetite, pale face, fatigue, and smaller than average” was likely born with 
 
49 Luo Jimin ŖĊý, “Zai aerjiliya yong zhenci zhiliao longya 50 li linchuang baogao” nƥSGĩƟ
IĂĬŜd50+¤Å_[A Clinical Report of Treating 50 Cases of Deaf-mutism with Acupuncture in 
Algeria], Hubei zhong yi za zhi [Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], no.3 (1980): 56. The Song 
Dynasty compilation of Formulas from Benevolent Sages Compiled during the Taiping Era (z m½Õ) 
categorizes 5 types of deafness in Vol.36. 
50 Wang Qicai Ġ^Â, “Zhenjiu zhiliao lei fengshixing guanjieyan yili” ƟĕĂĬōƱđ¸6ũĖ+  
[Use acupuncture to treat one case of rheumatoid arthritis], Shanghai zhenjiu zazhi ċƟĕç·[Shanghai 
Journal of Acupuncture and Moxibustion], no.3 (1984): 13. 
51 Charlotte Furth, A Flourishing Yin, 232. 
52 Luo Jimin ŖĊý, “Zai aerjiliya yong zhenci zhiliao longya 50 li linchuang baogao,” 54. 
53 Sun Guojie jë, “Zai aerjiliya yong zhenci zonghe liaofa zhiliao zuogu shenjing tong 257 li linchuang 
guancha baogao” nƥSGĩƟIœ[ĬĄĂĬoƷŀőı257+¤ŹÅ_ [A Clinical Report 
of Treating 257 Cases of Sciatica with Acupuncture in Algeria], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·[Hubei 
Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], no.1 (1979): 59. 
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insufficient kidney-qi and subsequently suffered from enuresis.54 These narratives did not assign 
any special category of natural constitution to Algerians. Like Chinese patients, the weakness of 
primordial qi was the root cause of sickness. 
While the classic agents of diseases, qi, also applied to Algerians, external influences and 
everyday habits marked particularities of the rise of evil qi in the Algerian body. Algerians were 
susceptible to rheumatism (bi zheng) as a result of the emergence of three evil qi of Wind, Cold, 
and Damp. These qi occurred frequently because the bed was low, too close to the floor, and 
Algerians liked to sit on the ground. The humid coastal climate in Algiers could lead to the 
accumulation of Wind and Damp in the knee meridian (xi luo), which worsened the arthritis due 
to the frequent kneeling down during Muslim’s prayers.55 Food was also responsible: the 
Algerian diet rich in such nutritious food as milk and butter could lead to excessive phlegm and 
Damp, and consequent block of qi;56 Algerian babies were often fed with formula, which 
produced illnesses of poor nourishment and generated propensity for enuresis.57 Emotional 
disturbance also led to illness. Angry with her husband, a young woman suffered sporadic strikes 
 
54 Gao Jieying Ƹąů, “Zhenci zhiliao yiniaozheng 105 li” ƟIĂĬƖİ105+ [Use puncturing to treat 
105 cases of enuresis], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·[Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], 
no.5 (1992): 40. 
55 Peng Yiyu ¯ÛƬ, “Zhenci Xiyan xue wei zhu zhiliao xi guanjieyan 120 li” ƟIšĺŊĂĬš6ũ
Ė120+ [Puncture Xiyan to treat 120 cases of knee arthritis], Shiyong zhong yi yao zazhi ĩLŭç· 
[Journal of Practical Traditional Chinese Medicine] 18, no.1 (2002): 31. 
56 Sun Guojie jë, “Zai aerjiliya yong zhenci zonghe liaofa zhiliao zuogu shenjing tong 257 li linchuang 
guancha baogao,” 59. In translating the Chinese medical terms, I refer to Paul Unschuld, ed. Huang Di Nei 
Jing Su Wen: An Annotated Translation of Huang Di’s Inner Classic - Basic Questions (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2011). On bi zheng, see Chapter 43 “Discourse on Blocks.” On overly rich food (gaoliang 
houwei ƸŎQa), see Chapter 3. 
57 Zhu Shanyou æá, “Wenzhen zhiliao xiaoer yiniaozheng 82 li” ďƟĂĬ1Ɩİ82+ [Use warm 
needles to treat 82 cases of enuresis], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·[Hubei Journal of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine], no.1 (1990): 12. 
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of hysteria (yi zheng) for two days; the flow of qi stagnated and rendered muscle contracture and 
stiffening and involuntary closure of the eyelids.58   
In all the above narratives of falling ill, the doctors ascribed meanings and explanations 
taken from classical medical texts—especially Su Wen (Basic Questions) and Ling Shu (Spiritual 
Pivot)—to the diseases already diagnosed in biomedical terms.59 Dealing with mostly chronic 
illnesses, they pointed to the importance of recognizing one’s innate characteristics, habitual and 
environmental influences, rather than chances and contingencies of being taken ill in acute cases. 
They resorted to the canons for medical authority, and justified their therapies by situating 
prognostics in the theoretical reasoning along the line of the canons. All these meanings were, 
however, constructed for their own professional community to consume. They would probably 
have liked to recommend changes in diet and daily practices to counter the illnesses if they had 
confronted Chinese patients; but they were reserved in taking this step for their Algerian clients, 
with whom language and cultural barriers rendered the translation of meanings unintelligible. 
Instead, the doctors chose to assume the position of an objective observer and passive healer, 
who only dealt with symptoms on the surface. They offered little moral judgment to blame the 
patient for his illness; nor did they request much in terms of his personal discipline.         
How the patients grasped illness remains wanting from the case reports. When they 
arrived at the acupuncture clinic, they had already found words from biomedical physicians to 
 
58 Xiao Renhe ŝƹ, “Hao zhen ci Yongquan zhiliao yizheng 50 li” üƟIČăĂĬĳİ50+ [Use 
filiform needles to puncture Yongquan to treat 50 cases of yizheng], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·
[Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], no.5 (1987): 39. 
59 The case of hysteria was an exception, which continues to be a complex and ambiguous disease category in 
Chinese medicine yet was no longer considered as real ailment in the West after the concept of hysterical 
neurosis was deleted from the 1980 DSM-III. See Arthur Kleinman’s works on neurasthenia by studying 
Taiwanese cases, Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Depression, Neurasthenia, and Pain in Modern 
China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Mary Garvey, “Hysteria,” Clinical Acupuncture and 
Oriental Medicine, 2 (2001): 221–227. 
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name their distress. Their own understanding of illness met in the contested zone between 
biomedicine and Chinese medicine. In addition, doctors’ narratives revealed little information on 
the experiences of suffering illness. If the Chinese doctors had been able to communicate well 
with the patient, they might have incorporated his complaints and suffering, like in the other 
articles documenting Chinese cases in the same journals. The inability to inquire as to the 
patient’s nuanced and individualized experiences left their portrayal of pains brief and general. 
We only learn that a 17-year-old adolescent who had a 13-year history of enuresis had “very 
heavy mental stress,” but unfortunately do not know how he perceived his illness, its cause and 
curing methods.60 Out of the total 673 bed-wetting cases reported by five different doctors 
between 1979 and 1991, the narrative tension lay in whether the patients had been treated before 
and, if they had, a brief mention of the previous useless medication grouped by the term 
“Western medicine.” Suffering was normalized and generalized due to poor communication as 
well as the lack of diagnostic interest in these seemingly straightforward categories of chronic 
diseases.  
Though we know little about how the patients narrated pains or positioned suffering in 
the local discourse setting, we learn from the case histories that they were active in seeking 
healing advice and conducting self-care drawn from a diverse range of sources. North African 
Muslims were often derogatorily described by colonizers as “fatalists” who were passive 
receivers of the illnesses and ultimately the death that fate dealt them.61 Current Chinese doctors 
in Algeria have similar opinions in this regard, though with a more positive spin, appreciating 
their patients’ compliance with medical advice and resilience when facing unfortunate medical 
 
60 Gao Jieying Ƹąů, “Zhenci zhiliao yiniaozheng 105 li,” 40. 
61 See Chapter 2.2. 
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results.62 Algerian patients, however, had their own views about therapies and pharmaceutical 
usages. In fact, they resorted to many strategies to hasten their journey to wellness. They had 
often received treatment prior to the recourse to acupuncture. Many had visited biomedical 
doctors and taken chemical drugs. A school teacher in Algiers had been using drugs to alleviate 
his asthma for 32 years;63 an internist from the Medical College of Oran had taken steroid to 
treat Bell’s palsy for two weeks before he visited a Chinese acupuncturist for expediting 
recovery.64 Some patients had used home remedies or been dosed by their family elders. A 
seven-year-old bed-wetting child from Arris (Batna Province) had been dosed with many tonics 
and nutritional supplements.65  
It was not uncommon for Algerians to seek treatment from disparate healing cultures. An 
impotent administrator of the Hospital of Arris had sought treatment from Soviet doctors in 
Batna, as well as taken herbal pills prescribed by Chinese internists to invigorate the kidney and 
strengthen yang.66 Even when one was generally healthy, he could still receive a blood-letting 
 
62 This is a popular perception among current Chinese doctors I interviewed and met in Algeria and Morocco 
in 2015-16. An orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Qu, who is on his third term in the Hospital Makour Hamou of Aïn 
Defla prefers the work environment in Algeria because of the higher respect and obedience his Algerian 
patients pay to him than patients in China. Personal interview with Qu Bin, at the Hospital of Aïn Defla, July 
21, 2016. 
63 Zhang Zhiguo ­Ăj et al. “Meihua zhen kou ci jia bahuoguan zhiliao xiaochuan zai A’erjiliya de 
yingyong tihui,” 109. 
64 Xiao Renhe ŝƹ, “A’erjiliya yishi tongxun sanze” ƥSGLƓŽC [Three medical cases 
from Algeria], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·[Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], no.4 
(1986): 40. 
65 Fang Shaohua ÕM, “Dian zhen zhiliao yiniaozheng 150 li” ĪƟĂĬƖİ150+ [Use electric 
needles to treat 150 cases of enuresis], Hubei zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç·[Hubei Journal of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine], no. 6 (1985): 37. 
66 Qian Zhiyun Ơ·, “Zai aerjiliya zhenci yan’an liangze” nƥSGƟIƵò
C [Two Cases of 
Acupuncture Treatment in Algeria],” Hubei zhong yi za zhi [Hubei Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine], 
no.3 (1980): 57-58. 
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treatment to prevent him from falling sick. Hijama, or “sucking,” as the practice is known and 
popularly performed in Algeria (and the whole regions of North Africa and the Middle East), is 
conducted at certain times of a year to draw blood from certain parts of the body by the vacuum 
created by cups.67 Mentioned by the Prophet Muhammad, hijama is part of Arab traditional 
medicine which remains popular until today for its integration with religious belief. Of the 35 
patients who answered my questionnaire distributed at the acupuncture clinic in the Ben Aknoun 
Hospital of Algiers in February-March 2016, 25 have received hijama treatment.68 All the 
Chinese doctors I talked to at several different clinics in Algeria and Morocco have observed 
small scars of incision left by hijama on the body of their patients and knew of this local healing 
practice. However, no trace of hijama was found in the case narratives. The omission was likely 
deliberate, signifying a Chinese negligence in assigning medical significance to the local healing 
method. But Algerian patients have a different opinion. Among the 25 people (5 men and 20 
women) who have used both hijama and acupuncture, twelve preferred hijama, four preferred 
acupuncture, and the rest nine indicated no preference. The sampling pool, though small, 
included people aged between 22 and 85, from illiterate elders to master’s degree holders. The 
span of divergence in age and education of the people who use and like hijama speaks of its 
contemporary popularity among ordinary Algerians, and likely more so decades back in time. 




67 Liakat Ali Parapia, “History of Bloodletting by Phlebotomy,” British Journal of Haematology, 143 (2008), 
490-495. 
68 Although the pool was small, it was randomly sampled, comprising patients waiting for their turns outside 
the clinic on random work days. 
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Given Chinese medicine’s role as an alternative, and one often reserved for chronic 
diseases in Algeria, diagnostic tensions were minimized by the time the doctor took over a case, 
no matter how he understood the disease differently from the patient. Tensions between the 
doctor and the client arose more clearly in the stage of technical intervention, as the former was 
eager to demonstrate his authority over the challenge from the latter. A good example is a 
Chinese medicine doctor’s technical management of the case of a 36-year-old driver, who broke 
the tibia and fibula of his right leg in a vehicle accident: 
After [his] arrival in the emergency room, [we] immediately performed scalp debridement and 
suturing, and calcaneal traction. On the second day, the patient requested a surgery. He said in tears 
that his entire family relied on him for their living and that he could not make do without his right 
leg. He begged to be treated with the best method. Three days later, he pleaded with the hospital 
director to intercede for him [asking for a surgery]. I told the director that we decided to treat him 
with the method of Chinese medicine. We first did calcaneal traction, and after the swelling was 
reduced, we would manually reset the bone and immobilize it with small splints. This is the best 
method we use in our country. All of us use this method in China for treatment. It is very effective, 
safe, and reliable. The director was very satisfied. He explained to the patient and asked him to 
follow our advice. The patient thus stopped pestering for a surgery. Four weeks later, the traction 
belt was removed and bones fixed with small splints. He was able to get out of bed using crutches. 
X-ray showed that the alignment of fracture was precise. The patient spent five weeks in hospital, 
and he was so grateful at the time of discharge that he invited us to visit his home. Four months 
after his accident, he was able to drive on the highway.69 
 
This narrative made an expert’s argument for a particular bone-setting strategy—the use of bone-
setting manipulation and small splint fixation without recourse to surgeries in treating limb 
fracture. This was an excellent illustration of a doctor’s advocacy for Chinese orthopedics as not 
only an alternative but a better method than surgical methods. The author observed that their 
Algerian counterparts always repaired bone fracture with surgery as a result of the deep influence 
by Western medical practices. “Many patients and their families,” like the driver in this case, 
“asked for surgery,” which the author considered unnecessary. He was adamant in arguing 
against patients (and Algerian doctors) by laying out the merits of the Chinese method—“no 
 
69 Wang Guosheng ĠjĨ, “Zai guowai yunyong zhongyi gushing liaofa zhiliao sizhi guzhe 42 li,” 43. 
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operation, less pain, quick result, and good effects.” The author identified two specific areas of 
advantage. First, the surgery-free method avoided the possibility of postoperative osteomyelitis, 
an infection in a bone. He reported the high frequency of infection he encountered and three 
cases of serious osteomyelitis within the first two months he started managing a ward, one of 
which had protracted for ten years. Second, he boasted of a treatment principle of Chinese 
orthopedics—“the combination of activity and inertia” (dong jing jie he), which emphasized 
functional exercises in the early stage of recovery. The doctor managed to persuade 42 patients 
to have their closed fracture repaired with the Chinese method from October 1986 to August 
1987. In these cases, the doctor was at odds with the Algerian medical staff and with the 
expectations of his patients. He deplored what he saw as the latter’s excessive preference for one 
treatment method, and asserted authority by giving the better alternative when the patient’s 
condition permitted. The purpose of writing case histories for fellow professionals was often to 
advocate one’s own method for treating a known disease. This case was less about individual 
authority than claiming credit for Chinese orthopedics abroad on behalf of the whole Chinese 
professional community. The doctor claimed that “people [i.e., foreigners] would sooner or later 
turn their attention to therapies of the traditional Chinese orthopedics.”70       
In contrast, issues of medical authority were less at the forefront in acupuncture 
treatment, because of its “magical” ambience and its uniqueness to Chinese medicine. Medically, 
acupuncture has been proven effective for certain chronic conditions—especially pain 
management—to which biomedicine cannot offer effective cures, despite controversies in its 
mechanism of function.71 Its popularity in Algeria was not only described by a large number of 
 
70 Wang Guosheng ĠjĨ, “Zai guowai yunyong zhongyi gushing liaofa zhiliao sizhi guzhe 42 li,” 44. 
71 Several decades later, Western medical studies attested to the efficacy of acupuncture. For example, see an 
NIH report regarding acupuncture in 1997. Acupuncture: November 3-5, 1997 (Bethesda: National Institutes of 
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Chinese reports and proved by its persistent existence until today as a medical option, but was 
also corroborated by foreign observers’ accounts. A French physician and head of maternal and 
child protection service, Dr. Hubert Papin, in the Hospital of Saïda between 1979 and 1981, 
recorded seven case histories of acupuncture treatment by his Chinese co-workers. Only one of 
the cases was indicated with “no clear improvement.” In conclusion, he commented that 
“acupuncture is very well received by Algerians; its empirical aspect and a little ‘magical’ 
atmosphere are very popular.”72 Patients often suspected that “needles were drugged.”73 The 
stories of “miracle” cures circulating locally and across provinces likely enhanced the mysticism 
of acupuncture. Its practitioners were mainly, if not solely,74 Chinese doctors from a faraway 
land, who acquired a collective expert authority drawn from the unfamiliarity and exoticism of 
the medical experience they offered.     
While Chinese acupuncturists shared a collective authority before their patients, in case 
after case, they showed themselves competing with fellow practitioners in terms of how a disease 
could be better treated with their distinctive methods. The Algerian patient’s body was 
incorporated into the corpus of experiments of “new acupuncture” (xin zhen liao fa), contributing 
to ongoing therapeutic debates back home in China.75 Take the most frequently discussed 
 
Health, Continuing Medical Education: Office of the Director, 1997). 
72 Hubert Papin, “Seize Mois de Coopération Médicale A Saïda (Algérie)” (MD thesis, Université de Nantes, 
1981), 143-149. 
73 HPA, SZ67-4-134-5, February 8, 1971. 
74 According to an Algerian acupuncturist, Hamid Brahimi, in the 1950s, many French doctors practiced 
acupuncture in Algeria on their return from Indochina. See an interview with him by Patrick Sautreuil, “Une 
visite à Hamid Brahimi, à Alger,” Acupuncture & Moxibustion 7, no. 2 (2008): 166-167. 
75 For a brief overview of various kinds of new acupuncture methods developed during the 1950s-70s, see Jiao 
Guorui ęjħ ed., Zhen jiu lin chuang jing yan ji yao Ɵĕ¤őƵƌŸ [A summary of clinical 
acupuncture experience] (Beijing: Ren min wei sheng chubanshe, 1981), 19. 
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disease, nocturnal enuresis, for example. Since the first study of modern acupuncture treatment 
for bed-wetting published in 1951, this symptom has attracted much interest of acupuncturists.76 
Five doctors published reports for a total of 673 cases treated in Algeria between 1979 and 1991. 
Claiming efficacy rates of their respective method from 87% to 100% (mostly around 90%), the 
doctors opined about the causes of the symptom and offered different treatment methods 
accordingly. Drs. Zheng, Fang, and Zhu subscribed to the classical theory associating bed-
wetting with the weakness of three functional entities (zang)—Lung, Spleen, and Kidney. Dr. 
Wang proposed that another functional entity, Liver, should be considered alongside the three. 
Dr. Gao instead narrowed her focus to mainly concern with Kidney qi. The sets of acupoints they 
selected to needle therefore differed according to their interpretations of causes. Furthermore, 
each of them offered a different method of enforcing stimulation. The two contemporaries in 
Algeria, Wang (1979-81) and Zheng (1980-82) used qin zhen (ÌƟ, thumb-tack needles for 
subcutaneous embedding) which had been just invented in 1980; Wang differed from Zheng by 
interrupting two courses of qin zhen treatment with regular sessions of needling. Fang (1982-84) 
used dian zhen (ĪƟ, electroacupuncture) to increase intensity of stimulation. Zhu (1986-87) 
applied a classic technique of wen zhen (Ɵ, lit. warm needle, burning of moxa attached to the 
needle). Gao (1971-73, 84-86, and 89-91) chose the most typical method—manual needling, 
which required the greatest precision in needle-manipulating skills.77 The range of efficacy rates 
 
76 The first article was by Liu Minying Býū, “Zhenci zhiliao yiniaozheng shiyan de chubu baogao” ƟI
ĂĬƖİƵĶEøÅ_ [A preliminary report on experiments of using acupuncture to treat enuresis], 
Zhen jiu za zhi Ɵĕç· [Journal of Acu-moxa] 1, no.4 (1951): 29.  
77 See Wang Qicai Ġ^Â, “Zhen ci zhiliao xiaoer yiniao 50 li” ƟIĂĬ1Ɩ50+ [Use puncturing 
to treat 50 cases of child enuresis], Hubei Zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç· [Hubei Journal of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine] no.2 (1982): 56-57; Zheng Yugang ƘğD, “Qin zhen zhiliao yiniao 286 li” ÌƟĂĬƖ
286+ [Use qin zhen to treat 286 cases of enuresis], Hubei Zhong yi za zhi ĐKLç· [Hubei Journal 
of Traditional Chinese Medicine] no.6 (1983), 42; Fang Shaohua ÕM, “Dian zhen zhiliao yiniaozheng 150 
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(here, only the cases without any improvement were excluded) these doctors achieved in Algeria 
fit well with the results reported in China between 1959 and 1974.78 Nothing special about their 
Algerian patients was noted in the way in which treatments were conducted or how the patient’s 
body reacted to the intrusion of needles.   
While the similarity in the end results may suggest the irrelevance of different bodily 
constitutions to the effects of acupuncture, some doctors argued for the higher sensitivity of the 
Algerian body than the Chinese body to acupuncture to promote their practice. A teacher from 
Hubei College of Traditional Chinese Medicine (	
.) in his late thirties, Sun Guojie 
 (1938-, acupuncturist (likely in Douéra) Nov.1976- Dec.1978), published a summary of 
257 cases of sciatica treatment conducted by eight Chinese medical teams dispersed across 
Algeria during January-August 1978. The vast majority of the patient samples were Algerians, in 
addition to a few French and Romanians. They included 142 men and 115 women, aged from 14 
to 80. Of them, 47 people had suffered pains for more than two years. Within two courses of 
treatment—ten sessions per course and an interval of 3-5 days between the two courses, 128 
patients were reported either to have fully recovered or shown clear improvement; after four 
courses, the number rose to 169 (65.7%). Compared with reported results in domestic 
experiments, Sun’s figures did not turn out to be particularly high. Five published reports 
between 1959 and 1975 claimed a rate of good efficacy ranging from 49.6% to 73.8%, among 
 
li,” 37; Zhu Shanyou æá, “Wenzhen zhiliao xiaoer yiniaozheng 82 li,” 12; and Gao Jieying Ƹąů, 
“Zhenci zhiliao yiniaozheng 105 li,” 40. 
78 The collection of clinical therapies of acu-moxa, Zhen jiu lin chuang jing yan ji yao Ɵĕ¤őƵƌŸ, 
collected 11 medical reports on different therapies to treat bed-wetting published in medical journals across 
China between 1959 and 1974. The efficacy rates ranged from 88.9% to 100%, mostly falling in the range 




which two were above 65%.79 Nevertheless, he came to a conclusion that treatment effects were 
better achieved in Algeria. Sun proposed two theses to account for the “better” results. First, as 
he contended, Algerians were “more sensitive to needling” for the reason that they had fewer 
chances of receiving acu-moxa treatment, in the same way that a new drug would have better 
effects on patients without prior exposure. Second, he suggested that Algerians “in general had 
strong constitution” which allowed them to “more easily feel a needle sensation” (zhen gan), in 
other words, the arrival of qi (de qi)—an important indication of gaining medical benefits.80 Sun 
connected a stronger bodily constitution to a higher sensitivity to acupuncture, which made the 
case for the receptivity of the stronger Algerian body to the Chinese therapy. Around the same 
time of the report’s publication, Sun was promoted to the position of lecturer in the Department 
of Acu-moxa of his college, which began his academic career.81     
The patients probably had little idea about the experimental features of the diverse 
acupuncture methods that their doctors tried on them; but they associated and sometimes 
differentiated what they observed about acupuncture with other local folk therapies. In answering 
my survey, 29 out of 42 patients thought the working mechanisms of acupuncture and hijama 
were different though they did not know exactly how. Only five thought the two were similar, 
and one of them saw the similarity lying in the shared identity of folk medicine. Three 
respondents indicated that they felt the effects were alike, but one of them preferred hijama for 
reasons of religious affinity. Whereas the patients shared a common puzzlement about why 
 
79 Jiao Guorui ęjħ ed., Zhen jiu lin chuang jing yan ji yao, 254–256. 
80 Sun Guojie jë, “Zai aerjiliya yong zhenci zonghe liaofa zhiliao zuogu shenjing tong 257 li linchuang 
guancha baogao,” 56-59. 
81 See his profile on Baidu Encylopedia, “jë,” Baidu Baike, https://baike.baidu.com/item/jë. 
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simply inserting stainless steel needles could induce bodily changes, the bee sting therapy which 
used bee venom—a drug on a sting—was more sensible. During my fieldwork at the 
acupuncture clinic in the Hospital of Ben Aknoun in Algiers in 2016, I met several patients who 
came for consultations asking whether they could be treated with the bee sting therapy. Among 
17 other patients whose opinions I asked about acupuncture and bee sting therapy, 9 thought the 
two shared similar effects and 8 disagreed.         
Chinese doctors attempted to position acupuncture as a hygienic, and therefore modern, 
medical approach superior to local folk practices.82 In comparison with hijama, which is a 
religious treatment practiced either by Imams in mosques or laymen—as an anthropologist found 
out in the Aurès Mountains—at certain preferred times of a year,83 acupuncture is a treatment 
practiced by licensed professionals in government-authorized modern medical facilities and in 
light of diagnosis. Moreover, the restriction of acupuncture practice to a hospital setting 
regulated disinfection, a practice that underlined modern medicine.84 Reformists of acupuncture 
in China had introduced the concept of disinfection as an important agenda of modernizing the 
practice. It was not uncommon to needle through clothes in the past. To revive the reputation of 
the oldest Chinese medical art that had seen decline in prestige in the Ming dynasty,85 reform-
 
82 Scholarly works have been done on the association of hygiene with modernity in the history of public health 
and medicine. For example, see Ruth Rogaski’s Hygienic Modernity (2004). 
83 M.W. Hilton-Simpson, Arab Medicine and Surgery: A Study of the Healing Art in Algeria (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1922), 62. 
84 Hijama, when practiced by medical professionals, also requires disinfection. But the majority of the 
treatment does not happen in a hospital setting, and is thus less regulated. For a comparison between hijama 
(Arab wet cupping) and Chinese wet cupping, see Salah Mohamed El Sayed et al., “Methods of Wet Cupping 
Therapy (Al-Hijamah): In Light of Modern Medicine and Prophetic Medicine,” Alternative & Integrative 
Medicine 2, no.3 (2013), doi:10.4172/2327-5162.1000111. 
85 Charlotte Furth, A Flourishing Yin, 290. 
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minded practitioners had since the Republican era started to call for special attention to 
disinfection.86 A 1957 article in a medical journal advocated that “it was best to apply iodine on 
the acupoints, and then use light alcohol to remove the iodine,”87 a standard method of 
disinfection that is still employed by biomedical doctors in China today. Acupuncture needles 
used in Chinese clinics in Algeria were not disposable ones; at the end of each day, nurses 
soaked the used needles in disinfectant to prepare for the next round of uses. Dr. Papin noted in 
1980 that during a treatment of placing catgut wires at some acupoints, the patient’s skin was 
disinfected with morphine and needles with alcohol.88 To further prevent from potential cross-
contamination, patients nowadays are requested to pass blood tests before they can be accepted 
to an acupuncture treatment. In contrast, hijama is still considered by virologists as a plausible 
reason for the prevalence of hepatitis C infection in East Algeria, especially among women.89 
Patients may still favor hijama for religious reason and its accessibility, but acupuncture has 
acquired a modern professional image as a result of its institutionalization at hospital facilities 
and, somewhat ironically, the regulation enforced on this practice by the Algerian Ministry of 
Health.     
Doctors were also eager to establish acupuncture as a valid medicine and proud to derive 
endorsement and expert authority from the patients they visited, especially in front of their 
 
86 Sean Hsiang-lin Lei, Neither Donkey Nor Horse: Medicine in the Struggle over China’s Modernity 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014), 159. 
87 Pang Zhongyan §®, “Ruhe tigao zhenjiu yiliao jishu” })ÊƸƟĕLĬÃå [How to improve 
acupuncture techniques], Shanghai zhong yi yao za zhi ċLŭç·[Shanghai Journal of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine] no.7 (1957): 16. 
88 Hubert Papin, “Seize Mois de Coopération Médicale,” 143. 
89 Aïcha Bensalem et al. “Eastern Region Represents a Worrying Cluster of Active Hepatitis C in Algeria in 
2012,” Journal of Medical Virology 88, no. 8 (2016): 1394-1403. 
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domestic audience. They talked and wrote with enthusiasm about successful treatments they 
completed for people of high social ranking, which were reproduced in Chinese media as 
testimonies to acupuncture’s worldwide appeal. Appraising the medical mission as an effective 
tool to build intimacy with foreign high officials, a Chinese historian made a list of 43 key 
African figures treated by Chinese medical teams between 1965 and 2005. He gathered the 
information from news reports and publications of the medical teams. The Algeria team alone 
registered ten cases in the list, all of which were acupuncture treatments. The clients included 
Mohamed Bedjaoui (minister of justice, treated in 1970), Chadli Bendjedid (the commander of 
the 2nd Military Region in 1973 and later president in 1983), Abdelaziz Bouteflika (president, 
1999-2019), in addition to an invitation from Morocco to treat King Hassan II’s brother Prince 
Moulay Abdallah for the sequelae of his gunshot wound.90 Although the Chinese teams were 
primarily dispersed to public hospitals in the far-flung areas where their patients were often poor, 
they had deliberately kept the high-ranking officials and people of influence on their radar. 
Indeed, “to orient towards the upper layer and focus on the middle and lower layers” 
(/1,-) was an internal guideline to instruct doctors’ interactions with 
Algerian clients.91 The Ministry of Health specifically required medical teams to report to the 
local Chinese embassy or consulate the medical case they received of any patient “who had 
 
90 Li Anshan è, “Zhongguo yuanwai yiliaodui de lishi, guimo ji qi yingxiang” jËxLĬƤĶP
Zź÷S7°c [The history, scope, and influence of Chinese foreign medical aid teams], Waijiao 
pinglun xƁƀ[Foreign Affairs Review] no.1 (2009): 39-40; for Prince Moulay Abdallah’s case history, 
see Zhang Jiasheng ­w, “Zhenci zhiliao ‘qiang shang houyizheng’ yili” ƟIĂĬ‘ð%]Ɩİ’+ 
[One case of treating the sequelae of gunshot wound], Zhongyi han shou tong xun L?ÇƓŽ
[Correspondence of Chinese Medicine], no.1 (1987): 36. 
91 HPA, SZ139-6-409-7, May 10, 1972. 
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political influence.”92 Thus reported the department of acupuncture in Douéra in 1976, “40% [of 
the patients treated] were Algerians from the higher society and friendly to us.”93  
Actively providing health care for power holders was a strategy to win local 
administrative support for the promotion of acupuncture. It was also a form of political capital 
that a doctor sought to earn to uphold his/her position back home where medical authority was 
divided (as a result of the promotion of mass science/medicine) and challenged (by Western 
medicine and the general political atmosphere of distrust of intellectuals). A foremost example of 
such beneficiaries was Shi Xuemin (", 1938-), whose career reached its climax when he 
was elected to the Chinese Academy of Engineering in 1999. Chinese media reported, with 
varying details, that sometime between 1968 and 1971, Dr. Shi treated a vice minister of national 
defense who had been paralyzed in bed for a period (30 days or half a year), and achieved 
immediate and stunning effect: the patient either “stood up immediately” or “lifted his leg” after 
the first treatment.94 The reports go that, after his return to Tianjin, Shi was invited to take some 
key position in the municipal government. After his decline of the offer, he was able to get his 
proposal of reestablishing a department and ward of acu-moxa approved. During his two-year 
 
92 SMA, B242-3-517-66, October 22, 1974. 
93 HPA, SZ115-5-87-4, November 1976. 
94 Several reports on this medical case vary on details. See Xu Yajing ³ƭ, “Zhen jian shang de feng 
huang zhi wu” ƟĶ<=ť——žjňƩƩvĻÑ [A Pheonix Dance on the Needle Tip: a 
record of Shi Xuemin, a member of China Academy of Engineering], Zhongguo Yiyao Bao jLŭÅ
[China Pharmaceutical News], June 10, 2004; Qu Yiping  , “Zhen jian wai jiao jia Shi Xuemin” Ɵ
xĻÑ [Needle tip diplomat, Shi Xuemin], Xiao kang ª[Insight China] no.9 (2015): 28-30; and a 
report on the website of the hospital where Shi has worked for decades since his return to China, Liang Wei 
ô# et al., “Shen zhen jing shijie hua bao sheng hui huang” ŀƟ¼ī, MĨƋĚ——žjňƩ
ƩvĻÑ[Miraculous needles surprised the world], Fist Teaching Hospital of Tianjin University of TCM, 
accessed June 3, 2019, http://www.tjtcm.cn/system/2010/05/13/010047433.shtml. These reports mention that 
Algerian newspaper El Moudjahid published a report on this case the next day, but unfortunately due to the 
lack of specific date of the treatment, I cannot locate the Algerian report to verify information. 
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absence, which coincided with the height of the Cultural Revolution, the normal hospital 
structure had been disrupted, the department of acu-moxa renamed to “new acupuncture” (xin 
zhen ke), and people without license acted as doctors.95 Shi might have not expected this much 
prestige he would come to enjoy; but his followers must have been inspired by his success and 
produced more records of medical feats. Shi’s case also shows that the authority of an 
acupuncturist depended on his patient when the resources of an incontestable medicine were 
absent.      
So far I have talked about clinical practice which involved both sick Algerians and 
Chinese acupuncturists and orthopedists. It was a dialogical process in which the Algerian body 
was constructed and the doctor’s authority was negotiated. It is worth pointing out that the 
medical case histories I use are texts that construct a representation. Written by Chinese mission 
doctors, they were selective and interpretive, and as such formed a part of the medical discourse 
of the revamped Chinese medicine in the socialist era, oriented toward a global look. The 
Algerian body was thus treated as sharing the same constitutional categories with the Chinese 
body, and qi figured prominently in the construction of illness. Yet the former was perceived as 
stronger and more receptive to acupuncture. What is interestingly missing from the 
representation was the gender dimension: neither between doctor and patient, nor in their 
relations of healing. Female and male patients suffered alike, were not presented as having 




95 See Xu Yajing ³ƭ, “Zhen jian shang de feng huang zhi wu”; and Qu Yiping  , “Zhen jian wai 
jiao jia Shi Xuemin,” 30. 
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The previous section has touched upon how the Chinese acupuncturists grafted onto the 
Algerian body the traditional medical concept of constitution to analyze reasons for falling ill. It 
has also discussed the Chinese remarks on the receptiveness of the Algerian body to acupuncture 
due to its constitution. In these cases, the Chinese physicians adopted the old concept, 
“constitution,” originally used to differentiate Chinese bodies, to comprehend the Algerian body 
and seek parallels with the latter. Bodily constitution, a medical concept that Marta Hanson has 
convincingly encapsulated in her analysis of the emergence of an imagined dichotomy between 
southern and northern human bodies in the Ming, has been central to the geography of diseases 
in Chinese medical thought. Hanson points out that climatic differences between the north and 
the south was perceived by Chinese physicians as giving rise to different constitutions, disease 
patterns, and recommended therapeutic approaches.96 This idea of regional determinism—or 
diseases as an effect of climate, diet, and other environmental factors—was not unique to 
Chinese medicine. Historians have extensively analyzed how, by the mid-eighteenth century, 
colonial physicians and scientists had been keenly probing the relationship between warm 
climates and tropical diseases.97 Likewise, Chinese physicians by classical training believed that 
one’s constitution was determined by the environment he lived in, rather than by fundamental 
physical differences between distinct groups of humans.  
 
96 Marta Hanson, Speaking of Epidemics in Chinese Medicine: Disease and the Geographic Imagination in 
Late Imperial China (London; New York: Routledge, 2011). 
97 For example, see David Arnold ed., Warm Climates and Western Medicine: The Emergence of Tropical 
Medicine, 1500-1900 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996). For most of the eighteenth century, race was not construed 
as an essential medical category. Suman Seth and other earlier historians date the turn in colonial medicine 
toward racial pathologies roughly in the 1760s as part of a response to the abolitionist movement. See Suman 
Seth, Difference and Disease: Medicine, Race and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 19. 
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While this classical idea persists (as in the above cases), some mission doctors in Algeria 
and then other African countries took up the newer, imported concept of “race” to substitute for 
“constitution.” This section examines the heterodox moment in the modern history of Chinese 
medicine when race became a factor in prescribing treatment and evaluating results. Focusing on 
medical case reports on acupuncture anesthesia, I demonstrate that Chinese acupuncturists used 
race as a reference category to argue for the Chinese therapeutics’ universality. Although their 
focus was not on pathology, and their comments on race were general and fraught with 
ambiguity, their adoption of racial groups as the filter of medical studies signifies an ignorance 
of intra-regional differences and an acknowledgment of genetic differences in determining 
therapeutic effects. The emergence of this racial narrative of acupuncture’s effects directly 
stemmed from the doctors’ desire to defend their field of expertise when it was losing advantage 
with the demise of the “Gang of Four” and when they saw the opportunity in the age of China’s 
expansion into the arena of global health. But, unlike colonial medical men who intended to 
associate physiques with social hierarchies, the Chinese mission doctors used race-specific 
criteria to re-evaluate acupuncture and write guidelines for treatment, part of their drive to make 
acupuncture a modern category of medicine.   
Following the convention in scholarship and popular usage, I use the term “acupuncture 
anesthesia” to refer to the use of acupuncture for control of pain during operations. The Chinese 
term mazui does not differentiate between anesthesia (sensation totally abolished or 
consciousness disturbed) and analgesia (the inability to feel pain). American medical scientists 
visited China in May 1974 to observe “acupuncture anesthesia” suggested in their official report 
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that the phenomenon be referred to, more appropriately, as acupuncture hypalgesia (AH).98 The 
real efficacy of acupuncture anesthesia was hard to determine, because its practice was not 
standardized and its effects varied along a wide spectrum of individual particularities. Since the 
problem of real efficacy is not my primary concern, I simply follow the convention to use the 
word “anesthesia” as a placeholder.        
  
“Race Does Not Matter” 
After his talk on acupuncture anesthesia at the University Hospital Mustapha Pasha of 
Algiers given in March 1977, Gao Guoxun published case reports in two leading journals of 
Chinese medicine on the team’s experiment with acupuncture anesthesia on patients of Saïda. 
The first appeared in the Journal of New Medicine (now Journal of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine, est. 1951, affiliated with China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences) in September 
1978; the second was published on Acupuncture Anesthesia (now Acupuncture Research, est. 
1976, affiliated with the Acupuncture Institute of the China Academy of Chinese Medical 
Sciences) in July 1979.99 The second was a re-formatting of the first one with simplified details. 
 
98 American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group, Acupuncture Anesthesia in the People’s Republic of 
China: A trip report of the American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group (Washington: National Academy of 
Sciences, 1976), 3-4. 
99 Saïda medical team (written by Gao Guoxun Ƹj), “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 356 li de lin 
chuang guan cha” nƥSGƏĩƟIƺƛ356+Ķ¤Ź [Clinical observation of 356 cases of 
acupuncture anesthesia in Algeria], Xin yi yao xue za zhi ÔLŭç· [The Journal of New Medicine] 9 
(1978): 33-35; and the second, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 365 li de lin chuang guan cha” nƥ
SGƏĩƟIƺƛ365+Ķ¤Ź [Clinical observation of 365 cases of acupuncture anesthesia in 
Algeria], Zhen ci ma zui ƟIƺƛ [Acupuncture Anesthesia], 2 (1979): 93-94. The title of the second article 
mistakenly indicates 365 cases whereas the text says 356. Gao Guoxun signed off his name in the byline. 
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Although statistics of the two articles slightly differed from what was reported in Algérie-
Actualité, they probably drew from the same sample pool that Gao used for his talk.100  
Gao opened his articles with a presentation of anesthetic methods, surgery types, and 
evaluation of anesthetic effects, which also formed the mainstay of the report in Algérie-
Actualité. According to him, the Saïda team performed 356 surgeries with acupuncture 
anesthesia between 1975 and 1977. The types of surgical operations were divided according to 
different body parts treated, in the following descending order of case numbers: 175 eye 
surgeries (172 of which were cataract removal);101 65 OB/GYN surgeries (37 of which were 
Caesarean section, 7 ovarian cysts removal); 61 abdominal surgeries; 33 ear, nose, throat, and 
stomatology; 16 neck, and 6 thorax and back. Gao reported an overall success rate at 98.3% 
(including Grade I at 69.4%, Grade II at 25.8%, and Grade III at 3.1%).102 In terms of types, 
Grade I results were achieved in cataract surgery and thyroidectomy (head and neck), treatment 
of pulmonary hydatid cysts (thorax), and treatment of liver hydatid cysts (abdomen).103 These 
figures generally corresponded with results achieved domestically and were in line with 
observations of Western doctors and historians of medicine. Contemporary observers, including 
the American anesthesiologist John Bonica (1917-1994), the historians Joseph Needham (1900-
 
100 Algérie-Actualité indicated 439 cases, among which 124 were male and 315 were female, and their ages 
ranged from 6 to 86. The total success rate was recorded to be 96.8%. 
101 Gao had a separate article on the 172 cases of cataract removal under acupuncture anesthesia. See Gao 
Guoxun Ƹj and Chen Hongjiu ƨĆ, “Zhen ci ma zui bai nei zhang zhai chu shu 172 li lin chuang 
guan cha” ƟIƺƛĵ8ƫÍ>å172+¤Ź [Clinical observation of 172 cases of cataract removal 
with acupuncture anesthesia], Xin yi xue ÔL [Journal of New Medicine] 10, no. 3 (1979): 133-134. 
102 According to the US standards, only Grades I and II are considered “potentially satisfactory for pain 
control.” See American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group, Acupuncture Anesthesia in the People’s 
Republic of China: A trip report of the American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group (Washington: National 
Academy of Sciences, 1976), 4. 
103 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 356 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1978). 
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1995) and Gwei-Djen Lu (1904-1991), commented respectively after their visits to China that 
acupuncture anesthesia was best for thyroidectomy and other neck operations and for superficial 
operations on the face, nose, throat, trunk, and limbs, whereas it was less good for abdominal 
surgeries, wherein the muscles did not sufficiently relax, and traction or stretching of the viscera 
and their membranes caused deep pain that acupuncture could not relieve.104 Gao was aware of 
the difficulty in managing pain in abdominal surgeries, and he accredited the good results in 
removing liver hydatid cysts to the particularities of this surgery type, which usually induced less 
traction or stretching.105  
Up to that point, his articles remained typical of such medical case summaries, wherein 
patients were reduced to numbers and treatment results were decontextualized. Like his Chinese 
colleagues, Gao argued for the safety and effectiveness of acupuncture anesthesia. He also gave 
advice on how to increase the success rate, following new trends in domestic practice. His 
suggestions included applying 0.5% procaine as a local infiltration anesthesia to enhance pain 
relief during abdominal operations, as well as using Dolantin (a narcotic used to treat severe 
pain) and Phenergan (a sedative) as assistance. Practitioners submitted to the compromise of 
combining these chemicals after they found out that acupuncture alone was not enough to control 
 
104 John Bonica, “Anesthesiology in the People’s Republic of China,” Anesthesiology 40, no.2 (1974):182-
184. Bonica was an influential anesthesiologist and pioneer in safe pain relief. He commented on acupuncture 
anesthesia based on his personal experiences during a three-week visit in China as a member of the first 
official American medical mission, June-July 1973. Also see Gwei-Djen Lu and Joseph Needham, Celestial 
Lancets: A History and Rationale of Acupuncture and Moxa, 222. These observations are confirmed by 
Chinese historians of medicine writing in retrospect. See for example, Zhonghua yi xue hui ML" and 
Zhongguo zhong xi yi jiehe xuehui jŷLŒ[" eds, Zhongguo zhong xi yi jie he xue ke shi j
ŷLŒ[ŇZ [A history of the integrated Chinese and Western medicine in China] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
kexue jishu chubanshe, 2010), 81. 
105 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 356 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1978): 35. 
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pain.106 In order not to delegitimize the efficacy of acupuncture, Gao reduced reasons of failure 
to simply patients’ “mental stress and fear.” He emphasized that all the six failures were with 
female patients, who were frightened and “unable to cooperate.”107 For these patients, he added, 
“even applying 50mg of Dolantin before a surgery would not achieve satisfactory results,” and 
he thus cautioned his readers to “select patients carefully.”108 Gao’s advice shows a pursuit of 
statistical perfection while unintentionally acknowledging the limits of acupuncture’s 
applicability to different individual bodies (as opposed to chemical anesthetics). 
What differentiated Gao from his counterparts was his creativity in imposing new 
meanings on the Algerian data, thereby underlining why the team’s overseas experiments 
mattered to the research and promotion of acupuncture anesthesia. As their medical results did 
not differ from domestic ones, Gao highlighted new geographical location (Algeria) and different 
racial categories of test subjects to argue for the method’s universality. He wrote: 
Some scholars in the West once said that acupuncture anesthesia was suitable only for the oriental 
race (dongfang renzhong), especially the Chinese, but not for the occidental race (xifang renzhong). 
Our practice proves that this argument is not correct. Acupuncture anesthesia applies to all kinds 
of races. There is no significant difference in effects among the yellow, white, and black races. In 
Algeria where we work, there are Arabs who are of European genesis and belong to the white race 
 
106 The method of combining acupuncture and chemical anesthetics was more popular than using acupuncture 
alone. See Zhang Ren ­, Zhongguo zhen ci ma zui fa zhan shi jƟIƺƛVZ [The History of 
Acupuncture Anesthesia in China] (Shanghai: Shangahi kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 1989), 212. 
107 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 356 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1978): 35. 
108 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 365 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1979): 94. 
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[Caucasians], and there are also blacks who belong to the Bantu. The two are of different races 
(zhongzu), yet effects are the same.109    
It is unclear who were the western scholars Gao had in mind, but doubt indeed existed among 
foreign observers. Dr. Oliver Gillie, a medical correspondent for The Sunday Times, wrote about 
the “mildly uncomfortable” but overall satisfactory experience of having his molar drilled under 
acupuncture in London in April 1972. His conclusion was positive but also indicated an a priori 
suspicion of its universality. Gillie opened his essay with the following statement: “Acupuncture 
anaesthesia works—not just on stoical Chinamen bolstered by the thoughts of Chairman Mao—
but also on people of British blood.”110 Gao was unlikely to have read Gillie’s report, but he may 
have learned about such doubt from Chinese propaganda that protested against Western disbelief 
in acupuncture anesthesia. Gao’s message was nevertheless clear-cut: he wanted to demonstrate 
with their experiments in Algeria that acupuncture anesthesia was a “world medicine” applicable 
to human beings of any race. Gao’s knowledge about Algerian ethnicities was poor; he 
conveniently categorized the Maghrebian Arabs with lighter skin as white, and the Algerians 
with darker complexion (whom he misidentified as Bantu, but were probably Tuaregs)111 as 
black. Yet the shaky categorization did not prevent him from drawing a conclusion of 
acupuncture’s anesthetic efficacy for people of different races.   
Gao’s narrative was idiosyncratic with respect to the dominant theory of medical 
geography in Chinese medicine, which has revolved around the concept of constitution. 
 
109 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 365 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1979): 94. 
110 “The day I got the needle in ‘stomach 44’.” Sunday Times [London, England] 9 Apr. 1972: 5. The Sunday 
Times Digital Archive. Web. 6 Feb. 2018. 
111 Tuaregs are an ethnic group within the Berbers. They live in the Sahara desert in southern Algeria and 
other neighboring countries. 
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Appearing as early as the Inner Canon, bodily constitution has remained a popular concept and 
has been reformulated into a systematic theory since the early 1980s.112 By the late Qing, it had 
become a fully established consensus that northerners and southerners had different bodily 
constitutions, and thus should be subject to different therapeutics in terms of pharmaceutical 
choices and usages for the same disease.113 The geographic imagination of a disease’s etiology 
and impact on a local body was taken up by some Chinese medicine physicians to resist the 
encroachment of biomedicine into China. For example, Marta Hanson has discussed the cases of 
Ge Yuanxu & (fl. 1876) and Qiu Qingyuan ( (1873-1948), both of whom advocated 
that Western medicine was not suited to the Chinese body due to differences in constitution. By 
the same token, the Western body was also considered to be a manifestation of its local qi and 
thus to require different medicines.114 New constitutional theories that have developed since the 
early 1980s tend to maintain this Ming-Qing medical environmentalism, but each offers its own 
categorization of constitutions.115 All of these discussions of medical regionalism have focused 
 
112 The current leading medical researcher in China on the theory of constitution is Wang Qi ĠĤ (1943-), 
who is also the pioneer of nanke (men’s medicine) in Chinese medicine. Wang Qi and Sheng Zengxiu ķuń 
proposed the “constitutional theory of TCM” in 1978, and published the first book on this topic, Zhongyi tizhi 
xueshuo L(ƉƂ [Theory of constitution in Chinese medicine] (Nanjing: Jiangsu keji chubanshe, 
1982). See Wang Qi, “Zhongguo tizhi xueshuo yanjiu xianzhuang yu zhanwang” j(ƉƂļŋġĜ
â [Current scholarship and prospect of the theories of constitution in China], Zhonguo zhongyi jichu yixue 
zazhi jLrĽLç· [Chinese Journal of Basic Medicine in Traditional Chinese Medicine] 8, no.2 
(2002): 6-15. For a discussion of him and nanke, see Everett Yuehong Zhang, The Impotence Epidemic: Men's 
Medicine and Sexual Desire in Contemporary China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), Ch6. 
113 Angela Leung ô7, “Jibing yu fangtu zhi guanxi: Yuan zhi Qing jian yijie de kanfa” ĮįţÕlƢ
-2ŢĎơƜīĶĹĄ [Disorders and locality: Views of doctors from the Yuan to the Qing], in Xingbie 
yu yiliao ¸FţƜĲ [Gender and medicine], ed. Huang Kewu ƻ4ù (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan 
jindai yanjiusuo, 2002), 194-201. 
114 Marta Hanson, Speaking of Epidemics, 146-147 and 153-154. 
115 Wang Qi, “Zhongguo tizhi xueshuo yanjiu xianzhuang yu zhanwang,” 7-9. 
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almost exclusively on herbal prescriptions which have been the dominant therapeutics since the 
thirteenth century.116  
The discussion about the applicability of acu-moxa to different constitutions did not re-
emerge until the early 1970s, which saw a sudden rise in Western interest in acupuncture in the 
aftermath of Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China. In this expanded context of acupuncture’s 
global transmission, attention moved away from regional differences within China to focus on 
comparisons between differently constituted bodies on a larger scale. A kind of racialization of 
the classical concept of constitution arose via its geographical expansion. An acupuncturist and 
historian, Tse Wing Kwong ) (1928-1998), noted in 1970 that needles adopted in Europe 
were in bigger diameter than the filiform needle (hao zheng) used in China and Japan to 
accommodate a different European constitution. He added that thicker needles used in Europe 
allowed other methods to insert them into the skin by, for example, using spring, which as he 
remarked, was “much less delicate and inferior to the classical hand manipulation.” European 
patients were only treated once or twice a week, and with only six to ten acupoints to needle; by 
contrast, patients in China and Japan received treatment every day or every other day, with many 
more loci treated each time.117 Tse further noticed that some French and German acupuncturists 
used silver needles for sedative purposes (xie, “inhibition”) and gold or copper ones for exciting 
purposes (bu, “excitation”).118 Tse took differences in constitution as a given, but offered a new 
 
116 Angela Leung, “Jibing yu fangtu zhi guanxi,” 194. 
117 Tse Wing Kwong Ɔþ3, Zhongguo zhenjiu chuan haiwai jƟĕ$ċx [The Development of the 
Chinese Acupuncture & Moxibustion in the World] (Hong Kong: Sing Wah Book Company, 1970), 43-44, 
and 74. 
118 Tse Wing Kwong, Zhongguo zhenjiu chuan haiwai, 41-42 and 56. 
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perspective of how the materiality of needles and methods of using them changed to correspond 
to a different type of constitution. 
While making similar claims about acupuncture’s effects on a non-Chinese body, Gao 
diverged from Tse in at least three ways. First, writing as part of a collective nationalistic fervor 
celebrating Chinese medicine as progressive and scientific, Gao claimed a local anesthetic effect 
for acupuncture, an application first tested in Shanghai in August 1958.119 With respect to 
technique, Gao did not find needles’ materiality worthy of attention: using filiform needles was 
the default for him. More importantly to Gao, applying the same tools and methods on bodies of 
a different race suggested acupuncture’s universality. Gao attempted to standardize the technique 
in keeping with this view. He carefully recorded the intensity and frequency of electric current 
that was passed to the implanted needles: “Connect the G6805 transistor electrotherapy device to 
the needle. The intensity of stimulation is based on a patient’s tolerance level. Use sparse waves, 
high or low frequency, ranging from 2000 to 5000 pulses every minute. It is usually better to do 
3000-4000 pulses every minute for a period of 20-30 minutes.”120 Here, Tse’s preference for 
manipulating needles by hand was superseded by electrical stimulation, a method first applied in 
surgery for anesthesia in December 1958 but not mentioned at all by Tse, who was then 
practicing in Hong Kong.121 As stated in a contemporary compendium of acu-moxa case 
 
119 Dr. Yin Huizhu ½ģ, an ENT specialist in Shanghai was recorded to be the first who applied/invented 
acupuncture anesthesia on a patient for tonsillectomy in August 1958. See Zhang Ren ­, Zhongguo zhen ci 
ma zui fa zhan shi jƟIƺƛVZ [The History of Acupuncture Anesthesia in China] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 1989), 8-9. 
120 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 365 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1978): 33. 
121 Zhang Ren recorded that the first case of using electroacupuncture for anesthesia was conducted by Meng 
Qinglu £ł, an ENT doctor in Xi’an on 5 December 1958. See Zhang Ren, Zhongguo zhen ci ma zui fa 
zhan shi, 13-14. 
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histories, the feature of electro-acupuncture was to provide more precise and consistent amount 
of stimulation.122 Even though the frequency range was broad and varied according to individual 
cases,123 Gao managed to provide a concrete set of instructions that could be reproduced by 
other acupuncturists. He believed these instructions could be reproduced across physiological 
differences, regardless of whether those differences were described in terms of constitution or in 
terms of race.  
Strikingly, Gao also moved away from the concept of constitution—which emphasized 
an individual body’s particularities—to a generality based on the larger concept of race, which 
assumed certain fundamental physical differences between population groups. Gao’s report was 
the earliest instance I have found that diverges from classical discussions of constitution, a term 
he did not use at all. He did not specify whether a non-Asian body required stronger or weaker 
stimulation to achieve the same effects as on an Asian one. Most interesting of all is that his 
introduction of race was used to promote a counter-racial discourse, which was not predicated on 
an established hierarchy but, instead, suited a desire both medical and political to carve a niche in 
the dominant biomedical culture. He seemed to choose the term “race” precisely for its breadth 
and vagueness, which incorporated all varieties of human subjects. The lack of subtlety in 
treating race actually made Gao’s medical and political message more forceful.  
 
122 Jiao Guorui ęjħ ed., Zhen jiu lin chuang jing yan ji yao, 19. 
123 Textbooks only offered a range for frequency, which varied from several dozens pulses every minute to 
several hundred pulses every second. See Wang Youliang ĠTŦ, “Zhen ci ma zui fangfa gaishu” ƟIƺƛ
ÕĄöƑ [An overview of methods of acupuncture anesthesia], in Zhen ci ma zui ƟIƺƛ [Acupuncture 
Anesthesia], eds. Weng Enqi ř¹ĥ and Gu Peikun ưqs (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu chubanshe, 
1984), 103. Gwei-Djen Lu and Joseph Needham also noticed this range instead of certain fixed frequency, see 
their Celestial Lancets, 230. 
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To further substantiate his argument that acupuncture anesthesia could be applied to all 
races effectively and easily, Gao made two bold assertions with which many of his Chinese 
colleagues and Western medical observers would have disagreed strongly: 
Our work is carried out abroad. Due to language difficulties, we have not been able to provide 
preoperative thought education and necessary training [for patients], such as qigong. [Nevertheless] 
the effect turns out not significantly different from that in China. In China in the future, as a result 
of the long-term practice of acupuncture anesthesia, people will acquire a certain knowledge and 
understanding of its effect, and may be exempted from preoperative thought education.124     
Gao’s remarks of saving from preoperative measures, including psychological motivation and 
qigong training to control breath, were provocative. In addition to the careful selection of only 
good-risk patients, contemporary Chinese doctors and Western observers (who observed but also 
were informed by the former) noted the importance of pacifying the patient before an operation. 
American doctors recorded that, in Chinese hospitals, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist 
explained to the patient the entire procedure, including the possibility of pain and the 
harmlessness of the method to the body. The patient was also encouraged to talk to others who 
had had operations under acupuncture anesthesia before.125 In addition to peer acceptance on the 
part of patients, Dr. John Bonica (1917-1994), an influential American anesthesiologist and 
pioneer in safe pain relief, also found that certain psychological pressures confronted patients. 
They were told that “this is a new Chinese invention which resulted from the great teachings of 
 
124 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “Zai A’erjiliya yunyong zhenci mazui 365 li de lin chuang guan cha” (1979): 94. 
125 American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group, Acupuncture Anesthesia in the People’s Republic of 
China, 19; John Bonica, “Anesthesiology in the People’s Republic of China,” 182-183. 
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Chairman Mao,” and thus felt it was “difficult…to refuse acupuncture.”126 A Dr. David Brown 
of Gravesend was more straightforwardly critical of the limitations of acupuncture anesthesia. “It 
is certainly something linked with the whole culture of the people and it is not likely to work 
here in the West.” So he remarked to The Sunday Times after returning from China as a member 
of a team of British doctors who had seen acupuncture used in brain surgery, lung removals and 
other major operations.127 Overall, whether it was Maoist stoicism or a pain tolerance particular 
to certain individuals that played a role, the psychophysiological mechanisms underlying the 
phenomenon were undetermined yet considered important. Dr. Bonica’s conclusion was that this 
method could only be applied to “certain highly selected patients” by trained personnel with 
complicated anesthetic machines.128 These limitations implied that it was unrealistic to use the 
method in commune and district hospitals in dire need of human and technical resources, 
although the method was originally intended for such conditions of paucity.  
Gao’s proposal of sparing qigong training also challenged the preoperative practice 
popular domestically. Training a patient with qigong—to breathe abdominally deeply and slowly 
for at least one week before operation—was indispensable to the preoperative procedure for one 
who was to undergo open chest surgery.129 The story has it that sometime between 1964 and 
1965, surgeons of Shanghai First Tuberculosis Hospital (renamed to Shanghai Pulmonary 
Hospital in 1998) found a surgery with acupuncture anesthesia exceedingly successful because 
 
126 John Bonica, “Anesthesiology in the People’s Republic of China,” 182. Bonica wrote this article based on 
his three-week visit in China as a member of the first official American medical mission, June-July 1973. 
127 “The day I got the needle in ‘stomach 44’.” Sunday Times [London, England] 9 Apr. 1972: 5. The Sunday 
Times Digital Archive. Web. 6 Feb. 2018. 
128 John Bonica, “Anesthesiology in the People’s Republic of China,” 184. 
129 American Acupuncture Anesthesia Study Group, Acupuncture Anesthesia in the People’s Republic of 
China, 14, 20. 
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the patient was breathing very slowly during operation. Inspired by the fact that the patient had 
been practicing qigong, they decided to train other patients with diaphragmatic breathing 
exercises which were essential to the qigong practice. By experimenting on pigs, the surgeons 
found that diaphragmatic breathing could control mediastinal flutter (abnormal side-to-side 
motions of the mediastinum during respiration, a major obstacle for such thoracic surgeries). 
After breath training, 80-90% of their patients could control mediastinal flutter and mitigate 
pains of visceral traction.130 This method of preparing patients for intrathoracic operations 
quickly spread nationwide. Dr. Bonica noticed in his 1973 trip that “five to seven days prior to 
surgery,” patients were “instructed to do these exercises several times daily, often under the 
supervision of a therapist in the hospital.131” Practicing qigong was soon written into the report 
of a national conference on the clinical researches on pneumonectomy under acupuncture 
anesthesia in May 1975. Medical scientists attending the conference in Xi’an from 16 provinces 
reached a consensus that practicing qigong prior to and during the operation was especially 
beneficial to lobectomy, and recommended to add qigong into the standard surgical procedure. 
Gao and his surgeon colleagues were probably aware of this recommendation, as this report was 
disseminated by the Hubei provincial health bureau to municipal and county health bureaus and 
hospitals.132 Until 1984, practicing “slow and deep” diaphragmatic breathing at a rate of 10 
 
130 “Zhenma fei qiechu yanjiu tansuo shimo” Ɵƺş@ƪļŋÈŐ~ä [The whole story of the research 
process of lobectomy with acupuncture anesthesia], blog of Dr. Xie Dong Ɔ:, July 14, 2012, 
http://www.haodf.com/zhuanjiaguandian/kongdu_742263121.htm. Dr. Xie is a thoracic surgeon at the 
Shanghai Pulmonary Hospital. He posted on his blog this short history of lobectomy under acupuncture 
anesthesia. It appears from the tone that it is an article written on behalf of the hospital to commemorate this 
historical episode. 
131 John Bonica, “Acupuncture Anesthesia in the People’s Republic of China: Implications for American 
Medicine,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 229, no. 10 (1974): 1320. 
132 HPA, SZ115-5-54-5, June 26, 1975. 
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times per minute for at least half an hour was still recommended in textbooks for lobectomy.133 
Gao’s proposal in 1978-79 thus challenged an established opinion and the medical authority 
enjoyed by the surgeons from the Shanghai No.1 Tuberculosis Hospital, who continued leading 
the research under the endorsement of the State Science and Technology Commission in 
December 1965.134  
If it stood firm, Gao’s position about the non-necessity of psychological preparation 
beforehand would not only challenge this popular practice but also fundamentally extend the 
applicability of acupuncture anesthesia. He was suggesting that the role of cooperation, 
willpower, national pride, and other emotional sentiments on the part of the patient was 
insignificant. Even if doctors were limited in their linguistic ability to communicate with their 
patients to offer psychological support and preoperative instructions, or the patient lacked 
sufficient motivation to risk suffering otherwise avoidable pain, acupuncture anesthesia could be 
smoothly applied to non-Chinese patients.   
Gao’s idiosyncrasy was appreciated by some of the mission doctors, who quickly adopted 
the language of race following his suit. Within a year, in 1979, two doctors from a medical 
mission in Senegal reported 345 cases of hernia repair for the “adult black race” with 
acupuncture anesthesia. The article itself was a regular case report of herniorrhaphies treated 
with the Ferguson method, without any direct mention of different reactions to acupuncture 
anesthesia unique to Senegalese. The article would have otherwise remained average if without 
the editorial decision to insert the phrase “adult black race” into the title. The authors were likely 
 
133 Qiu Demin Ŷ¶¿, et al., “Zhen ma fei qiechu shu” Ɵƺş@ƪå [Lobectomy with acupuncture 
anesthesia], in Zhen ci ma zui ƟIƺƛ [Acupuncture Anesthesia], eds. Weng Enqi ř¹ĥ and Gu Peikun 
ưqs (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu chubanshe, 1984), 154. 
134 Zhang Ren ­, Zhongguo zhen ci ma zui fa zhan shi, 21. 
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inspired by Gao in other ways as well. They echoed Gao by suggesting that the lack of 
psychological preparation did not affect satisfactory results; they also boasted, as Gao did, of 
local nurses’ ease in learning this anesthetic method and practicing it safely.135 Another doctor 
on a mission to Madagascar (1984-86) used the same trope to promote hand-acupuncture (shou 
zhen). Summarizing 955 cases of pain treatment for locals, Chinese workers, and other foreign 
expatriates, the author concluded his article stating that hand-acupuncture “was effective not 
only for the Chinese ethnicity (minzu) from the Northern Hemisphere but also for other 
ethnicities of different colors from South Asia, Euro-America, and Africa; therefore it has similar 
effects regardless of locality, climate, ethnicity, or skin color.”136 Such inclusion of “race” shows 
a political urgency for these Chinese doctors beyond mere taxonomic issues. The purpose of 
“racializing” acupuncture was to de-racialize and universalize Chinese medicine, which was 
taken up from time to time when necessity arose to demonstrate its wide applicability.  
 
“Race Matters” 
Perhaps as part of an indirect criticism of this broad-brush approach to race and 
acupuncture, some doctors saw the need to go beyond the simple observation of usefulness to 
determine the parameters of race’s impact on the efficacy of acupuncture. They did so by 
investigating the correlation between race and propagated sensation along the meridian channels 
 
135 Zhu Yuanyou æ2' and Xu Shunlin ſŤĦ, “Zai Saineijia’er caiyong zhenci mazui wei chengnian 
heise renzhong xing shan xiubushu 345 li jingyan tihui” nt8JƝĩƟIƺƛÀ¡Ƽŧņųĭ0
Ŵå345+őƵ(" [Experiences from 345 cases of hernia repair with acupuncture anesthesia for adult black 
race in Senegal], Fujian yike daxue xuebao Ń«LŇyÅ [Journal of Fujian Medical University] 2 
(1979):84-85. 
136 Ma Mingfei ƴÚƮ, “Shou zhen ‘dui ying dian’ zhiliao tongzheng 955 li” ÁƟ “¦ė” ĂĬıİ955
+ [Use hand acupuncture to treat 955 cases of pain], Zhongguo zhenjiu jƟĕ [Chinese Acupuncture & 
Moxibustion] no.1 (1989): 37-39. 
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(PSC), an important phenomenon in classical acupuncture theories that is still believed to 
facilitate an optimum therapeutic result in acupuncture treatment. Li Boning  (1933-), a 
former biomedical doctor trained to become an acupuncturist, reported that his black patients in 
Mozambique demonstrated higher PSC than patients in Chengdu, and concluded that PSC was 
“not an individual phenomenon specific to a certain region or nationality (minzu) but prevalent in 
all kinds of human beings.”137 Li’s conclusions were echoed by Zhang Dengbu ­!+ (1942-), 
who reported black Tanzanian patients to show “significantly higher” PSC than his patients in 
Shandong. Zhang further emphasized that the higher sensitivity among Tanzanians “had no clear 
relation to [their] sex, age, profession, or illness,”138 thereby implying race as the cause of 
difference. Cai Zongmin ' and Yang Biying ê#% introduced the white race into the 
comparison by analyzing their patients in Zigunchor, Senegal, and Francistown, Botswana. They 
found that the white patients showed lower PSC in the category of the “marked PSC,” yet overall 
shared similar rates of PSC at other category levels compared to the yellow and black races. 
They reasserted the hypothesis that PSC “universally existed” amongst peoples of “different 
countries, regions, and races (zhongzu).”139    
 
137 Li Boning è&, “Dui 203 ming mosangbike ren xunjing ganchuan xianxiang de diaocha” 203\Ů
óû4µő¾$ġƇĶƄñ [An investigation into the phenomenon of propagated sensation along the 
meridian channels in 203 Mozambicans], Zhongguo zhenjiu jƟĕ [Chinese Acupuncture & 
Moxibustion] no.1 (1982): 10-11. 
138 Zhang Dengbu ­Ĵƙ, “104 li tansangniya heizhongren xunjing ganchuan xianxiang diaocha baogao” 
104+póƼņµő¾$ġƇƄñÅ_ [A report of the phenomenon of propagated sensation along 
the meridian channels in 104 Tanzanian black people], Shandong zhongyi xueyuan xuebao 	LƩ
Å [Journal of Shandong College of Traditional Chinese Medicine] 7, no.1 (1983): 66-67 and 29. 
139 Cai Zongmin ŲÑ and Yang Biying êľū, “Baizhongren huanzhe de xunjing ganchuan ji qi yu 
zhenci liaoxiao guanxi de guancha” ĵņºśĶµő¾$S7ƟIĬÐ6ŏĶŹ [Observations 
about white patients’ propagated sensation along the meridian channels and its relationship to acupuncture 
effects], Zhongguo zhenjiu jƟĕ [Chinese Acupuncture & Moxibustion] 6 (1989): 31-34. 
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Not all mission doctors identified racial groups by skin color—a seemingly convenient 
yet poor marker for race. Instead, some used other racial categories as defined by geography or 
ethnic nationality. While publishing his observations of South Yemeni patients under the title, 
“The Racial Differences in Reactions to Needling,” Dr. Wang Yuanjun ƶ (1929-) from 
Anhui did not in fact differentiate between racial and cultural groupings. Wang claimed to fill a 
gap in the medical literature about “racial differences” (zhongzu chayi) in the tolerance level of 
pricking, yet the cases he examined were Yemenis and Iraqis, whom he lumped together as 
Arabs—a cultural and linguistic category rather than racial. His findings were nonetheless 
interesting and provided some practical advice for his colleagues practicing overseas. Drawing 
on two-year service (1986-88) in South Yemen and over thirty years’ experience in China, Wang 
conjectured that Yemenis and Iraqis had substantially lower tolerance levels than Chinese and 
Europeans, manifested in three main respects. First, Wang reported that South Yemenis were 
much more prone to fainting during acupuncture. They fainted even whilst in the sleep position; 
there were also cases of passing out when the acupoint zusanli *, was needled, which had 
never happened before in the author’s career.140 Second, South Yemenis needed longer time to 
recover from fainting, ranging from six hours to three days, whereas the most serious Chinese 
case would only need 30 minutes. Third, Yemenis were barely able to bear the same level of 
stimulation as Chinese and Europeans did. Relatedly to the low tolerance, Wang reported better 
and faster effects on Yemenis. He advised that an acupuncturist should consider the “racial” 
 
140 Zusanli Ɗƞ, stomach-36, is one of the most frequently used of all acupoints. It is not far below the 
knee. KimTaylor recorded in her thesis that it was one of the six acupoints taught to barefoot doctors in China. 
“The history of the barefoot doctors” (M.Phil. dissertation in History of Medicine, University of Cambridge), 
26 and 34, quoted by Elisabeth Hsu, “The History of Chinese Medicine in the People’s Republic of China and 
its Globalization,” East Asia Science, Technology, and Society 2 (2008): 476. 
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factor when prescribing the amount and intensity of stimulation.141 Wang’s opinions were well 
received among doctors of Chinese medicine. His article was included into a Library of 
Outstanding Academic Achievements of TCM in 1997.142    
Similar discussions on therapeutic nuances for treating different races or ethnicities 
abounded in the mid- to late 1980s and continue today. Doctors often drew from the cases of 
local patients they treated during their service on overseas missions, which accounted for the 
ambivalence in their reports between race and ethnic identity.143 More recently, some have 
returned to the concept of constitution and attempted to reconcile it with race, arguably due to 
the popularity of new constitution theories emerging in the early 1980s. In a 2008 article in a 
leading acupuncture journal Chinese Acupuncture & Moxibustion, Wang Xiaoyan ÝŨ put 
forward the phrase “constitution differences among races,” on which she later published a whole 
book in 2012.144 Drawing on her clinical experience in Britain from 2002-2006, she discussed 
 
141 Wang Yuanjun ā2ƶ, “Zhen ci fan ying de zhongzu chayi” ƟIU¦Ķņ×¬ [The racial 
differences in reactions to needling], Shanghai zhenjiu zazhi ċƟĕç· [Shanghai Journal of 
Acupuncture and Moxibustion] 3 (1990): 18. 
142 Zhang Junting ­.© ed., Zhongguo zhongyiyao youxiu xueshu chengguo wenku jLŭ!ńå
ÀïÒ¥[Library of Outstanding Academic Achievements of TCM] (Beijing: Zhongyi guji chu ban she, 1997).  
143 For example, there is a medical report on treating a type of pain particular to the so-called “Somali race.” 
See Guo Xin ƚ/ and Guo Xiaoling ƚÝĢ, “Yong wei zhen dian liao zhijie zhencifa zhiliao suomali 
zhongzu de suomali dingdiantong 2000 li linchuang baogao” ĩiƟĪĬĸÉƟIĄĂĬŐƴƞņ×ĶŐ
ƴƞėı2000+¤Å_ [A clinical report on using wei zhen electroacupuncture to treat 2000 cases of 
location-fixed pains for the Somali race], Zhongyiyao yanjiu Lŭļŋ [Research of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine] 1 (1994): 61-62. 
144 Wang Xiaoyan ĠÝŨ, “Renzhong jian tizhi chayi dui zhenci liaofa de yingxiang” ņƣ(Ɖ¬Ɵ
IĬĄĶ°c [Influence of different constitution of races on application of acupuncture therapy], Zhongguo 
zhenjiu jƟĕ [Chinese Acupuncture & Moxibustion] 28, no.11 (2008): 819-821. Her book is a more 
comprehensive discussion of applications of different Chinese medical therapies based on her theory. See 
Renzhong jian tizhi chayi yu zhongyi liaofa zhi yunyong ņƣ(Ɖ¬LĬĄƏĩ [Different 




extensively how prescriptions of Chinese medicine—including herbal formula, acupuncture, 
moxibustion, cupping, and tui na massage—should be adjusted according to differences between 
blacks, whites, and yellows.145 Grafting “race” on the well-accepted concept of “constitution” 
lured many, professional and laymen alike, to simply take it for granted that black, white, and 
yellow patients would be treated differently. With Wang and her predecessors, one finds an 
attempted justification for this in the alleged essential physiological peculiarities of the races. 
This more recent move toward providing race-based treatments of Chinese medicine is hardly 
disconnected with the growing industry of racialized medicine and personalized medicine, whose 
proponents argue that diseases are correlated with ethnicity and race and that racial profiling is 
useful for treatment.    
Moving from constitution to race, the Chinese acupuncturists discussed above attempted 
to “racialize” Chinese medicine while maintaining a distance from arguments about social and 
cultural distinctions based on race. Although the standpoint and observation of these Chinese 
doctors remind us of how European doctors had categorized indigenous peoples in the colonies, 
neither the first strand of thoughts to reject difference among races nor the second one to 
correlate race with treatment effects intended to reproduce all-encompassing racial hierarchies 
relevant beyond the medical realm. In this respect, the Chinese case offers a counterexample to 
the perception that medicine of racial difference has always been used to discriminate against 
non-whites or minorities. Meanwhile, despite the significant structural differences between 
European colonialism and Chinese medical missions, both European colonial scientists and 
Chinese mission doctors believed their race-based distinctions to be “scientific.” Using statistical 
methods, the Chinese doctors claimed “objective” observations about how different racial groups 
 
145 Wang Xiaoyan ĠÝŨ, Renzhong jian tizhi chayi yu zhongyi liaofa zhi yunyong, Chapters 6-10. 
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reacted to acupuncture, aiming to provide guidelines for treatment suitable to racially different 
bodies. While this reification of race ironically emerged in the context of asserting the 
universality of acupuncture, it still created new versions of whiteness, blackness, and yellowness 
in terms of Chinese medicine.    
 
Conclusion 
New concepts of race entered Chinese medicine as acupuncture travelled to Africa. 
China’s overseas medical missions since 1963 provided unprecedented opportunities for Chinese 
doctors to practice acupuncture on non-Asian bodies in large quantities and to collect medical 
data for both research purposes and political ends. Chinese doctors began to adopt race as a 
biologically significant category to study differing reactions to acupuncture in the mid-1970s. 
Notably, they were not aware that this coincided with an important turning point in medical 
debates on race in the West. In a landmark 1972 paper titled “The Apportionment of Human 
Diversity,” Harvard geneticist Richard Lewontin showed that there was more genetic variation 
among individuals within conventionally defined racial groups than between individuals of 
different racial groups.146 This evidence showed that race lacks biological reality and implied 
that the Chinese research seeking to establish links between conventionally defined racial groups 
and treatment effects was misguided from the start. Even though they failed to explain what they 
meant by “race,” what remains meaningful for us to examine is the underlying social and 
political reality reflected in Chinese efforts to develop a race-based Chinese medicine. 
 
146 Richard Lewontin, “The Apportionment of Human Diversity,” in Evolutionary Biology, eds. T. 
Dobzhansky, M.K.Hecht, and W.C. Steere (New York: Springer, 1972), 381-398. 
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By introducing race and race-related statistics into their research, the Chinese medicine 
doctors worked toward making a “New Medicine” (xinyi) with Maoist-socialist value that 
dialectically synthesized the contradictory healing systems of the so-called Chinese and the 
Western.147 They started doing so as professional urgency blazed with the withdrawal of state 
ideological support. The wide promotion of acupuncture anesthesia in surgical interventions 
came to a halt “overnight”—as remembered by some senior acupuncturists—along with the 
sobering down of ideological crazes.148 Officially sponsored criticism appeared in the early 
1980s, overturning the “inappropriate position” to which acupuncture had been raised in the 
previous decade.149 It was thus of little surprise for acupuncture specialists to look to the state-
sponsored overseas mission to defend the legitimacy of their profession and gain recognition of 
individual expertise. Gao Guoxun, for example, benefited from his leadership in the promotion 
of acupuncture anesthesia in Algeria. In the same year after giving his talk, Gao was elected as 
one of the medical mission’s four model workers, and praise for him was circulated through the 
Chinese embassy in Algeria.150 He was later promoted from the head of the acu-moxa 
department to the director of the hospital where he had worked in Wuhan. In private, however, 
he was viewed by some of his mission colleagues as “self-taught, not academically trained, and 
 
147 For a brief overview of “New Medicine,” see Paul Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas, 252-
260; and for Mao’s view on “New Medicine” versus “Old Medicine,” see Kim Taylor, Chinese Medicine in 
Early Communist China, 16-17. 
148 Li Yongming èþÚ, Meiguo zhenjiure chuanqi ŗjƟĕĘ${ [Acupuncture journey to America] 
(Beijing: Ren min wei sheng chubanshe, 2011), 195. 
149 Feng Hsi-chen and T’ao Nai-huang, “The Evaluation of Acupuncture Anesthesia Must Seek Truth from 
Facts,” Wen-hui pao, October 22, 1980. Translated by Paul Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas, 
360-366. 
150 “Chronology of medical teams in Algeria,” in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 334-335. 
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not well recognized in terms of expertise in Wuhan’s medical circle.”151 Gao has since continued 
to capitalize on his overseas experience. In 1987, Gao submitted an abstract of his earlier reports 
that we have analyzed in this chapter to the First World Conference on Acupuncture and 
Moxibustion held in Beijing, restating his argument that “the overseas results affirmed that our 
country’s acupuncture anesthesia was successful,” without mentioning race.152 It is clear that the 
trope of race was a matter of professional and political urgency for these Chinese doctors more 
than a physiological issue. Their desire to show that Chinese medicine was just as good as 
biomedicine remained intact, but the motive for doing so shifted from a Maoist ideological one 
to a Deng-ist economic one in keeping with China’s overall transformation in the late 1970s.  
Thus, the making of this new Chinese medicine was truly transnational. By creating and 
circulating miraculous effects from abroad, Chinese reporters helped to heighten the profile of 
Chinese medicine and justify the state’s endorsement of it. By advertising acupuncture 
anesthesia and other Chinese medical methods, doctors asserted the legitimacy of their 
knowledge and practice and interpreted Algerian bodies as more receptive to the alternative 
healing. By matching supposedly racially different bodies with medical paradigms and 
treatments, doctors not only claimed the universality of Chinese medicine but also introduced 
race as a new site of knowledge-making within that system of medicine.       
Arising in the late-socialist era, the discussion over race and Chinese medicine heralded 
by the mission doctors persists until today and rides the tide of the renewed global surge of the 
 
151 Personal interviews with Dr. Wei Bo in Guangzhou, June 15, 2017; with Dr. Feng Hongzhi in Wuhan, 
August 22, 2017. 
152 Gao Guoxun Ƹj, “254. Zai beifeizhou shixing zhenci mazui 471 li de linchuang guancha” nKƮć
ÖųƟIƺƛ471+Ķ¤Ź [Clinical Observation of 471 cases of acupuncture anesthesia in North 
Africa], in Zhenjiu lunwen zhaiyao xuanbian ƟĕƀÒÍŸƒŔ [Selected abstracts of papers on 
acupuncture & moxibustion] (Beijing: Zhongguo zhenjiu xuehui, 1987), 179. 
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importance of race in medical research and practice in our genomic age.153 Chinese medicine, 
now as a modern knowledge, joins the interplay between race, ever more closely associated with 
personalized medicine, and illnesses, increasingly connected to chronic conditions exhausting the 
resources of postcolonial states.  










153 This global surge of racial discourse in health has attracted scholarly attention for a decade. See, for 
example, Ian Whitmarsh and David Jones, eds. What’s the Use of Race?: Modern Governance and the Biology 
of Difference (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010). 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
 
Refashioning Socialist Medicine: Acu-moxa Instruction in Médéa, 1975-77  
 
We sit in a long rectangular room with a light marble floor. There are couches lined up against 
the three walls of the room, each with elaborately embroidered flower-pattern covers and 
matching cushions. Mme Trabelsi welcomes me and my interpreter, Nadjet, to her surprisingly 
elegant Maghreb-style living room, in her apartment inside an old four-story cement apartment 
building with yellow paint peeling off the walls. The apartment is not far from the House of 
Culture of Médéa, and is 1.6 miles away from the provincial hospital where Mme Trabelsi spent 
her entire working life. While she speaks a mixed language of French and colloquial Algerian, 
she greets me with a strong-accented “ni chi le ma” (Have you eaten?), an antiquated salutation 
in Chinese. Her voice is strong and clear, and she sounds confident and assertive whenever she 
speaks, even at the times when she is recollecting her memories from forty-two years ago. 
Trabelsi gives a trial acupuncture treatment to Nadjet on one of the couches, which 
functions perfectly as a treatment bed, due to its extended length, rectangular shape, and firm 
mattress support. It is Nadjet’s first time receiving acu-moxa. She pauses for a moment when 
Trabelsi offers to give her acu-moxa, but decides to give it a try. Trabelsi holds a needle with her 
right thumb, index, and middle fingers. She does not hesitate for a moment before applying the 
needle, nor does she spend time locating the point; she simply inserts the needle in a clean and 
effortless manner. Her age is only revealed by the wrinkles on her face and the grayish hair that 
slips out of her loosely wrapped headscarf when she lowers her head during the practice. She is 
seventy-two now. At the age of thirty, while pregnant, she studied under Chinese medicine 
physicians at the Paramedical School of Médéa, Algeria. She took classes from October 1976 to 
June 1977 along with nine other nurses, at the end of which she received a certificate that granted 
235 
 
her the title “nurse acupuncturist.” Along with the certificate, she was given a gift: a thin 
pamphlet entitled L’Anesthesie par Acupuncture, printed in Beijing in 1972, which is now 
wrinkled and smudged with light blue ink. Since then, she has practiced acu-moxa with Chinese 
acupuncturists in E.P.H. de Médéa (Hospital of Mohamed Boudiaf) until the last Chinese team 
left in 1983. She tells us that “The service was closed with their departure. I have been doing 
acupuncture at my home ever since.” She adds, “But I have trouble finding needles. Nor do I 
have any mugwort leaf. I did not stop practicing, with the means that I have. The little means that 
I have are from a friend who offered for free as a gift for the sick.”1  
The method that Trabelsi uses in the trial treatment is creative, one not adopted by 
Chinese acupuncturists trained in medical schools. She places five cupping glasses on Nadjet’s 
mid-and lower back, and inserts four needles into her skin in the spaces between the glasses. 
Trabelsi then takes out an Omron Electronic Pulse Massager, attaching its two small pads on 
Nadjet’s lower back with her backbone in the center. Electric current pumps through her body 
tissues, and nearby needles jitter as a result of mild muscle contractions. The needles jitter more 
obviously when Trabelsi applies the same method to Nadjet’s right arm. Two elements of this 
treatment strike me as surprising. First, Trabelsi applies cupping and acupuncture 
simultaneously. When the two techniques are combined, Chinese doctors normally use the cups 
to cover the needled area with or without the needle, rather than applying cupping and needling 
together on different areas of the skin. Second, the formal method of using electroacupuncture is 
to attach wire to the tail of the inserted needles and then to adjust the frequency and intensity of 
the electric impulse depending on the condition that is being treated. For Chinese professional 
 
1 Personal interview with Mme Messaouda Kelloud Trabelsi at her home in Médéa, Algeria, July 11, 2018. In 
this chapter, the life stories of Trabelsi and her comments on the course she took is all from this interview. 
They will not be footnoted unless from other sources. 
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acupuncturists, using needles remains essential in this modern technique. I ask Trabelsi about 
these differences. She replies without hesitation, “I invented the methods.” Throughout our 
conversations, she emphasizes that she “got good results” on her patients.  
Trabelsi became a nurse-acupuncturist in 1977 through her participation in a government 
initiative to accommodate the increasing demand of Algerian patients for acupuncture treatment 
since 1974. In 1974, under the slogan “Health For All,” a nationwide system of free medical care 
in all public health services was introduced in Algeria. Outpatient care, hospitalization (including 
meals), medicines, and public health programs were made almost entirely free to all Algerians. 
The cost of the program was borne by the state and a Social Security system.2 The introduction 
of free medical care immediately “multiplied” the number of patients crammed into public 
hospitals.3 The workload of the Chinese acupuncturists increased dramatically. “There were a 
lot of people but not many doctors,” Trabelsi recalls, adding that “the Chinese doctors asked for 
help and wanted to train students who were good. The Ministry of Health and the head of the 
Chinese mission found training a good idea. They came to me, because I had a good level [of 
nursing expertise], [asking me] to help the Chinese to deal with the patients. They offered me to 
do the training and I said yes.” Algerians’ demand for more acupuncture practitioners aligned 
with a major long-standing policy of China’s foreign aid as reflected in the often invoked 
Chinese “fish proverb”: Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and 
 
2 Ali Dehmene Mohammed, “The Financing Health System Problem in Algeria,” International Research 
Journal of Management, IT & Social Sciences 3 no. 7 (2016): 48-53. Chinese doctors and health officials 
collected information on Algeria’s policy on the free medical care system. The information is incorporated in a 
compendium of Algeria, Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya `gİÑĈă
^ÕĐ³ìĦuH; [Compilation of the basic information for the designs of complete projects in 
foreign aid: Algeria], Vol. 3 (Internal publication, 1981), 292-293. 
3 “Chronology,” in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 325. 
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you feed him for a lifetime. The pursuit of self-reliance was a significant component of China’s 
revolutionary experience that Mao was eager to export to the world. His grandiose plan of 
“exporting revolution,” however, prompted a wide range of interpretations by different 
government officials when it came to policies in practice.4 Chinese health officials saw that 
training medical personnel of the recipient countries, especially in Africa, would help the locals 
to advance health care, bring about social reform, and ultimately, empower the locals in their 
struggles against either European colonizers or, in the postwar period, the new American and 
Soviet imperial powers. Although Mao’s vision of “exporting revolution” to Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America was formed amidst the geopolitics of the late 1950s, it continued to shape the 
platform of China’s foreign policy until 1982. In this larger political context, China and Algeria 
quickly agreed to initiate the training of Algerian acupuncturists. The first course started on 
March 10, 1975.  
For the first time, Algerian nurses like Trabelsi started practicing Chinese medicine. She 
had watched the Chinese doctors treating patients with acupuncture in the hospital of Médéa and 
was curious to learn how to do the same. Chinese health officials and authorities were ambitious: 
they did not simply want to alleviate the workload of the Chinese doctors, but also to spread the 
newly “scientized” and cost-effective Chinese medical technique in Algeria. Sharing with 
Algerians the socialist ideals of health care that offer equal access without charge, the Chinese 
sought to contribute to the country’s health care system with a distinct Chinese medicine. They 
 
4 Under the rubric of “exporting Chinese revolution to the world,” officials in different sectors in China 
actively engaged with the monumental project from their respective fields. For example, the Foreign Language 
Press and the International Bookstore translated, published, and distributed numerous foreign-language 
publications, including Mao’s writings, as a way to transmit the revolutionary thoughts to a global audience. 
See Lanjun Xu, “Translation and Internationalism,” in Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History, ed.  
Alexander Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 76-95. 
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also saw the training program as a good opportunity to exhibit how Maoist China was leading the 
way toward global socialism by providing alternative medicine suited to local conditions.  
However, attempts to establish a formal training course were short-lived. The Chinese 
medical mission recruited only two classes from 1975 to 1977, each lasting for a year, and only 
trained twenty-two Algerian nurses to become practitioners of acu-moxa.5 After the last Chinese 
doctors left Médéa in 1983, the acupuncture service was shut down. Two other male nurses from 
Médéa who had also undergone the training quit the practice. Trabelsi decided to continue 
practicing at home, receiving patients who came by “word of mouth” advertising. While the 
Chinese missions continued to introduce acu-moxa to other areas in Algeria where they were 
assigned, the revolution in medical development that Chinese doctors had hoped for proceeded 
on a much slower timeline than was initially envisioned.  
Trabelsi embodies a socialist medical imaginary that the medical missions from Maoist 
China attempted to introduce to Algeria, but is almost nonexistent today. As Trabelsi remembers 
fragments of Chinese, she has swept back to scenes where she worked and trained with her 
Chinese colleagues. While her pronunciation of the Chinese names of several acupuncture points 
for treating facial paralysis are hardly identifiable, she continues to actualize her private 
conception of what Chinese acu-moxa is and how it can be performed in a novel way. Her 
healing praxis showcases appropriation of acu-moxa into the local cultural and healthcare 
context, as a result of the complex process of the transmission of medical knowledge from 
Chinese medical teachers to Algerian students, and the collaboration and negotiation between the 
 
5 “A’erjiliya juban zhenjiu yishi xunlianban” ĦuH;?ģ¿C_ąæÆ [Acupuncture Course for 
Medical Staff offered in Algeria], People’s Daily, April 3, 1975, p.6; “Guoge, A’erjiliya juban zhenjiu yisheng 
xunlianban” aSĦuH;?ģ¿CÈąæÆ [Acupuncture Courses for Medical Staff offered in 
Togo and Algeria], People’s Daily, May 10, 1976. 
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latter and their patients. Since the mid-1980s, historians of Chinese medicine have gradually 
abandoned a neatly bounded notion of Chinese medicine as an object of inquiry.6 Shifting the 
focus from probing the fundamental, unified essence of Chinese medicine, scholarship has aimed 
to explore how Chinese medicine has been variously reconstructed over time along the lines of 
physician identity (e.g., the rise of scholar-physician (ruyi) versus traditional doctors and 
midwives), the geography of disease and related cultural differences (“north” versus “south,” 
“center” versus “periphery” and “local,” and “China” versus “West”), as well as boundaries of 
medicine (e.g., orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy, sacred religious healing vs. secular medicine, 
indigenous vs. foreign). This rich scholarship underscores the heterogeneity inherent in Chinese 
medical traditions. The systemization and standardization of Chinese medicine sponsored by the 
state since the 1950s appear to have contributed to its alleged homogeneity. Yet this process has 
also introduced elements of diversity; movements of integrating Chinese and Western medicine 
have further multiplied theoretical and practical diversity. When the already nonunitary practice 
of acu-moxa travelled to Algeria, it was further diversified as it was transmitted, appropriated, 
and reconfigured by peripheral actors new to the practice. By examining how the training course 
was organized and received under specific circumstances, this chapter draws a nuanced picture 
of the process by which novel forms of practice and knowledge of Chinese medicine emerged in 
encounters beyond China’s borders.  
 
6 The earlier scholarly works tended to treat Chinese medicine as a single bounded rational system and focus 
on essential concepts of Chinese medicine that differ from Western medicine. While these works grappled with 
the theoretical sophistication of Chinese medicine, they were often ahistorical and acontextual. See for 
example, Ted J, Kaptchuk, The Web That Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine (Chicago: 
Congdon & Weed, 1983); and Manfred Porket, The theoretical Foundations of Chinese Medicine: Systems of 
Correspondence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974). 
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The newly developed interpretations of acu-moxa healing in Algeria consequently posed 
a challenge to the “Chineseness” of acu-moxa. But the problem of “Chineseness” seems to pale 
in comparison to the political agenda of making China’s socialist medicine international and to 
serve the world as an alternative medicine. Trabelsi’s training and innovations reveal the fluid 
boundaries of this socialist medicine, which aimed to incorporate local practitioners into its 
system, and was inevitably being redefined by its new participants. Questions thus arise as to 
what properly did or did not constitute socialist medicine when it was extending its coverage to 
new practitioners and patients in unfamiliar cultural, social, and political contexts; as well as how 
the boundaries around medical orthodoxy and physician identity were maintained or negotiated. 
Scholars have demonstrated that medical identity is closely connected with other domains of 
identity—regional, occupational, class, national—and that reconstruction of medicine involves 
claims of authority, securing one’s livelihood, defending one’s status, and so forth.7 Bearing in 
mind these factors, this chapter considers the refashioning of acu-moxa during its transmission 
from Chinese teachers to Algerian students in circumstances of scarcity—limited time, limited 
medical supplies, and limited ability to achieve desired results—and a redrawing of boundaries 
around proper practices of socialist medicine in Algeria.   
This chapter begins with an analysis of the political motivations of Chinese and Algerian 
officials in endorsing the acu-moxa training that led figures like Trabelsi into the amorphous 
field of acu-moxa. It places the initiative of alternative medicine education in the context of 
China’s policy that hoped not only to export socialist medicine, but also to perpetuate its use in 
the recipient communities. It tells the positive attitude of the Algerian health officials toward the 
“unorthodox” medicine during a time when the country was in dire need of health workers. 
 
7 The same set of literature as mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
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Drawing on interviews with Algerian nurses, health officials, and Chinese instructors, this 
chapter reconstructs activities of a typical day during acu-moxa training between 1975 and 1977. 
It examines the language, cultural, and epistemological barriers that affected the transmission of 
acu-moxa, as well as how these barriers were either skirted or overcome.  
Within this context, this chapter answers the question of how Algerian practitioners who 
studied directly under Chinese instructors came to practice acu-moxa in a novel way. By 
examining the “short and sweet” content of the training and the teaching principle of “combining 
theory with practice,” it argues that the training of Algerian nurses was a simplified learning that 
reflected the new curricula and education model of Chinese medicine that was being systemized 
and standardized in China. Efficiency and speed took precedence over the faithful reproduction 
of medical knowledge. By prioritizing practical techniques over the philosophy of acu-moxa 
during the course, Chinese acu-moxa doctors in effect acquiesced to the divorce of practice from 
theory in the recent scientification movement of acu-moxa in China. Stripped of a holistic 
cosmology of Chinese medicine, acu-moxa became a technique that, as Harold Cook observes, 
travelled more easily than the exchanges of “the highest forms of natural knowledge [that] 
explained why things were.”8 The transformation of acu-moxa to a technique in the Algerian 
context reinforced the long-standing bias of the medical society in imperial China, which had 
seen acu-moxa as a lowly technique inferior to herbal medicine.9 Acu-moxa was taught to 
 
8 Harold Cook, Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), Ch.11. 
9 On the hierarchy of knowledge within Chinese medicine, see for example the literature on scholar-physicians 
(ruyi), such as the work of Yi-Li Wu. 
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Algerians for its use-value rather than for its philosophical truth-value.10 In this regard, the lack 
of diagnostics in acu-moxa training is especially illuminating.  
The seemingly reductive method which undermined the acu-moxa doctors’ professional 
authority in medical circles, however, opened up space for free interpretations and reformulation 
of acu-moxa by local practitioners. While acu-moxa has a few side effects, the side effects are 
easy to control if the practitioner abides by some fundamental principles. Therefore, it is easy for 
a trainee practitioner to achieve a minimum level of efficacy, while adapting their practice as 
they see fit. Unrestricted by the theoretical confines that may have trapped academically trained 
Chinese practitioners, Trabelsi invented her own methods and established her professional 
authority through experience and efficacy. Although the artisanal skill of needling is hard to 
quantify and the efficacy of her methods is difficult to measure, her expertise is recognized 
insofar as her patients are satisfied.  
 
A Political Initiative 
On 22 March 1976, China’s state mouthpiece People’s Daily ran the headline “Algerian 
Medical Assistants Complete Acu-moxa (zhenjiu) Training Course,” announcing “the birth of the 
first batch of Algerian acu-moxa practitioners.”11 Below the report was another piece of 
acupuncture-related news, which read “Togolese Doctors Succeed in Surgery with Acupuncture 
Anesthesia.” Surrounded by news reports of ambassador meetings, Chinese officials’ visits to 
 
10 Here I borrow Bridie Andrews’s argument to apply to the case of acu-moxa in Algeria. She has argued that 
germ theory was accepted in China for its use-value to particular individuals and groups of people rather than 
for its universal truth-value. “Tuberculosis and the Assimilation of Germ Theory in China, 1895–1937,” 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 52, no. 1 (January 1997): 114-157. 
11 The most commonly used term zhenjiu is a compound that contains both needling/acupuncture (zhen) and 
moxibustion (jiu). The term is often (mis)used to refer to needling only. 
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Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa, and the celebration of the national anniversaries of 
Tunisia and the Pahlavi Iran, the two pieces on acupuncture stand out. But the very fact that they 
were positioned beside political news and take up a relatively large proportion of space suggests 
an editorial decision to present the overseas transmission of Chinese medical knowledge as a 
political victory and a manifestation of China’s technological advancement. Both reports 
described the promotion of acu-moxa abroad through training courses. The successful surgery in 
Togo was reported to be performed during a training course of acu-moxa. The accompanying 
article to the report on Algeria had more details:  
The trainees are selected medical staff from different hospitals, all with many years of work 
experience. After a year of training, [they] have preliminarily mastered the basic theoretical 
knowledge and practical know-how of acu-moxa. During the course, Algerian and Chinese 
instructors worked in close cooperation. In order to familiarize the students with acupoints, 
the Algerian instructor(s) specially taught them the basic knowledge of human anatomy. 
The Chinese doctors who taught acu-moxa classes asked the students to practice needling 
on them so as to gain knowledge in a real sense, and the students were deeply moved.12  
Promoting acu-moxa abroad was a Chinese initiative. When the first Chinese medical mission 
assigned to Médéa arrived in 1970, few locals knew anything about acu-moxa. When asked 
whether the Algerian government had requested acu-moxa specialists, Mr. Memmi, the head 
nurse of internal medicine and a medical observer with the Chinese team, commented that he had 
never heard of or learnt about acu-moxa until the Chinese doctors arrived in Algeria. In his 
understanding, acupuncturists were deployed because the Chinese team was sent as “a complete 
mission with all specialties and thus even acupuncture was classified [by the Chinese] as a 
 
12 People’s Daily, March 22, 1976, p.5. 
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specialty.”13 Prior to the arrival of the Chinese team, Médéa had doctors from Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Egypt. Between 1970 and 1983, the provincial hospital of Médéa operated with 53 
doctors from China on successive missions, who were assisted by 200-300 Algerian nurses and 
other hospital staff. “The Chinese did not accept other [foreign] doctors. They took the hospital 
alone.” In Mr. Memmi’s account, he explained that the agreement signed between Algeria and 
China stipulated that other foreign doctors in the hospital would be excluded: “And they had all 
the specialties, so they did not need other doctors.”14 However, the official health cooperation 
protocols between the two governments do not include these terms. Mr. Memmi’s memory of 
these terms most likely derived from a broad consensus that Chinese medical teams only worked 
on their own in Algerian hospitals. His observation is justifiable as few Chinese records indicate 
any foreign colleagues working in the same hospital except on rare occasions.15 It was not until 
1985 that Algerian doctors started joining the Chinese workforce in a hospital in Guelma.16 With 
Chinese doctors in complete control of medical supervision, they could take the liberty of 
proposing new initiatives or experimenting with alternative methods of treatment.  
Specifically, the proposal to train local acu-moxa practitioners was likely to be initiated 
by the Chinese mission in Algeria out of both political motivation and practical concern. A report 
 
13 Personal interview with Mr. Memmi, at an office in the Hospital of Médéa, July 11, 2018. 
14 Personal interview with Madaoui Ahmad, the Director of E.P.H. de Médéa, Algeria, July 24, 2016; personal 
interview with Mr. Memmi, at an office in the Hospital of Médéa, July 11, 2018. 
15 Zhou Jianying Qý, “Da ai wu jiang—yuan shanghai yike daxue yuanwai yiliao 50 zhounian jishi (part 
2)” bÁÌ——G
¹CØbj`CÍ50Q{ån[Great love is boundless: a documentation 
of the 50th anniversary of the foreign medical aid service of former Shanghai Medical University], Shangyi 
xiaoyouhui 
C®I& [Shanghai Medical University Alumni Association], accessed August 28, 2019, 
http://shmc.org.cn/show.aspx?info_lb=3&info_id=826&flag=3. This feature report mentions that the first 
Shanghai team in Relizane, Algeria, from April 1972, co-worked with three Bulgarian doctors. But it is also 
likely that Bulgarians left soon after the Chinese arrival, as in the case of the first Chinese team in Saïda. 
16 “Chronology,” in Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 355. 
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based on an interview with Xu Hong ¸, an administrator and the deputy head of the team 
(July 1974-December 1976), and Dr. Wang Mingzhang ÄÞ, one of the acu-moxa 
instructors, indicates that it was the Chinese team who took the lead in launching the course.17 
Titled “To Leave a Permanent Medical Team,” this report emphasizes a major objective declared 
in Chinese foreign aid policy: to teach the people of recipient countries how to use technologies 
and cultivate their capability of self-reliance. China had fully embraced its belief in the power of 
self-reliance after the Soviet Union abruptly cancelled its aid to China and withdrew all technical 
experts in 1960. This hard lesson taught the Chinese officials that developing countries should 
rely primarily on themselves. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai declared in his very visible tour of ten 
independent African countries (including Algeria) between December 1963 and February 1964 
that the purpose of China’s aid was to “help [the recipient countries] embark step by step on the 
road of self-reliance,” and that Chinese experts were to help the local personnel “fully master 
[relevant] techniques” in all technical assistance.18 In his meeting with the Tanzanian president 
Julius Nyerere on March 25, 1974, Mao Zedong commented that the main goal of the Chinese 
medical mission was specifically “to teach your [Tanzanian] doctors.” He added that “all 
technical staff should do this, [so that] when we leave in the future, you can manage completely 
by yourselves. If [we] don’t teach, that is not good.”19 Fulfilling this task in accordance with 
 
17 Mingyi fengliu zai beifei,181-186. 
18 “The Chinese Government’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other 
Countries,” January 15, 1964. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, eds., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan Q
ª` ė [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 
388. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121560. 
19 “Tong Nileier tanhua zhuyao neirong de tongbao” MvĭuČĊā1pÐĘ [Briefing of Mao’s 
meeting with Julius K. Nyerere], March 25, 1974. XAbįR~ [Chinese Cultural Revolution 
Database]. http://ccrd.usc.cuhk.edu.hk.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/Title.aspx.  
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state policy, Xu and the other team members were more than ready to claim the credit for taking 
action. The “To Leave a Medical Team” report presents a narrative of how the team leaders 
decided to run a formal training course in order to help Algerians cultivate their own medical 
personnel, and how their proposal was met with enthusiasm from both Chinese and Algerian 
health authorities.  
China’s state media took a different approach in producing propaganda about this 
initiative to spread medical knowledge abroad. The “To Leave a Medical Team” report was 
included in a commemorative anthology edited by the Hubei Provincial Health Department in 
1993 and was only circulated within the small circle of the Hubei medical missions. While the 
Hubei doctors were eager to claim credit for their initiative, the broader Chinese audience 
remained largely unaware of their actions. The national media skirted around the subject of who 
initiated the acu-moxa training course. People’s Daily reported in April 1975 that “the Algerian 
government, in order to cultivate their own acu-moxa medical personnel and develop acu-moxa 
therapy, decided to hold this training course.”20 This phrasing instead created an impression that 
the recipient societies (not only Algeria but many more) were eager to adopt the Chinese healing 
method. After watching other news reports on the successes of such training courses in Algeria, 
Togo, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Guinea,21 what Chinese readers likely came to grasp was the 
gravitational pull of acu-moxa to foreigners, rather than the work of Chinese missions who 
hoped to claim credit for acu-moxa initiatives.   
What was missing from these narratives was the practical rationale for running the acu-
moxa course. With patients pouring into public hospital services after the initiation of free 
 
20 People’s Daily, April 3, 1975, p.6. 
21 See for example, People’s Daily, March 22, 1976, p.5 and July 11, 1977, p.5. 
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medical care in January 1974, Dr. Wang, the sole acupuncturist on the Médéa mission, was 
unable to handle the increasing demand. Mr. Memmi recalls: “The ‘false’ patients increased. A 
patient came to see four doctors a day.” Given that acu-moxa treatment can apply to a wide range 
of health problems and many of the locals were curious to try it, the doctors’ workload increased 
significantly. Local health authorities were also impacted by increasing demand by local 
inhabitants. Both Trabelsi and the current hospital director, Madaoui Ahmad, recognized the 
pressure to provide more acupuncture services. They both mentioned that the Algerian health 
officials at the time “saw it was essential that this technique be taught to specialist nurses and 
even for other hospitals.”22 
In the face of pressing demands from the population for medical care, the Algerian health 
authorities welcomed the Chinese proposal. The acu-moxa training courses were held in the 
Paramedical School of Médéa, which operated in a wing of the Hospital of Médéa. Like many of 
the health infrastructure building plans proposed in Algeria’s first four-year development plan 
(1970-3) and second four-year plan (1974-7), the construction of the paramedical school was not 
yet actualized. The construction had started several years before, but had been suspended for a 
long time.23 Given that only 29 percent of the allocated budget for building medical 
infrastructure was used during the second plan, the anthropologist Mahfoud Bennoune attributed 
its failure to the indifference of the authorities to non-industrial sectors.24 In comparison, 
training of doctors and paramedical staff received more attention from the health authorities and 
 
22 Personal interview with Madaoui Ahmad, the Director of E.P.H. de Médéa, Algeria, July 24, 2016. Mme 
Trabelsi was present in the interview. 
23 “Le Dr Boudjellab préside l’ouverture d’un cycle de formation de jeunes,” El Moudjahid (French), March 
11, 1975, p.3. 
24 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 247. 
248 
 
also achieved greater progress. The number of Algerian physicians increased from 285 in 1962 
to 1,241 in 1973,25 and paramedical personnel increased from 250 in 1962 to 13,543 in 1974.26 
The number of adequately trained medical workers, however, remained small and obstructed the 
objective of extending health services to the interior of the country.27 Under pressure to provide 
more medical assistants, training programs for paramedical personnel were given priority on the 
agenda of the Ministry of Health and Population. The Chinese proposal to offer a training course 
thus fit in the Ministry of Health and Population’s plan and was quickly accepted. In the opening 
ceremony of the first training course, the health minister Dr. Omar Boudjellab announced that 
the goal of the course was “to train not only acupuncture technicians, but also instructors in this 
discipline whose role will be to supervise courses of initiatives.”28 By heralding a new course to 
train more acu-moxa instructors, the Algerian health officials appeared optimistic toward an 
initiative that promoted an “unorthodox” medicine alternative to French biomedicine. 
What is noteworthy is that the trainees were all nurses, with twelve in the first class, and 
another ten in the second. No Algerian doctors took the training. Local doctors remained a scarce 
intellectual resource in Algeria in the mid-1970s, especially in the public health sector. When 
Houari Boumédiène took power in June 1965 and reversed many of the socialist policies of the 
previous Ben Bella government, doctors were allowed to open private medical offices and so 
began to work only part-time in public health facilities. In order to reduce regional disparities in 
 
25 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 247-8. 
26 Dr. Ammar Benadouda and Dr. Abdelkrim Yaker, “Quelques données de base pour une programmation 
sanitaire nationale,” Revue de la santé publique, 12 (July 1976): 31. This journal was published by Institut 
National de Santé Publique, Alger. 
27 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 246. 
28 “Le Dr Boudjellab préside l’ouverture d’un cycle de formation de jeunes,” El Moudjahid (French), March 
11, 1975, p.3. 
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health care coverage, the Ministry of Health and Population compulsorily assigned new medical 
school graduates to the interior of the country for a period of at least two years. Yet this measure 
did not effectively disperse Algerian doctors outside of coastal urban centers.29 Even though the 
total number of Algerian doctors, pharmacists, and dentists had increased to 2,092 by 1974, half 
of them were concentrated in the three major coastal cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, 
and over 2,000 worked as full-time private practitioners.30 Few stayed in the public sector. The 
fact that Chinese medical teams were assigned to Médéa in place of Algerian doctors illustrates 
this lack of adequate local manpower. Unlike their Algerian counterparts who were able to refuse 
to settle in underprivileged areas of their own country, the Chinese doctors were mobilized, and 
as it happens, had no choice but to “go down to the countryside,” into borderlands, and into rural 
areas in Africa.  
Testimonies of both Algerian health personnel and Chinese mission doctors attest to the 
immense popularity of acu-moxa treatment among Algerian patients from the mid-1960s. But the 
attitudes of Algerian doctors toward this medical technique remain unclear. Acu-moxa was only 
recently revived in socialist China in the late 1950s, after a long period of dormancy since 1822 
when the Qing court’s Imperial Medical College (taiyiyuan) had abolished the discipline.31  
From July 1971, the Chinese government launched a series of international campaigns to 
promote acu-moxa, especially acupuncture anesthesia. These included a television broadcast of 
the U.S. president Nixon’s observation of an open-chest surgery assisted by acupuncture 
anesthesia, as well as inviting the renowned Italian film director Michelangelo Antonioni to 
 
29 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 249. 
30 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 248-250. 
31 Kim Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China, 44. 
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produce a documentary that had a 10-minute episode of a Caesarian section of a woman in labor 
anesthetized solely with the use of needles. While these graphic scenes catalyzed an upsurge in 
the use of this “ancient” Chinese medical technique in the West, doubts about its efficacy 
remained abundant in biomedical societies. Furthermore, acu-moxa was closely associated with 
basic health care in China where the large population was not able to afford the more expensive 
biomedical health care. Acu-moxa’s characterization as low cost failed to attract Algerian 
doctors who preferred to stay in the more lucrative private sector in the major cities. It was not 
until the early 1990s that several Algerian doctors officially acquired training in acupuncture in 
either China or Europe.32       
Public Chinese accounts of the acu-moxa courses did not reference any of the pragmatic 
health care needs in Algeria or political motivations of the Chinese state. The lack of reference 
reveals the much politicized nature of the overseas promotion of this medical technique. 
Acclaimed as a socialist achievement that was also a “solely” Chinese innovation, acu-moxa was 
an important component of China’s socialist medicine meant to appeal to the peoples of 
developing countries, in much the same way as Maoist revolutionary ideology had done. This 
message repeatedly appears in news coverage of acu-moxa overseas, and in the 1976 report, 
“Algerian Medical Assistants Complete Acu-moxa (zhenjiu) Training Course.” The report 
emphasizes Algerian officials’ support and enthusiasm for acu-moxa by highlighting the fact that 
the course was held by the Algerian Ministry of Health and that its opening and conferral 
ceremonies were attended by high-level government officials. The secretary of the governor of 
the Médéa province was quoted expressing the wish that there be “more Algerian medical 
 
32 “Selon le Dr Hamid Brahimi : L’acupuncture : une solution médicale au problème de l’obésité,” El 




assistants and doctors who research and promote the acu-moxa therapy.” The report also adds the 
perspective of Algerian patients who were said to be very cooperative and “passionately 
encouraging” the Algerian interns during their practice. Cooperation was crucial, it implied, not 
only between Chinese and Algerian teachers in their instruction, but also in the practitioner-
patient relations, and more broadly, in the further consolidation of friendly Sino-Algerian 
relations. This rhetoric of cooperation was at the heart of the revised strategy to implement 
Mao’s vision of China’s position vis-a-vis the Third World. While the Chinese diplomats and 
technical experts’ radical imposition of Maoist ideology of world revolution on local Africans 
was a prevalent phenomenon during the height of the Cultural Revolution (from 1965 to the 
early 1970s),33 a milder approach of “exporting revolution” was adopted from the mid-1970s to 
restore the precarious relationship between China and African countries. Because of 
overwhelming negative responses to the former policy of explicitly propagandizing Maoist 
ideologies within local communities, and the rapprochement with the U.S. in 1972, Chinese 
official discourse started to adopt a softer tone in addressing different ideologies and visions of 
development. The rhetoric of cooperation came to prevail over hierarchical conceptions of aid or 
education. In this larger political context, ideas about teaching and learning acu-moxa were 
conceptualized as knowledge exchange between two parties on an equal footing. As a medical 
technique highly acclaimed in domestic discourses, acu-moxa was also expected to be as 
effective and appropriate to Algerian communities and the wider developing world. It was thus 
assumed that Algerians would positively receive the medical method and be willing to cooperate, 
rather than be forced, to adopt the method.      
 
33 See Cheng Yinghong Ùþ, Mao zhuyi geming: ershi shiji de zhongguo yu shijie ±îįRD




          
A Day of Training, 197634 
A typical day of training started when the acu-moxa department opened its doors. 
Patients were often already lined up in the corridor, sitting on the chairs by the wall. Salutations 
were exchanged between patients, particularly because patients came to the hospital quite often, 
as treatment consisted of five sessions a week. The nurse of the department checked in patients 
and wrote down their names and main complaints on a register book. The first batch of patients 
were called into the treatment rooms. One was for men, the other for women. Most patients took 
a treatment bed each; a few chose to sit on chairs. The more experienced patients removed 
clothes from parts of their bodies where they knew the doctor would needle. The ones who 
recently had come into acquaintance at the clinic hugged and kissed each other’s cheeks twice or 
three times. First-timers received answers to their queries from fellow patients, which might have 
assuaged feelings of nervousness. There were no screens to shield patients for privacy. Anyone 
new to the clinic who might have felt uncomfortable quickly adapted to the free and open 
atmosphere. Chinese doctors arrived at the clinic on time. They put on their white coats and a 
busy day of treatment and teaching began.  
The trainees were divided into groups and each group followed a Chinese doctor. They 
watched how the doctor chose a set of acupoints for the treatment of particular diseases or 
symptoms, and found some patterns in how they chose them. They watched how the doctor 
effortlessly played with needles. They had studied the meridians, channels, acupoints on a small 
plastic human model for the past two months. Finally came the time when the doctor asked them 
 
34 This narrative of a day of training is constructed based on my interview with Mme Trabelsi and my 
observation in an acupuncture clinic in Ben Aknoun Hospital in Algiers in 2016. 
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to try practicing on patients. Trabelsi took the opportunity. The instructor asked her which 
acupoints she thought were fit for the treatment. She gave the Chinese names of the acupoints 
that she could memorize, and pointed to those she did not remember the names of, but knew the 
locations. After all, it was too difficult to remember all the “376 points and 24 meridians”—
according to her—in their Chinese names.35 The Chinese instructor corrected her where 
necessary and let her take a needle. She “immediately did it” and her fearlessness “surprised” the 
instructor. The patient did not object. “They were satisfied,” said Trabelsi, because “the doctors 
assisted us with the patients; it was they who told us how to do it.” The needles stayed on the 
body for twenty minutes. When the time was up, the trainees removed the needles and stacked 
them in a container. When the morning service was over, nurses of the department would soak 
the needles in liquid antiseptic to prepare them for use the next day.       
The trainees spent their afternoons in classes where the Chinese acupuncturists took turns 
to teach theories and rudimentary knowledge of acu-moxa. The classroom was a makeshift room 
in a wing of the hospital that was temporarily used as the Paramedical School. A blackboard, 
small plastic human models, and some tables and chairs were all they had. They had no printed 
textbooks; instead they used handouts slapped together by the instructors. Instructors talked in 
Chinese, trying to use some Arabic and French to explain themselves, yet most of the time, they 
had to rely on the team’s translator to figure out the lecture content. Sometimes the instructor 
wrote down words and drew body maps on the blackboard. Trabelsi copied the terms of 
meridians and acupoints in their Chinese pronunciation in her notebook. (She later lent the 
notebook to an Algerian doctor who was interested but never got it back from him.) The trainees 
 
35 The total number of acupoints varies. The most commonly used human model for acupuncture today has 
361 acupoints. There are 12 regular meridians plus 8 extra meridians, and 2 vessels. So the total adds up to 22. 
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also reviewed anatomy and neurology when necessary. Trabelsi had studied anatomy between 
1964 and 1966 with European sisters in Médéa as part of her official nurse training. Before she 
started the course of acu-moxa, she had worked at the rank of “senior technician” in the 
polyvalent intensive care unit for three years in the hospital of Médéa. She did not find much 
difficulty in either refreshing her knowledge of biomedicine or learning an alternative method. 
From time to time, the trainees were given written and oral exams to test their mastery of “the 
acupoints and the meridians of each organ,” and operation exams on real patients.     
This education module of in-classroom instruction and practice on patients lasted for six 
months. Afterwards, the trainees returned to hospitals in Guelma, Douéra, Mascara, Batna, and 
Tiaret, where they previously worked. All of these hospitals, except for Tiaret, had Chinese 
missions deployed there.36 At these hospitals, the trainees took an internship, presumably with 
Chinese acupuncturists, for another six months before they were granted the certificate to 
perform acu-moxa.37 Trabelsi and two other local male nurses continued their internship with 
the instructors in Médéa. At the end of the year of training, everyone in the class received the 
diploma. Trabelsi proudly graduated with honors. 
 
36 Personal interview with Madaoui Ahmad, the Director of E.P.H. de Médéa, Algeria, July 24, 2016. Mme 
Trabelsi was present in the interview. There was never a Chinese mission stationed in Tiaret, so it might be a 
slip of Trabelsi’s memory. 
37 The People’s Daily, March 22, 1976, p.5. The two courses trained a total of about 20 nurses. The sixth 
medical team’s work report mentioned that they trained 19 students (9 men and 10 women). The first class (9 
students) graduated in March 1976 and went back to their hospitals to practice acupuncture. The second class 
ended in March 1977. See Hubei Provincial Archives (HPA), SZ115-5-87-4, November 1976. But other 
sources indicated different numbers. People’s Daily recorded 12 students in the first class (see April 3, 1975) 
and 10 students in the second class (see May 10, 1976). A medical mission doctor, Fan Dalin ûb¬ 
recorded a total of 25 Algerian trainees during the two classes. See Fan Dalin, “Zhongguo zhenjiu xiangyu 
A’erjiliya” !%# [Chinese acu-moxa won reputation in Algeria], Hubei wenshi 
 [Hubei Literature and History] 2 (2012): 101.     
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Besides what individuals learned during the course, what kind of knowledge and 
technical skills did the Algerian nurses possibly acquire about acu-moxa? After all, these 
Algerian nurses lacked any prior knowledge about Chinese medicine and the Chinese natural 
philosophy in which the medical practice is grounded. Their first encounter with acu-moxa was 
when they watched Chinese doctors practicing on patients. While they might have been surprised 
by the needling method, they most likely recognized the practice of cupping, because the 
Chinese cupping therapy looks similar to the folk medical practice of dry hijama. Hijama, which 
normally refers to wet cupping (wet means bleeding) in Algeria, is generally performed by 
Muslims as it is a form of medicine specifically mentioned and encouraged by the prophet 
Muhammad. Patients visiting Chinese acupuncture clinics today almost always associate acu-
moxa with hijama. Trabelsi, after learning and practicing acu-moxa for four decades, came to 
embrace Chinese cupping, which she identifies as “the same as dry hijama.”  
That said, it was probably more difficult for Algerian nurse trainees who were trained in 
biomedicine to accept the theories of Chinese medicine than patients. The modern healthcare 
system of Algeria was built upon French ideals of health care, and regardless of their proficiency 
in biomedical knowledge, all Algerian medical personnel were educated in a French-inflected 
system of medicine. The trainees were all certified nurses “in their 20s, with some clinical 
experience,”38 trained in the basics of Western medicine and were well accustomed not to just 
biomedical ideas of treatment but also biomedical claims of superiority over alternative forms of 
medicine. In China as well, where people had a sense of Chinese medicine as part of their 
cultural heritage, many Chinese biomedical doctors found it difficult to accept a different 
 
38 Fan Dalin, “Zhongguo zhenjiu xiangyu A’erjiliya,” 100-101. 
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medical theory when they were forced to study Chinese medicine in the mid-1950s.39 Given 
their prior training in biomedicine, how did Algerian nurses negotiate, respond to, and become 
loyal to Chinese medicine and its techniques? How did they interpret acu-moxa knowledge 
mediated by layers of linguistic and cultural translations? What were the new meanings that they 
attached to acu-moxa and what practices might they have revised to adapt acu-moxa to their 
local context?  
 
Transferring “Barefoot” Acu-moxa 
Much as the massive production of “barefoot” doctors in China that occurred through 
condensed training from the mid-1960s to 1984, the crash course in acu-moxa only served as an 
introduction to this medical practice. This was due to several factors, including but not limited to 
the impact of previous knowledge systems on acquiring new knowledge, obstacles in effective 
linguistic and cultural communication, and time constraints on honing new skills. This limited 
introduction leads us to question how tacit knowledge such as the praxis of acu-moxa, which had 
been bounded in the Chinese cultural space, travels across cultures. It raises a significant 
question of whether medical knowledge should and could be faithfully transferred while 
retaining its intrinsic nature, or whether it had to be abridged or reformulated for the wider good 
at the expense of its purported “true essence.”40  
 
39 See for example, Yang Shuqian «­E and Zhu Chenyu Öč, “Xiyi xuexi zhongyi yajiuban de jidian 
jiaoxue tihui” ĀCjCÔÜÆÐ6Àj)& [Some lessons from the taking the course of Western 
medicine doctors studying Chinese medicine], Zhongyi zazhi C¦ [Journal of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine] 7 (1957): 379-380. 
40 I write this in full awareness of the difficulties of defining what is the “true essence” or “tradition” of 
Chinese medicine. Vivienne Lo writes that Chinese medicine “claims to be a ‘living’ tradition,” in “But is it 
[History of] Medicine? Twenty Years in the History of the Healing Arts of China,” Social History of Medicine 
22, no.2 (2009): 285. Historians of Chinese medicine have effectively argued that “traditional” Chinese 
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Due to a shortage of manpower, educators trained health workers only to an “adequate” 
level to meet basic needs. The content and method of acu-moxa instruction in Algeria turned out 
to replicate the practice of training “barefoot” rural health workers in China. The Chinese 
instructors, a principle actor in the process of knowledge transmission, prioritized the pragmatic 
goal of widely applying acu-moxa over concerns about relaying acu-moxa in its “original” form. 
They were mostly concerned with training an Algerian staff that could at minimum offer 
independent treatments for a definite set of common diseases. The Algerian nurse trainees, on the 
other hand, came to appreciate the “easiness” of acquiring a medical skill that could be 
mechanically practiced and flexibly applied to a wide range of symptoms. When the Chinese 
doctors performed acu-moxa themselves, they sought to present it to the Algerian public as an 
alternative medicine that provided miraculous cures (Chapter 3). When it came to instructing 
Algerian trainees, they chose to teach a “barefoot” version of acu-moxa that offered a minimal, 
but adequate level of cure.     
 
Learning the “Short and Sweet”  
The news report in People’s Daily, “Algerian Medical Assistants Complete Acu-moxa 
(zhenjiu) Training Course,” mentions a specific component of the training: “In order to 
familiarize the students with acupoints, the Algerian instructor(s) specially taught them the basic 
knowledge of human anatomy.” The report did not mention, however, the theory of meridian 
channels (jingluo) which is key to Chinese medicine in general and acu-moxa in particular. Both 
Trabelsi and Memmi had studied anatomy before they started working with Chinese doctors. 
 
medicine only appeared when it encountered biomedicine in the late nineteenth century, and became 
institutionalized as TCM in the late 1950s. See Kim Taylor (2005) and Volker Scheid (2002). 
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Other trainees who were also state-certified nurses most likely also had basic training in anatomy 
as well. In this case, refreshing one’s knowledge of gross anatomy served as a path into a 
Chinese medicine course. The news report underscored an association between anatomy and acu-
moxa that framed the latter in scientific terms. Using biophysical knowledge was supposedly a 
good teaching strategy, introducing new information that could be connected to the students’ 
prior knowledge. Yet with no conclusive evidence of the biophysical existence of meridians and 
acupoints, how could one rightly graft the new information grounded in the cosmology of the 
Chinese medical body onto the existing biomedical system grounded in cadaver dissection? 
While understanding the muscle and bone distribution of the human body can help to increase 
the accuracy of acupoints, western anatomy and meridian channels are two completely different 
systems. Anatomy maps are not always in line with meridian maps; even different versions of 
meridian maps are not always consistent.41 On a different yet equally important note, the 
adoption of this teaching method also implies that some Chinese acu-moxa doctors, if not all, 
were familiar with western anatomy. This is manifest in their ability to use anatomical terms to 
guide students to the locations of acupoints. As it turned out, this mixed style of learning was not 
only an adjustment to the learning habits of Algerian trainees, but had already been ventured 
during the state-sponsored movement of “integrating Chinese with Western medicine” and the 
institutionalization of Chinese medicine education in China since 1956.42  
Chinese medicine witnessed unprecedented challenges from Western biomedicine 
starting in the late nineteenth century. It was nearly outlawed in 1929, but survived the 
 
41 See Lan Li’s unpublished paper circulated in the Modern Chine Seminar held at Columbia, 2016. 
42 Here I use the year of the decision to establish four Academies of Traditional Chinese Medicine across 
China for periodization. The organization went through some difficulties and these academies only became 
fully functional until 1958. See Kim Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China, 103-108. 
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repression of the Nationalist state after persistent protests and opposition from the Chinese 
medical community. Its survival, however, did not change elite perceptions of Chinese medicine 
as unscientific and backward. Rather, suspicion and denial of Chinese medicine (including acu-
moxa) continued after the Communists took power. After being forced to withdraw from urban 
centers in 1927, Communists used Chinese medicine due to a shortage in supply of biomedicine. 
Even so, the cadres and policy-makers in the CCP’s health sector retained a negative view of 
Chinese medicine into the 1950s. At the First National Health Convention in August 1950, 
amidst a climate of reform for Chinese medicine, He Cheng ďĉ, the then deputy minister of 
health and a trained physician in Western medicine, proposed using the scientific theories and 
methods of Western biomedicine to study Chinese medicine.43 Although He was dismissed from 
his position in 1955 due to the charge that he was guilty of a “policy error” by de facto restricting 
Chinese medicine and trying to substitute it with Western medicine,44 his proposal ushered in an 
era of continuous passion for reforming Chinese medicine along biomedical lines.  
The evolution of acu-moxa since the 1950s is a typical example of the process of 
“scientizing” Chinese medicine. The process consisted of two components: making Chinese 
medical knowledge compatible with biomedicine in certain ways; and educating medical 
practitioners in both Western and Chinese medicine so that they were able to integrate both into 
their practice. While the latter was a policy forcefully imposed by the PRC government on the 
medical society, the former came first as a spontaneous response to the modernizing impulses 
that swept across China at the turn of the twentieth century. Taking Western biomedicine as the 
 
43 People’s Daily, October 23, 1950, 3. 
44 Zhu Chao ¤¼ and Zhang Weifeng , Xin Zhongguo yi xue jiao yu shi XCjòL [A 
history of medical education in New China] (Beijing: Beijing yike daxue, Zhongguo xiehe yike daxue, 1990): 
103-108. “Policy error” was a very serious political charge in the early PRC period. 
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standard medical practice, Chinese medical professionals and urban intellectuals sought to rid 
Chinese medicine of its superstitious and backward elements.45 Due to Mao’s strong and 
persistent interest in acu-moxa, the therapy became part of Chinese medicine that received 
unparalleled attention in the scientification movement after the founding of the PRC.  
Zhu Lian’s ¤Ç (1909-1978) 1951 book, The New Acu-moxa, was widely recognized as 
a pioneering attempt to scientize acu-moxa following Mao’s criteria of creating a “new, 
scientific, and unified” democratic culture of the new republic.46 Trained as a gynecologist, Zhu 
studied acu-moxa at the hand of a famous Chinese medicine physician, before setting out to 
simplify acu-moxa and make it more accessible by the masses. She avoided canonical medical 
theories and literature, instead expounding acu-moxa in the language of anatomy and physiology 
in a colloquial style. Kim Taylor points out that Zhu “dismissed the age-old concepts of qi, yin 
and yang and the five phases as out of date,” and “considered the arrangement of acupuncture 
points along the channels to be ‘contrived’.” Or more simply, as a famed Chinese medicine 
practitioner-scholar recalls, Zhu “never believed in the existence of meridian channels.”47 
Rather, she used Soviet innovations in the medical theory of neuro-pathology and the method of 
tissue therapy to explain the workings of acu-moxa.48 Although she adopted the names and 
locations of acupoints passed down among classically trained physicians, she used the new 
 
45 For example, see Bridie Andrews, The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960; Sean Lei, Neither 
Donkey Nor Horse. 
46 See Mao’s “On New Democracy,” January 19, 1940. 
47 Zhang Shujian ­>, “Jinxiandai zhenjiu kexuehua shijian yu zhuanxiang—yi Zhu Lian wei zhongxin” 
ĕÅ$ģ¿ØjAnĒēN——%¤Ç [Practice and reorientation of acu-moxa scientization in 
modern times: taking Zhu Lian as the center], Zhongguo zhenjiu Xģ¿ [Chinese Acupuncture & 
Moxibustion] 34, no. 10 (2014): 1011. 
48 Kim Taylor, 24-29. 
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nomenclature of “stimulation points” (ciji dian) to replace “acupoints” (xue wei). Just as 
importantly and idiosyncratically, she used a different method of charting the human body to 
mark those points.49  
Zhu’s innovations have had a far-reaching influence in the field of acu-moxa. In 1955, 
she was appointed the head of the Acu-moxa Research Center at the Beijing Research Academy 
of TCM due to her leading research role in the field and political connection in the Party. Since 
its publication in 1951, her book, The New Acu-moxa, had been a recommended textbook by the 
government. Her “scientific” interpretation of acu-moxa provided the basis for subsequent books 
published on the topic into the mid-1950s, all of which sought to simplify acu-moxa and make it 
easier to learn.50 The book was so popular on the public market that an admirer plagiarized its 
content to piggyback on its popularity. Plagiarism was so rife that it was reported to the press and 
publication bureau of Beijing Municipal Government in 1952.51 In 1957, a newer textbook 
edited by Jiangsu Provincial School of Chinese Medicine (´ùÒCj®) re-emphasized the 
classical meridian theory, marking a turn toward seeing Chinese medicine as distinct.52 Yet, 
Zhu’s ideas about the use of anatomical references to locate acupoints and the employment of 
physiological concepts more broadly to explain the mechanisms of Chinese medicine, continues 
to shape the scientific study of TCM today. With the establishment of colleges of Chinese 
 
49 See Kim Taylor, 21-24, for an explanation of the method. 
50 Kim Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China, 57. 
51 Beijing Municipal Archives, 008-2-290, April 1952. 
52 Zhang Shujian ­>, “Jinxiandai zhenjiu kexuehua shijian yu zhuanxiang,” 1014. Volker Scheid 
discusses how syndrome differentiation (bianzheng lunqzhi) became the pivot of contemporary Chinese 
medicine, which demarcates Chinese medicine from Western medicine. This demarcation was developed since 
the 1950s. See Chinese Medicine in Contemporary China: Plurality and Synthesis (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002), Ch.7. 
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medicine in the late 1950s, and the wide use of acu-moxa textbooks in these schools, teaching 
curricula and clinical praxis increasingly built on biomedical knowledge.53  
The acu-moxa knowledge brought to Algeria on the Chinese medical mission was thus a 
product of this scientification process, though it remained in flux. Most of the Chinese medicine 
physicians on the mission were students of the newly reformulated school of “scientific” acu-
moxa. Many were trained in Western medicine first before they switched to Chinese medicine, 
like Zhu herself. Some of them were even her immediate disciples. For example, Tian Conghuo 
É#Ď (b.1930) on the second team in Saïda (Dec.1965-Sept.1968) was Zhu’s student in the 
Acu-moxa Research Center between 1952 and 1953, after graduating from China Medical 
University (a biomedical school). He is still active as one of the top acu-moxa physicians in 
China. 
The new “scientific” school of acu-moxa was by no means a coherent one. It drew its 
constituencies from different educational backgrounds, which led to different ideas about theory 
and practice. An examination of the backgrounds of the Chinese instructors of the training course 
suggests an intellectual affiliation with the new school of acu-moxa. But it also shows the 
theoretical and practical diversity within the group of acu-moxa practitioners despite nation-wide 
efforts to standardize Chinese medicine. Coincidently, each of the three instructors represented a 
different medical training track, and thus had diverse medical knowledge and different 
propensities for instruction and practice. In descending order with respect to age, they were: 
Wang Mingzhang ÄÞ (b.1923), a famed acu-moxa expert in Wuhan and the lead instructor 
on the Médéa team (mentioned earlier); Wei Fengpo ĵ7[ (b.1928), a physician of combined 
 
53 Elisabeth Hsu, “Innovations in Acumoxa: Acupuncture Analgesia, Scalp and Ear Acupuncture in the 
People’s Republic of China,” Social Science & Medicine 42, no.3 (1996): 422. 
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Chinese and Western medicine who was transferred from Douéra, the then headquarter of the 
Chinese medical mission; and Chen Hongtao ĩ¸º (b. ca. 1928), a Chinese medicine 
physician of obscure training who was transferred from the Guelma team.54  
Wang Mingzhang was a classically trained acu-moxa practitioner from a hereditary 
Chinese physician family. He started learning about medicine with his father by studying the 
classical texts, such as The Inner Canon (c.1st century BCE), Treaties on Cold Damage Disorders 
(the early 3rd century), as well as the acu-moxa classics of the A-B Canon of Acupuncture and 
Moxibustion (the 3rd century) and the Great Compendium of Acupuncture and Moxibustion 
(1601). He only started his biomedical education when he took the “further education course for 
Chinese medicine practitioners” around 1951, a nation-wide popular class that was part of He 
Cheng’s agenda for reforming Chinese medicine practitioners by teaching them biomedicine. 
Before going on the mission, Wang was the director of the research and education of acu-moxa 
and cold damage disorders in the Wuhan Academy of TCM.55 Wang’s understanding of acu-
moxa was no doubt based on a belief in the system of meridian channels. But he was also likely 
to be familiar with Zhu’s scientific theory of acu-moxa in his capacity as a professor at the TCM 
academy. 
Wei Fengpo, in contrast, was a typical product of the reversed program “doctors of 
Western medicine studying Chinese medicine,” which began in the end of 1953.56 In this 
 
54 My interview with Dr. Wei Fengpo at his home in Guangzhou, June 19, 2017. Fan Dalin, “Zhongguo 
zhenjiu xiangyu A’erjiliya,” 100-101. 
55 See the entry of ÄÞ in Sogou Baike, 
https://baike.sogou.com/v155040929.htm?fromTitle=%E7%8E%8B%E6%98%8E%E7%AB%A0&ch=ch.bk.a
mb. 
56 Kim Taylor, 65. 
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program, which for the first time placed Chinese medicine in a position of comparative 
superiority, biomedical doctors were encouraged, and often compelled, to study Chinese 
medicine so that they would have a solid foundation for the integration of the two medicines. A 
graduate from China Medical University (class of 1952) and a neurologist in the First Hospital 
Affiliated with Wuhan Medical College (formerly Tongji Medical School before being relocated 
from Shanghai), Wei attended a class of “doctors of Western medicine study Chinese medicine” 
in Hubei College of TCM between 1962 and 1965. He did not volunteer to study Chinese 
medicine, but his superiors ordered him to alter his career path. After the training, he was 
designated to set up the acu-moxa department in Hubei College of TCM.57 His own experience 
transitioning from one medical system to another enabled him to empathize with his Algerian 
students and grasp the translational tension between the two different medical systems. 
The third instructor, Chen Hongtao, who was of the same generation as Wei, was not a 
systematically trained practitioner, but most likely was one of many self-made doctors who were 
prevalent in China before the mid-1980s to compensate for the shortage of elite doctors. Chen 
reportedly started learning acu-moxa with his father at the age of sixteen.58 It is unclear how he 
was selected to join the mission, but his tenure in Algeria (May 1973-Aug.1975) overlapped with 
the last years of the Cultural Revolution when many elite medical professionals remained under 
 
57 See the entry of “ĵ7·[sic],” in Zhenjiu xuebao ģ¿j[Journal of Acupuncture and Moxibustion] 1 
(1986): 48. My Interview with Dr. Wei Fengpo at his home in Guangzhou, June 19, 2017. 
58 Lv Zizhao OöĤ, “Qimiao de zangqi yundong yishu—ji Chen Hongtao daifu de ‘jijin yundong liaofa’” 
fhÐôUĔ@C£——Ćĩ¸ºbcÐ‘ñàĔ@Í¶’ [A marvelous therapy for organ exercises: a 




purge status.59 He was only involved in teaching for four months before he left Algeria.60 
Unlike Wang and Wei who later rose to prestigious status in circles of Chinese medicine, Chen 
remained obscure. He was associated with a certain “muscle exercise therapy (jijin yundong 
liaofa),” which he claimed to have developed on his own in Algeria, and later used to produce 
some miraculous cures both in Algeria and in China. In the early 1980s, he worked in the 
Chinese medicine department of a small hospital in Wuhan while still obsessed with his 
invention,61 one that easily reminds us of pseudo-medical therapies popular in the Cultural 
Revolution and the medical “Great Leap Forward.”62 
The teaching crew thus consisted of a veteran doctor of classic acu-moxa and Chinese 
medicine, a physician of combined medicine who was ordered to change his path in the middle 
of his career, and a reckless practitioner with informal training. Given their diverse approaches to 
acu-moxa, how did they form teaching curricula for Algerian students? What elements of acu-
moxa did they agree upon to be the most essential and irreducible in teaching a basic course to 
foreigners who had no previous knowledge of Chinese medicine? In their work report to the 
Hubei Provincial Department of Health, the team complained about “having neither experience 
 
59 See Chapter 1 for more details on the politics in the selection of mission members. 
60 People’s Daily, 1975-8-27. 
61 Li Shunlai , “Bozhong xingfu de renmen—ji zhongguo yiliaodui zai A’erjiliya” 	
——"” [People who sow the seeds of happiness: a documentation of Chinese 
medical teams in Algeria], Guoji jingji hezuo 
 [Journal of International Economic Cooperation] 
no. 3 (1986): 15. Lv Zizhao $&, “Qimiao de zangqi yundong yishu,” 33-34. 
62 Not much work has been done on this subject. An article posted online about the “chicken blood therapy” 
craze from 1959 to 1965 offers a good introduction to the health care fads at the time. See Joel Martinsen, 




nor textbooks or teaching aids.” The three had to compile teaching material on site and make 
auxiliary aids by themselves.63 But the lack of ready-to-use textbooks or teaching guidelines in 
fact afforded them great flexibility in what they taught and how they did so.  
If the students had sat in a formal, full-time program (two and a half years) of “doctors of 
Western medicine studying Chinese medicine” that was typical in China, they would have been 
educated based on the four main medical classics--the Great Compendium of Materia Medica 
(Bencao gangmu) (1596), the Yellow Emperor’s Inner Canon (Huangdi neijing), Cold Damage 
Disorders (Shanghan lun), and the Essentials of the Golden Cabinet (Jingui yaolue) (c.200)--to 
gain a basic understanding of Chinese medicine. A 1955 class syllabus shows that Chinese 
students were made to study diagnosis and methods of pulse-taking for a whole month before 
starting to learn acu-moxa. In this class, even the carefully selected young medical graduates 
across China found it hard to decipher the ancient medical texts written in classical Chinese.64  
Obviously, the lack of adequate teaching materials, language barriers, a limited time 
frame, and students’ prior knowledge structures all posed serious challenges that made this kind 
of formal learning impossible in Algeria. Well-versed in the classical theories, Wang was made 
responsible for compiling the lectures on fundamental theories of meridian channels, qi and 
blood, zang-fu organs, and acupoints. Before every class, the translator rendered these texts into 
French.65 Wang’s training determined his personal preference for situating acu-moxa in a 
Chinese cosmology of medicine and the body. Yet few of these concepts left an imprint on the 
minds of the Algerian students. If they had paid attention to the zang-fu theory (the Organs and 
 
63 HPA, SZ115-5-87-4, November 1976. 
64 Kim Taylor, 91-95. 
65 Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 183. 
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Bowels), they should have learned about qi, the Five Phases, and their interrelations, yin-yang.66 
Such knowledge is, however, missing from Trabelsi’s understanding of Chinese medicine. She 
seems lost when asked about the Five Elements, though she recalls learning theories for two 
months. Instead she believes that Chinese medicine was “easy” to learn, “because [we know] the 
diseases and their causes, and after that, it was just about meridian paths and points.” She does 
not even relate to qi, the energy flow that is generated by zang-fu and circulates in the meridians, 
whose proper function is the target of acu-moxa treatment.  
Trabelsi’s comment hints at a reductive, yet very practical learning curricula, which 
focused mainly on applied knowledge related to actual practice. The training thus bore a 
resemblance to the domestic training model of rural health workers who were only briefly 
introduced to acu-moxa. Chinese paramedics emerging from the late 1960s were middle school 
graduates, who took a 3 to 6 month course in minimal medical training to become peasant-cum-
medics, or “barefoot doctors.” A former urban youth sent down to the rural areas in Anhui recalls 
that acupuncture was the only technique that was taught—by biomedical doctors—out of the 
whole body of Chinese medicine. This was because herbal formulas were difficult to master 
within a short period of time, and Chinese medicinal formulas had a dozen ingredients and were 
often more expensive than commonly used Western medicines like aspirin.67 To ensure Algerian 
nurses were capable of practicing acu-moxa on their own in six months required a simplified 
way of approaching the technique. After all, knowing nothing about the esoteric concepts of yin, 
 
66 Elisabeth Hsu observes that in a Chinese medicine college’s course on acumoxa, the meridian system was 
introduced with emphasis on zang-fu. See The Transmission of Chinese Medicine (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 200-201. 
67 Luo Jiren íī", “’Chijiao yisheng’ bingfei doushi ‘zhongyi’” “đõCÈ”|Įě “C” [Not all 




yang, or qi did not prevent students from practicing if they were instructed where to apply the 
needles or cups.  
Several methods of locating acupoints coexisted at the time. By the start of the training 
course, Zhu’s New Acu-moxa was no longer the standard textbook. A turn toward retaining the 
classical meridian theories consummated in the late Ming and Qing period (17th-early 19th 
centuries) was cemented by a 1961 acu-moxa textbook compiled by the Nanjing College of 
TCM, which is still considered a classic in modern times.68 Presumably based on this latter 
textbook, the same college (renamed as Jiangsu New Medicine College in 1970 after it integrated 
with the Nanjing Medical College) compiled an acu-moxa manual in 1972 specifically for the 
Chinese medical mission to teach local nurses in Tanzania.69 Like the textbook, the Tanzania 
Manual starts by introducing meridian channels and the relationship between the channels and 
acupoints, which do not exist in Zhu’s version. It also differs from Zhu’s in terms of how to 
locate acupoints. In this manual, the anatomical landmark method that Zhu advocates is rendered 
secondary to two other more traditional ones: the proportional measurement method (ĳ8q
¶) and finger measurement method (ğKÛ¶), which are always combined in use. 
Anatomical terms sometimes appear in the descriptions of acupoint location, but they go more 
often to the part of annotation “as a preliminary exploration for clinical treatment as well as for 
 
68 A previous version of this textbook is the 1957 one mentioned above edited by the same college, which was 
renamed to the Nanjing College of TCM. Zhang Shujian ­>, “Jinxiandai zhenjiu kexuehua shijian yu 
zhuanxiang,” 1014. 
69 Jiangsu xinyi xueyuan yuanwai jiaocai bianxiezu ´ùCjĪ`¨ì3ç [the editing group of 
foreign aid textbooks of Jiangsu College of New Medicine] ed., Yuan sang jixiao yihu zhuanye yishiban 
jiaocai: Zhen jiu xue (taolun gao) ¯®CC_Æ¨: ģ¿j (ĄćÚ) [Textbook for medical 
assistants in the department of nursing at the technical school of Tanzania: Acupuncture-Moxibustion (under 
discussion)] (Nanjing, December 1972). 
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research and education.”70 Although the manual was intended for foreign learners, its editors 
decided not to guide the reader through anatomy in the belief that it was only complementary to 
the original Chinese methods.  
It is unclear how much emphasis the Chinese instructors in Algeria put on anatomy to 
help with locating acupoints. Like other Chinese doctors, they found explaining the physically 
nonexistent meridians difficult.71 They found themselves compelled to reduce the “boring and 
confusing” components of Chinese medical philosophy and “adjust the teaching method.”72 
Wei, the former biomedical doctor, used technical terms in biomedicine to offer explanations.73 
It seems to have worked well: Trabelsi affirmed several times that “it was not difficult for [them 
to understand what the doctor said] because [they] already did anatomy and neurology.” Her 
assertion echoes the news report, but makes one wonder whether she and her fellow students had 
felt how the physiology of Chinese medicine did not map onto the science of the body taught to 
them in their previous training. In any case, they used small plastic human models, perhaps with 
western anatomy maps and acupoint maps,74 to learn to locate acupoints. They were asked to 
memorize the fourteen meridians, with important acupoints on each of the channels, all in their 
 
70 Yuan sang jixiao yihu zhuanye yishiban jiaocai: Zhen jiu xue (taolun gao), 11. 
71 For example, a doctor on a contemporary mission in Tanzania found it hard to explain to his British interns 
about the concepts of meridian, qi, and blood. He comments that it is hard to understand for someone without 
sufficient knowledge of Chinese culture. See Ouyang Basi °ĥ,V, Sangjibaer: Shitoucheng li de Suzhou 
yisheng ¯êzuÓe]ĝÐùyCÈ [Zanzibar: doctors from Suzhou in the City of Stones] (Nanjing: 
Jiangsu kexue jishu chubanshe, 2013), 110. 
72 Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 184. 
73 See Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 184. The anthropologist Mei Zhan also records using biomedical terms in the 
teaching of acu-moxa to foreigners in Shanghai hospitals in the late 1990s. See her Other Worldly, Ch.4. 
74 A packing list for the cargo from Shanghai to Saïda dated December 30, 1964 shows that 5 sets of acu-
moxa maps were included. SMA, B123-6-708-114. 
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Chinese names.75 For a Chinese speaker, those names themselves oftentimes have a cultural 
imaginary that reveals locations and associated functions. If taught in China, rhymed verses 
containing the names of meridians and acupoints would facilitate rote memorization. But the 
songs might not have been of much use to non-Chinese speakers. Trabelsi feels that language 
was the most difficult part of the course.  
Belief in the difficulties in teaching acu-moxa was shared by the editors of the Tanzania 
Manual. A brief comparison between the Manual and Illustrated Clinical Acupoint Selection 
(zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie), the most popular contemporaneous acu-moxa reader in China,76 
reveals differing editorial emphases that were tailored to different audiences, and suggests what 
content might be considered suitable for foreign nurses. The Manual, as mentioned above, was 
compiled in 1972 by a medical college for mission doctors to use in Tanzania to teach local 
nurses. The Illustrated Selection was first published in 1966, and sold 2,459,000 copies across 
China until the 1970s. It targeted “rural grassroots health workers,”77 or “barefoot doctors,” 
though it actually had a wider readership. Two major differences between the books stand out: 
one in their theoretical layout and the other in their practical use. First, although the Manual does 
not delve deep into theories, it still attempts to cover a little bit of everything to present a 
systematic knowledge of acu-moxa. Whereas the Manual includes theoretical introduction to 
meridians, acupoints, and their interrelations, the Illustrated Selection assumes a prior knowledge 
 
75 The early 1970s witnessed the rise of interests in translating texts of Chinese medicine into English. But the 
first standardized acupoint names in English was not published until 1981 by the WHO. See Standard 
Acupuncture Nomenclature (Manila: WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, 1981). 
76 Beijing zhongyi xueyuan B!CjĪ [Beijing TCM College], ed., Zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie ģ¿
}KÛYĂ [Illustrated Clinical Acupoint Selection], 2nd edition (Beijing: Renmin weicheng chubanshe, 
1970). This book was edited by Yang Jiasan «Ê	 (1919-2001), a well-known acupuncturist, though his 
name was named printed in the book.   
77 Zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie, 2. 
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of what acu-moxa is and opens straight away with the methods of locating acupoints. Both 
emphasize the traditional methods mentioned above: whereas the Manual annotates acupoint 
locations with anatomical references, the Illustrated Selection, in its preface, dictates plainly that 
it does not include any anatomical knowledge or the distribution of nerves or blood vessels 
except in rare cases. In the Manual’s section on clinical solutions, it narrates in detail symptoms, 
syndrome differentiation (bianzheng), and acupoint selection according to various bianzheng 
results. In contrast, the Illustrated Selection simply lists the relevant acupoints for one symptom 
or disease, with marks to indicate whether an acupoint can be needled or heated with mugwort. 
In other words, in an idealized foreign learning setting, the Manual editors hoped to convey, 
though briefly, the fundamental ideas of the Chinese medical body and present the logical 
connection between bianzheng diagnosis and treatment decision. The Illustrated Selection, in 
contrast, is intended for mechanical instruction for diverse audiences who would practice without 
the supervision of doctors.  
Differences between the two books can be found in comparing their practical 
instructions. Both books present a selection of acupoints considered important for clinical use out 
of the total 361 points plus extra-meridional points, but the Manual selection is smaller (145 
points on the fourteen regular meridians plus 18 extra-channel points) compared to the 
Illustrated Selection’s (172 regular points and 26 extra-channel ones). It is likely that Chinese 
barefoot doctors or avid laymen would refer to the 113-page Illustrated Selection when they 
needed it, and would also peruse the selection of other acupoints. But a foreigner who did not 
read Chinese had to learn to prioritize the most useful acupoints.  
The mission in Algeria did not have the Manual. During the training course, the Chinese 
instructors might have created a textbook somewhere between the Manual and the Illustrated 
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Selection. While they might have started with an ambitious plan to relay systematic knowledge 
of Chinese medicine and acu-moxa to their students, they eventually surrendered to the many 
obstacles inherent in that project and decided to reduce the course content to a “short and sweet” 
summary. They certainly did not ask the Algerians to memorize any text except for the names of 
acupoints. They held onto one belief shared with the editors of the Manual and the Illustrated 
Selection. Neither contains a single excerpt from a classical medical text intended for the target 
learners to memorize. These texts were reserved for medical students trained in academies, who 
were to learn the “high” knowledge of Chinese medicine and acu-moxa.  
 
“Combining Theory with Practice,” or Divorcing Theory from Practice 
The difficulties in expounding the theories of the Chinese medical body pushed the 
Chinese instructors to adopt not only the principle of giving “short and sweet” explanations, but 
also the method of “combining theory with practice.”78 On-site learning and internships took up 
most of the training schedule. Whereas all the trainees had, more or less, learned some skills of 
acu-moxa by the end of the course, the more zealous among them, like Trabelsi, went on to 
become devoted independent practitioners. At first glance, the trainees’ successful completion 
appears to indicate the success of the Chinese instructors to integrate theory with practice. Closer 
examination, however, reveals a practice-oriented approach that in effect stripped down original 
theories of acu-moxa as much as possible and transformed acu-moxa to a technique. This was 
hardly uncommon during the Cultural Revolution, when various attempts were made to render 
Chinese medicine more socialist and revolutionary—that is, to rid it of superstitious and “feudal” 
 
78 HPA, SZ115-5-87-4, November 1976. 
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elements and make it more accessible to the masses.79 During the process of praxis, the trainees 
found leeway to develop their own ways of interpretation, understanding, and application of acu-
moxa that were not always in line with the interpretation that the instructors offered to them.80  
“Combing theory with practice” aligned with a major idea of Maoist dialectical 
materialism, which emphasized the mutual conditioning of practice and knowledge.81 Prior 
domestic experience of Chinese medicine physicians in teaching Chinese medicine to biomedical 
doctors had also informed the necessity of this method. A ministry of health report to Mao and 
the Central Committee in November 1958, which was later circulated to local provincial offices, 
summarized the experience and recommended that teachers “tightly link clinical internship with 
theoretical studies.”82 Moreover, apprenticeship had been (and still is) central to the learning of 
traditional Chinese medicine, which considers theory and practice indispensable to each other. 
The modern textbooks’ divide between theory and clinical practice in the curricula of TCM (first 
established in 1956) stemmed from the scientization movement’s imposition of Western 
categories of learning on Chinese. In reality, as Judith Farquhar found out in 1982 during her 
 
79 T.J. Hinrichs, “New Geographies of Chinese Medicine,” Osiris 13 (1998): 302. 
80 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1979), 275. On “praxis,” the continual 
interplay between thought and action. 
81 Mao Zedong, “On Practice” nĒć (July 1937). Paul Unschuld mentions the importance of experience, 
“practice”—a Marxist-Maoist value as the source of knowledge—to “New Medicine.” See Paul Unschuld, 
Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 257-258. 
82 “Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan weishengbu dangzu ‘guanyu zuzhi xiyi lizhi xuexi zhongyi ban de zongjie 
baogao’” .dēFÈĚ+ç/çèĀC×ðjCÆÐéP[The Central 
Committee of the CCP forwarded the Ministry of Health’s “report on organizing Western medicine doctors to 
take leaves to study Chinese medicine”] (November 18, 1958), in Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian di 
11 ce X%ªĞāÂėìßD2 [Selected Important Documents from after the Founding of the 
Nation, Vol.11] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), 566-572.  
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study of Chinese medicine at the Guangzhou College of TCM, the real arena of learning was still 
in the clinics.83  
Teachers, students, and patients’ bodies were the sites of clinical practice. The news 
report of 1976, “Algerian Medical Assistants Complete Acu-moxa (zhenjiu) Training Course,” 
depicted a scene of “learning while practicing” (bian xue bian gan): “The Chinese doctors who 
taught acu-moxa classes, in order to let the students gain knowledge in a real sense, asked them 
to practice needling on the doctors themselves.” While the news was intended to exhibit the 
Chinese instructors’ spirit of self-sacrifice and altruism, it also speaks to a learning method 
indispensable to acu-moxa: experimentation on living bodies. Wang was reported to draw an X 
into his skin with his fingertips to lead students to the right location of an acupoint, who he then 
allowed to practice by puncturing it with a needle.84 The students were also made to find 
accurate locations and needle on themselves and each other. It was at such moments of direct 
engagement with their own bodies that the trainees probably learnt to use the different kinds of 
“same-body inch (cun q)” method—a method using a person’s inborn measurement system—
to measure the relative distance of an acupoint to a body landmark.85  
The method of “learning while practicing” in the early stages of acu-moxa training was 
hardly a new practice in Chinese missions abroad. The Togolese doctors mentioned earlier had 
not finished their acu-moxa training before they performed surgery with acupuncture under the 
instruction of their Chinese teachers. Trabelsi avowed that she practiced directly on patients, 
 
83 Judith Farquhar, Knowing Practice: The Clinical Encounter of Chinese Medicine (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994), 38 (n.29). 
84 Mingyi fengliu zai beifei, 185. 




which caught me by surprise. To be sure, practicing the skill of needling on living bodies is a 
convention in Chinese medical learning. For acupuncture to attain salubrious effects, the practice 
must cause needling sensation, de-qi (literally, receiving air). De-qi is a feeling that cannot be 
observed visually. Whether air arrives, how much of air arrives, and how fast the process occurs 
is all dependent on the technique of the acupuncturist, and can only be felt by the acupuncturists 
and the patient. When air arrives, the practitioner should feel “a fish taking the bait,” a feeling of 
tightness as if being sucked by something. Also, the patient should have feelings of “soreness, 
numbness, and heaviness.”86 To practice the skill, acupuncturists need live reactions that cannot 
be felt on cadavers. This age-old perception is deeply grounded in Chinese medical physiology, 
which valorizes the dynamic and relational quality of visceral systems found in living organisms. 
A cadaver with static organs is not worth examining.87 Trabelsi’s quick adaptation to practicing 
needling on patients may have derived from her experience in administering injections. 
Moreover, she was legally allowed to freely experiment her acu-moxa skills on patients as long 
as a doctor was in presence.     
Trabelsi has apparently well internalized the method of learning through practice, and has 
even developed her own innovations over the years. She talks about experience often, like most 
doctors of Chinese medicine do. Rather than establishing individual virtuosity through classroom 
achievement and laboratory analysis, senior Chinese doctors’ expertise draws on long years of 
 
86 Needling sensation has been considered by many acupuncturists to be an important component of 
acupuncture since the early classical texts. English scholarship has also discussed this phenomenon. See for 
example, Zhang Ren, Zhongguo zhen ci ma zui fa zhan shi Xģ=ĶĜJwL [The History of 
Acupuncture Anesthesia in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 1989), 264; Jian 
Kong et al., “Acupuncture De Qi, from Qualitative History to Quantitative Measurement,” Journal of 
Alternative and Complement Medicine 13, no.10 (2007):1059–70. 
87 Judith Farquhar, Knowing Practice, 93-94. 
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clinical practice and through ongoing engagement with patients and canonical texts.88 Trabelsi 
claims that her own experience has taught her new knowledge about this healing technique. 
When describing the essential set of points used to treat facial paralysis, she adds, “we can 
change some points, not always using the same ones. It is by experience.” She lists the diseases 
and symptoms she treats, including facial paralysis, knee problems, sinusitis, tendonitis, pains, 
and female infertility. When asked whether she learned to handle these cases during her training, 
she explains: “Not by training, by experience. I got good results, even for cancer pain.” She thus 
associates experience with efficaciousness, in much the same way as Chinese senior doctors of 
TCM do.89 It is doubtful that she found out how to treat these diseases by herself. Everything 
she lists are common conditions treated by Chinese acu-moxa doctors. Facial paralysis, arthritis, 
sciatica, and other forms of chronic pain are commonly found among Algerian patients who go 
to the acupuncture clinic in Algiers. Female infertility is not a category directly targeted by acu-
moxa treatment, but some symptoms and causes of it—including menstrual irregularities, 
cramps, amenorrhea, uterine prolapse—all indicate that acu-moxa can be used, as is made clear 
in the popular reader, Illustrated Clinical Acupoint Selection.90 Trabelsi probably learned to 
handle these cases during her internship. In portraying her expertise as the product of her long-
time engagement with patients, Trabelsi instead underscores her own technical initiatives and 
presents herself as a savvy practitioner who can deal with a wide range of illnesses.  
 
88 Judith Farquhar, “Rewriting Chinese Medicine in Post-Mao China,” in Knowledge and the Scholarly 
Medical Traditions, ed. Don Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 251-276. 
89 Elisabeth Hsu discusses this layer of meaning of experience (jingyan), see The Transmission of Chinese 
Medicine, 98. Judith Farquhar’s discussion of jingyan in Knowing Practice (171-4) focuses on the collective 
repertoire that a doctor draws from. 
90 Zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie, 113. This manual was the most popular acu-moxa reader in China since its 
first publication in 1966. Until 1970, it had been printed five times and sold 2,459,000 copies. The number was 
much more than the total number of Chinese and Western medicine doctors. 
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Despite the possible extravagance of these claims, her comments on the selection and 
choices of acupoints for facial paralysis, and her claim that she learnt to treat different cases 
successfully through her practice, convey an understanding that acu-moxa is a technique subject 
to the creativity of its practitioners. The flexibility inherent in acu-moxa practice derives from 
the theory that all the acupoints along the same meridian share in common treatment effects. 
After the well-acknowledged classic, the Great Compendium of Acupuncture and Moxibustion 
(1601), the principle of “Better to miss the acupoint than the channel” has been regarded as a 
tenet in praxis.91 Except for Zhu and her close followers who strongly rejected using the concept 
of the meridian system, textbooks published after the mid-1950s have all acknowledged this key 
principle in acu-moxa. The Tanzania Manual also explains the relationship between a meridian 
and its acupoints along these lines. As long as a practitioner chooses the right meridian, they are 
already half way to success. While Trabelsi may only be vaguely aware of this theory, she must 
have observed her instructors selecting different sets of acupoints to treat different patients with 
similar symptoms. However, deciding on which acupoint to use is a judgment based on one’s 
own experience. When she was using trial and error on different patients to find the correct 
acupoint, she was accumulating experience. This personal knowledge cannot be made fully 
explicit and is only partly transmissible.92  
The popular belief that acu-moxa has no side effects also promises Trabelsi safety in her 
trials. Elisabeth Hsu has discussed how acupuncture analgesia, scalp acupuncture, and ear 
acupuncture all gained publicity during the Maoist era and were all discovered through practice. 
She suggests that the divergence from tradition did not come from deliberation or theory, but 
 
91 Zhang Shujian ­>, “Jinxiandai zhenjiu kexuehua shijian yu zhuanxiang,” 1010. 
92 Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1964) is relevant here. 
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from audacious experiment.93 Given the limited tools and materials Trabelsi could obtain after 
the Chinese mission left, it is not a coincidence that she uses an Omron pulse massager to 
substitute for the electro-acupuncture machine used in Chinese hospitals. She explains that 
effects are better with electronic devices. Her preference of using methods that would generate 
stronger stimulation is also manifest in her innovation of using acupuncture and cupping 
simultaneously. It is unclear whether she is ever aware of the potential risks associated with her 
novel practice. The popular reader Illustrated Selection cautions its laymen audience that some 
points cannot be needled and others cannot be heated with mugwort.94 While Trabelsi must have 
learned about these precautions, she emphasizes the limited side-effects of acu-moxa to justify 
her inventions.       
In the end, Trabelsi’s case shows an increasing divorce of theory from practice. After the 
first two months of study in the classroom—only partly devoted to learning theories from 
lectures translated into French—she has since been swimming in the unpredictability of a 
medical practice whose underlying mechanism is far beyond the reach of her knowledge. She 
does not seem uncomfortable with this. After all, modern biomedicine also acknowledges a vast 
gap between theory and practice, including in the field of nursing.95 The very limited theoretical 
knowledge of meridian channels that Trabelsi learnt from Chinese doctors became meaningless 
to her because it was of little practical relevance to her actual healing methods. In a standardized 
education curriculum offered in a TCM college in China, students were always asked to rote 
 
93 Elisabeth Hsu, “Innovations in Acumoxa,” 421-430. 
94 Zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie, 108. 
95 There is a body of literature on this subject, For example, Alistair Hewison and Stuart Wildman, “The 
Theory-Practice Gap in Nursing: A New Dimension.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 24, no.4 (1996): 754–61; 
Pamela Baxter, “The CCARE Model of Clinical Supervision: Bridging the Theory–Practice Gap,” Nurse 
Education in Practice 7, no.2 (2007): 103–111. 
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memorize classical medical texts, in the hope that sudden insights would occur in the course of 
future practice.96 But such moments of enlightenment that link practice back to classic theories 
are certainly out of the question for Trabelsi. Even the limited number of Chinese names that she 
knows for acupoints are gradually slipping from her memory.  
Nonetheless, Trabelsi has developed her own “theory” from her practice. It is not a theory 
of the “high” knowledge of acu-moxa, which explains why a method does or does not work, or 
why certain acupoints are preferred in specific situations. It is rather a “structure of knowledge” 
that developed over time from new habits and workflows to make her healing practice more 
efficient.97 Her “theory,” however, remains personal as she does not codify it into any sensible 
form—be it drawings, descriptions, models, manuals, or treatises—that can be circulated and 
produce new conceptual structures of knowledge among fellow Algerian practitioners.   
 
Diagnostics and Professional Identity 
The Chinese art of medical diagnosis was unlikely a part of the Algerian nurses’ training, 
because the course was geared to practical needs and not to theoretical approaches. Diagnosis 
had also been largely divorced from the practice of acu-moxa during the scientification 
movement of Chinese medicine. Although Zhu and the following Chinese scientists and 
practitioner-physiologists made efforts to elevate the status of acu-moxa by endowing it with a 
scientific vocabulary and a new explanatory framework, the desire to teach acu-moxa to the 
masses required that it be adapted into a technique that could be easily accessible and 
 
96 Elisabeth Hsu, The Transmission of Chinese Medicine, 103. 
97 See Matteo Valleriani’s discussion of the relation between practical and theoretical knowledge. “The 
Epistemology of Practical Knowledge,” in The Structures of Practical Knowledge, ed. Matteo Valleriani 
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 1-19. 
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reproducible, though not without potential risks. This transformation of acu-moxa isolated its 
application from its theoretical structure, and thus reinforced the hierarchy of knowledge 
between diagnosis (based on medical philosophy) and treatment (technique), and the hierarchy of 
professions between academically trained physicians (who master the philosophy) and 
paramedical technicians (who know only the technique).   
As Kim Taylor has argued, the therapeutics of acu-moxa remained detached from its 
scientific theory when it came to selecting acupoints. In Zhu’s book, subsequent textbooks, the 
Tanzania Manual, and popular readers of the period, there were always chapters offering 
therapeutics, with a list of diseases and symptoms and possible acupoints to use for each 
category.98 Illnesses were classified by a mixture of mainly Western medical nomenclature—
some of which did not exist in Chinese medical concepts (e.g., stomach ulcer)—and some 
traditional Chinese ones (e.g., baofa huoyan (acute conjunctivitis, literally, an outbreak of fire 
eyes)), with disease categories blended with symptoms (e.g., wei tong (stomach pains), and 
written occasionally in colloquial terms (e.g., er di zi (acute otitis media)).99 Zhu explained that 
she decided to use either disease names or symptoms by following “the targeted treatment that 
acu-moxa could offer.”100 Not only were these categories different from book to book, but the 
selection of acupoints for a certain illness also varied. No “scientific” reasoning was provided to 
justify this diversity. Zhu had to admit that her therapeutics chapter “focused on providing 
 
98 See Kim Taylor’s discussions on three acu-moxa textbooks published in 1953-1954 for government 
institutions. Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China, 58-61. 
99 Zhenjiu linchuang quxue tujie, 110-111. Symptoms such as stomach pains, joint pains, back pains are 
prevalent in all these books and manuals. 




personal experience and understanding of clinical practice of acu-moxa.”101 This experience-
based knowledge was hardly standardized at the time.   
These textbooks and popular manuals on acu-moxa did not offer diagnostics. There were 
no discussions about how to determine the type of illness. Readers often had to resort to their 
own experiences or had to consult a doctor first, before looking for a corresponding choice of 
points from those lists. But the authors of these texts appeared to be confident in the lists they 
compiled. As soon as readers could match the symptoms and administer the recipe provided in 
the lists, they could cure the disease. This confidence in the medical efficacy of texts was, as Yi-
Li Wu shows, rooted in the Chinese tradition of scholar-amateurs’ claiming authority through 
compiling popular medical handbooks of proven formulas.102 These textbooks of acu-moxa 
were designed purposefully as recipes for the layman or those who were inadequately-trained to 
access medical knowledge based on personal experience. Unsurprisingly, they became the 
manuals that barefoot doctors carried with them into rural China.103  
Like their Chinese barefoot counterparts, Algerian nurses were not taught how to 
diagnose, but were likely given a list of symptom-recipe matches. Yet the nurses were 
disadvantaged by their lack of access to textual knowledge. The Tanzania Manual made an 
exceptional effort to teach trainees how to select different acupoints according to different 
syndromes (suizheng peixue) under the same category of disease or symptom. Such emphasis on 
 
101 Zhu Lian, Xin zhen jiu xue, 154. 
102 Yi-Li Wu, Reproducing Women: Medicine, Metaphor, and Childbirth in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 81 and Ch.2. 
103 More simplified versions of such textbooks appeared in this period. For example, Kongjun Shenyang 
yiyuan Ý4µĥCĪ [Shenyang Air Force Hospital] edited a pocket manual, Kuai su zhen ci liao fa ęģ
=Í¶ [Fast acupuncture therapies] (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1969). 
282 
 
syndrome differentiation (bianzheng), as analyzed by Volker Scheid, was a nationalistic, and 
politically correct, effort from the 1950s to mark Chinese medicine as distinct from Western 
medicine.104 But the complexity of syndrome differentiation and the many unique Chinese 
medical concepts, such as the two important categories of feng han (wind-cold) and feng re 
(wind-heat), which both cause cold, rendered the transmission of this knowledge impossible in a 
crash course.105 Compiled in Chinese, and most likely not translated into Swahili, the Manual 
worked more as a reference for the Chinese doctors than an actual textbook for local nurses. 
Despite the inability to carry out a full process of making a diagnosis and deciding on a 
treatment method, Algerian nurses were able to assist in diagnosis in certain instances. Trabelsi 
often interrogated patients about their conditions: she would ask if they were in pain or had a 
fever, if they had taken an X-ray, and how they came to have an illness. Before applying acu-
moxa, she observed whether the region she was going to needle or apply moxibustion appeared 
“red, hot, or swollen.” If she found things abnormal, she would refer to a doctor. What is striking 
is that she learned to use treatment results as a means to exclude possible causes of certain 
symptoms. If a patient’s condition was not improved after two courses of treatment (one course 
included 5 sessions a week, and the two can be consecutive or not), she would recommend the 
patient to take an MRI for further examination. “Like my daughter, nobody knew the problem. I 
asked her to do acupuncture. She refused, and finally accepted. After the first session, she got to 
sleep without pain. For the following days, she could not sleep again. She had excruciating pain. 
Then she was diagnosed with an MRI and found out that she had cancer.”  
 
104 Volker Scheid, Chinese Medicine in Contemporary China: Plurality and Synthesis (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), Ch.7. 




In short, making diagnoses was not intended to be part of the acu-moxa training course. 
Neither news reports nor Chinese work reports on the training course mentioned anything about 
diagnosis. The modernizers conceived acu-moxa as a technique dissociable from diagnostics. 
The instructors were confronted with cultural and linguistic obstacles to transmit the complex 
system of Chinese diagnostics, even if they had wanted to. Moreover, Algeria’s health system 
did not sanction the official learning of diagnosis in such a crash course for paramedics. 
Diagnosis was reserved as a field for professional doctors who graduated after many years of 
training in medical schools. This was a professional boundary drawn firmly between doctors and 
nurses in Algeria. The Chinese instructors had likely come to see the disruption of the division of 
labor between doctors and nurses as a new “norm” amidst the revolutionary craze in China’s 
Cultural Revolution. This revolutionary idea, however, came into conflict with Algerians’ 
insistence on the hierarchy of knowledge and professions.  
 
The Artisanal Skill of Needling  
Acu-moxa is as much a skill as knowledge. After a diagnosis is made and a certain 
therapeutic decision is prescribed, the patient’s clinical experience is only half complete. From 
there, patients’ experiences in the clinic differ based on which doctor or nurse treats them and 
what treatment they choose to use. Moxibustion is simple and standard; but needle manipulation 
requires skills, which are highly variable and resilient to standardization. If the personal 
knowledge of how to select the right set of acupoints still hinges upon textual learning, how to 
needle is an “artisanal literacy,” to use Pamela Smith’s words, a tacit knowledge that is gained 
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through “a process of experience and labor.”106 To become a good needle manipulator requires 
observation, imitation by bodily engagement, and apperception. The artisanal skill of needling 
was more accessible than the textual knowledge of acu-moxa. But the unquantifiable nature of 
the needling skill makes it difficult to judge the trainees’ acquired level of “artisanal literacy.” 
General consensus in China is that needling sensation, de-qi, is crucial to the effects of an 
acupuncture treatment. Many classical monographs on acu-moxa have extensive discussions of 
the methods and skills to achieve the sensation, while also representing different schools of 
practice. An important contemporary reference book summarizes 130 categories of a total 480 
methods of needling, targeting 148 types of clinical symptoms.107 Modern laboratory research 
has also shown that the depth and duration of needling and the method and intensity of needle 
stimulation are directly associated with the magnitude of its therapeutic effects.108 For the same 
patient, at the same location on the skin, different methods of using the needle are believed to 
induce different body reactions, which in turn affect the result.109  
Trabelsi does not seem to have been bothered with the potential complexity of needling 
methods. She describes her first experiment on a patient as completed immediately and 
smoothly, which surprised her instructor. She does not mention whether and what kind of 
 
106 Pamela Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 8. 
107 Lu Shoukang Ĩs ed., Zhenci shoufa baijia jicheng ģ=¶Ïoī [Collected works of 
techniques in acupuncture from various schools] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhong yi yao chubanshe, 1995). 
108 For example, see Choi Yu-Jin et al. “Does the Effect of Acupuncture Depend on Needling Sensation and 
Manipulation?,” Complementary Therapies in Medicine 21, no.3 (2013):207-214. 
109 Ji Xiaolan i¡- and Li Zhigang §:, “Duiyu zhenci shoufa tigao zhenjiu linchuang liaoxiao de 
sikao” rģ=¶Ĵģ¿}ÍÐï [Thoughts on enhancing acupuncture therapeutic effects 
with acupuncture manipulation], Guoji zhongyi zhongyao zazhi XħCü¦ [International Journal of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine] 33, no.4 (April 2011): 331-333. 
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needling practice she had previously performed in class. It was unlikely that her instructors had 
not urged the trainees to practice needling beforehand. A common method was to practice on 
layers of paper to exercise control. The Tanzania Manual gives detailed instructions: “Use 4 to 6 
layers of soft paper at the size of 60*40mm, put cotton of 1 to 3cm height in the middle, then 
wrap them with threads tightly, for the purpose of repetitive practices according to different 
inserting requirement and operating postures.” The manual then continues to point out the 
difference between practicing on paper and on human bodies. It concludes that “there must be a 
step of practicing on one’s own body before one can personally feel it.”110 When teaching in 
China, Dr. Wang required his disciples to exercise their fingers “at least an hour a day for two to 
three years uninterruptedly.” He was quoted in an article on improving the effects of 
acupuncture, saying that “doing acupuncture without attention to needling skills is like singing a 
song without melody. [In that way, one] can by no means become a real acu-moxa doctor.”111 
Given the short duration of the training course and loose teacher-student relationships, it was 
unlikely that Wang would have required his Algerian trainees to train in the same way as he did 
with his students in China, who were bound to him in a much closer master-disciple relationship. 
That Trabelsi does not recall doing finger exercises implies that the Algerian students more 
likely did not have to practice in this regard.  
Trabelsi’s pursuit of stronger stimulation in the treatment for her patients also violates a 
fundamental rule in acupuncture treatment, which claims that de-qi by itself does not guarantee 
an effect. A Yuan scholar-physician and acupuncturist, Du Sijing © (1235-1320), has 
 
110 Yuan sang jixiao yihu zhuanye yishiban jiaocai: Zhen jiu xue (taolun gao), 76. 
111 Ma Yuying ĲÃý and Liu Zhi’an 9l, “Wang Mingzhang lun tigao zhenci liaoxiao de liang yaosu” 
ÄÞćĴģ=ÍÐāã [Wang Mingzhang’s view on the two elements to enhance acupucnture’s 
effects], Shanxi zhongyi xĀC [Shanxi Journal of Traditional Chinese Medicine] 9, no.3 (1993): 36-37. 
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often been cited by researchers of Chinese medicine for commenting that “although qi arrives, 
the methods of bu and xie are mistakenly used, thus the disease is not cured.”112 The 
scientification of acupuncture has galvanized the simplification of needle manipulation skills, but 
it still preserves the fundamental difference between bu and xie when needling. The two classical 
terms were translated into the modern biological terms “excitation” and “inhibition” to describe 
the responses of organisms to stimuli. Modern laboratory experiments recognize that stronger 
stimulation often generates inhibitory responses, whereas weaker stimulation yields excitatory 
responses; stronger stimulation works for diseases relating to hyperactivity (jineng kangjin ¥ó
Ė), whereas weaker stimulation works for diseases relating to hypofunction (jineng dixia ¥
ó().113 Trabelsi must have observed the doctors using electrical devices to increase the 
intensity of stimulation, which is a lazy approach that doctors adopt to replace the manual 
rotation of the needle while it remains in the skin. She reproduces stronger stimulation by 
creatively using an electric massager, but her observations alone may not have informed her that 
stronger stimulation is not always sought after in every treatment.   
Practicing acupuncture in a proper and effective manner requires skill and apperception. 
To acquire the skills needed, observation and exercises in direct engagement with bodies are 
necessary. Knowledge of needling is taught through teachers’ explication, but it is also expected 
 
112 The original text is “…Ĭ²÷ÿ¾0Î.” In Du Sijing © ed., Ji sheng ba cui ½È
á [Recipes from the Collectanea to Benefit Life] (10 volumes) (Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1938). 
See its Volume 2, Zhen jing zhai ying ji Ģäúī [Collection Selecting the Quintessence from the 
Needling Classics]. Ji sheng ba cui is a Yuan dynasty collection (1315) of 19 medical works from the JinĠ 
and Yuan* periods.  
113 Chen Shaozong ĩtm and Liu Jing 9¢, “Cong chuantong zhenjiuxue dao xiandai zhenjiuxue—
zhenjiu xiandaihua 50 nian zhi huigu” #'ëģ¿j<Å$ģ¿j——ģ¿Å$A50{Wı [From 
traditional acupuncture to modern acupuncture: a reflection on fifty years of acupuncture’s modernization], 




that insights emerge suddenly after a long time of practice. Official strategies of teaching 
acupuncture are found only in a close relationship between mentor and followers, master and 
disciples.114 The student has to observe and imitate the master’s practice, and then influenced by 
what he constantly sees and hears, comes to reproduce his master’s knowledge.115 This bond of 
teacher-student relationship was presumably not existent in the short crash course in Algeria.    
 
Conclusion   
Trabelsi is the only nurse in Médéa who continues giving acupuncture treatment to 
patients. Her continuous practice indicates that she is able to achieve some good results and has 
cultivated a relationship of trust with her patients. She also has no local competitor who might 
offer better treatment. Nonetheless, the director of the hospital who sat with us in a previous 
interview, interrupted her when she was talking about her current practice, stressing that her 
service was a completely private practice that was not under legal protection. As a paramedic 
who does not have a doctor’s license, she has to bear the consequences if any patient were to 
issue complaints.116 When I asked her again about this, she refuted the director’s allegation and 
insisted that she could practice without a doctor’s presence in her capacity as a senior technician. 
When she started her training with the Chinese instructors some forty years ago, the 
theories, practices, and the education of Chinese medicine, including acu-moxa, was being 
 
114 For a discussion on the establishment and valorizing of formal and exclusive relationships between master 
and disciple in Chinese scholarly medicine between the Song and Ming, see Angela Ki-che Leung, “Medical 
Learning from the Song to the Ming” in The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History, eds. Paul Smith 
and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 374–398. 
115 This is similar to teaching art. Polanyi has discussed how art can be passed on only by example from 
master to apprentice. See his Personal Knowledge (1964). 
116 Personal interview with Madaoui Ahmad, the Director of E.P.H. de Médéa, Algeria, July 24, 2016. 
Trabelsi was in presence. 
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systemized and standardized in China. What Trabelsi and her cohorts learned most likely 
followed prevailing models of standardized knowledge. Language barriers, cultural distance, 
prior knowledge, and a limited time frame—in addition to personal priorities and investment—
all obstructed their education. Moreover, the often tacit forms of acu-moxa knowledge and the 
artisanal skill of needling defy standardization and easy transmission. If the “original” 
knowledge distilled from the holistic body of Chinese medicine during the scientization 
movement is recalcitrant to cross-cultural transmission, the complex process by which acu-moxa 
was transmitted produced new knowledge through practice. Trabelsi created her own 
interpretation of what acu-moxa is and how it can be performed. Though the version of acu-
moxa that she practices is a reformulated one, it satisfies her patients’ needs. She has come to 
stand as the authority of acu-moxa in Médéa and the nearby areas where her patients are from.  
Trabelsi is also interested in acupuncture anesthesia. She received a short pamphlet in 
French on the subject as a gift when she completed her course. Chinese doctors told the trainees 
about acupuncture anesthesia, but never practiced in Médéa. Trabelsi regrets that she never 
learned acupuncture anesthesia for painless childbirth. Between 1972 and 1978, Chinese medical 
teams in other hospitals of Algeria carried out a series of surgery experiments assisted by 
acupuncture as the anesthesia method. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these 
experiments, along with other miraculous cures by acupuncture, were not only mobilized to 
legitimize the medical status of acu-moxa as a significant manifestation of socialist medicine, but 
were also marshalled to promote the professional authority of the acu-moxa doctors in China.  
 





Manufacturing Medical Supplies under a “China Model”: Unfinished Industrial Planning, 
1973-1980 
 
On 13 September 1974, amidst the lingering shadow of the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” 
Campaign (January-June 1974), a team of four technocrats departed Shanghai for Beijing to 
report to the Ministry of Health. There they were joined by ministry officials and an interpreter 
to form a technical research delegation to Algeria.1 The group was to conduct a survey of 
Algeria’s industrial capacity and medical supplies as a prerequisite for building a surgical 
supplies manufacturing facility that China had agreed to offer to Algeria as economic aid. For 
various reasons, the duration of the research tour was extended beyond what the group initially 
planned and took nearly eight months. The length of time it took to complete this initial stage of 
information gathering was inauspicious. After a prolonged process of designs, negotiations, 
revisions, and the preparatory production of manufacturing equipment in China, the project came 
to an abrupt end in 1980. Few know about this project today.2 Despite the huge amount of effort 
and resources invested in the project, its revocation—by either China or Algeria—removed it 
from the official history of China’s foreign aid.3  
The unfinished project is nonetheless significant as it is just the tip of the iceberg of 
forgotten, failed or cancelled projects that reveals tensions in socialist China’s deep engagement 
 
1 The delegation had eight members in total. See the handwritten comments in the document, SMA, B90-2-
259-13, March 18, 1974. 
2 A now retired interviewee who was active on duty in the Shanghai Health Bureau in the early 1980s doesn’t 
know about this project. He kindly asked around for me among his former colleagues and acquaintances and 
did not get any information. 
3 There is no available source about who made the decision. In December 1980, the Chinese Ministry of 
Health issued a short notice informing about the revocation of the project “for some reason [unspecified].” 
SMA, B90-2-574-8, December 23, 1980. 
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with Africa since the 1960s. Little direct evidence is available to speak to why the project was 
cancelled and by whom, but the tensions latent in the research and negotiation process between 
China and Algeria in addition to China’s overhaul of its foreign aid policy partly accounted for 
the project’s eventual failure. Complaints detailed in reports by Chinese technocrats reveal how 
their vision conflicted with Algerian habits of industrial production and norms of medical 
practices. When the Chinese believed in the applicability of their industrial model to Algeria, 
their belief was largely founded on the discourse of similitude: China and Algeria shared a past 
as victims of colonialism but also a present experience as developing countries. This failed case, 
however, reveals a mismatch between designs and needs and alerts us to Algeria’s agency. Chris 
Alden and Daniel Large point out the “asymmetrical privileging of China” in contemporary 
China-Africa studies, “variously neglecting, ignoring, or erasing African agency.”4 Following 
the recent “agency turn” in this field, this chapter explores the Algerian perspective in their 
dealings with their Chinese “cooperators”—not “donors.” Despite the shared claim of socialism 
as a state ideology, China was one of a number of foreign powers acting in Algeria’s industrial 
landscape but was also not the one that was the most desirable. By contextualizing the planning 
stage of the project within Algeria’s economic politics and by analyzing the Chinese reports, this 
chapter examines the tensions between an Algerian government wary of the neo-colonial risks 
posed by this development partnership and a Chinese government whose officials and 
technocrats were eager to introduce their experience to Algerians. It also hints at the plausibility 
of Algerian “bureaucratic agency” in affecting the outcome of the negotiations, as incidents of 
 
4 Chris Alden and Daniel Large, eds. New Directions in Africa-China Studies (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2019), 13-15. 
 291 
procrastination, apathy, and lack of coordination were common.5 By and large, the case under 
review has a wider relevance to the question of how China has found a place in recipient 
countries’ politics.      
Examining China’s failures will undermine the teleology of China’s ascendancy in 
Africa. Current international attention has been devoted to China’s development assistance in 
Africa, especially after the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation III (FOCAC) Beijing summit in 
November 2006 and the release of China’s first African Policy that year.6 But this recent 
attention has tended to obscure complex and multivalent histories of the PRC’s involvement on 
the continent, many of which date back decades. Global policy-related analysis and media 
commentary over the past two decades have focused on the scope, investment figures, and 
impact of contemporary Chinese-funded economic aid projects in African countries.7 Little 
historically grounded research has been done to approach and “locate engagements between 
Africa and China within both historical processes and newly emerging realities.”8 Historians of 
international relations, such as Shu Guang Zhang, have taken the lead in adding a temporal 
 
5 For a case study of “bureaucratic agency” in the circumstances of asymmetrical power relations, see 
Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou, “Bureaucratic Agency and Power Asymmetry in Benin–China Relations,” in New 
Directions in Africa-China Studies, eds. Chris Alden and Daniel Large (New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 
189-204. But, the power balance between China and Algeria in the 1970s was very different from what Soulé-
Kohndou deals with in her case. 
6 The official paper of “China’s African Policy,” the Chinese government, January 2006, 
http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156490.htm. 
7 There is a growing body of English-language literature, especially in the field of political science, 
international relations, and journalism, on China’s engagement with Africa after the 1990s. The focus of this 
literature is mainly on the scope of China’s engagement in Africa, the estimated amount of investment, the 
scope of the coverage, the potential impact on the local economy, society, and environment, and the local 
reception. See, for example, Deborah Brautigam (2009), Howard French (2014), Jamie Monson (2009), Ching 
Kwan Lee (2017). 
8 Jamie Monson and Stephanie Rupp, “Introduction: Africa and China: New Engagements, New Research,” 
African Studies Review 56, no. 1 (2013): 21-44. 
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dimension to contemporary analyses by arguing for the existence of continuities between China’s 
early experience with the socialist world and its state directed export economy after 1978. 
However, viewing foreign aid as economic statecraft, Zhang investigates the use of “economic 
instruments in pursuit of foreign policy goals” and is methodologically confined to the aid 
packages written on paper in the archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.9 He 
seldom specifies whether the promised projects were actually carried out. More recently, 
historians writing in Chinese have started to concern themselves with how aid projects in the 
Maoist era were planned, investigated, executed, and received, which reveals the state’s power in 
mobilizing and allocating technical resources abroad.10 Yet, the studies of successful projects 
have missed an important, and perhaps central, part of the whole story of China’s engagement 
with Africa: the process of experimentation and failure.11 
This chapter presents as a case study socialist China’s solution to Algeria’s problem of 
infrastructure-building for its medical supplies industry. It offers a pertinent example of Chinese 
technocrats’ self-absorbed approach of transferring aspects of China’s domestic development to 
Algeria. Despite current official denials of the fact that China is promoting its own model of 
development, the application of Chinese experience to the African context has been an integral 
 
9 Shu Guang Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2014), 2. 
10 See Jiang Huajie p"T, “Lengzhan shiqi zhongguo dui feizhou guojia de yuanzhu yanjiu” FMP
-6Y-4_I ag [A study on Chinese aid to African countries during the Cold War (1960-1978)] 
(PhD diss., East China Normal University, 2014). Another typical case study of this scholarship is Shen 
Xipeng’s recent research on the well-known TARAZA railway (1965-1976), see Shen Xipeng X,B, 
Zhongguo yuanjian tanzan tielu yanjiu -I>/vzxag [A research on China’s aid in the Tan-Zam 
Railway] (Hefei: Huang shan shu she, 2018), Chs. 4-6. 
11 Deborah Brautigam mentions in passing that numerous turn-key aid projects foundered after being handed 
over to the local African governments, and that one out of six needed Chinese team to return for furthering 
training and management. Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift (2009), 52 and 57. 
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element of Chinese engagement with the continent as early as the Maoist era, and in a wide 
variety of areas from the provision of health care services to the production of medical supplies. 
Socialist China’s domestic industrial model was developed in resource-poor conditions as a 
result of the U.S.-led trade and technology embargo and the Soviet withdrawal of material and 
technical assistance. Although China’s lower technical capabilities and smaller economic 
capacity prevented it from becoming a formidable challenger to the supremacy of the U.S. and 
the USSR in world politics, China posed a postcolonial socialist alternative during the Cold War. 
Scholarly efforts to understand China’s influence in other parts of the world in the Maoist era 
have focused on its revolutionary warfare strategy and ideological fetishization.12 What remains 
understudied is how Chinese technocrats also attempted to introduce the Chinese industrial ideal 
of “self-reliance” to Africa, which was in opposition to the archetypal postcolonial model for 
economic growth premised on the importation of technocratic expertise and use of funds from 
former colonizers.13  
My analysis of the research reports of the provincial-level technocrats in the delegation to 
Algeria shows that the Chinese had faith in the transformative impact of China’s practices in 
Algeria. This confidence was not blind self-assertiveness but was built upon actual economic and 
industrial growth in China. The dominant scholarly narrative of PRC’s history asserts that the 
Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) had catastrophic 
 
12 On the influence of Chinese revolutionary warfare on African liberation movement, see for example, Kyle 
Haddad-Fonda, “An Illusory Alliance” (2014); Donovan Chau, The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, 
Ghana and Tanzania (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014). On the ideological influence of Maoism, 
see Alexander Cook ed., Mao’s Little Red Book (2014); Tareq Ismael, “The People’s Republic of China and 
Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 9, no. 4 (1971): 507-529. 
13 Some new research has been done in this field. For example, Cole Roskam has an article on China’s 
architectural diplomacy in West Africa. “Non-Aligned Architecture: China’s Designs on and in Ghana and 
Guinea, 1955-92,” Architectural History 58 (2015): 261-291. 
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consequences for China’s economy, emphasizing the negative effect of radical leftism in 
industrial planning, the impact of frequent political campaigns on production, and in the long 
term, the effect of a dire shortage of educated personnel that stymied China’s ability to develop 
and absorb new technology.14 Partly due to the lack of sources from the period, Chinese-
language industry gazetteers often skip the decade before the 1978 reform, designating it as a 
period of destruction, stagnation, or retrogradation. While that statement is overall true, painting 
the highly politicized segments of the socialist era with such a broad-brush does not do justice to 
Chinese administrators and technocrats’ efforts to revive the economy; moreover, it reinforces 
the teleology of a Chinese economic ascendancy having been disturbed by Maoist politics. In 
fact, the period between 1970 and 1974 saw a resumption of systematic growth with industrial 
output growing at an average rate of 8 percent a year.15 The efforts of Chinese technocrats to 
look for ways to counteract the low efficiency of the centrally planned economy during this 
period should not be easily dismissed.16  
My case study seeks to transform the way we can look at industrial development in the 
socialist era from the micro-perspective of Shanghai technocrats, the actual designers of 
 
14 For example, Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China (1969), which argues that China had 
considerably better economic development than India with regards to most indicators; Charles Bettelheim, 
Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China (1974); Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy: 
The Quest for Development since 1949 (1987); Sun Huairen 3D ed., Shanghai shehui zhuyi jingji jianshe 
fazhan jianshi, 1949-1985 nian [c
mZ>u%8i&, 1949-1985: [A brief history of the 
socialist economic development in Shanghai, 1949-1985] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990), 505-
507. For a collection of English-language scholarship on China’s economic history since 1949, see Michael 
Dillon ed., Key Papers on Chinese Economic History since 1949 (4 Vols) (Leiden: Brill, 2016).  
15 Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan, eds. China: A Country Study (Washington: 
GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988), 221. 
16 For a discussion about the pursuit of efficiency in industrial growth in the PRC from 1949 to the early 
1980s, see Lin Chaochao Uww, Dongyuan yu xiaolv: Jihua tizhi xia de shanghai gongye (K\s
_[9 [Mobilization and efficiency: Shanghai’s industry in the planned economy] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2016). 
 295 
industrial projects. Contrary to the conventional perception that China’s foreign aid in this era 
was ideologically centered and less concerned with finances, the whole process (1973-80) of 
planning and negotiating the construction of a surgical instruments factory in Algeria exhibits a 
realistic approach to industrial development not far from the behavior of capital. At the level of 
provincial developers, “the principles of profitability and business sustainability reign[ed],” in a 
manner similar to what Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang argue is China’s current 
business model in official economic cooperation zones in Africa.17 While this chapter argues 
that there was conformity to the logic of capital in the socialist design,18 it does not intend to 
downplay industrial characteristics developed in accordance to the features of China’s domestic 
economic life. By examining the research tour conducted from October 1974 to May 1975, this 
chapter uncovers a set of industrial methods—standardization, economy, and cost control—that 
Chinese technocrats saw as crucial for Algeria to build a self-sustaining medical industry from 
scratch. These methods manifested a Chinese vision of industry building that did not necessarily 
adopt state-of-the-art technology but rather employed technology they believed to be most 
suitable to local conditions.  
I begin this chapter by introducing the Shanghai technocrats who formed the research 
group to Algeria, and their expectations for the visit. I then review Algeria’s dependence on 
foreign technology and capital in its path towards industrialization to explain why Algeria 
needed China’s aid and what China could possibly offer. In examining how the Chinese research 
 
17 Bräutigam, Deborah and Tang Xiaoyang, “African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa,” 
The Journal of Modern African Affairs 49, no.1 (2011): 50. 
18 Recent studies utilize a global political economy framework to explore contemporary China’s economic 
role in Africa and argue that its economic patterns of exploitation are similar to the global behavior of capital. 
For example, see Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in 
Africa (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017). 
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group amassed information about Algeria’s industrial capacity and preferences for surgical 
supplies, I show how various Chinese actors including medical mission doctors and industrial aid 
personnel contributed to a China-centric source base of knowledge on Algeria. In the context of 
this new specialized knowledge and the discovery of differences between the two countries 
outside of the official political narrative of similitude, the second part of the chapter analyzes 
three interrelated solutions that the Chinese group thought could deal with what they saw as 
Algeria’s industrial “problems.” By reviewing focal issues of the negotiations over project 
design, I explore how tensions between the Chinese vision and Algerian realities made this aid 
project highly problematic and anticipated its failure.  
 
Shanghai Technocrats and Their Tour of Algeria, October 1974 - May 1975  
The research delegation arrived in Algiers on 18 October 1974,19 amid a tumultuous 
period of economic readjustment (1969-74) in China following the height of the Cultural 
Revolution.20 The “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” Campaign, which had re-empowered 
“rebels” and brought back turbulent time, was gradually being phased out by early July, when 
Mao called it off. This short-lived quasi-“Second Cultural Revolution,” however, had already 
struck another blow to an economy that had been on the mend in 1972. Rekindled political 
campaigns disrupted railway and port transportation, which blocked the industrial network and 
 
19 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974, p.1. 
20 Chinese historians agree on the “Three Ups and Downs” in the economic history of the CR. The first Up 
was the first half of 1966. The second was from 1969 until the beginning of the “Criticize Lin Criticize 
Confucius” Campaign. The third was in 1975 under Deng’s supervision of economy. See Sun Huairen 3D 
ed., Shanghai shehui zhuyi jingji jianshe fazhan jianshi, 490. 
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led to output reduction in the pillar industries, including coal mining, steel, and fertilizer.21 
Nevertheless, the worsening domestic economic situation did not slacken China’s foreign aid 
projects. On the contrary, the years between 1971 and 1975 witnessed a dramatic increase in its 
foreign aid expenses as a result of the PRC’s admission to the United Nations. The establishment 
of diplomatic relations with African countries always came in tandem with China’s promises of 
aid packages. In addition to doubling its targets in Africa, China continued to pour more 
weapons, supplies, advisors and cash into North Vietnam (the DRV) for the growing war with 
the United States.22 Algeria’s request for a surgical supplies manufacturing facility in 1973 was 
part of a long list of new proposals, which revealed China’s growing economic statecraft. After 
the State Council approved the request in April 1973,23 the two countries signed an exchange of 
notes on 20 March 1974 to actualize the plan.24 The Shanghai research group was formed 
accordingly to conduct a preliminary investigation of the state of Algeria’s industries to allow for 
future medical industrial planning.  
Such an investigative mission was heavily technical as it was political, requiring 
expertise from a combination of industrial and architectural specialists. It had two main 
purposes: to decide the site of the facility and to collect information for the project design. 
Unsatisfied with “simply collecting existing informational documents,” special emphasis was 
 
21 Shi Yun &~ and Li Danhui S	E, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (di ba juan): nanyi jixu de “jixu 
geming” oV+.&(h#): }jk_jk*(1972-1976) [The history of the People’s 
Republic of China (Vol.8): the uncontinuable “continuous revolution”] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 2008), 371-377. 
22 Shi Lin `U, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo A-_60mZ' [Foreign 
economic cooperation of contemporary China] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), 56-61; See 
also Shu Guang Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 253-255. 
23 SMA, B242-3-411, July 21, 1973. 
24 SMA, B90-2-450-41, April 3, 1978. This document includes an overview of the process of the negotiation. 
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given to “field investigation for accurate and reliable information,” and the acquisition of “first-
hand knowledge.” Based on its findings, the research delegation was to negotiate with the 
recipient country about the details of the blueprint—“construction scope, production capacity, 
industrial technology, construction standards, building structure, etc.”—before signing a 
memorandum of design and construction.25 During this process, the delegates kept regular 
correspondence with their supervising ministries in China. They sent back seven monthly 
progress reports through diplomatic messengers to the Ministry of Health,26 which in turn 
distributed copies to 11 other government bureaus and enterprises in Beijing and Shanghai. The 
transmission of messages took almost a month to reach local offices directly managing the 
project; more time was needed for sending feedback through the Economic Counsellor’s Office 
of the Chinese embassy in Algiers.27 The long interval between sending their reports and 
receiving instructions from their domestic superiors meant that the delegates had to be flexible in 
handling problems on the ground. Having to negotiate a balance between needs and designs, the 
delegates could not just include technically skilled personnel but had to include experienced 
technocrats who were able to make proper decisions.  
 
25 Shi Lin `U, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo, 109-110. Before the 1980s, a memorandum 
was usually signed after the field investigation, as a basis for design and the division of work between the two 
parties. Afterwards, official contracts with more binding power were signed instead of a memorandum. See Shi 
Lin, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo, 110. 
26 The Ministry of Health was the ministry commissioned with this project (cheng jian bu G>y). The 
delegation seemed to have sent copies of the first and second reports to the ministry of health and Shanghai 
bureau of meters and instruments (yi biao ju r7). In the third report, a handwritten note indicates that the 
Chinese embassy in Algeria instructed sending only one copy to the commissioned ministry instead of several 
copies to different bureaus at the same time so as to save the messengers from too much burden. See SMA, 
B90-2-333-67. 
27 See the closing section of the document, SMA, B90-2-333. 
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The technocrats in the research delegation were all from Shanghai, which was 
commissioned to execute the aid project by the Ministry of Health and the State Infrastructure 
Commission.28 The leader of the delegation, Xue Boqing q$, was a high-ranking 
technocrat from the Shanghai Medical Equipment Industry Corporation, who was later promoted 
to deputy general manager of the corporation in May 1978,29 and then the CEO from April 
1984.30 A Shi Xiguang `{ was a deputy head of the technology department of the same 
corporation.31 A third member, Yu Kuanxiang 5d was presumably an industrial expert and 
high-level manager from the Shanghai Surgical Instruments Factory.32 Another member, Lu 
Shuichang |WN, was likely a chief architect from the Shanghai Industrial Architectural 
Design Institute.33 Taken together, they were a group of technocrats who specialized in the 
medical industry and industrial architecture; furthermore, they may well have had experience in 
building similar projects outside China. From 1967 to 1976, medical industrial experts from 
Shanghai were in the DRV supervising the construction and operation of a Second Medical 
Equipment Factory, which was designed to manufacture surgical instruments and syringe 
 
28 SMA, B103-4-440-60, May 24, 1973. For the names of the delegates, see SMA, B103-4-501-44, June 27, 
1974. 
29 Qin Fuxiang fed and Zhang Jiren @l eds., Shanghai dianzi yibiao gongye zhi [^2r9
C [A history of Shanghai’s industry of instruments and electronics] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan 
chubanshe, 1999), 400. 
30 Yu Siqing L<, Zhu Jisheng Rl], and Shen Zhuangli X;b eds., Shanghai yiyao zhi [!n
C [A history of medicine and pharmaceuticals in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan 
chubanshe, 1997), 677. 
31 SMA, B90-1-596-5, January 5, 1977. 
32 SMA, B90-1-626-58, October 7, 1978. 
33 Shanghai intended to send experts in both industrial and architectural designs, and submitted a list of 
candidate institutions. See SMA, B90-2-259-13, January 5, 1974. 
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needles. Xue’s corporation was one of the three Chinese contractors for this project.34 The 
Vietnamese factory started its experimental production in November 1973, which meant that, 
before the research tour to Algeria, Shanghai technocrats had already accumulated experience in 
building medical industries abroad. What they needed to do was transfer the special know-how 
to Algeria.  
It was no accident that Shanghai was selected to pursue the project in Algeria. On the 
general level, as one of the largest comprehensive industrial bases and ports in China, Shanghai 
was an ideal candidate to contract overseas aid projects. The proposed medical supplies facility 
in Algeria took the form of a “complete plant” project (chengtao xiangmu, or turn-key projects), 
a primary type of China’s foreign aid that handed over a completed facility to the recipient to 
start production. In such projects, Chinese contractors conducted the research and design, 
provided all or part of the machinery and building materials, and supervised plant construction 
and equipment assembly. During the process, Chinese experts also trained local workers with 
necessary skills.35 To execute a turn-key project thus required the ability to mobilize a rich array 
of technical, capital, and human resources as well as to coordinate these resources from 
government institutions and industrial entities. Guided by the development strategy of “self-
reliance,” Shanghai developed an industrial system that “covered almost every industrial sector” 
from 1949 throughout the late 1970s.36 The extensiveness of industrial coverage within one 
 
34 Shanghai yiyao zhi, 631-632. Between 3 July 1968 and 1 July 1979, the Shanghai Medical Equipment 
Industry Corporation was under the supervision of the Municipal Bureau of Instruments and Electronics 
Industry. See “Da shi ji” 1t [Major events], Shanghai dianzi yibiao gongye zhi, 21. 
35 Shi Lin `U, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo, 19.  
36 “History of Industries in Shanghai,” https://www.encyclopedia.com/books/international-magazines/history-
industries-shanghai. 
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administrative district substantially facilitated the management of turn-key projects. During the 
1970s alone, Shanghai contracted around 110 turn-key projects in Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East.37 In the 1960s-70s, many government bureaus and enterprises in Shanghai had their own 
aid offices,38 developing a work module for foreign projects and cultivating skilled aid 
personnel. More specifically, Shanghai was privileged with the best technology and expertise in 
China in the field of manufacturing medical equipment. The majority of special machinery for 
producing medical equipment was manufactured in the greater Shanghai area.39  
Equipped with expertise and experience in foreign aid projects, the research group had a 
tight plan for its investigation in Algeria. However, the visit was plagued by delays in relaying 
information that they had requested, constant changes in the Algerian administration, and 
protracted processes for convening meetings, forcing the investigation to extend to nearly eight 
months even though it still did not acquire enough satisfactory information. On the next day after 
arrival, they were met by the Algerian minister of health. Without much of a break, they set out 
on October 21 to visit 12 industrial enterprises and medical facilities along the Mediterranean 
coast, traveling from Algiers eastward to Constantine and Annaba, and from Annaba 70km 
southwest to Guelma and then further southwest to Oued Zenati before their final stop in Médéa, 
near Algiers.40 While the sixteen-day survey trip produced valuable, though brief and general, 
information about Algeria’s industrial landscape and capacity, the remaining seven months that 
 
37 Zhou Mingwei )O et al., Shanghai waishi zhi [0C [A history of Shanghai’ foreign affairs] 
(Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1999), 406-407. 
38 “Dui wai jingji jishu yuanzhu” 60mZHQI  [Foreign economic and technical aid], in Shanghai 
renmin zhengfu zhi [VJ=C [A history of Shanghai People’s Government], eds. Li Kaiya S? 
et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2004), 440. 
39 SMA, B103-4-440-60, May 24, 1973. 
40 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974. 
 302 
they spent in Médéa turned out to be fraught with anxiety from unfulfilled requests, uncertainty 
about progress to be made, disagreements and compromises in negotiations, and, most of the 
time, idleness while waiting.    
 
Algeria’s Dependence on International Partners  
The research group’s tour along the coast, though short and brief, quickly alerted the 
Chinese technocrats to the conspicuous Western presence in Algeria’s industrial sector. Eight out 
of the nine manufacturing plants and medical supplies facilities they visited (the other three were 
hospitals) were either assets inherited from colonial French companies or new sites built with aid 
mainly from the West. Among the various Western powers, West Germany and France appeared 
to have dominated the scene. The only exception was Guelma Household Ceramics, the first 
Chinese industrial turn-key project in Algeria completed in 1971.41 (Table 5.1) The Chinese 
observed that Algeria was heavily dependent on foreign technology, expertise, and capital in its 
industrial development, “except foreign direct investment in the heavy industries.”42 On the 
industrial sites, they often found manufacturing equipment, factory buildings, and technologies 
provided wholesale by Western companies,43 and workshop directors from France or West 




41 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974. 
42 SMA, B90–2-333-26, May 1975, p.4. 
43 The group indicates this in the case of the motorcycle and bicycle factory in Guelma. SMA, B90–2-333-26, 
May 1975, p.4 and p.8. 
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Chinese observations about the wide range of aid providers in Algeria confirmed the 
perception of international policy observers that Algeria, like other post-colonial African 
countries, was interested in taking all available opportunities for economic development, 
remaining open to aid from any foreign provider willing to offer it on acceptable terms.45 
Making state-controlled heavy industrialization the priority for its development, Algeria under 
the leadership of Houari Boumediene (1965-1978) adopted a flexible and a less ideologically 
concerned approach to acquiring technology and capital from multinational corporations and 
international banks. In fact, socialist Algeria’s trade volume with Comecon countries and Third 
World countries was minimal by the early 1980s: 5.7% of its exports and 1.2% of imports were 
with the former, and less than 2% with the latter. Analyzing the evolution of Algeria’s foreign 
debt in the 1970s, an Algerian scholar Rachid Tlemcani commented that “the Algerian economy 
is fully integrated by international capital to a great extent.”46 Even the state’s control of local 
investment in the economy had in fact been based on loans from foreign banks.47 Although 
Algerians in economically responsible positions shared the feeling that international capitalism 
was not a partner but an adversary,48 they submitted to the theory that capital goods and 
advanced technologies are vital to post-colonial developing countries in an increasingly 
interdependent world.  
 
45 For example, see R. Craig Nation’s “Introduction”, 6; and Colin Legum, “The Soviet Union’s Encounter 
with Africa,” in The Soviet Impact in Africa, eds. R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1984), 16. 
46 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 139 and 145. 
47 Jeff Frieden, “Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in 
Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea,” International Organization 35, no.3 (Summer, 1981): 412-413. 
48 Jean Leca, “Algerian Socialism: Nationalism, Industrialization, and State-Building,” in Socialism in the 
Third World, eds. Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (New York: Praeger, 1975), 124. 
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Algeria’s implantation of new production units was reliant on technological transfer from 
developed countries, with an emphasis on advanced technology. According to the theory of 
modernization that Algeria subscribed to, economic development essentially depended on 
technology. Importing sophisticated technology and know-how would stimulate national 
development at a faster pace, and in the long run self-generate new technology so that it would 
be worth the initial investment. To achieve substantial economic growth in a relatively short 
period, “Algeria had to employ the most advanced modern technology.”49 Using funds from 
energy exports and foreign debts, Algeria contracted foreign engineering agencies to implement 
projects, which introduced technical and organizational technologies. During the first Four-Year 
Plan (1970-73), more than 65% of the new industrial units built were turn-key projects.50 
Commenting on Algeria’s mining industry by the mid-1970s, a Chinese source confirmed that 
“Algeria’s newly built enterprises maximized the use of the world’s most advanced technology 
and were marked by their large scales and concentration.”51  
Technologically inferior and financially restricted, socialist China was not among the 
most desirable partners for Algerian industrialists. Where the Algerian industrialists emphasized 
investment in capital-intensive heavy industry, China, on the other hand, was only able to offer 
projects in small labor-intensive industries. By the time of the Shanghai technocrats’ visit, there 
 
49 On the development model that Algeria adopted, which is called “industrializing industries,” designed by 
Destane de Bernis, see Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria, 111-114. 
50 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria, 139 and 146. 
51 Jiangsu sheng jianzhu shejiyuan 	 [Jiangsu Provincial Architectural Design Institute] 
ed., Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya 

 [Compilation of the basic information for the designs of complete projects in foreign aid: Algeria], 
Vol. 3 (Internal publication, 1981), 201. 
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was only one Chinese-funded light industrial project in operation in Algeria: Guelma Household 
Ceramics. Another project, a rice mill in Skikda, was only recently put into design after a 
memorandum signed in 1973.52 Guelma Ceramics faced such extensive production problems in 
trying to reach its designated capacity that word of them reached Premier Zhou Enlai in May 
1973. His instructions on addressing this case generated a wave of investigation nationwide into 
China’s turn-key projects in the previous decade.53  
Likely aware of this problematic case, Algeria nonetheless made a proposal for a surgical 
instruments factory in the same year. According to the delegation’s report, China was not the 
first choice. The Algerian Ministry of Industry initially proposed to build the factory with aid 
from West Germany. The Ministry of Public Health opposed this and “insisted on Chinese aid.” 
An Algerian health official was quoted saying that “the aid of West Germany was only words on 
paper.”54 It is difficult to interpret what the official meant or to make any decisive inference 
about the internal negotiations and concerns on this specific project without Algerian sources. 
But looking at the larger picture offers some plausible considerations of what may have factored 
into Algeria’s decision. 
The request came at a time when Western aid was shifting from industry to agriculture. 
From the late 1960s to early 1970s, Western donors found that industrialization projects did not 
alleviate unemployment and that the fruits of growth failed to trickle down to the poor.55 They 
 
52 Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, 152. 
53 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi )CV]^- ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1959-1976 :
I2m [Zhou Enlai chronology, 1949-1976], May 14, 1973 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997); 
and SMA, B103-4-441-27, July 21, 1973. For the specific problems of Guelma Ceramics, see Yuanwai 
chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, 191. 
54 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974, pp.6-7. 
55 From 1962 through 1965, the most important sources of foreign aid for Algeria were, in the order of the 
amount of investment, France, the U.S., West Germany, the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia. While the 
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thus changed their focus from large-scale industrial projects and infrastructure-building to rural 
development in order to deal with more basic human problems such as poverty and 
malnutrition.56 In contrast, China’s core ideas on development remained on a more traditional 
track, in isolation from the new trends in the West. Chinese aid “continued to reflect China’s 
domestic ideas about development: centrally planned interventions to boost production, health, 
and infrastructure.”57 China was more likely to be willing to fund a state-owned industrial unit 
in Algeria, where skilled technicians from Shanghai would train Algerians to produce substitutes 
for imports. So, if the comments from the health official cited above implied a certain amount of 
discontentment in Algerians’ dealings with the Germans, the Chinese offer was potentially seen 
as an alternative.  
Moreover, the adoption of Chinese aid fell into the regime’s ideological efforts to “root 
out the Western influences” in its culture.58 The dominance of the West in Algeria’s industry 
would have a deep influence on social relations in industrial workplaces and more generally on 
social, cultural, and political aspects of the whole society. The demands of modernism and its 
new cultural expressions made Algerian leaders extremely suspicious. The regime was pursuing 
an industrialized society, but its vision of society was also complemented by both Islam, which 
dominated norms related to family values and social mores, and Marxist nationalism, which 
 
aid from other countries was in the fields of technical assistance and budgetary support, the majority of the 
American aid took the form of Food for Peace donations. See Jacques M. May, The Ecology of Malnutrition in 
Northern Africa (New York, Hafner Pub. Co., 1967), 125-126. 
56 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 32. 
57 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 37. 
58 Jean Leca, “Algerian Socialism,” 139. 
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concerned the transition to socialism.59 Bringing in socialist China to Algeria’s industrial 
landscape was an attempt to diversify industrial models and develop an alternative path of 
industrialization that would not be fully colonized by international capital.  
On a more specific and pragmatic level, Algeria started to feel the pressure to develop its 
own medical supplies industry to relieve the financial stress of its free health care policy, which 
began on 1 January 1974. This new measure of social welfare brought the immediate financial 
burden of purchasing sufficient surgical instruments from abroad to meet the rapidly growing 
number of patients in Algeria. China offered interest-free loans, according to an agreement on 
economic and technical cooperation signed on 28 October 1963 in Algiers. Guelma Household 
Ceramics was made possible as part of the aid package in which China agreed to offer Algeria 
more than 280 million French francs (equivalent to 57 million USD) of long-term interest-free 
loans for turn-key projects and cash aid.60 Problems definitely occurred in this ceramics plant, 
but this was not unique. “Numerous difficulties were encountered,” Tlemcani explained while 
commenting on the turn-key projects Algeria had contracted with the West. Because equipment 
and manufacturing methods were imported and skilled local workers were in short supply, 
“breakdowns, delays in spare part deliveries, repair facilities and experts located abroad” all 
affected actual production.61 Chinese “mistakes” might not have seemed acutely alarming to 
Algerian officials given their favorable financial terms.      
 
 
59 Jean Leca, “Algerian Socialism,” 138-139. 
60 Shi Lin [J, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo, 40. Shu Guang Zhang mentions that Beijing 
called a halt to its aid when Ben Bella was overthrown by his defense minister Houari Boumedienne in 1965. 
See Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 118. 
61 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria, 146-147. 
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Knowing Algeria    
The group’s investigative mission in Algeria served more than its immediate goal of 
information gathering. It also added to China’s reservoir of expertise concerning Algeria’s 
industries, economy and culture, which was necessary if China was to be a global power. Up 
until the 1960s, China approached Africa mainly through the West, using former colonial 
knowledge. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, a laboratory technician on the first team to Algeria 
in 1963 obtained information about the country from an American journalist’s 1955 account. By 
sending the research group to conduct field surveys, China produced new knowledge about 
Algeria that was less mediated and more China-centric. In this process of information gathering, 
Chinese mission doctors, among other Chinese aid workers in Algeria, emerged as informants 
and experts who claimed authority by providing eyewitness accounts of the situation on the 
ground.    
Chinese knowledge about Algeria had been limited in its interests, depth, and channels of 
acquisition. A search of the Chinese word of “Algeria” in the Chinese Periodical Database 
(1833-2017) yields a total of 2,017 items between 1925 and 1979, the vast majority of which 
appeared after 1949 (1,975 items) with the most attention devoted in years 1960-1965 (961 
items).62 Subjects of these articles were centered around international politics. Mentions in the 
earlier period were mostly due to Algeria’s strategic importance in the North Africa Campaign of 
WWII; after 1949, discussions moved to the issue of decolonization and support for the Algerian 
people’s war of independence; during the 1960s-70s, discourse was dominated by official visits, 
cultural and economic exchanges, endorsement of the friendship between the two countries with 
reviews of Algeria’s anti-colonial history. Occasionally, background articles were published to 
 
62 Quanguo baokan suoyin !>c4[Chinese Periodical Full-text Database], http://www.cnbksy.com. 
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introduce to the public aspects of Algeria’s economy such as agriculture and the land problem, 
but their information mainly came from French and Soviet sources.63 Personal travel essays of 
state-sponsored writers and journalists added a lively hue to otherwise stiff political narratives, 
but the essays’ political purpose determined the narrow focus of information.64 All in all, 
Algeria was presented as a victim of colonialism and China’s anti-colonial African partner.      
China’s industrial foray into Algeria required specialized knowledge that existing 
political discourses did not offer. Deeper on-the-ground engagement demanded new ways of 
knowing about Algeria through diversified sources and new methods of analyzing them. To build 
a successful turn-key project, Chinese contractors wanted to know nitty-gritty details that ranged 
from geological data to tax rates. During the 16-day tour, the research group attempted to acquire 
information including 1) overall industrial productivity, factory building standards, and labor 
costs, on the basis of which they could better estimate production costs, and 2) the market need 
for surgical supplies. After they were settled in Médéa where the proposed factory would be 
built, they conducted geological surveys of potential building sites and sent request lists to 
Algerian officials for specific data.65 
Many difficulties arose during the collection of information, perhaps the most trying of 
which was the low level of efficiency of Algerian bureaucrats. The introductions to the sites they 
 
63 For example, see Qu Xiangqian Zn, “A’erjiliya tudi wenti—ta de lishi fazhan he duli qian de jiben 
zhuangkuang” s0	#%qv——,X1U_X&FT [The land problem of 
Algeria: its historical development and basic situation before the independence], Jingji yanjiu eP\^ 
[Economic Research Journal] 11 (1963): 61-69. 
64 The better-known essay collection is written by two Xinhua News Agency reporters about their tour of 
Algeria from July to August 1963. See Wen Jie r? and Yuan Ying jw, Feizhou de huiju uOXRS 
[The torch of Africa] (Tianjin: baihua wenyi chubanshe, 1964). 
65 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974, p.7. 
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visited were general, so they complemented these with their observations. Algerian responses to 
their requests for data were often slow, disappointingly brief, or even outright rejections. For 
example, from early on, the group had requested many times to the Algerian Health Ministry for 
the local sales prices of surgical instruments. The ministry kept delaying its reply, and it was not 
until after the mission was concluded and a memorandum was signed on 27 May 1975 that the 
Central Pharmacy finally provided a price list.66 In fact, such experiences in dealing with 
Algerian officials were not new to the Chinese. The earlier research group for the Guelma 
Ceramics project in 1965 shared the same frustrations. They complained that “it was difficult to 
gather information in Algeria, with most of the time spent in meetings and waiting for replies 
from home. … For the information and data needed for the design, Algerians either gave you a 
brief written reply or held meetings several times. It was impossible to learn very detailed and 
specific things.”67   
Algerian attitudes might have been unfathomable to the Chinese experts who viewed 
themselves as providing “sincere, selfless assistance,” as commented by an Algerian director 
they met in their visit to Constantine.68 A plausible explanation lay in Algeria’s “moss-grown 
bureaucracy.”69 Problems of bureaucracy were a common phenomenon in many countries, 
certainly including China where Mao Zedong blamed it on the rise of bourgeois thoughts within 
the party and reified his anti-bureaucracy sentiments in nationwide anti-revisionist campaigns. 
 
66 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.3; “Zhong A guanyu xiujian yiliao qixie chang huitan jiyao zai 
A’erjier qianzi” s3W Kldk$s00a+ [The signing of a memorandum in 
Algiers between China and Algeria about building a medical instrument factory], People’s Daily, May 29, 
1975, p.5. 
67 Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, 196-197. 
68 SMA, B90–2-333-26, May 1975, p.8. 
69 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria, 156. 
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But Algeria appeared to suffer from this social disease chronically and severely. In the same year 
as the group’s visit, the Algerian political leadership started attacking its own bureaucracy by 
calling it “a source of paralysis and rigidity.” John Nellis, an expert on public management at the 
World Bank, was quoted by Tlemcani saying in 1980 that “[a]lmost every one visiting the 
country, …has come away with an account of the rigidities, red-tape, slowness, and rudeness 
which seem an inescapable part of most dealings with the Algerian officialdom.”70 The delays 
and buck-passing that the Chinese research group experienced were likely more of a structural 
problem than deliberate actions taken towards them. Lack of internal coordination between 
supervisors and handlers was a routine matter in Algeria’s everyday life and proved to be a 
persistent hindrance that Chinese contractors would learn to deal with.  
More importantly, difficulties also arose as a result of the uneasy reconciliation between 
different technical systems and practices. A decade after Guelma Ceramics began production, 
Chinese technocrats reflected on mistakes committed in the research stage of the project. 
Compared with European contractors, the inadequacies of Chinese technology were obvious. But 
what had seemed more obstructive was the discrepancies between the established norms and 
standards in Algeria and the ones that the Chinese were accustomed to following. Take the 
architectural design for example. The French code of building design used in Algeria and the 
Soviet code adopted by China were hardly compatible. China’s architectural codes in the 
socialist period were systematically borrowed from the Soviet Union. Developed amidst the 
material shortages in the postwar reconstruction and the Cold War arms race, the Soviet codes 
followed the guideline of economy and adopted lower safety standards. The Chinese followed 
 
70 Rachid Tlemcani, State and Revolution in Algeria, 155-6. 
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suit and developed a tendency to pursue economy as a sign of technological progress.71 
Moreover, the building materials produced in China, like steel, were lower in strength, which 
also affected how Chinese architects designed projects. The Chinese contractors initially rejected 
the Algerian request to use the French codes when signing the memorandum. But when it came 
to the actual stage of construction, they had to succumb to this request because otherwise they 
could not obtain the construction license that was granted by a different Algerian bureau that 
firmly adhered to the French codes. Whereas European architectural firms simply used the 
French model and could easily dock their designs with local Algerian agencies, the Chinese, who 
insisted upon eschewing third-party contributors, had to learn every detail and cumbersomely 
adjust their design to meet the Algerian requests. This gap in design codes was just the start. 
More differences, such as climatic particularities, soil properties, and user preferences all became 
sources of dissatisfaction.72 As a latecomer to Algeria without former colonial knowledge and 
an outsider to the established theories and norms, China needed to discover how to strike a 
balance between maintaining the familiar method and fitting into the local system, which was 
central to China’s industrial foray into foreign industrial sectors.      
To complement a lack of information from official channels, the research group resorted 
to Chinese informants for help. Experts supervising workshops of Guelma Ceramics not only 
warned about potential issues in design and operation but also provided valuable industrial and 
economic information, including tax rates and the estimates of the enterprise’s finances, which 
 
71 Ke Song, “Political Ideology and the Production of Architectural Theories in Mao’s China (1949–1976),” 
Architectural Histories 6, no. 1 (2018): 1-15.   
72 Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, 194-202. 
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Algerian officials always shied away from disclosing,73 as well as working days, wages and 
benefits.74 To better grasp the demand for medical supplies, the group visited Chinese doctors 
on medical aid missions. Shanghai had sent doctors to Algeria to join the medical missions from 
the Hubei Province since 1963. Though the dispatch of Shanghai doctors to Algeria was sporadic 
between 1963 and 1972, at the time of the delegation’s visit, a total of 45 doctors from Shanghai 
were stationed in Guelma and Oued Zenati in Eastern Algeria.75 The group paid a visit to the 
two teams, observing their working environment and hospital facilities. The doctors also 
provided first-hand accounts of what kind of medical supplies were sorely needed or what was 
sufficient, as well as differences in the habitual practices of Algerian medical personnel.   
Chinese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison (MFEL) were aware of 
the significance of such piecemeal information and the huge investment of Chinese technical 
investigation groups and aid personnel into finding this information. Sources collected through 
fieldwork were compiled into a three-volume “database” of knowledge about Algeria. The 
compilation is divided into 6 parts and 36 chapters, covering nature, geography, geology, 
infrastructure, public works, agriculture, industry, transportation, and health care. It was just one 
of a series of efforts to integrate information on Third World countries—those which China was 
in technical partnership with during the 1960s-70s—into organized manuals for future use. 
Under the shared title of Fundamental Sources for Designing Foreign Aid Complete Plant 
Projects, the series covers more than ten countries and was designated “for internal use only and 
 
73 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.4. 
74 SMA, B90-2-333-1, pp.20-24. 
75 Doctors from Shanghai worked in the two places from May 1972 to March 1975. See Mingyi fengliu zai 
beifei, Appendix II.  
  
  315 
shall not be taken abroad or shown to foreigners.” Even “its title should not be mentioned in any 
document for foreign users.” The MFEL further exhorted users to double check and supplement 
existing data in their future research trips and update the ministry with new information.76  
These efforts to gather information debunk one of the stereotypes of Chinese activities in 
Africa: the perception that the Chinese took no interest in their new surroundings. By the 1980s, 
Chinese personnel living in Africa were exclusively sent by the government and thus were 
closely monitored. They indeed had limited physical freedom to explore the host country and 
interact with locals. Their activities were also severely restricted by their foreign language 
capability. Although they did not investigate the foreign land as aggressively as earlier Western 
missionaries or colonizers had done, they were still important informants to facilitate China’s 
engagement in Africa.   
 
Three Chinese Solutions to Algeria’s Industrial “Problems” 
Under pressure to supply a free health care system, Algeria decided to build its own 
medical supplies industry to reduce its reliance on imports. The Chinese government responded 
to its request for a surgical instruments manufacturing facility, but the visions of the two parties 
conflicted in many ways, from overall prospects to the principles of production and operation. 
Algeria asked for a comprehensive factory capable of manufacturing as many kinds of surgical 
instruments as possible, on the premise that, according to its health minister, Algeria did not need 
as much as China needed and “could not afford to build many separate plants for different 
production purposes.” The Chinese ministry of health rejected this ambitious proposal; and 
advised a manageable step-by-step plan, which started from producing basic but essential 
 
76 Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, Preface. 
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surgical instruments, such as lancets, scissors, clamps, and trays. It reasoned that these products 
required the same set of machinery and operation skills, and thus could be quickly produced. 
Chinese ministerial health officials tried to persuade their Algerian counterparts by touting 
China’s own experience in building a medical instruments industry after 1949. The Algerian 
health minister finally compromised but asked for a second-stage plan to be included in the 
memorandum.77  
This initial disagreement was to be followed by more tensions over the specifics of 
industrial planning. Assuming that Algeria’s goal in this project was to establish an import 
substitution industry, Chinese technocrats eagerly introduced the Chinese industrial model of 
“self-reliance,” which was developed in China in the context of the Western embargo and split 
with the Soviets. By examining the industrial and medical practices in Algeria, they proposed 
solutions that involved three interrelated principles—standardization, economy, and cost 
control—as a prerequisite for a self-sustaining medical supplies industry. Borrowing from but 
also limited by domestic experience, the Chinese designers believed in the power of these 
principles and sincerely offered them to Algerians whom they thought shared the same anxiety 
about industrializing on a weak foundation. The extensive attention they devoted to the three 
principles also points to Chinese technocrats’ rising concerns about pursuing profits with regards 
to industrial planning and management. However, in pursuing these principles in a different 
industrial culture, they ignored Algeria’s consumer demand and instead attempted to impose 
Chinese industrial standards and change the norms of local medical practices. They also 
disregarded Algeria’s societal expectations of the employment of advanced technologies, which 
they were not able to offer, but instead advocated affordable technology deemed appropriate for 
 
77 SMA, B242-3-411, July 21, 1973. 
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a developing country starting from scratch. These conflicts in industrial ideals and gaps between 
the Chinese vision and Algerian realities may have accounted for the project’s final revocation, 
or at least partly for the difficulties and delays faced by a project sought after by Algeria and 
funded by China.  
 
Standardization of Product Lines 
One major purpose of the Shanghai technocrats’ mission was to investigate the need for 
surgical instruments and finalize product lines that China was willing to offer. Dismayed by the 
medley of surgical instruments used in Algeria, they introduced Chinese methods in streamlining 
the product lines at the expense of user preferences. In justifying certain selections over others, 
they relied on and reinforced a narrative of China’s model of industrial progress.  
Algeria’s reliance on the industrial technology of a range of foreign countries was 
manifest in its health sector. During visits to medicine storehouses and local hospitals, the 
research group was surprised by the vast diversity of surgical instruments in use in Algeria. At 
the storehouse of the Central Pharmacy, which had monopolized the import and manufacture of 
drugs and medical supplies since 1969,78 the group found stainless steel surgical instruments 
imported from countries such as West Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden. There were also 
imports from Switzerland, Britain, the U.S., Romania, Hungary, Poland, and China. Chinese 
products seemed to be new to the local “market,” which was controlled and planned by the 
government, as the group found only scalpel blades made in China.79 Algeria’s importation plan 
 
78 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 246. 
79 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974, p.5; B90–2-333-26, May 1975, p.1; B90-2-333-1, May 1975, p.8. 
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of the year 1975 attested to the Chinese impression that “specifications were in disarray and 
types were numerous.”80 The group summarized the welter of tools in an amusing way, saying 
that they came from “all countries” (wanguo, literally, ten thousand countries) with “all 
specifications” (wanzhong, literally, ten thousand kinds).81  
The mixture of medical equipment from different countries and of different standards 
appeared to be the status quo in hospitals at all levels. In the University Hospital Mustapha Pasha 
of Algiers, which was the biggest hospital and medical research center in Algeria (with 2,800 
hospital beds), the Chinese found surgical instruments from the Soviet Union, West Germany, 
France, and Switzerland, in addition to more complex machines from the United States. Surgical 
blades came from both Germany and China. At the provincial and county level hospitals in 
Guelma and Oued Zenati, which were both run by Chinese medical teams, the group found the 
operating rooms as poorly equipped as town or village clinics in China. The two hospitals were 
similarly equipped with instruments of different origins and make. Moreover, they were limited 
in type, and were either poorly kept, worn-out, or obsolete, compared with the much better 
equipped Mustapha Pasha Hospital where medical resources were centralized.82  
A major reason for the use of a medley of instruments of various specifications in Algeria 
was the prevalence of foreign doctors in post-independence Algeria. The Chinese visitors 
surmised that “most doctors came from different [foreign] countries; [they] had different habits 
and made different demands.”83 For example, hemostatic forceps had sizes ranging from 11cm 
 
80 SMA, B90-2-333-67, p.5. 
81 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
82 SMA, B90–2-333-26, May 1975, p.15-19. 
83 SMA, B90-2-333-67, p.5. 
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to 24cm, in 1cm increments, which they saw as unnecessary in practice.84 Still, the existence of 
different choices could not always meet the needs of doctors. Chinese doctors felt 
“unaccustomed” to Algeria’s imported instruments, and preferred to use the sets of surgical 
instruments, such as A1 and A2 surgical kits, that they carried from China.85 The group 
speculated that other foreign medical teams might have also used instruments brought from 
home.86 
The Chinese industrial designers saw this chaos as a symptom of colonialism and a 
hindrance to industrialization. The existence of too many sizes of hemostatic forceps reminded 
them of the situation in China “before the Liberation.” Invoking this example and the old term 
“wanguo” conveniently likend the status quo of Algeria’s medical supplies with that of China 
before 1949.87 “After the Liberation,” they contrasted, “based on investigation and research, and 
on the premise of meeting the needs, [we] reduced specifications, which proved to be positive for 
production and had good effects.”88 They thus suggested applying the same approach to the 
Algeria project. Confident that the streamlined product lines would still “basically satisfy the 
Algerian needs,” they almost forcibly imposed a plan “following the standards of [their] 
 
84 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
85 SMA, B90–2-333-26, May 1975, p.15-19. As for the A1 and A2 surgical kits, they were initially designed 
for military use and were popularly used in civilian hospitals as well. See the following document for a list of 
the items included in the kits. SMA, B90-2-163-47, March 14, 1969. 
86 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
87 The term wanguo they invoked was initially used in imperial China to describe the whole body of foreign 
countries that paid tribute to the Chinese emperor, but became better known in the nineteenth century when 
China was forced to compete in the new international order of capitalism and imperialism, as it appeared in the 
Chinese title of the translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of Internal Law, Wanguo Gongfa, and monthly 
political journal Wanguo gongbao (A Review of Times) that ran between 1868 and 1907 and attracted a wide 
and influential Chinese readership. 
88 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
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country’s product lines.” The proposal was met with resistance, but they managed to “talk [the 
Algerians] into acceptance by example.”89 To be sure, exporting existent standardized 
production methods was easier for Chinese contractors. Moreover, the assumed similitude 
between the marketplace in Algeria and pre-1949 China and the successful Chinese story of 
building its own industry for its own market perpetuated the belief of the Chinese technocrats 
that their method was applicable to Algeria.        
Adjusting product lines involved not only reducing specifications within product lines but 
also abandoning a whole series of products deemed obsolete or inappropriate. By determining 
whether a product was worth manufacturing, the Chinese claimed either relative advancement in 
medical technology or moral concerns over the use of technology. Algerian negotiators requested 
“many times” to add wound clips (chuang yuan jia) to the production list but were rebuffed. 
Even though “the craft was simple and no additional machinery was needed,” the Shanghai 
group advised not using wound clips because their usage “easily led to infection and left obvious 
scars after recovery.” They urged the Algerians to give more consideration to patient care rather 
than simply pursuing convenience. The Algerians were reluctant, but in the end, wound clips did 
not make it into the final production list.90 By denying repeated requests for a popular 
instrument, the Chinese group could have potentially influenced the practice of Algerian doctors.  
Throughout the negotiation process, the Chinese group not only displayed confidence in 
their industrial expertise accumulated from domestic experiments but further added a 
comparative edge into the narrative of industrial achievement. Despite disruptions in industrial 
development, China’s medical supplies manufacturing industry made slow, yet certain, 
 
89 SMA, B90-2-333-67, p.5. 
90 SMA, B90-2-333-1. 
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technological progress. In 1964, a Shanghai medical instruments plant successfully produced 
eyeless needles for suture sizes from 6-0 to 9-0—a technical advancement that facilitated a 
microsurgery conducted by a Chinese team who performed the world’s first limb replantation. A 
thinner diameter 11-0 was produced in 1974, which until today is still the smallest suture size.91 
That said, China’s overall technological and industrial capabilities were without doubt inferior to 
their Western counterparts.92 Chinese industrialists felt a sense of superiority by emphasizing the 
comparative quality of China-made products sold at lower costs. An Algerian ministerial health 
delegation visiting the Shanghai Medical Instruments Factory in July 1973 was quoted saying 
“the products were advanced although the equipment was simple.”93 After their survey in 
Algeria, the Chinese group reported that the quality of Chinese surgical blades exported to 
Algeria was “comparable with others.”94 Chinese doctors on the medical mission in Algeria also 
contributed to this narrative. They told their visiting compatriots that “the qualities of foreign 
surgical instruments are mediocre, whereas ours are delicate, pretty, easy to use, and are favored 
by not only our doctors but also Algerian and French doctors and are popular in Algeria.”95 
While the credibility of this comment is questionable, it still reveals that the Chinese felt they 
had a superior level of technology and expert authority to offer to Algeria’s surgical supplies 
industry.  
 
91 For the technological development in surgical instruments manufacturing, see “Shoushu qixie” <G K
[surgical instruments], in Shanghai yiyao zhi, 330-332. 
92 For a brief summary of the industrial technological gap between China and developed countries in 1965, see 
Jiang Huajie, “Lengzhan shiqi zhongguo dui feizhou guojia de yuanzhu yanjiu,” 125. 
93 SMA, B242-3-411, August 1, 1973. 
94 SMA, B90–2-333-46, November 8, 1974, p.5. 
95 SMA, B90-2-333-1, May 1975, p.8. 
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By altering product lines, the Chinese technocrats attempted to assert a Chinese method 
of industrial standardization and made choices for Algerian users without considering their 
preferences. In doing so, they were drawing an industrial plan that would demand 
accommodations from consumers. Underlying their plan was a notion of “consumption 
determined by production,” a major feature of socialist China’s planned economy, which also 
informed the second principle they proposed. As we will see next, Chinese perceptions of 
Algerians’ over-consumption and inefficiency emerged as a site of tension between industrial 
pragmatism and the habits of local users. To their dismay, Algerians proved to be resilient to the 
reforms that the Chinese industrialists would have liked to bring about.  
 
Economy in Production and Consumption 
In the Chinese process of planning, whether a certain surgical product was to be included 
or not was determined by its cost-effectiveness in production rather than its popularity among 
consumers. For example, disputes over what type of suture needles was worth manufacturing 
reveal tensions between the Chinese anxiety to pursue economy as a key industrial principle and 
Algerian resilience against Chinese attempts to alter norms. The Chinese group proved to have 
an overly idealized view about the applicability of the Chinese medical industrial model—which 
was not designed for consumer satisfaction—to Algeria where the market was open to different 
foreign suppliers and for diverse users. 
The suture needle, tiny as it is, aroused detailed discussions about how to measure the 
value of expense versus convenience. Algerians were accustomed to using “eyeless” suture 
needles, or swaged needles, which had the suture crimped within the needle. This European-
made needle was individually packed in sterile pouches, and for single use only. In contrast, the 
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more commonly used needle in Chinese hospitals was the “eyed” needle which had a hole where 
the suture was manually threaded. The needle was intended for repeated use, and Chinese nurses 
disinfected the needles by soaking them in disinfectant or using an autoclave. Algerian nurses, 
however, refused to use the “eyed” needles brought by Chinese medical teams, saving 
themselves from the extra trouble of threading and sterilization.96 While the convenience of the 
“eyeless” type was patent, the Chinese group strongly recommended manufacturing the less 
convenient “eyed” needle, as the latter was more financially efficient. The “eyed” type, with no 
suture material attached, was estimated to be sold at 7 santeem and could be re-threaded. In 
comparison, the “eyeless” type would cost 3 dinars (equivalent of 300 santeem), and was for 
single-use only. A regular surgery consumed 6 to 7 needles on average, which would add up to a 
cost of about 20 dinars if “eyeless” needles were used. The Chinese group exhorted Algerians to 
adopt the more economical type of needle. “We are both developing countries,” they reasoned, 
“after weighing the pros and cons, [we find that] it is appropriate to manufacture ‘eyed’ suture 
needles.”97 
Chinese preferences for producing reusable needles did not necessarily reveal a neglect 
for risks of cross-contamination but rather a calculated economic decision. Single-use medical 
devices were only introduced at the beginning of the 1970s. Before that, most medical devices 
were considered reusable after being cleaned. For both economic and environmental reasons, the 
trend to reprocess single-use devices began in the late 1970s and has been parallel to the trend of 
 
96 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
97 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
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using single-use devices.98 China produced “eyeless” suture needles as well,99 but the group 
was more concerned about seeking cost saving modes of production so that developing countries 
with limited resources, such as Algeria and China, could afford access to necessary supplies. 
Based on its own consumption figures, the Provincial Hospital of Médéa estimated the total 
annual demand for suture needles in Algeria at 1,200,000 units. The Central Pharmacy foresaw a 
double or even triple increase in the need for the upcoming years of 1976 and 1977.100 Under the 
free medicare policy, the sharp increase in consumption and the significantly higher unit cost 
would contribute to financial strain on the Algerian government’s budget. 
On the other hand, producing sterile “eyeless” suture needles would be a “very costly” 
experiment for Chinese contractors, a fact that they concealed from Algerians. Making “eyeless” 
needles itself did not involve more sophisticated technology; the only difference lay in 
productivity.101 However, China did not have the technology to sterilize “eyeless” suture needles 
before their final packaging. China-made “eyeless” needles required pre-use sanitization by 
being soaked in disinfectant.102 The contractors had to first experiment with new methods 
domestically in order to supply the project in Algeria, which would largely increase Chinese 
 
98 Jeannell M. Mansur, “Reuse of Single-Use Devices: Understanding Risks and Strategies for Decision-
Making for Health Care Organizations.” A White Paper by Joint Commission International (2017): 4. 
99 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
100 SMA, B90-2-333-1. 
101 SMA, B90-2-333-1, p.4. 
102 In 1960, Ethicon of Johnson & Johnson creates technology that allows sutures to be sterilized by 
bombarding them with radiation. This is heralded as a breakthrough because it allows sutures to be sterilized 
once already sealed in their final packaging, ensuring bacteria stays out. https://www.jnj.com/our-
heritage/history-of-sutures-ethicon 
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investments.103 China’s foreign aid projects had indeed stimulated domestic technological 
development by forcing it to cope with foreign demands.104 In this case, however, the Chinese 
group did not see the value of trying out a new, expensive technology, which could be easily 
substituted by a little more labor of nurses.  
This priority assigned to economy in production was thus realized by increasing labor at 
the user’s end. Implicitly, the Chinese industrial design required users to change their habits from 
alleged over-consumption to frugality. Several other instances displayed this anxiety. One of 
them was scalpels. A file provide by the Central Pharmacy showed an importation of 1,900 
scalpels in 1973, and 1,800 in 1975; at a meeting, its officials verbally gave an estimate of 3,000 
as the yearly consumption.105 In the Chinese view, scalpels with permanently attached blades 
should not be manufactured, because this type of scalpel “had to be discarded after its blade was 
worn out.” It was thus “much more economical” to manufacture blades and handles separately. 
They further emphasized that the use of the scalpel with a permanently attached blade was 
“purely a problem of users’ habit,” and suggested removing the type from its product line,106 
Another instance of unnecessary costs were in packaging. The Chinese group observed that 
scalpel blades used in Algeria were individually packed in aluminum foil, and that syringe 
needles were packed 12 units in one plastic box. While they admitted that such packaging was 
 
103 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
104 Shi Lin [J, ed., Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo, 113-116. 
105 SMA, B90-2-333-1. 
106 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
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“quite exquisite,” they suggested the planned Algerian industry to switch to China’s packaging 
standards, which were presumably more economical.107 
To a certain extent, the Chinese technocrats saw the problem of supply shortage not so 
much industrial as cultural. Whereas they euphemistically associated disputes over suture 
needles, scalpels, and packaging to the habits of local practitioners, they criticized Algerians’ 
poor maintenance of surgical instruments. They hinted at the assumption that Algerians would 
have needed fewer new instruments if they had known how to make good use of what they 
currently had. Chinese mission doctors found ways to deal with the shortage in new supplies; yet 
they were disgruntled by the poor condition of the appliances at hand. In the hospital of Guelma, 
“all used surgical instruments were placed in one container, in poor condition.” Complaints from 
the doctors in Oued Zenati were more detailed and striking. “Instruments are not maintained 
after use, and discarded once rusty. No one takes care of suture needles. … If [the needles were] 
managed well, their consumption can be limited to a small number. All of the seven surgical 
scissors were stolen, even the ones locked in the medicine chest. [Someone] broke the lock.”108 
The mismanagement of equipment was considered the major reason for the “much higher” 
average consumption level in Algeria than in China.109 For example, the group initially 
estimated Algeria’s annual need for scalpel blades at 335,000 based on consumption levels in 
China. But they had to reset the figure to 1,000,000, which was more than double. A similar gap 
in consumption was also found in the case of suture needles. Whereas the Chinese estimate was 
 
107 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
108 SMA, B90–2-333-26, May 1975, pp.17-19. 
109 SMA, B90-2-333-67. 
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330,000, the figure provided by Algeria was 1,200,000.110 To the Chinese designers, reducing 
excessive consumption was as pertinent as increasing production.  
Reducing waste was in fact an important method for Chinese industrialists to promote 
efficiency and productivity. It had been one of the four visions—“greater, faster, better, and more 
economical”((7*Y)—China’s leadership laid out as the general guideline for socialist 
construction from 1956.111 However, radical leftism in Chinese politics since the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-60) prioritized the amount and speed of construction at the expense of quality and 
economy. While Chinese economic growth in the socialist era characteristically had low 
efficiency, historian Lin Chaochao has recently argued that industrial technocrats were 
consistently concerned by the pursuit of efficiency. As she rightly argues, repeated movements 
of “increasing production and practicing economy” and campaigns to “fight against waste” were 
methods, among others, to compensate for a lack of internal incentives to do so in China’s 
economic system.112 Seeing “wastefulness” in the production and consumption of Algeria’s 
socialist system, the Chinese designers felt an imperative to introduce the spirit of frugality. To 
substantiate their viewpoint and make a case for a mutual appreciation of economy, a certain 
Algerian professor of surgery was quoted to have expressed concerns about the high cost of 
sterile “eyeless” suture needles, saying that “Algeria would consider using the eyed type, which 
is much more economical.”113  
 
110 SMA, B90-2-333-1, May 1975, p.5. 
111 Shen Zhihua M6i, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (di san juan): sikao yu xuanze i
L"
(`): 8fhpA(1956-1957) [The history of the People’s Republic of China (Vol.3): deliberation 
and choices] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2008), 147-212. 
112 Lin Chaochao, Dongyuan yu xiaolv, 6 and 191. 
113 SMA, B90-2-333-1, p.4. 
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The Chinese ideal of economy was, again, met with resistance. In the finalized 
production list, the group succumbed to “the habits of Algerian doctors” and offered to produce 
non-sterile eyeless suture needles along with the eyed ones.114 After all, the proposed 
manufacturing facility would not be able to produce everything Algeria needed in the near 
future. Its products would still be sold at a “market” where foreign imports dominated and 
consumer satisfaction was a concern. Whereas the official Chinese narrative always claimed that 
China’s aid projects were tailored “to the specific needs of the target governments,”115 these 
disputes around the principle of economy reveal Chinese technocrats’ inadequate understanding 
of local realities. Algeria had aspired to building industries equipped with the best technology, 
importing better products than China could offer. With limited financial resources, policymakers 
had to make a tradeoff between health care at the expense of quality, comfort, and convenience, 
and higher standards at the expense of supply shortage. Algerian officials did not seem to set 
their minds on a certain definite path. The Chinese technocrats, on the other hand, were overly 
optimistic building an Algerian import substitution industry. What was worse was that, they 
underestimated the difficulties of entering a health care market that was centrally planned, but 
had diversified users (local and foreign doctors) and consisted of imported products.  
 
Control of Production Cost for a Loss-generating Plant     
Some Shanghai technocrats would have sworn that the surgical instruments 
manufacturing facility had been doomed from the beginning. They had worried that the facility 
would not be financially sustainable before their research visit to Algeria. Their concerns about 
 
114 SMA, B90-2-333-1, p.4. 
115 Shu Guang Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 134. 
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finances heightened and lingered during and after the research tour. Their superiors in the 
ministries of health, the MFEL, the Shanghai Bureau of Instruments & Electronics were all 
aware of the project’s high financial risk. It thus bears asking: Why did it take as long as seven 
years to finally revoke such a financially unfeasible plan if it did not have a promising 
beginning? While lack of access to government papers on the facility’s revocation conceals 
contingent variables, a review of the negotiation process suggests several plausible answers. 
Firstly, contrary to common perceptions that China’s aid projects in Africa were less concerned 
with finances in the socialist era, provincial Chinese technocrats were rational agents who 
emphasized profitability and sustainability of Chinese-built projects. Secondly, the ultimate lack 
of commercial incentives for the medical supplies project turned it into mainly political capital 
for China. 
China’s self-criticism of its foreign aid in the Maoist era focuses on “the sole 
consideration of political factors without economic ones” (bBNobePo), which 
was a narrative originating from the overhaul of economic and foreign policies in the 1980s. 
While it rightly exposes the ideological determinant in China’s foreign economic engagement, it 
contributes to a teleology of post-Mao return to the right track that ignores previous rational 
activities in China’s development assistance to Africa. Neglecting to detect rationality in 
previous foreign aid stems partly from a post-socialist imperative to eliminate ideology in 
economic activities, and partly from a focus on China’s grandiose infrastructure projects (e.g., 
the TAZARA railway) and showcase projects (e.g., exhibition halls, theaters, and monuments). 
Analyses of less-discussed industrial “turn-key” projects focus on severe cost overruns during 
actual construction as a result of the lack of budget accounting systems and mismanagement on 
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the ground.116 But if we move our focus to the process of planning, concerns about making 
industrial projects financially sustainable for local governments were prominent, on the basis of 
which many African proposals were rejected.117  
The Shanghai technocrats were suspicious of the feasibility of the surgical supplies 
project in Algeria right from the start and clearly expressed their reservation. Before departing 
for Algeria, they reported their anxieties about the high chance of incurring financial losses to 
Ms. Chen Muhua t;, the vice minister of MFEL: 
In light of Article 5 of the “Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to 
Other Countries,” [we] feel [the current situation] somewhat contradictory. A certain type 
of product has a profit rate of about 50% in the Shanghai area. But in Algeria, [it may not 
profit] because the production of surgical instruments is characterized by light use of raw 
material yet heavy workmanship, complicated industrial arts, many manual operations (60% 
of the total production) and high skill-level. In addition, [Algeria’s] industrial base is poor, 
and [they demand the factory to produce] many varieties in small quantities. If we don’t do 
well, it is likely that the factory will generate losses. As far as we know, almost all Algerian 
enterprises operate at a loss.118   
 
Announced by Premier Zhou Enlai during his tour of Africa in 1963-64, the “Eight Principles” 
were China’s official commitment to Africa’s development. They have since been observed by 
the Chinese government. Its fifth point stipulates that for Chinese-built projects, “the recipient 
governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.”119 The Shanghai research 
group, however, found this promise unrealistic in the Algerian case. They were rather pessimistic 
 
116 For example, see Jiang Huajie, “Lengzhan shiqi zhongguo dui feizhou guojia de yuanzhu yanjiu,” Ch.3. 
117 For example, China’s first turn-key project in Africa was in Guinea (a match and tobacco factory), but it 
rejected the Guinean proposal at the same time for a paper making factory given its potential financial 
unsustainability. See Zhu Chenchen HEE, “Shanghai dui feizhou guojia jingji jishu yuanzhu yanjiu (1956-
1966)” Q/uO!.eP=G@\^(1956-1966) [A research on Shanghai’s economic and technical 
aid to African countries (1956-1966)] (MA thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2017), 34. 
118 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.2. 
119 For a full translation of the Eight Principles and a one-by-one interpretation, see Bruce Larkin, China and 
Africa 1949-1970 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 103-106. 
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about the facility’s prospects and called the project a “thorny problem,” which was likely to turn 
into “a baggage that does harm to both sides.”120 Since China and Algeria already exchanged 
notes to initiate the project in March 1974,121 Chen encouraged the group to be more optimistic 
for the time being: “Many factors determine the cost. …[Algerians] may do well and may make 
profits. [Let’s] not predetermine [the result].” But she also warned that “we cannot cover every 
demanded product, and should give priority to the ones that were needed in the largest quantity, 
as well as increase the efficiency of machinery without investing extra.”122 Chen’s bottom line 
was clear: the aid project had a budget cap, and China could not afford to take more risks than 
the already promised investment. 
The group’s doubts were corroborated by the information collected during their field 
research in Algeria. Rough calculations alone were enough to suggest a disturbing conclusion: 
locally manufactured products could not, in most cases, beat the ones imported in terms of price, 
regardless of quality differences. The group compared the production costs of some major 
products among manufacturers in Algeria (estimated), Shanghai, and Beijing (see table below).  
It is important to note that taxes were not yet included in the production cost. Given that, 
only hemostats and needle holders were estimated to cost less than the sale price of equivalent 
imported products. The group were particularly anxious about the high proportion of labor costs 
in the total cost. Wages took 57-86% of the total cost in Médéa, in comparison to 8-17% in 
Shanghai. The group found four reasons to account for the huge gap. First, the wage of a normal 
worker in Algeria was set 7-8 times what a Chinese worker earned. Second, working days in 
 
120 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.2. 
121 SMA, B90-2-450-41, April 3, 1978. 
122 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.2. 
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Algeria were only 220 days compared to 305 in China. Third, Algeria’s production efficiency 
was only 60-80% of similar factories in Shanghai. Fourth, the existence of a variety of 
allowances in Algeria incurred huge expenses.123 From the Chinese perspective, the 
consumption of labor power in Algeria was so inefficient that it created little surplus value. Even 
this little profit would be gone when taxes were considered, not to mention the amount needed to 
accumulate and reinvest for further expansion as part of a regular regime of production. In the 
group’s revised design of the facility in November 1975, they reported that if the tax rate was 
40% [of the total revenue?], “the plant will not financially sustain.”124  
 
Table 5.2 Comparison of Production Costs in Algeria (estimated), Shanghai, and Beijing, 1975 (in 
Algerian Dinar) 
 
Product Algeria Shanghai Beijing 
 Sales prices Cost Wage Wage in 
cost (%) 
Cost Wage Wage in 
cost (%) 
Cost 
Hemostat (16cm) 18.78  16.24 13.32 82.2 3.34 0.58 17.3 7.72 
Scalpel blade  6.97 4.59 65.7 0.7   0.852 
Suture needle 3.3 5.29 2.99 56.6 0.32   0.826 
Surgical scissors 15.2 21.29 18.30 86.0 2.7 0.50 16  
Scalpel handle 8.32~10.12 14.29 11.29 79.0 2.46 0.20 8 2.76 
Syringe needle 2.05 8.82 5.40 69.3 1.00 0.08 8  
Dressing forceps 10 12.56 10.00 77.2 4.60 0.72 15.6  
Needle holder 23.33 16.53 13.61 82.0 3.34 0.58 17.3 5.76 
 
Notes: 1. Production costs in China were converted from Chinese yuan to Algerian Dinar by the 
author. At the time, 1 Algerian Dinar equals 0.5 RMB.  
                2. The production cost covers: wages and benefits, depreciation of fixed assets (the 
expected lifetime of the factory building is 50 years, the equipment 20 years), packaging (2% 
of production), raw material (including power), annual maintenance of equipment (2% of the 
equipment value), and management (5% of production).  
                3. Taxes are not included in the production cost.    
Source: Shanghai Municipal Archives, B90-2-333-67.  
 
 
123 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.1. 
124 Algerian officials never gave information on taxes. The group learned from their informants in Guelma 
Household Ceramics. SMA, B90-2-450-41, April 3, 1978. 
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A desire to maximize profit was clear in the technocrats’ process of planning, which 
explains partly why they were eager to encourage the more economical methods discussed 
earlier (such as reducing waste). This case challenges the current belief that it was not until after 
the era of “reform and opening up” that China started to assess benefits of investment.125 Not 
only did the Shanghai group caution about financial risks from the outset, Chinese high officials 
also enforced a cap budget. Furthermore, during negotiations, China firmly rejected Algeria’s 
proposal to install a second or even third-stage plan.126 Although China offered free-interest [or 
low-interest?] loan for this project, it was reluctant to see it turn into debt that would later be 
cancelled. It was only until 2000 that Chinese leaders belatedly started to follow the Western and 
multilateral lenders to cancel debts for highly indebted poor countries.127 China was thus 
interested in the profitability of the project, in addition to observing the spirit of the “Eight 
Principles” to help Algerians profit on their own. This case was actually not unique. In 1965, 
China refused to build a paper-making factory for Guinea, its long-term partner, due to 
infeasibility.128 It rejected two other Algerian requests for dam building in 1972 and 1976 after 
careful cost-benefit analysis.129 
Chinese concerns were not unfounded given Algeria’s limited industrial capacity and 
development strategies. Algeria sought out “very high rates of investment,” following the 
 
125 Zhou Hong 5 ed., Zhongguo yuanwai 60 nian !@'602 [China’s Foreign Aid: 60 Years in 
Retrospect] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 154-155. 
126 SMA, B90-2-333-1, p.7-8. 
127 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 127-128. 
128 Zhu Chenchen HEE, “Shanghai dui feizhou guojia jingji jishu yuanzhu yanjiu,” 34. 
129 Yuanwai chengtao xiangmu sheji jichu ziliao huibian: A’erjiliya, 126-128. 
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USSR.130 But if the planned project was hardly able to extract profit from living labor, how 
could it continue reinvestment for further production? What was worse, as Benjamin Stora points 
out, was that “turn-key” plants in Algeria “often operated at 30 to 40 percent of their capacity” as 
a result of difficulties in mastering imported technologies.131 The Chinese technology was not as 
sophisticated as the Western or Soviet ones, but it required instead highly skilled manpower that 
was lacking in Algeria. Even within China where language and cultural barriers were not issues, 
successful technological transfer was difficult. The Chinese group foresaw the gap between 
designated capacity and real production. They used a Chinese example to warn ministerial 
officials: A surgical supplies facility built in the Jilin Province in 1966 sent many workers to 
Shenyang, Shandong, and Shanghai for training. But eight years later, the factory with 260 
employees was still operating at a loss. It produced a pair of scissors at the cost of 23 yuan, 
which was to be sold at 2.54 yuan, while the defect rate was as high as 61%.132 This alarming 
industrial failure was most likely attributable to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, but it still 
speaks to the enormous difficulties in building a new industry without skilled workers and good 
management. 
Why, then, did the Chinese continue pursuing the plan? Getting repaid for the loan was 
the only economic aim that China had at the time. Domestic economic considerations were yet to 
enter the equation; China did not fund the project in order to expand international markets for 
Chinese manufactured goods, labor, and technology. China-made surgical supplies sold to 
Algeria in 1973 were done so at prices lower than domestic sale and, for some items, even lower 
 
130 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History (Cornell University Press, 2001), 155. 
131 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 156. 
132 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.2. 
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than production cost.133 Until late 1978, there was no mention of other trade on surgical items 
between China and Algeria. Therefore, only political capital can account for China’s 
motivations; and it was this trade-off between political objectives and economic concerns that 
prolonged the process. 
The years 1973-74, during which China and Algeria exchanged notes to initiate this 
manufacturer, were a high point in Third World unity. China had entered onto the world stage as 
a recognized power with a permanent veto in the UN Security Council in October 1971, and had 
entered a phase of rapprochement with the U.S. the next year. These new opportunities 
motivated China to seek a position of influence in an independent power base—the Third 
World—to hedge against the Soviet threat and oppose American hegemony. Meanwhile, Algeria 
was also invested in its own Third World plan, through which it aimed to reform the existing 
world economic order. Algeria held the Fourth Summit of non-aligned countries in September 
1973, in which the overwhelming majority of its participants bought the Chinese view of the 
world divisions. Algerian president Houari Boumedienne initiated a special session at the UN in 
April 1974, where Deng Xiaoping made his famous speech outlining China’s “Three Worlds” 
theory and endorsed the new international economic order (NOEI), which Algeria had taken a 
leading role in forming.134 The political relationship between China and Algeria, which had been 
undermined by Soviet influence in Algeria since 1965, again became closer.  
While seeking political support, China rendered economic concerns for a small-scale 
industrial project as secondary. To borrow Ching Kwan Lee’s term, China’s goal was not “profit-
 
133 See the two tables in attachments 2 and 3 to SMA, B90-2-450-90, August 30, 1978. 
134 Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War (2016), Ch.5. For Algeria’s Third World plan, see Benjamin Stora, 
Algeria 1830-2000, 159-160. 
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maximization” (as global private capital does) but “profit-optimization.”135 Through this 
particular aid project, China sought to accumulate another form of profits: political capital. 
Driven by these political motivations, Chinese supervisory officials sought to explain away the 
financial infeasibility of the surgical supplies project. During their visit to Algeria, the group was 
instructed by their superiors and the Chinese embassy not to discuss the cost issue with 
Algerians. They were told:   
Because they [Algerians] had a large number of unemployed people in their country, there 
may be a concern to increase employment. Moreover, they have a strong national sense of 
depending on their own (LDg9), and they may have their own flexible economic 
policies. At least, [this facility] will make it possible not to import these products from 
foreign countries.136 
It has become clear to the group that running this facility was less about profit making. The 
group commented that its operations would solely rely on Algeria’s price policy and economic 
policy, and all “depends on their attitudes.”137 What is interesting here is this act of justification, 
which reveals that among Chinese provincial technocrats and actual aid planners, the logic of 
capital was the de facto norm. When Shi Xiguang, a member of the research group, included the 
above quote in a report to the Ministry of Health on the cost problem in 1978, he defended his 
group as having been acutely aware of the problem throughout.138 He made clear that his group 
 
135 Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China, 12. 
136 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978, p.3. 
137 SMA, B90-2-333-67, p.6. 
138 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978. 
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had fulfilled their job as responsible, economically concerned specialists, yet that the final 
decision was not theirs. 
The research group had no feasible solution to the cost problem. If they had been to offer 
their advice to help Algeria build its own medical supplies industry, they would have suggested 
reducing the labor cost by cutting wages and allowances, and by increasing working days. This 
was the only immediate solution given the difficulty of producing more profit under the current 
conditions. China could not provide more advanced technology to boost production efficiency, 
nor could the workers’ productivity increase substantially overnight. It was embarrassing, 
however, for the Chinese—as self-claimed socialist brothers—to propose a solution that would 
contradict the direct interests of the Algerian working class. In the end, China’s industrial 
development model, which was heavily reliant on accumulation and investment extracted from 
cheap labor, was not applicable to Algeria.  
The continuation of this industrial project over seven years exemplifies the political 
economy of socialist China in Africa. It was a political courtesy for China to strengthen its 
relationship with Algeria when both were seeking international leadership and mutual support in 
their shared vision of the Third World. At the level of technocratic executors, it was never 
viewed as a good deal. The tension between political gestures and on-the-ground concerns, as 
well as the latter’s growing significance in decision-making towards the late 1970s, were 
manifested in the changing ways in which how the cost problem was discussed. As a courtesy, 
the research group was first told “not to discuss the problem” during their visit to Algeria in 
1974. By the end of 1976, they no longer shied away from the issue in official talks, but were 
still instructed “to lay out the details item by item, but not to make conclusions about making 
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loss or profit” on Algerians’ behalf.139 In late 1978, when the two sides still maintained the 
momentum of the project and planned to sign another contract for equipment and raw materials, 
the group offered a fairly low estimate of the gross margin at about 10% (taxes and accumulation 
excluded, and the facility operated at its full capacity). They straightforwardly listed out 
concerns about wage rates, management, labor skills, and product quality, urging Algerians to 
reconsider the feasibility of the project.140   
 
Conclusion 
In 1980, the surgical supplies project—though unfinished—came to an end. In January, it 
was still listed in the Ministry of Health’s foreign aid plan of the year.141 By late June, 
manufacturers in Shanghai were informed that the project had been cancelled. They started to 
redistribute machinery and raw materials assembled for the Algeria project among themselves.142 
The final formal notice from the ministry came in December, informing all participating 
institutions the revocation “for some reason [unspecified].”143 While contingent reasons may 
have played a role, the timing of the decision is revealing. China had begun to feel the financial 
burden of its foreign aid from the early 1970s. A national conference on foreign aid held by the 
MFEL in June 1975 came to a sober conclusion that cooled down the enthusiasm that had 
permeated China’s aid activities over the past two decades. The conference concluded that China 
 
139 SMA, B90-2-450-79, August 3, 1978. 
140 SMA, B90-2-450-90, August 30, 1978. 
141 SMA, B90-2-574-1, January 11, 1980. 
142 SMA, B90-2-574-21, July 14, 1980. 
143 SMA, B90-2-574-8, December 23, 1980. 
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should carry out the agreements it had already signed, but would need to control the number of 
its new agreements.144 The Algeria project narrowly escaped this new principle, as it was signed 
in May that year. In this and the following conference in 1977, executor institutions of aid 
projects were urged to “pay attention to actual results, and be diligent and economical.”145 Two 
years later, the National Planning Conference on 15 May 1979 decided to reduce “turn-key” 
projects in countries, including Algeria.146 In this context of China’s aid policy overhaul, the 
cancellation of the unfavorably evaluated surgical supplies project did not come off as a surprise. 
This failed project, nonetheless, reveals much about socialist China’s vision and process 
of implementing its industrializing model in Algeria. China’s industrial planning for Algeria was, 
like any other international aid, inherently connected with the export of capital, technology, 
management and relations at the workplace, and norms of behavior. However, the Chinese 
industrial pursuit of self-reliance and economy did not fit well with Algeria’s development 
agenda and its market environments. The process of research and design for the specific project 
demonstrates the different political, economic, and cultural dynamics were at play, and how state 
agents from technocrats to policymakers had different concerns and priorities. As post-socialist 
China has become more involved in global development, considering how aspects of China’s 
domestic development can be selectively applied in other parts of the world will remain a subject 
of interest.      
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145 Zhou Hong 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“A specter is haunting the world—the specter of ‘global China’.”1 The sociologist Ching Kwan 
Lee begins her most recent book on China’s state capital in Zambia with a powerful allusion to 
the Communist Manifesto of 1848. The specter of international socialism that Marx had foreseen 
for communist powers has morphed into a vision of China’s capitalist globalization. While Lee 
assumes that this shift occurred within the past decade when post-socialist China became an 
economic powerhouse, this study has shown that the “expansionist moment” she describes in fact 
occurred over many decades.2 China has globalized in many forms and this contemporary 
expansion builds on earlier experiences and bilateral structures that have not been sufficiently 
studied. Reflecting on China in the 1960s-70s reminds us of China’s active attempts to exert 
global dominance when its economic power was still limited. Such attempts were not restricted 
to diplomatic maneuvers, such as those in the Bandung period (1955-early 1960s) when China 
sought an alliance of socialist states and former colonial countries under an anti-imperialist 
agenda. Nor were they confined to propaganda through sport exchanges, cultural events, and the 
distribution of magazines.3 China’s attempts to extend its global reach included a vast number of 
bilateral aid projects to developing countries, despite China’s acclaimed principle of “self-
reliance,” which stood in opposition to dependable aid relationships. In these projects, monetary 
and technological flows were inseparable from individual agents working on the ground who 
 
1 Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Bruce Larkin mentions the wide distribution of Peking Review in Africa. See Bruce Larkin, China and 




lived by the Chinese socialist ethos of work and life. China’s global reach, which remains limited 
but grows every day, far predated the outward expansion of its capitalism.    
Of China’s variety of aid categories including industry, military, transport, agriculture, 
sports and cultural complexes, sending medical teams was not the most financially demanding 
form: China spent an average of 12 million yuan (5-6.5 million USD) annually from 1963 to 
1978, while each medical team member only cost 10,000 yuan (4,000-5,380 (USD).4 Neither 
was it as eye-catching as major constructions and monuments like the Tazara Railway (whose 
cost was estimated at $415 million) that attracted the public spotlight and scholars’ attention.5 
Nevertheless, the medical aid program has outlived many other forms of China’s global outreach 
and has persisted into the twenty-first century in a design by and large similar to its original. 
Although China has taken a drastic post-socialist turn and its Sino-Soviet disagreements have 
dissolved into thin air, early experiments with medical aid missions still shape China’s 
participation in international health care and continue to inform the role it takes on in global 
governance.  
This study of Chinese medical teams in the socialist era has examined the mission to 
Algeria to show how China’s medical missions served as an ideological and methodological 
challenge to the postcolonial international health regime. Specifically, this case shows that the 
Chinese mission was different from its counterparts in the West and the Soviet bloc, as its 
medicine had several distinctive features: hybrid medical technology, Maoist humanitarian 
 
4 The Ministry of Health Archives, 148-17-1983-Y-28-1, p.9. 
5 Jamie Monson, Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and 
Livelihoods in Tanzania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 30. The medical aid program has not 
attracted scholarly attention until very recently. For example, Bruce Larkin’s landmark study in 1971, China 




health care ethics, and the intersection between medicine and internationalist solidarity. To 
illustrate these features, I analyzed the mobilization of human resources to Algeria, the 
application of mixed technologies of biomedicine and Chinese medicine, efforts to build medical 
supply infrastructure to manage local health problems, and China’s ambitions to transplant 
Chinese socialist healthcare ethics and ideals to Algerian communities. During these processes, 
China’s socialist medicine emerged as a hybrid and flexible product of Maoist ideals for social 
welfare and internationalism. Central to the model of Chinese health care provision in post-
colonial Africa, socialist medicine offered alternative vocabularies of the configuration of health 
and control in postcolonial health management within the global South. 
It is this legacy of the socialist era that perpetuates China’s bilateral form of medical aid 
in a post-Cold War world where multilateral frameworks for international health are the norm. 
While Algeria has developed the capacity to produce physicians and medical specialists, it 
continues to turn to China to supply doctors for laborious positions in remote areas where 
Algeria’s own doctors refuse to go. The high demand for Chinese OB-GYN specialists, 
anesthesiologists, and acupuncturists in Algeria, for example, is a typical case of reliance on 
health care provided by China.  
On the part of China, however, the institutional base for socialist medicine has been 
largely dismantled. Since 1985, the Chinese government has increasingly reduced the state’s role 
in health care. It has withdrawn funding for hospitals; reduced subsidies to health care 
professionals, including barefoot doctors; turned professionals into entrepreneurs in a cash nexus 
with patients; and exerted less control over the management of health care facilities. Skilled 
physicians working for major hospitals receive hefty bonuses; hospitals are eager to keep them to 




“unprecedented difficulties” in recruiting doctors and managing medical teams.6 The reasons the 
program can operate along the existing model are that the state continues to monopolize health 
care service—the private sector remains small (generating less than 10% of the total revenue of 
the hospital industry in 2016)7, as well as doctors remain highly attached to public hospitals. The 
Chinese medical aid program today thus has a schizophrenic split between internal market-driven 
reform and an outbound political imperative to provide socialist-style health care. 
Open critiques of old methods of running medical missions have also arisen from within 
the medical society. Having trained and worked in well-equipped urban medical centers with up-
to-date medical technology in China, doctors complain about the widening gap in material 
conditions between China and their host countries. In China’s turn toward high-technology 
medicine, newer generations of doctors with greater specialist training have grown to rely 
heavily on lab tests and sophisticated machines. They feel at a loss without technical support; 
some view their assignments to poorly-equipped hospitals as a waste of expertise. Other 
recurring concerns include the extended length of the mission, the lag-behind in professional 
development due to the two-year absence abroad, poor living conditions, and incompatible 
stipends and benefits.8 The socialist ethos among individuals has faded quickly in the aftermath 
 
6 Chen Dongcai 7'& from the department of International Cooperation of Hunan Provincial Health 
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of the collapse of socialist medicine. Providing cost-effective health care has lost popularity 
among Chinese medical practitioners. 
Despite these paradoxes and problems, the medical aid program is still part of China’s 
development package for Africa in China’s competition for more global influence. Some reforms 
to medical teams were made as China transitioned during its post-Mao economic reform. In the 
early 1980s, Chinese teams gradually retreated from rural posts to major hospitals and reduced 
mobile services in order to centralize medical resources. Yet, the goal of the program to meet 
local needs for basic health care has remained the same and continues to distinguish the Chinese 
medical intervention from other suppliers. In response to challenges from within, some from the 
Ministry of Health recently advocated that the Chinese government prioritize the establishment 
of a “barefoot doctor” system in Africa9—but this time, not by using Chinese professionals, but 
by training Africa’s own. The same doctors who raised issues about the program nevertheless 
admitted that the mobile medical tour to remote areas was very popular among locals and 
suggested the reinstallation of the practice.10 Although Chinese practices are moving closer to 
the modern Western regime of medicine, China’s international health interventions are still 
inspired by the moral and technical legacies of socialist medicine, trusting in their 
appropriateness for resource-poor conditions.  
The fact that the government insists on preserving the program speaks to the faith of 
Chinese leaders in using it to project China’s soft power in the global governance of health. The 
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medical aid program can be used to remind the international community of the ethical and 
humanitarian dimensions in China’s engagement with Africa. It also helps to soothe fears and 
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